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KYM ANDERSON, CHERYL MCRAE AND DAVID 
WILSON 
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, culminating 
in the GATT Secretariat being transformed into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on 1 January 1995, has altered forever the 
process of quarantine policy-making by national governments. On 
the one hand, WTO member countries retain the right to protect the 
life and health of their people, plants and animals from the risks of 
hazards such as pests and diseases arising from the importation of 
goods. On the other hand, the WTO's Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement) requires that quarantine 
measures be determined in a manner that is transparent, consistent, 
scientifically based, and the least trade-restrictive.1 This tension 
between national sovereignty and international obligation is 
aggravated by the vagueness of wording in the SPS Agreement, and 
has led already to several contentious cases coming before the 
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. It has forced national governments 
to review and in many cases to consider reforming their quarantine 
                                                 
1  The term quarantine measures is shorthand for sanitary (human and 
animal health) and phytosanitary (plant health) measures as used in the formal 
title of the SPS Agreement. An excellent non-technical guide to the SPS 
Agreement is available in WTO (1996). The legal text of the Agreement is 
reproduced in the Appendix to this volume, taken from WTO (1995, pp. 69-84). 
The SPS measures dealt with in that Agreement are a subset of the various 
technical barriers to trade, the rest of which are disciplined somewhat more 
loosely under the WTO’s more generic Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(WTO 1995, pp. 138-162)  
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policies, and in the process to try to understand how best to 
implement the SPS Agreement. 
Simultaneously, national governments the world over are under 
pressure from their constituents to bring more rational economic 
thinking to bear on all areas of policy making. Quarantine policy is 
not immune from this pressure for better economic governance. Yet 
the SPS Agreement seems to ignore important economic dimensions 
of quarantine policy, most notably the cost of those policies to 
consumers. Perhaps this is a reflection of the fact that quarantine 
agencies (who supplied the drafters of the SPS Agreement) have 
focused their attention on the scientific aspects of quarantine and 
not consulted economists, even as consultants, and, partly as a 
result, the economics profession has paid little attention to 
quarantine issues in the past. 
In addition to these pressures on national governments, two others 
are affecting quarantine policy making. One is the ever-growing 
demands, as incomes and international traffic increase, from (i) food 
consumers for tougher import barriers to ensure food safety 
standards do not drop and (ii) environmental groups concerned that 
the natural environment not be threatened by imported pests and 
diseases. The other is from food-exporters abroad who worry that 
the long-hoped-for benefits to them from the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture will be reduced by traditional farm 
protectionist measures being replaced by excessively protectionist 
SPS responses to the health and environmental lobbying.  
When it is brought to their attention, economists are surprised that 
the SPS Agreement does not take consumer interests explicitly into 
account, because they are used to thinking of import barriers as 
equivalent to a consumption tax and a producer subsidy. However 
that oversight/omission is a natural consequence of quarantine 
policy making being a science-based process. If import risk analysis 
reveals an unacceptable plant, animal or human health risk 
associated with importing a product, then a quarantine measure is 
imposed or retained. Producers' (and increasingly health and 
environment groups') concerns about the risk of imported products 
carrying pests and diseases with them, and/or counter-claims by 
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would-be importers, are also taken into account. However little 
thought is given to whether the cost of quarantine measures to 
others outweigh the producer, environmental or food safety benefits 
of restricting trade. In this sense, of looking only at the direct effects 
and using command-and-control measures rather than also looking 
at indirect effects and blending cost/benefit thinking into import 
risk analysis and considering the efficiency of alternative prevention 
or mitigation strategies, it has been claimed by some economists that 
quarantine policy assessment is about where environmental policy 
assessment was two or three decades ago.2  
The imperative on national governments to improve their 
understanding of their international obligations under the SPS 
Agreement, and at the same time to respond appropriately to the 
above range of domestic pressures on them, calls for a fresh 
approach to quarantine policy making. As a beginning, economists 
and quarantine officials need to come together to discuss their 
different approaches to policy analysis, with a view to seeing to 
what extent cost/benefit thinking can be profitably blended into 
quarantine policy making while honouring their SPS Agreement 
obligations. This volume represents the fruits of one attempt to do 
just that via an international workshop to explore the economics of 
quarantine and the SPS Agreement. 
The volume begins in Part I with an in-depth discussion of the 
issues and challenges raised above from four different perspectives: 
those of a US government economist, an Australian quarantine 
official, a WTO official, and a pair of national government trade 
lawyers (one Australian, one Swiss). 
Part II of the volume focuses very specifically on one of the most 
difficult parts of the SPS Agreement to understand and therefore 
operationalise. The SPS Agreement leaves national governments to 
                                                 
2  See e.g., James and Anderson (1998). Economic assessment of environmental 
policies is so mainstream in the US now that a detailed handbook for doing 
analyses has been published by the Environmental Protection Agency (2000) 
and is freely downloadable at www.epa.gov/economics. 
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determine their own 'appropriate level of protection' (ALOP), but 
requires them to provide that quarantine protection in a manner that 
is consistent across commodities. Three perspectives on how to do 
that are provided by authors from the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and New Zealand. The latter suggests an 'iso-risk' approach to 
ALOP but, as Chapter 9 points out, that still ignores the benefits to 
consumers from imports. Chapter 10 is an attempt to bring together 
the ALOP concept as it relates to the cost of imports due to risk of 
pests, diseases or food hazards, on the one hand, with on the other 
hand the other benefits from importing (e.g., lower prices for 
consumers). That short chapter was not a commissioned paper, but 
rather one that grew out of the discussion at the workshop for which 
the other chapters were prepared. 
Part III provides four more papers by economists on the potential 
benefits of including more economics in import risk analysis. 
Among other things, Chapter 11 focuses on the requirement of the 
SPS Agreement that quarantine policy measures should be the least 
trade-restrictive available to achieve the country’s ALOP. Chapters 
12 and 13 focus on Australia’s quarantine decision making, 
including the recent reforms to that process. The final chapter in this 
section evaluates the economic consequences of livestock disease 
importation, drawing primarily on US experience. 
Then in Part IV some specific health and environmental issues are 
analysed. A group of World Bank economists examine in Chapter 15 
the trade effects of the recent tightening of European Union 
technical standards on aflatoxin levels in cereals, dried fruits and 
nuts. They focus just on African exports of those products to the EU, 
but even that subset of economic damage to EU trading partners is 
estimated to be massive – and for a miniscule reduction in health 
risk within the EU. In Chapter 16 a Danish and an Australian 
economist take a global view of the economics of the adoption of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). They estimate the 
economic effects of some countries adopting new GM farm 
technologies without and then with bans by other countries on their 
importation of the resulting GM products. The latter bans are shown 
to be hugely more expensive than the alternative of just requiring 
labelling of GM products so that consumers in the importing 
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country can make a free but more informed choice. Food safety 
issues more broadly are the focus of Chapter 17, while Chapter 18 
focuses on SPS issues of relevance to the natural environment.  
The book concludes in Part V with a brief summing up by an 
international trade economist of what he learnt from the workshop 
discussion. We the editors also learnt a great deal. One important 
point of consensus was that while clearer language and explicit 
recognition of trade benefits to consumers would have been helpful, 
their omission from the SPS Agreement is not sufficiently serious to 
warrant opening up the Agreement for re-negotiation at this stage. It 
is not serious because most participants felt that integrating 
economic analysis into quarantine policy making was not prevented 
by the SPS Agreement. On the contrary, it was felt that the use of 
cost/benefit analysis might promote a greater understanding of the 
SPS Agreement and an economy wide approach to determining 
ALOP. Further, there was general agreement that cost/benefit 
analysis and other economic tools may help governments to better 
understand the gains and losses inherent in any chosen ALOP, and 
that this would lead to better quarantine policy making - from the 
economic viewpoint not only of the implementing country but, in 
almost all cases, also that of its trading partners. Put another way, 
good SPS policy from a WTO perspective is likely also to be good 
economic policy from a national perspective. 
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The integration of economics into SPS risk 
management policies: issues and challenges 
DONNA ROBERTS 
Although many governments are now committed to reducing the 
number and rigidity of regulations that are thought to stifle 
economic innovation and competition, it is widely expected that the 
regulatory environment for agricultural producers and processors 
will become more complex in the coming years (OECD 1997). 
Income growth is fuelling demand for food safety and 
environmental amenities, and media coverage, such as reports on 
dioxin in European animal feed or on the effects of Bt corn on North 
American monarch butterfly populations, amplifies the political 
salience of this demand. On the 'supply side' of regulatory activity, 
officials who devise sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures - 
regulations that sometimes restrict imports in order to reduce risks 
to animal, plant, and human health - face additional challenges. 
These officials are now bound by the multilateral legal obligations 
found in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
which came into force in January 1995. By drawing attention to 
policies that were generally ignored (even by trade specialists) until 
the Uruguay Round, the SPS Agreement has had the intended effect 
of prompting widespread review of SPS measures by regulators and 
lawyers in both importing and exporting countries, and the 
unintended effect of begetting policy re-evaluation by others. 
                                                 
  The views expressed in this paper are not to be attributed to the USDA 
or the Office of the US Trade Representative. 
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Economists in particular have started to scrutinise SPS policies in 
much the same way that they previously examined other risk-
reducing measures, including asbestos removal or toxic waste 
cleanups. Taken together, these developments have substantially 
changed the parameters for regulating imports of agricultural 
products from the time when the maxim "when in doubt, keep it 
out" was viewed as an appropriate decision rule.  
It is clear that efforts to improve economic governance in the area of 
risk regulation share many goals with the SPS Agreement.1 
Regulatory reform initiatives and the Agreement both advocate 
transparency of regulatory rulemaking in order to promote 
symmetry of information among stakeholders, which includes 
agricultural producers, processors and consumers on one hand, and 
trading partners on the other. Both also require that a regulation be 
based on a careful assessment of the risks that the measure is 
designed to mitigate, and make provision for the inclusion of the 
costs of control programs as a factor in regulatory decisions. 
However, in other respects, there is some ambiguity about whether 
the legal obligations found in the SPS Agreement are wholly 
congruent with the spirit of reform initiatives which have produced 
guidelines for consideration of economic efficiency and 
distributional effects of measures as decision criteria. The SPS 
Agreement is primarily intended to aid WTO Members in the 
decentralised policing of regulatory protectionism in foreign 
markets. Regulatory protectionism or capture occurs when domestic 
groups with a vested interest in a particular regulatory outcome 
successfully lobby for overly restrictive SPS measures which, by 
limiting or preventing safe imports, lower net social welfare. Two 
requirements in the SPS Agreement - to base SPS decisions on a risk 
assessment and to notify trading partners of changes in SPS 
measures - underpin the multilateral system of pre-empting 
protectionism.  
While the Agreement’s emphasis on risk assessment and its 
elaboration of risk-related costs that "shall" be factored into SPS 
                                                 
1  For a review of the regulatory reform agenda see Viscusi (1998).  
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policies may ease the task of judging the legitimacy of trading 
partners' measures, its silence on the role that benefits might play in 
policy choice leads to the conclusion that it is a product of what has 
been called "the risk assessment paradigm" (Kopp, Krupnick and 
Toman 1997). The risk assessment paradigm, centered on the 
concept of "acceptable level of risk" (referred to as the appropriate 
level of protection in the SPS Agreement), has a number of 
shortcomings, but its principal drawback in the context of SPS 
policies is that it encourages myopic focus on the direct risk-related 
costs of imports. In the risk assessment paradigm, regulators view 
their task as promulgating measures that reduce risk to negligible 
levels; in an economic paradigm, the normative framework would 
account for the benefits as well as the potential costs of imports to 
infer appropriate levels of protection from individual preferences. If 
the omission of WTO rules for factoring the benefits of imports into 
policy choice is interpreted as a prohibition of such considerations, 
SPS measures will continue to be biased against welfare-improving 
imports.  
Developments since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round highlight 
the need for increased attention to the issue of how economic 
analysis can improve the quality of SPS policies. To date, debates in 
the WTO SPS Committee, the international standards organisations, 
and public fora have largely focused on the appropriate roles of 
national sovereignty, consumer concerns, and risk assessment in 
policy formulation, reflecting legal, political, and scientific 
perspectives on risk management (Roberts 2000). The absence of 
economists at the table may be explained by the fact that they are 
prone to point out that absolute levels of health and safety are 
prohibitively expensive, and hence "often viewed as the immoral 
purveyors of the dismal science" (Viscusi 1992). But it is also true 
that with few exceptions, economists have been slow in turning 
their attention to SPS policies, and a great deal of work lies ahead 
for those who advocate a role for economics both in these 
multilateral debates and in individual regulatory decisions.  
Examining if or how the SPS Agreement purposefully or 
inadvertently constrains the use of economics in SPS policymaking 
is a logical first step for this agenda. This chapter provides an 
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overview of the "rules of the game" from an economic perspective, 
and, equally important, examines how major regulatory actors 
might be expected to interpret these rules as they implement the 
Agreement. The first section describes the origins of the SPS 
Agreement and examines the provisions most relevant to risk 
management practices. The following section turns to a brief review 
of the use of cost/benefit analysis in regulatory decision making. 
This review sets the stage for an assessment of the status of 
economic criteria in the multilateral rules for SPS measures. This is 
intended to flag a number of issues and challenges that could arise 
as regulators seek to manage trade-related health and 
environmental risks more efficiently. The final section presents some 
brief concluding remarks about the potential role for economics in 
risk management policies. This discussion notes that at this stage - 
in advance of extensive SPS jurisprudence – the development of 
principles for efficient regulatory decision-making could make a 
substantial contribution to domestic economies as well as the 
international trading system. 
The SPS Agreement: origin and principle provisions 
The consensus view that emerged in the decade following the Tokyo 
Round of trade negotiations was that multilateral rules had failed to 
stem disruptions of trade in agricultural products caused by 
proliferating technical restrictions. Not one SPS measure was 
successfully challenged before a GATT dispute settlement panel 
after the Tokyo Round, and several prominent disagreements over 
SPS measures in the 1980s (most notably the US-EU beef dispute 
over hormone-treated beef) remained unresolved (Stanton 1997). 
Meanwhile, the commitment to negotiate an Agriculture Agreement 
during the Uruguay Round which would discipline the use of 
agricultural non-tariff barriers for the first time heightened concerns 
that governments would resort to regulatory compensation, in the 
form of SPS barriers, to appease domestic producers in this 
politically sensitive sector (Josling, Tangerman, and Warley 1996).  
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Origins of the SPS Agreement 
The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration which launched the 
Uruguay Round in 1986 stated that one objective of the negotiations 
would be to create disciplines which would minimise the "adverse 
effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and barriers can 
have on trade in agriculture". Initial negotiations targeted perceived 
defects in the Tokyo Round Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement which had impeded resolution of some SPS disputes.2 
But despite progress on closing some loopholes in early drafts of a 
revised TBT Agreement, support for the negotiation of a separate 
SPS Agreement emerged during the negotiations. It was recognised 
that SPS measures mitigate risks that may vary by the source and 
the destination of the traded product; as a result, such measures 
often violate (or apparently violate) the GATT Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN) and national treatment principles.3 Negotiators 
therefore concurred that the elaboration of multilateral rules for 
these measures could not be conveniently incorporated into the 
revised TBT Agreement which reiterates the GATT principles. 
In 1988, a Working Party was created to draft a separate agreement 
for SPS measures. Consensus formed around an agreement which 
consisted of a preamble stating the objectives of the Agreement in 
broad terms; fourteen Articles which stipulate both procedural and 
substantive disciplines; and three annexes which set forth 
definitions and elaborate on procedural requirements (GATT, 1994). 
The provisions in two of these Articles indicate what the scope for 
                                                 
2  For example, one loophole had been created by the TBT Agreement’s 
definition of a measure that would be subject to the disciplines in the 
Agreement. The definition omitted explicit reference to production and 
processing methods. This omission provided the legal rationale for the 
European Community (EC) when it blocked the US request for a technical 
expert group to review the scientific basis of the EC’s ban on hormone-treated 
beef. 
3  The MFN principle (found in Article I of the GATT) stipulates that 
concessions offered to one trading partner must be offered to all; the national 
treatment principle (codified in GATT Article III) holds that imported products 
must be "accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin". 
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integrating economics into risk management decisions is under the 
SPS Agreement.  
Relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement 
To provide a substantive basis for judging the legitimacy of SPS risk 
mitigation measures, the SPS Agreement sets out a number of 
criteria in Article 2 (Basic Rights and Obligations) and Article 5 
(Assessment of Risk and Determination of the Appropriate Level of 
Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection). Article 2 broadly states the 
scientific requirements: measures must be "based on scientific 
principles," and "not maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence" (Article 2.2). Article 5.1 expands on these general 
obligations, requiring Members to base SPS measures on a risk 
assessment, defined as an evaluation of the likelihood and economic 
and biological consequences of the hazards specified in the 
Agreement.4 Article 5.2 elaborates on factors, such as disease 
prevalence or relevant testing methods, to be included in a risk 
assessment. Article 5.3 shifts from scientific factors to economic 
factors, but the focus remains on the potential adverse consequences 
of imports. Potential production or sales losses and potential 
eradication or control costs are the "relevant economic factors" to be 
taken into account in assessing and managing risks to animal and 
plant health, according to Article 5.3. The Agreement is silent on 
economic decision criteria for human health measures. 
Articles 2 and 5 also set forth consistency tests for judging whether 
SPS measures are discriminatory or disguised restrictions on trade 
which rest on comparisons of potential risk-related costs of imports. 
Article 2.3 states that Members must ensure that their measures do 
not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members 
where identical or similar conditions prevail, which includes 
                                                 
4  The relevant hazards are identified in the definition of an SPS measure in 
Annex A: those measures that protect human, animal, or plant life and health 
within the territory of the Member from risks related to diseases, pests, and 
disease-carrying or -causing organisms, as well as additives, contaminants, 
toxins, or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages, or feedstuffs. 
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between their own territory and that of other Members.5 Thus if the 
commodity risk is thought to be the same for imports from Country 
X and Y, the language of the Agreement suggests that the importing 
country should adopt the same import measure for both countries. 
Comparisons of the risks of Commodity X with Commodity Y are 
indicated in Article 5.5, which enjoins Members to avoid "arbitrary 
or unjustified variation" in protection against risks. The Article 
states that avoiding such variation is necessary "to achieve the 
objective of consistency in the application of the concept of 
appropriate level of protection" (ALOP). An ALOP is tautologically 
defined in the Agreement as the level of protection deemed 
appropriate by the Member establishing SPS measures to protect 
human, animal, or plant life or health: an explanatory note states 
that many Members otherwise refer to this concept as the 
"acceptable level of risk." 
These disciplines, in addition to the frequent reference to the ALOP 
throughout the entire Agreement6, sustain the perception that it is a 
product of a paradigm which endorses risk-related costs as a 
normative basis for SPS regulatory decision-making. Within this 
decision framework, authorities choose measures which reduce risk 
to negligible levels rather than measures whose benefits at the 
margin equal their costs, as in the economic paradigm. The role of 
economics in an SPS risk assessment paradigm is primarily 
relegated to the calculation of the quantity of imports to help the 
risk assessors with their job of calculating the likelihood and 
consequences of disease or pest introduction.  
Policy analysis and choice within the risk paradigm can be 
illustrated by a recent response to a US request to export poultry 
meat to New Zealand (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2000). 
                                                 
5  These disciplines are simply variants of the aforementioned GATT MFN 
and national treatment principles. 
6  For example, the Agreement states that Members may adopt measures 
that do not conform to international standards if these standards do not provide 
the chosen ALOP (Article 3), and that Members shall accept the SPS measures 
of other Members as equivalent if the exporting country objectively 
demonstrates that its measures achieves the importing country's ALOP (Article 
4). 
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One of the concerns of NZ regulators was that importing poultry 
meat from the United States could introduce infectious bursal 
disease (IBD).7 NZ authorities determined that if US exports of bone-
in chicken cuts equaled 1 percent of total NZ consumption, the 
estimated risk of IBD being introduced into back yard flocks 
evaluated at the 95th percentile was three introductions per 100 
importation years (assuming that the flocks were fed cooked scraps 
from the imported chicken) which was considered too high. The 
same quantity of boneless cuts was estimated to present a risk of 
less than one introduction per 1,000 importation years, again at the 
95th percentile of the risk estimate, which was considered acceptable. 
However, the report notes, should US exports equal 10 percent of 
current NZ consumption, the risk of boneless cuts would increase to 
6 introductions per 100 importation years, which again would be 
considered to be unacceptably high. It is apparent that the gains 
from trade could be exceptionally modest and still outweigh the 
potential costs of allowing imports, but a further implication of the 
risk paradigm is that, because risk monotonically increases with 
quantity, judgments based on the levels of risk alone will logically 
be conditional on the amount imported. The prospect of SPS quotas 
in international trade should cause enough concern to prompt at 
least some re-consideration of this decision framework.    
Fortunately, other language in Article 5 alludes to a larger role for 
economics in SPS policy choice. Article 5.6 states that measures must 
not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the ALOP, 
taking into account technical and economic feasibility. While such 
language takes the ALOP – no matter how conservative – as a given, 
it does require importers to choose the least trade-restrictive means 
to achieve it. Language which directly addresses the choice of the 
level of risk reduction is more tentative: Article 5.4 states that when 
                                                 
7 The International Office des Epizooties (OIE) classifies transmissible 
animal diseases onto a "List A" of those most harmful "diseases which have the 
potential for very serious and rapid spread, irrespective of national borders, 
which are of serious socio-economic or public health consequence," and a "List 
B" of those less harmful "diseases which are considered to be of socio-economic 
and/or public health importance within countries." IBD has been classified as a 
List B disease.  
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determining the ALOP, Members should (not "shall" which 
indicates a legal obligation) "take into account the objective of 
minimizing negative trade effects." These two provisions clearly do 
not require SPS measures to be justified by the economic welfare 
effects on producers, consumers, taxpayers, and industries which 
use the regulated product as an input, but at least envision 
consideration of economic factors that extend beyond the potential 
risk-related costs of imports.  
Economic analysis of SPS regulations 
Officially mandated reviews related to improvement in the content 
and process for regulations over the past 25 years reflect 
policymakers' increasing interest in the use of cost/benefit analysis 
(CBA) as a tool for regulatory assessment (Antle 1995; Viscusi 1998). 
The intellectual foundations of cost/benefit analysis are found in 
welfare economics, which provides a theoretical framework within 
which policies can be ranked on the basis of how much they 
improve social well-being. Social well-being or welfare is the 
yardstick used by economists to provide a single metric that 
captures the relevant features of well-being that might be affected 
by a policy. The metric employed in CBA is a monetary measure of 
the aggregate change in individual well-being resulting from a 
policy decision. In the economic paradigm, individual welfare is 
assumed to depend on the satisfaction of individual preferences, 
and monetary measures of welfare change are derived from the 
measurement of how much individuals are willing to pay or to be 
compensated to live in a world with the policy in force. Within this 
paradigm, a policy that improved social welfare as indicated by the 
metric would be preferred to a policy that would reduce welfare, 
and a policy that would increase welfare more would be preferred 
to a policy that would increase welfare less. CBA can be simply 
described as a study to determine what effect proposed alternative 
policies would have on the value of this social-welfare metric. The 
principal merits of CBA include transparency; a consistent 
framework for data collection and characterisation of information 
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gaps; and the ability to aggregate dissimilar effects into one measure 
(Kopp, Krupnick, and Toman 1997).8 
Net social welfare, or net benefits, produced by alternative SPS 
measures can most easily be described in the context of a single-
commodity, partial equilibrium model to evaluate a proposed 
change in a measure that protects crops or livestock. In this simple 
framework, SPS policy evaluation would entail calculation of 
changes in the welfare of producers and consumers of the regulated 
product. As quarantine policy prohibits agricultural products from 
foreign sources unless a government has specifically determined if 
and under what conditions a product may enter, CBA-based 
decisions would require evaluation of whether the benefits of lower-
priced imports (to consumers) would outweigh the potential costs 
(to producers) associated with these same imports. The net benefits 
of a proposed measure would be calculated from changes in 
producer and consumer surplus.9 Producer losses would stem from 
two sources in this open-economy framework: lower product prices 
and the expected value of losses resulting from exotic pests or 
diseases.   
Scientists and regulatory officials may judge that the probability of 
importing a disease along with the product is essentially zero -- for 
example, if a disease had never been known to exist in the exporting 
country. This "zero risk" scenario is identical to the standard trade 
liberalisation scenario wherein a country decides to eliminate a 
prohibitive tariff. However, evaluation of a change in an SPS 
measure to allow imports differs from the evaluation of removing a 
tariff if there is some probability, however small, that a disease will 
be imported along with the product. In addition to the producer and 
consumer surplus changes that result from a decrease in price in the 
                                                 
8 Multi-attribute decision analysis tools, which likewise reflect an 
economic perspective on risk management, can be used when aggregation of 
dissimilar effects into one measure is impossible or deemed to be inappropriate. 
See, for example, Keeney and Raiffa (1993).  
9  Producer surplus is defined as producers' revenue beyond variable costs 
which provides a measure of returns to fixed investment. Consumer surplus is 
a measure of consumers' willingness to pay for a product beyond its actual 
price.  
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domestic market, potential production losses from a disease must be 
evaluated as well. Actual empirical estimates of the effect of a 
change in a quarantine measure poses substantial challenges. The 
analyst must have a means for assessing the probability of 
introduction of a disease (a likelihood model) together with a means 
of assessing different disease outcomes (an epidemiological model) 
to use as inputs into an economic model to estimate (i) the expected 
value and standard errors of changes in producer surplus stemming 
from disease-related production and sales losses; (ii) producer 
surplus losses resulting from lower prices; and (iii) consumer gains 
from lower prices. Model results could then provide input into the 
calculation of costs not included in a partial equilibrium commodity 
model, including the administrative/enforcement costs of the 
import protocol and potential public disease-eradication 
expenditures. 
Is the SPS Agreement congruent with economic policy 
prescription? 
From the previous discussion, what can be said about the apparent 
congruency or incongruence of the SPS Agreement with regulatory 
reform initiatives? Examination of this issue is made somewhat 
difficult by the fact that in aiming to avoid being overly prescriptive, 
the Agreement provides latitude for alternative interpretations.10 The 
following discussion should be understood as only an attempt to 
flag potentially important issues for further discussion as 
governments consider how best to integrate economics into SPS 
policy evaluation. Some issues pertaining to costs, benefits and 
distributional effects of changes in SPS policies that increase market 
access are considered in turn. It is argued here that the language of 
the SPS Agreement is clearest with respect to the risk-related costs 
associated with imports. How the benefits of imports may factor 
                                                 
10  Some reasonable interpretations of the individual provisions of the SPS 
Agreement can lead one to conclude that the Agreement is internally 
inconsistent. In the words of the Appellate Body, some parts of the Agreement 
are "not a model of clarity in drafting and communication" (WTO 1998a, p. 66). 
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into decisions is decidedly ambiguous - an ambiguity that is the root 
of most disagreements about how economics can inform SPS policy 
choice. Distributional effects are not explicitly addressed in the 
Agreement (with one exception, noted below) but, since policy 
makers are often more concerned with equity than efficiency, 
inclusion of such influences on SPS policies is examined as well.   
Costs 
Article 5.3 is reprised here to facilitate comparison of costs that are 
recognised by the SPS Agreement and costs as they are routinely 
calculated in a CBA. The Article states: 
"In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and 
determining the measure to be applied for achieving the 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection from 
such risk, Members shall take into account as relevant factors: 
the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in 
the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a cost or 
disease; the costs of control or eradication in the territory of 
the importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of 
alternative approaches to limiting risks." 
The cost components of a standard CBA for measure that protects 
crops or livestock were identified in the previous section as: (i) the 
expected value of changes in producer surplus stemming from 
disease-related production and sales losses; (ii) producer surplus 
losses resulting from lower prices; (iii) government expenditures to 
administer the import protocol; and (iv) the expected value of 
public-financed disease eradication expenditures. 
With respect to the first item, the Agreement seems to neither 
endorse or prohibit the translation of the expected value of revenue 
(production and sales) losses estimated during the course of a risk 
assessment into the expected value of producer surplus losses in a 
CBA framework. The Agreement explicitly requires the third and 
fourth components to factor into risk management decisions. 
Consideration of the second component would likely be regarded 
by SPS authorities as a violation of the spirit of the SPS Agreement. 
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The Agreement is predicated on the idea that countries should not 
factor lower product prices resulting from imports into SPS 
decisions. Such producer surplus costs would likely be regarded as 
costs related to commercial activity, unrelated to health or 
environmental protection. However, trading partner’s concern over 
this point could be mitigated by the fact that the use of cost/benefit 
analysis to inform SPS policies will generally result in policies that 
are less trade restrictive than current approaches to risk 
management, even if all costs are factored into policy choice. 
However, this conclusion hinges on whether the benefits of imports 
can be recognised as a legitimate factor in SPS policy choice, an issue 
taken up in the following section.  
Benefits 
It is interesting to note that the word benefits (in reference to trade or 
anything else) does not appear in the Agreement. One's 
interpretation of this omission is likely to depend on how one views 
the GATT/WTO. One view is that the recognition of the benefits of 
trade liberalisation is so universal, it merits no further emphasis. A 
less magnanimous view is that the trading system built around the 
GATT over the past fifty years is the product of enlightened 
mercantilism, rather than the ideology of free trade.11 Statements 
found in the Agreement such as "Members shall ensure that any 
sanitary of phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent 
necessary" (Article 2.1) are broad enough to accommodate both 
views. 
In view of the lack of explicit disciplines on if and how the gains 
from trade can factor into SPS regulatory decisions, what 
conclusions can regulators draw? An example can best illustrate the 
Agreement's ambiguity about the standing that benefits have in 
SPS regulatory decisions. Consider the situation where the United 
                                                 
11 Krugman (1991) observes that GATT-think (i.e., exports are good; 
imports are bad; other things equal, an equal increase in imports and exports is 
good) sees trade policy as a Prisoners' Dilemma: individually, governments 
have an incentive to be protectionist, yet collectively they benefit from free 
trade. 
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States decides to allows imports of beef, but not poultry, because 
although the expected value of disease-related losses are the same 
for the two products, the benefits to consumers of importing beef 
outweigh those costs while the benefits of importing poultry do not 
(i.e., relative to foreign competitors, the US is a more efficient 
producer of poultry than of beef). Although the choice to allow only 
imports of beef might be efficient regulatory policy from a CBA 
perspective, some in the WTO community (and most certainly the 
country whose import request for poultry was turned down) could 
well view these choices as evidence of "arbitrary and unjustifiable 
distinctions" in the levels of protection that had resulted in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade, in violation of 
Article 5.5. It is also conceivable that in some cases consideration of 
benefits could lead to an apparent violation of Article 2.3, the other 
consistency discipline, which holds that Members must ensure that 
their measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate 
between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail.  
The omission of explicit disciplines on benefits in the Agreement 
need not be interpreted as a prohibition on the inclusion of trade 
benefits as a factor in SPS regulatory decisions. It should be 
remembered that the Agreement is an international trade treaty 
whose purpose is to limit the use of the putative scientific claims for 
protectionist purposes, and not to establish templates for risk 
management decisions. More elastic interpretations of the 
Agreement could view the incorporation of trade benefits in 
regulatory decisions as congruent with the objectives of "minimizing 
negative trade effects" and adopting "least trade restrictive" policies, 
which are enunciated in Articles 5.4 and 5.6. However it is clear that 
decision criteria must be sufficiently explicit to support a finding 
that any potential variation in the ALOP is "unarbitrary and 
justifiable".  
The long debate in the WTO SPS Committee over guidelines for 
implementing Article 5.5 indicates that a shift from a risk 
assessment paradigm to an economic paradigm is not imminent. 
Adopted in June 2000, five years after the SPS Agreement came into 
force, the guidelines faithfully reflect the decision framework 
implicitly endorsed by the Agreement, which in turn faithfully 
Chapter 2  Issues and challenges  23 
 
reflects the decision framework of most (and certainly the most 
influential) WTO Members (WTO 2000). In the most generous 
interpretation of the guidelines, consumer or processor gains from 
trade could be viewed as falling in the same category as producer 
losses that result from decreases in domestic prices brought about 
by imports -- as commercial considerations that might somehow be 
integrated into a country's choice of its overall ALOP, but which 
should not be used as decision criteria for individual health or 
environmental measures. This view stems from both philosophical 
objections as well as pragmatic concerns that CBA-based import 
protocols would complicate the effective decentralised policing of 
SPS measures by WTO Members.   
Distributional issues 
Regulatory reform initiatives, reflecting the current mainstream 
view, state that while net social benefits should be an important 
factor in regulatory decisions, it need not be the only one. For 
example, USDA's Departmental Regulation on Regulatory Decision-
making (DR-1512-1) encourages regulators to consider a broad 
range of qualitative factors such as equity, quality of life, and 
distributions of benefits and costs (USDA 1996). These guidelines 
reflect societal concerns over a strictly utilitarian approach to policy-
making, e.g., adopting a policy that results in substantial benefits for 
the wealthy while impoverishing the poor.  
Nothing in the Agreement would seem to preclude a Member from, 
for example, maintaining extremely conservative import protocols 
to protect crops and livestock that favour producers over 
consumers, as long as any variation in the weights does not appear 
to be connected to creating discriminatory or disguised restrictions 
on trade. In fact, the Agreement can be read as explicitly protecting 
the right of Members to do so in the language regarding the choice 
of an ALOP. According to the US Statement of Administrative 
Action (SAA) to Congress, the Agreement "explicitly affirms the 
rights of each government to choose its levels of protection 
including a 'zero risk' level if it so chooses" (President of the United 
States 1994, p. 745). The SAA also notes that ―In the end, the choice 
of the appropriate level of protection is a societal value judgment." 
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The SAA was intended to assure Congress that the SPS Agreement 
did not jeopardise the Delaney Clause, and hence may have 
somewhat overstated the case, but the Agreement seems to place no 
constraints on a government's choice of weights for producer and 
consumer welfare in a CBA framework, as long as the consistency 
tests set forth in Articles 2 and 5 are met. These consistency 
requirements may, in fact, be a tall hurdle. But whether a 
government would actually want to explicitly adopt such weights 
within an economic decision framework – in contrast to current 
practices which fuse distributional considerations together with 
other factors to yield an ALOP -- remains to be seen.  
The use of some other distributional effects as SPS decision criteria – 
say to adopt more conservative import protocols for agricultural 
commodities produced by poorer farmers – may be judged to 
violate the Agreement. However, potential conflict between the SPS 
Agreement and guidelines for consideration of distributional 
impacts in regulatory decisions is limited by the obvious fact that 
governments usually rely on other types of policies to remedy social 
ills.  
The Agreement does, however, allow the use of distributional 
considerations to override consistency criteria to aid developing 
countries. Article 10.2 states that WTO Members may allow longer 
phase-in periods for compliance with new regulations on "products 
of interest to developing country Members". However, these 
countries report that such allowances have in fact been exceedingly 
rare (WTO 1998b), corroborating the observation that SPS measures 
are not generally the instruments of choice to redress income 
inequalities.   
Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion highlights some issues that 
multidisciplinary teams will need to consider as governments judge 
how best to incorporate efficiency and equity criteria into its 
regulatory decision-making process. One issue, the valuation of 
non-market goods, emerges within the risk assessment paradigm as 
well as the economic paradigm. Another, the issue of how 
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policymakers should weigh the effects of a decision on different 
groups in society, is implicit in the determination of the appropriate 
level of protection in the risk assessment paradigm, and explicit in 
the economic paradigm. Perhaps the most important issue is 
examination of the circumstances where using net benefits as a 
decision criterion (as recommended in the economic paradigm) 
might run afoul of provisions of the Agreement that hinge on 
comparisons of risk-related costs (the end product envisioned in the 
risk assessment paradigm).  
To date, international debate over SPS measures has generally 
ignored the economic dimensions of risk management. Perhaps the 
conclusion to be drawn from discussion in the SPS Committee and 
elsewhere is that it is inaccurate to portray the SPS Agreement as a 
binding constraint which prevents regulators from using economic 
efficiency criteria as guideposts in SPS policy formulation.  It would 
appear that such criteria have not systematically factored into SPS 
regulatory decisions in many WTO Member countries, either before 
or after the Uruguay Round. One economist, for example, has 
argued that the system of food safety regulation in the United States, 
arguably among the most scientific in the world, "represents a 
wildly inefficient allocation of public funds" (Antle 1995). It may 
therefore be more accurate to view the SPS Agreement as a mirror, 
rather than a yoke, for contemporary approaches to SPS risk 
management. So although the integration of economics into SPS risk 
management decisions will generally result in increased market 
access, advocates of a more expansive interpretation of the 
Agreement to allow this integration can expect to encounter 
resistance even in net exporting countries if a challenge to the 
domestic status quo decision framework is perceived.   
Concerns that advocacy for a greater role for economics in SPS 
policy formulation could weaken the Agreement itself can also be 
expected to surface.  Despite differences between what economists 
would recommend and what the Agreement might allow or 
proscribe, the risk assessment paradigm of the SPS Agreement has 
clearly reduced the degrees of freedom for the disingenuous use of 
SPS measures to restrict imports in response to narrow interest 
group pressures. Because the past five years have been witness to a 
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number of unilateral, negotiated, and adjudicated decisions to ease 
SPS trade restrictions, the principles and mechanisms established by 
the Agreement are credited with being an important institutional 
innovation that has increased market access opportunities (Roberts 
1998). WTO Members will therefore be wary of any initiatives that 
could appear to weaken literal interpretations of the Agreement, 
especially Articles 2 and 5 which have been important in SPS 
jurisprudence. The measures challenged in the three SPS cases to 
advance to the Appellate Body over the past five years have failed 
the tests set forth in one or both of these Articles.  
In short, the balance achieved by the SPS Agreement over the first 
five years – curbing the most egregious uses of SPS measures as 
non-tariff barriers while leaving domestic regulatory regimes largely 
intact – is exactly what many WTO Members had hoped for. It is 
from this perspective that these countries will judge initiatives to 
allow the costs and benefits of measures to factor into decisions that 
govern if and how agricultural products gain access to markets. 
Therefore, the challenge is to develop a voluntary ―WTO +" policy 
framework for countries with the analytical capability and interest 
to begin to rank SPS policy options on the basis of efficiency and 
equity goals with sufficient transparency to permit informed 
judgement about compliance with the Agreement. A truly 
integrated assessment will require coordination of multiple 
disciplines. As James and Anderson (1999) note, "…economists and 
biological scientists have a symbiotic relationship in the sharing of 
knowledge about how to effectively reduce society’s exposure to 
unwanted health risks in the most efficient manner, bearing in mind 
all the costs involved". It is likely that differences in paradigms, 
unstated assumptions, and expected end-products of analysis will 
make such collaboration difficult at first. But if the SPS Agreement is 
to fulfil its potential as serving the overarching goal of welfare 
enhancement through trade, such challenges must be met.  
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The analytical foundation of quarantine risk 
analysis 
MIKE J. NUNN 
Although people have always made decisions in the face of 
uncertainty, the ability to appreciate risk by specifically assessing 
probability and consequences is a particular characteristic of 
modern times. The ability to consider what may happen in the 
future and to choose rationally between options is essentially a 
modern phenomenon that has its historical roots in the mathematics 
of risk-taking, particularly of gambling, insurance and financial 
investment (Bernstein 1997). The understanding of risk and rational 
risk-taking that has developed from these roots through risk 
analysis underpins the modern market economy, including 
international trade. This paper explores the analytical foundation of 
the analysis of risks associated with importing animals and plants or 
their products1 as used by quarantine authorities to develop sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures to mitigate the spread of disease2. 
                                                 
1  In animal quarantine, this process is called 'import risk analysis' (IRA); in 
plant quarantine, the same process tends to be termed 'pest risk analysis' (PRA). 
In this chapter, the former term is used for the generic process, regardless of 
what is being imported. 
2 In animal (and human) quarantine, 'disease' is used generically to 
include any harmful condition caused by a transmissible agent, whether a 
microbe, parasite or insect. In plant quarantine, the term 'pest' tends to be used 
in this way, often as in the term 'quarantine pest' which includes weeds. The 
SPS Agreement refers to 'diseases, pests, and disease-carrying or -causing 
organisms, as well as additives, contaminants toxins or disease-carrying 
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Risk analysis has been recognised only recently as a formal 
discipline in its own right and there is still some confusion in both 
scientific and popular literature about the precise definition of each 
of its elements (Krewski and Birkwood 1987; Covello and Merkhofer 
1993; Byrd and Cothern 2000). Several attempts have been made to 
develop a standardised nomenclature in a range of disciplines — 
including animal health, plant health, food safety, and 
environmental science (Nunn 1997). However, some authorities use 
'risk management' rather than 'risk analysis' for the overall term (e.g. 
SA/SNZ 1999) and others restrict 'risk analysis' to include elements 
such as risk identification, assessment and evaluation but not risk 
management and risk communication. Still others (including OIE 
2000), define hazard identification as separate from 'risk 
assessment', resulting in four elements of risk analysis (hazard 
identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication). The only difficulty arising from these variations in 
terminology is that one needs to be conscious of which set of terms 
is being used in any particular publication or discipline. Despite 
variations in terminology and details of application, the basic 
principles and analytical foundation are the same across a wide 
range of disciplines in which risk analysis is applied. 
In this chapter, risk analysis is used as the term for the overall 
process comprising three elements — risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication. Risk assessment is the 
process of identifying and estimating the risk associated with an 
option, including evaluation of the likelihood of an event and of the 
consequences if that event were to occur. Risk management is the 
process of identifying, documenting and implementing measures to 
reduce risk (either the likelihood of occurrence or the consequences). 
Risk communication is the process of interactive exchange of 
information and opinions concerning risk between risk analysts and 
stakeholders. 
                                                                                                                                               
organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs'. For the purpose of this chapter, the 
term 'disease' is in the broadest sense to include all of the hazards covered by 
the SPS Agreement. 
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Risk communication 
Although usually listed last of the three elements of risk analysis, 
risk communication needs to be practised throughout a risk 
analysis. If this is not done, risk analysis is easily perceived as a 
process of 'expert' risk analysts advising stakeholders of the result of 
their risk assessment and their proposed risk management 
strategies. Such a limited approach implies that communication is 
primarily one-way and occurs only after the risk assessment and 
management steps have been completed, ignoring the need for two-
way communication and consultation throughout the whole 
process, which is fundamentally iterative in nature. Such an 
approach also invites conflict, particularly in complex risk analysis 
by regulatory authorities on potentially controversial by issues. In 
these cases, which can occur in quarantine risk analysis, poor 
communication acts as critical factor in provoking outrage among 
stakeholders, particularly those directly involved. 
Perceptions of risk by stakeholders or the general public often align 
poorly with those of 'experts', and a rapidly growing body of work 
on risk perception and communication (e.g. Slovic et al. 1985; 
Covello 1991; Margolis 1996) has defined a number of key factors 
that determine individual and group perceptions of risk. For 
example, factor analysis has shown that hazards that are perceived 
as unfamiliar or provoke dread are assigned a higher risk than can 
be demonstrated statistically (Slovic 1987). Unfamiliar or unknown 
hazards, even with a low probability, that are regarded as having 
potentially catastrophic effects are perceived as high risk and 
provoke strong public demands for government to regulate and 
protect against them. Examples include hazards such as a nuclear 
accident or the introduction of an unfamiliar disease that might be a 
zoonosis (e.g. Ebola or Nipah viruses) or the introduction of a 
known disease that might decimate one or more native species. Risk 
analysts working in quarantine need to be cognisant of such 
reactions to risks and take account of them in their communication 
with stakeholders. Similarly, they should also appreciate the effects 
of trust, fear (Slovic 1993; Purchase and Slovic 1999) and outrage 
(Sandman 1993) on how stakeholders feel and behave. 
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The results of poor risk communication have been documented in a 
number of case studies such as the epidemic of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy or 'mad cow disease' (Powell and Leiss 1997). Risk 
analysts, particularly those working on highly technical risk 
assessments, tend to focus on the technical detail of their particular 
problem and may be surprised to find their dedicated work on a risk 
assessment and carefully reasoned recommendations for risk 
management provokes strong and vocal opposition. Leaving 
consideration of risk communication until late in the risk analysis 
process rather than informing and involving stakeholders or the 
general public early and often throughout the process only increases 
the likelihood of such unfavourable reactions. 
In quarantine risk analysis3, it is critical that stakeholders 
understand the international framework in which import risk 
assessment and risk management operate. Although technical 
specialists practising these disciplines in regulatory agencies (such 
as national quarantine services) appreciate this framework and the 
obligations and principles associated with it, there may be only 
limited understanding of it among stakeholders in the industries 
that might be affected by their recommendations and decisions. 
Indeed, there may be relatively limited understanding of the 
international framework among some of their policy colleagues and 
the politicians they serve, despite the fact that these politicians or 
their predecessors committed their countries to this international 
framework. Keeping stakeholders (including, in the case of 
quarantine import risk analysis, affected industries as well as 
relevant policy makers and politicians) informed of why and how a 
risk assessment is being done and of the risk management options 
(and inviting their comments) will help them to understand the risk 
analysis framework. It may also help to achieve some 
                                                 
3  Risk analysis in quarantine can be applied both to imports or to exports. 
The former application (import risk analysis) is the more common and tends to 
dominate discussion of quarantine risk analysis. The latter application may be 
undertaken by a country to help it gain market access or on behalf of a another 
country (e.g. as 'technical assistance' under Article 9 of the SPS Agreement as 
discussed below in the fourth secion of this chapter). 
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understanding of, if not always agreement with and ownership of, 
the final decision.  
Another element of risk communication in quarantine risk analysis 
is the need for risk analysts working in this area to communicate to 
both specialists in other disciplines and with their colleagues in 
other countries. The latter need is particularly acute with complex 
quarantine import risk assessments, for which greater exchange of 
ideas and experience can only improve the quality of analysis 
undertaken in a rapidly developing and difficult area.  
Principles of risk analysis 
In 1996, a major review of Australian quarantine (the 'Nairn 
Review', Nairn et al. 1996) reported on the process then used for 
quarantine import risk analysis in Australia (AQIS 1991) and 
recommended changes designed to increase consultation while 
continuing to meet international obligations. Its recommendations 
were largely adopted (DPIE 1997) and are now in operation (AQIS 
1998, Tanner and Nunn 1998). The Nairn Review identified a 
number of fundamental principles that apply to risk analysis in a 
range of disciplines and recommended that they should also apply 
to quarantine import risk analysis. The review recommended that 
risk analysis should be consultative, scientifically based, 
transparent, harmonised, and subject to appeal on process.  
Consultation 
Risk analysis should include early and ongoing consultation with 
key stakeholders to help obtain consensus on matters such as 
priorities, the scope and type of risk assessment, and the risk 
management strategies required to ensure any proposed import 
does not jeopardise the importing country's animal and plant health 
status or have a negative effect on its natural environment. 
Scientific basis 
Risk analysis should fundamentally be a scientific process. In 
particular, risk assessment should be 'essentially a scientific 
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endeavour based on experimentation and observation' (ANZFA 
1996, p. 2). However, it is acknowledged that 'risk management 
involves policy decisions based on a balance of scientific, social and 
economic considerations' (ANZFA 1996, p. 2). In recognition of this 
distinction, some countries separate the regulatory application of 
risk analysis by assigning official responsibility to different agencies 
for risk assessment (its scientific or technical component) and for 
risk management (which is deemed to comprise its policy or 
political component). 
Transparency 
Risk analysis should be transparent and open. Details of the risk 
assessment undertaken and any risk management options examined 
should be readily available for both peer review and public scrutiny. 
Consistency and harmonisation 
From a regulatory perspective, risk analysis should be consistent 
with both government policy and international obligations. 
Consistency should be achieved by reference to existing policies and 
procedures, by reference to relevant international standards, 
guidelines and recommendations, and through the contribution of 
participants experienced in risk analysis. 
Subject to appeal on process 
The process of risk analysis should be subject to appeal to ensure 
natural justice. Both the Nairn Review of Australian quarantine 
(Nairn et al. 1996) and a report on the use of risk analysis in a wide 
range of regulatory agencies in the United States (CRARM 1996) 
confirmed the need for provision to appeal. 
Subject to periodic external review 
Within any organisation, the risk analysis process and associated 
decisions should be subject to periodic external review, which is 
consistent with the principles of transparency and harmonisation. 
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The international policy framework for quarantine risk 
analysis 
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
culminated in the formation in January 1995 of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The role of WTO is defined in an agreement, 
of which two annexes have particular relevance to quarantine and 
trade - the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT Agreement). The SPS Agreement defines the basic rights 
and obligations of WTO member countries with respect to taking 
'sanitary and phytosanitary measures' to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health. The TBT Agreement covers food standards such 
as labelling and nutritional requirements. The following sections 
summarise key points in the SPS and TBT Agreements. The 
discussion is drawn from the actual text of the Agreements, but the 
full text should be consulted for detailed and definitive information. 
The SPS Agreement 
The SPS Agreement defines the basic rights and obligations of 
member countries with respect to taking "sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures" to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health. WTO member countries ('Members') shall ensure their 
measures are based on an assessment of the risks to human, animal 
or plant life or health "taking into account risk assessment 
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations" 
— the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) and the 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (Codex) for animal quarantine, plant 
quarantine and food safety, respectively. The SPS Agreement 
defines nine principles governing sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures that may affect international trade (in Articles 2 to 10). 
Similar principles apply to risk analysis in related areas such as food 
safety (ANZFA 1996; Randell and Whitehead 1997) and 
biotechnology (Doyle and Persley 1996). 
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Basic rights and obligations (Article 2) 
Article 2 states that Members "have the right to take sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health", provided that such measures are "not 
inconsistent with" the Agreement. Members shall ensure that any 
measure "is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is 
not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence" - except where 
"relevant scientific evidence is insufficient" (in which case Members 
"shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of 
time", as provided in Article 5, on risk assessment). In addition, 
"Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between 
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including 
between their own territory and that of other Members" and such 
"measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute 
a disguised restriction on international trade". 
Harmonisation (Article 3) 
Under Article 3, Members "shall base their sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations" but "may introduce or maintain sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures which result in a higher level of sanitary 
and phytosanitary protection ... if there is a scientific justification, or 
as a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection 
a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5" (on risk 
assessment). 
Equivalence (Article 4) 
Article 4 states that Members "shall accept the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures of other Members as equivalent, even if 
these measures differ from their own or from those used by other 
Members trading in the same product, if the exporting Member 
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objectively demonstrates ... that its measures achieve the importing 
Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection". 
Risk assessment (Article 5) 
Article 5 (entitled "assessment of risk and determination of the 
appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection") outlines 
Members' obligations with respect to risk assessment. Members 
"shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based 
on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to 
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk 
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organizations". Members shall take into account relevant scientific 
evidence and relevant economic factors, and "when determining the 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, take into 
account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects". In 
addition, to help achieve "consistency in the application of the 
concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection 
against risks to human life or health or to animal and plant life or 
health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable 
distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different 
situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade". Members shall ensure that 
"measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve 
their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, 
taking into account technical and economic feasibility". 
"In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account 
available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production 
methods; relevant inspection, sampling and test methods; 
prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest- or disease-
free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and 
quarantine or other treatment". In addition, "in assessing the risk to 
animal or plant life or health and determining the measure to be 
applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection from such risk, Members shall take into 
account as relevant economic factors: the potential damage in terms 
of lost production or sales in the event of the entry, establishment or 
spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or eradication in the 
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territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost-
effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks". 
Paragraph 7 of Article 5 states that "in cases where relevant scientific 
information is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available 
pertinent information, including that from the relevant international 
organisations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall 
seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of 
time". 
Regionalisation (Article 6) 
Article 6 (entitled "adaptation to regional conditions, including pest- 
or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence"), 
outlines Members' obligations with respect to regionalisation. 
Members "shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
are adapted to the sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of the 
area — whether of all of a country, part of a country, or all or parts 
of several countries — from which the product originated and to 
which the product is destined". Members shall "recognise the 
concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or 
disease prevalence", and "determination of such areas shall be based 
on factors such as geography, ecosystems, epidemiological 
surveillance, and the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary 
controls". In addition, "exporting Members claiming that areas 
within their territories are pest- or disease-free areas or areas of low 
pest or disease prevalence shall provide the necessary evidence 
thereof in order to objectively demonstrate to the importing Member 
that such areas are, and are likely to remain, pest- or disease-free 
areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence, respectively". 
Transparency (Article 7) 
Under Article 7, Members "shall notify changes in their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures" and shall provide information on them 
promptly through a designated "enquiry point". 
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Control, inspection and approval procedures (Article 8) 
Under Article 8, Members shall observe specified provisions "in the 
operation of control, inspection and approval procedures ... and 
ensure that their procedures are not inconsistent" with the 
provisions of this agreement. 
Technical assistance (Article 9) 
Article 9 states that Members shall "agree to facilitate the provision 
of technical assistance to other Members, especially developing 
country Members ... to allow such countries to adjust to, and comply 
with, sanitary or phytosanitary measures necessary to achieve the 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection in their 
export markets". In addition, "where substantial investments are 
required in order for an exporting developing country Member to 
fulfil the sanitary or phytosanitary requirements of an importing 
Member, the latter shall consider providing such technical assistance 
as will permit the developing country Member to maintain and 
expand its market access opportunities for the product involved". 
Special and differential treatment (Article 10) 
Article 10 states that "in the preparation and application of sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, Members shall take account of the 
special needs of developing country Members, and in particular of 
the least-developed country Members", including phased 
introduction of measures where possible. In addition, developing 
country Members, "upon request", may be granted "specified, time-
limited exemptions in whole or in part" from obligations under the 
agreement, "taking into account their financial, trade and 
development needs". 
The TBT Agreement 
The TBT Agreement covers food standards that are not related to 
the protection of human health and safety against risks arising from 
additives, contaminants, toxins, disease-causing organisms, or 
diseases carried by animals. It thus encompasses rules intended to 
provide relevant information and to protect consumers against 
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deception and fraud. Labelling and nutritional requirements come 
within the scope of the TBT Agreement. 
Under the TBT Agreement, Members shall ensure that products 
imported from one country are accorded treatment no less 
favourable than accorded to like products of national origin and to 
like products originating in any other country. Members shall also 
ensure that technical regulations are "not prepared, adopted or 
applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade". Technical regulations shall be no 
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, 
taking into account the risks non-fulfilment would create. 
Legitimate objectives specifically include national security 
requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; and the 
protection of human safety, animal or plant health or safety, or the 
environment. 
Risk assessment 
The fundamental steps in risk assessment are the identification of 
the risks or hazards of concern, the assignment of a probability of 
the occurrence of each risk, and the estimation of the consequences 
resulting from the occurrence of each risk. There are several 
published reviews of methods used in import risk assessment (e.g. 
Sutmoller (1997) for animal quarantine) and such papers and 
individual assessments should be examined for discussion of the 
details of specific approaches. 
In summary, the initial step in quarantine import risk assessment is 
to determine which diseases in the country of origin of a proposed 
import do not occur in the importing country and are of sufficient 
concern to warrant measures to exclude them. The assessment 
establishes a scenario tree or outline of the pathway or pathways of 
entry and establishment of unwanted diseases that might be 
associated with a proposed import. In qualitative approaches, 
emphasis focuses on the key points in the pathway where risk 
management factors can be applied to eliminate (e.g. by heat 
treatment of a product) or reduce (e.g. by vaccinating or testing live 
animals) the risk of importing diseases of concern. In semi-
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quantitative approaches, numerical values (e.g. the prevalence of the 
disease of concern) are applied at each point for which data are 
available. In fully quantitative approaches, such data are applied at 
all points of the pathway of entry and establishment. Data used in 
the assessment are extrapolated from information on the biology 
and pathology of the disease of concern in countries where it occurs. 
Such information may be readily available in published scientific 
literature, may require specific investigation with the assistance of 
countries where the disease occurs, or in some cases may not be 
available and must be obtained by additional field or laboratory 
studies. 
Quantification 
In many disciplines, there has been a marked trend towards the use 
of more quantitative methods of risk assessment over recent years. 
In engineering and related disciplines, fully quantitative 
assessments are feasible and widely undertaken. However, in 
biological and natural resource disciplines the lack of basic data is 
often a limiting factor to attempting quantitative risk assessments. It 
is only in relatively simple cases that reliable quantitative data are 
available for all steps in quarantine import risk assessment (i.e. for 
all points in the pathway of entry and establishment of a disease). 
There has been a tendency to consider that more quantitative 
approaches are necessarily 'better' or 'more scientific' than less 
quantitative approaches. Such a view is misguided, for a 
quantitative risk assessment that uses poor data or inappropriate 
quantitative techniques can far less scientific than a good semi-
quantitative or qualitative assessment.  
At present, methods used in risk assessment range from fully 
qualitative approaches to fully quantitative approaches (in which 
numbers are used for all stages or steps in a scenario tree) — with 
many actual assessments using both approaches (i.e. using 
quantitative data where these are available and qualitative 
assessment where quantitative data are not readily available). All 
degrees of quantification are acceptable under the SPS Agreement 
and WTO recognises the validity of qualitative risk assessments. 
However, as in other areas of application of risk analysis, there is a 
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trend towards increasing use of more quantitative approaches to 
quarantine import risk assessment and a number of developed 
countries devoting significant resources to more quantitative 
approaches. From a practical perspective, it should also be 
appreciated that even when they are possible, more quantitative 
approaches are extremely resource-intensive, requiring skilled staff, 
large amounts of data, sophisticated computing resources, and a 
large investment of time. 
The vast majority of quarantine decisions on import access requests 
do not require complex risk assessments, whether qualitative or 
quantitative. In such cases, importing countries can meet their 
appropriate level of protection by basing their risk analysis on the 
application of well tried and proven risk management measures that 
are adopted as or consistent with international guidelines and 
standards. This is reflected in the huge quantity and high value of 
animals, plants and their products that are traded internationally 
without spreading disease. Thus although quantitative approaches 
to risk analysis have some application in evaluating selected import 
access requests, semi-quantitative and qualitative approaches are 
more appropriate for the vast majority of quarantine import risk 
analyses.  
In a minority of cases, which tend to occupy the majority of effort 
and raise the most policy and economic concern, import access 
requests do not require complex and resource-intensive risk 
analysis. These cases tend to involve the proposed import for the 
first time of a commodity from a country or region that has a 
number of diseases that do not occur in the proposed importing 
country and for which there are significant gaps in knowledge (e.g. 
of epidemiology and pathogenesis) and no internationally agreed 
risk management measures. Risk assessment in such cases is 
extremely difficult because of their inherent complexity, which also 
frequently makes them unamenable to a more quantitative approach 
but inevitably leads to differences in interpretation of the 
judgements made by adopting a more qualitative approach. The 
proposal to import salmon meat into Australia was an example of 
such a case and led to an appeal by Canada and ultimately use of 
the WTO dispute settlement procedures (Pauwelyn 1999). 
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Deterministic and stochastic approaches 
Semi-quantitative or quantitative approaches to risk assessment can 
be either deterministic or stochastic. The deterministic approach 
assigns a single number (e.g. an amount or a probability) to each 
point in a scenario tree so that assessment leads to a single value, 
ignoring the fact that variation is an integral component in all 
natural systems. In contrast, the stochastic approach assigns a 
probability distribution to each point and determines a net 
probability density distribution by using techniques such as Monte 
Carlo simulation (Cohen et al. 1996; Thompson and Graham 1996; 
Vose 2000). For example, in considering disease risks associated 
with an import access request, a risk assessment using a 
deterministic approach might assign a value of 10per cent for the 
prevalence of a particular disease in the population of origin. In 
contrast, a stochastic approach might assign this a value determined 
by a normal distribution with a mean of 10per cent and a standard 
deviation of perhaps 2per cent, thus approximating the real range of 
values encountered in the population. The stochastic approach uses 
computer simulation, which can now be undertaken through a 
range of software packages that can be run on personal computers. 
Such simulations lead not to a single value for the overall 
assessment but to a range of values defined as a probability density 
distribution. A stochastic approach provides a more realistic 
estimate than does deterministic analysis because it takes account of 
natural variation. 
Sensitivity analysis 
For most quarantine risk assessments there are - and are likely to 
continue to be - data gaps that preclude the use of a fully 
quantitative approach. In such cases, simple scenario trees can be 
analysed in a semi-quantitative or quantitative manner even where 
there are some gaps in data. For example, an extreme value may be 
assumed for data missing at a particular point (e.g. that the 
prevalence of a pathogen in the population of origin is 100 per cent) 
and the simulation run. Alternatively, expert opinion can be used to 
provide a 'best guess' of the value for a particular data point (e.g. 
using the Delphi technique). Other approaches that are likely to be 
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used increasingly include applications from new computing 
developments (e.g. of fuzzy logic or agent-based modelling) to help 
fill data gaps. Such approaches enable the analyst to conduct 
sensitivity analyses to determine whether or not the particular 
parameter for which data are not available has a major impact on 
the overall risk.  
Such analysis often shows that there are only a few critical points in 
the pathway that have a significant effect on the overall probability, 
and if good data are available on these points, the analyst can be 
confident that the assessment is robust. However, if good data are 
not available on these critical points, the analyst can report that 
robust quantitative risk analysis is not possible until further 
information is available to fill these gaps. Risk analysts reaching this 
conclusion might encourage research providers to commission or 
conduct appropriate research to fill the gaps identified, use a less 
quantitative approach, or focus on appropriate risk management 
options to reduce the risk. 
Applying the international policy framework for 
quarantine risk analysis 
Aside from the technical issues associated with risk assessment 
methods, three issues dominate the application of the current 
international framework for quarantine risk analysis — the use of 
the 'precautionary' approaches, determining the appropriate level of 
protection, and the need for multidisciplinary input.  
The 'precautionary principle' 
In some cases, a risk analysis may determine that there are 
significant gaps in information that need to be filled by further 
research before a scientifically based decision can be made on a 
particular issue. Analysis might also lead to recommendations that 
specify the gaps and define the research needed to fill them. For 
example, a number of submissions to the Nairn Review of 
Australian quarantine (Nairn et al. 1996) argued that where there is 
significant uncertainty or where there are significant gaps in 
knowledge needed to conduct a risk assessment, quarantine 
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authorities should take a conservative or precautionary approach. 
Some submissions went further and advocated adoption of the 
'precautionary principle' (or a variant of it) in cases they deemed 
involved significant uncertainty, probable delayed identification or 
reporting of incursions, or inadequate or no means of containing, 
controlling or eradicating incursions. 
The 'precautionary principle' has been defined in various ways but 
may be simply seen as the principle of adopting a conservative 
approach when the relevant information needed to make an 
informed decision is limited — the greater the uncertainty, the more 
conservative should be the decision. Although the SPS Agreement 
does not use the term 'precautionary principle', Article 5.7 states that 
"in cases where relevant scientific information is insufficient" 
Members may provisionally adopt "sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures on the basis of available pertinent information". However, 
the SPS Agreement also states that in such cases, Members "shall 
seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of 
time"4. Thus Member countries' international obligations preclude 
the ongoing or indefinite use of the a precautionary approach as 
grounds for not taking a decision on any quarantine import access 
request. This would seem to be a valid and feasible application of 
the 'precautionary principle', but the use of this term and its precise 
definition and application in other international agreements may in 
future have an effect on how Article 5.7 is interpreted and applied. 
The 'appropriate level of protection' 
Different stakeholders can have widely divergent perceptions of the 
risk associated with a decision. This divergence is often the result of 
disagreement about the level of risk associated with a particular 
                                                 
4 The SPS Agreement is unclear on both which country (i.e. the proposed 
importer or exporter) has the responsibility to obtain the 'additional 
information necessary' and on what constitutes a 'reasonable period of time' to 
review a measure put in place by adopting a precautionary approach consistent 
with Article 5.7. Guidance on these points may be obtained through precedence 
from judgements made by the WTO Disputes Settlement Body. 
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option, in which case consensus can be approached through 
improving the underlying risk assessment. However, the 
disagreement is often more fundamental and rests on different 
perceptions of what level of risk a decision maker, stakeholder or 
society as a whole is prepared to accept - that is, the appropriate 
level of protection (or 'acceptable risk'). Improved risk assessment 
can improve the accuracy of the estimate of the risk associated with 
a decision, but does not help in deciding what constitutes the 
appropriate level of protection.  
Improved risk communication and agreed guidelines or standards 
can help in reaching consensus, but ultimately what constitutes an 
appropriate level of protection is based not on science but on 
judgement - whether of an individual person, stakeholder group, 
community or country. How to determine and describe an 
appropriate level of protection has been the subject of considerable 
discussion related to WTO disputes (e.g. Walker 1998 on the growth 
hormones dispute) and the focus of increased attention by 
quarantine authorities in recent years (e.g. Wilson and Gascoine 
2001). This concept is the subject of Part II of this volume. 
The need for a multidisciplinary approach 
Risk assessment (particularly using more quantitative approaches) 
is an extremely demanding, complex and resource-intensive 
process. It involves consideration of scientific and economic factors, 
often requiring the use of multidisciplinary teams. One of the 
challenges for quarantine import risk assessment is to improve the 
match between the outputs of scientific assessment and the inputs 
needed for economic assessment.  
There have been few formal published economic risk assessments of 
specific quarantine import access requests. Those that have been 
completed tend to be for long-standing and high profile requests to 
import products. Examples in Australia include apples (Hinchy and 
Low 1990), salmon meat (McKelvie 1991; McKelvie et al. 1994) and 
poultry meat (Hafi et al. 1994). Such assessments tend to focus on 
those economic factors that the SPS Agreement specifies shall be 
considered rather than on broader economic aspects that might be 
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addressed in approaches such as cost–benefit analysis that 
economists might ordinarily apply to such questions (e.g. James and 
Anderson 1998). The extent to which broader economic aspects 
might be considered in quarantine import risk assessment will 
undoubtedly be a major theme of discussion at this workshop. 
In complex risk analyses in areas such as quarantine or genetically 
modified organisms, risk assessment teams may need to include 
specialists with skills in disciplines such as communications, 
mathematics, statistics, computer modelling, ecology and 
environmental science in addition to those in risk analysis, animal or 
plant health, and economics. There is also a need to include 
specialists in law, especially in international and trade law, to 
ensure both that the risk analysis process meets statutory 
obligations domestically and that it takes account of all relevant 
international obligations. 
It can be expected that future consideration of issues related to risk 
and trade will require detailed risk analysis. Some of these issues 
will require detailed scientific risk assessments, which will tend to 
use more quantitative approaches where possible, if only to provide 
a basic sensitivity analysis and comparison of the effect of different 
risk management options. Many will also require detailed economic 
assessment of the potential effects. For example, in quarantine 
import access requests, economic assessment may be required of 
both the specific cost of the potential establishment of an exotic 
disease (for inclusion in the import risk analysis itself) and of more 
general economic effects of the trade on prices and markets (for 
consideration in possible industry adjustment measures or other 
policy options). Some issues will also require detailed 
environmental risk assessment, and there is a particular need for 
economists to work with scientists to develop better standards and 
methods for such assessment. Similar requirements for 
multidisciplinary input also occur in other areas of risk analysis 
related to trade (e.g. trade in genetically modified organisms).  
 
Conclusion 
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The standards, guidelines and recommendations provided for 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (by WTO, the SPS Agreement 
and TBT Agreement, and the use of OIE, IPPC and Codex) provide a 
sound framework for the application of risk analysis to international 
trade in animals, plants and their products. This framework, 
although still evolving and imperfect, offers a practical and tested 
approach to the complexities of evaluating risks related to 
international trade. It is certainly worth careful consideration in the 
development of similar standards, guidelines and recommendations 
in other areas of risk analysis related to trade. There is thus an 
opportunity for greater interdisciplinary collaboration to develop 
better both improved methods for risk assessment and better 
standards, guidelines and recommendations for risk analysis across 
all areas of potential risk related to international trade. It is to be 
hoped that this workshop will help to encourage greater 
interdisciplinary understanding and, ultimately, collaboration in 
improving the international framework for risk analysis as applied 
to international trade in animals, plants and their products. 
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The WTO dispute settlement framework and 
operation 
GRETCHEN HEIMPEL STANTON 
The member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
have designed a set of rules governing international trade. The rules 
are legally binding on members and were designed to regulate and 
expand trade. The dispute resolution system is central to 
encouraging, facilitating and ensuring compliance with these rules. 
The rule-oriented system favours mutually agreed solutions and is 
designed to secure voluntary compliance with removal of 
inconsistent trade actions. The procedures are detailed and of a 
quasi-judicial nature. They include timetables, an appeal process, 
and follow-up to ensure implementation. The system permits little 
scope for economic considerations.  
The first section of this chapter briefly describes the WTO dispute 
settlement process. The second section outlines how it has been used 
in three specific disputes concerning the Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement), and the 
outcome of those disputes. The final section contains some 
reflections on the extent economic factors are or are not taken into 
consideration in the dispute settlement process. 
 
                                                 
  The views expressed are those of the author only and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the World Trade Organization. 
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The dispute settlement process 
The primary emphasis in the WTO dispute settlement system is to 
find a mutually satisfactory solution. The first step in the formal 
dispute settlement procedure is that the complaining Member 
Country formally requests consultations with the disputed Member  
through the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. This step is mandatory 
even though the parties to the trade dispute may have already gone 
through extensive bilateral attempts to solve the problem. 
If these formal consultations fail, the complaining country may 
request the establishment of a dispute resolution panel. This panel is 
normally composed of a chairperson and two members. The panel 
members should be unbiased and are approved by both countries. If 
the parties to the dispute cannot reach agreement on the 
composition of the panel, the WTO Director-General may be asked 
to appoint individuals to serve on the panel. 
The panel receives written arguments and evidence from both 
parties, and holds two meetings at which the parties present oral 
arguments and questions to each other. In addition, the panel 
provides an opportunity for interested third parties to submit their 
written or oral arguments. For disputes alleging violation of the SPS 
Agreement, panels should seek advice from relevant technical and 
scientific experts. These experts are to be selected in consultation 
with the parties to the dispute, and their advice may be sought 
either on an individual basis or through the establishment of an 
expert review group. The panel process is strictly confidential. 
The panel prepares a report containing a factual description of the 
situation, a summary of the claims and main arguments of the 
parties (including any third parties), the scientific advice provided, 
and the panel's findings and conclusions. The panel normally 
provides its report within six months to one year. The panel report 
is made public. 
A panel report is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body within 60 
days after issuance, unless there is a consensus against adoption or if 
one of the parties to the dispute appeals the decision. The Appellate 
Body is a permanent body established by the WTO and composed of 
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seven persons acting as judges. Three Appellate Body judges are 
appointed to consider an appeal. The Appellate Body may uphold, 
modify or reverse any or all of a panel's legal findings and 
conclusions, but its review is limited to issues of law. The Appellate 
Body issues its report within 60, or exceptionally 90, days. The 
adoption of the Appellate Body report is subject to adoption by the 
Dispute Settlement Body on the same "negative consensus" basis as 
the panel reports. Once adopted, the rulings are legally binding on 
the country involved. 
If the panel and/or Appellate Body conclude that the defending 
party's actions were inconsistent with one or more WTO agreements 
they will recommend that the country bring its actions into 
conformity with the agreements. Occasionally, ways to do this are 
recommended. 
The defending country has 30 days to inform the DSB how it will 
implement any recommendations. If immediate compliance is not 
possible, the DSB approves a reasonable period of time for 
implementation. If no agreement on "a reasonable time" can be 
reached, an arbitrator may be asked to rule. If the implementation is 
not undertaken within the reasonable period of time, the parties to 
the dispute may negotiate a temporary compensation, usually in the 
form of reduced tariffs or easier access for products from the 
complaining country into the market of the other. 
If no agreement on compensation is reached, the party which brought 
the complaint may request the authorisation of the Dispute 
Settlement Body to retaliate by suspending concessions on trade from 
the offending party. If the parties do not agree on an appropriate 
level of retaliation, the determination may be referred to the original 
panel. This arbitration on the appropriate level of retaliation is the 
only step in the settlement of SPS-related disputes in which economic 
considerations are of primary importance.  
If the defending party modifies its actions and claims to have 
complied with the judgement against it, but the challenging country 
does not agree, the matter may be referred back to the original panel 
for re-examination. 
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Disputes on sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
Many disputes involving quarantine and other sanitary measures 
are resolved without recourse to the formal dispute settlement 
system. Bilateral consultations, formal or informal, are often 
sufficient to clarify any misunderstandings. The SPS Committee also 
acts as a forum for specific trade concerns and through informal 
discussions helps prevent disputes between trading partners. 
Raising an issue in the SPS Committee meetings also permits other 
countries to express their interest and concerns, and may lead not 
only to resolution of the problem at hand but also to the avoidance 
of future problems.  
As of October 2000, over 200 disputes had been formally raised 
under the WTO's dispute settlement system. Of these, 18 alleged 
violation of the SPS Agreement. In five of these 18 cases, panels have 
been established: two regarding the EC ban on meat treated with 
growth-promoting hormones; two regarding Australia's restrictions 
on imports of fresh, chilled or frozen salmon; and one regarding 
Japan's requirement that each variety of certain fruits be tested for 
the efficacy of fumigation treatment. In several cases, the parties 
found mutually agreed bilateral solutions; other cases are still 
pending.  
Case 1: The EC hormones ban 
The complaint by the United States and Canada against the 
European Community's ban on imports of meat treated with 
growth-promoting hormones was the first SPS Agreement dispute 
referred to a panel. This dispute goes back to the 1970s, when 
European consumers became concerned over the use of growth-
promoting hormones in livestock. European consumer organisations 
called for a boycott of veal suspecting that hormonal irregularities in 
teenagers had been caused by veal treated with illegal hormones 
(DES). 
In 1980, the EC Council of Ministers banned the use of oestrogen. In 
1988, the European Community banned the use of other hormones 
for growth promotion, including three natural hormones (oestradiol 
17, progesterone and testosterone) and three synthetic hormones 
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(trenbolone acetate, zeranol and melengestrol acetate (MGA)). The 
European Community also banned imports of meat and meat 
products unless the exporter could prove the meat had not been 
treated with the banned hormones. The European Community 
argued the ban was necessary to protect human health from 
potential risks caused by the consumption of meat containing the 
residues of veterinary drugs. The use of the three natural hormones 
for therapeutic and for herd-management purposes remained 
authorised. 
In 1996, the United States and Canada separately requested a WTO 
panel to examine the case. The main arguments of the United States 
and Canada were: (i) no scientific evidence showed risks to human 
health from the proper use of these hormones for growth-promoting 
purposes; (ii) the EC measure was not based on international 
(Codex) standards; (iii) the EC measure was not based on a risk 
assessment; (iv) the level of risks accepted by the European 
Community with respect to hormones was inconsistent with the 
level of risk the European Community accepted in other comparable 
situations; and (v) there were less trade restrictive measures the 
European Community could impose to ensure health protection.  
Two separate panels were established, in May 1996 (United States 
complaint) and in October 1996 (Canadian complaint). The panel 
sought expert advice concerning the human effects of veterinary 
hormones and drugs used in animals for human consumption; on 
the role of hormones in human cancer; and on the Codex process of 
developing international standards for food safety. Both panel 
reports were issued in August 1997. All parties appealed some 
findings. The Appellate Body report was issued in January 1998, 
and adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body the following month 
(WTO 1998a). 
Legal issues and findings 
According to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, Members shall base 
their requirements on international standards. The Panel decided 
this meant a measure needed to reflect the same level of protection 
as the international standard. The Codex Alimentarius Commission 
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had established standards for five of the six hormones in question. 
According to Codex, intake levels of the three natural hormones did 
not have to be limited. For two of the three synthetic hormones, 
Codex had identified levels of residues below which there was no 
evidence of any human health risk. The Panel concluded that the 
ban on imports of hormone-treated meat was not based on the 
Codex standards (the recognised international standard), since it 
achieved a significantly higher level of protection. The Appellate 
Body decided that "based on" meant that a measure could adopt 
some, but not necessarily all elements of an international standard.  
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement allows a country to have 
requirements that achieve a higher level of health protection than 
the international standard. However, these higher requirements 
must be scientifically justified, or be the consequence of the 
Member's appropriate level of health protection. These requirements 
thus must be based on a scientific assessment of the health risks 
involved as required by Article 5 of the SPS Agreement. Although 
the Panel considered Article 3.3 to be an exception to Article 3.1, 
while the Appellate Body considered it an "autonomous right", both 
agreed that the European Community had violated Article 3.3 
because it had not based its ban on a risk assessment. 
According to Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, Members should 
base their SPS measures on an appropriate risk assessment. The 
definition of a risk assessment, in the case of food-borne risks, is an 
evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human health. The 
European Community had invoked several scientific reports on five 
of the hormones, and the panel accepted that some of them could be 
considered to be risk assessments. However, none of the studies 
supported a ban on hormone-treated meat and the panel concluded 
that the EC measure was not based on the scientific evidence 
submitted. The Appellate Body confirmed that the EC ban was not 
based on a risk assessment and clarified that a rational relationship 
between the measure and the risk assessment was necessary. With 
respect to MGA, and to the potential health risks invoked by the 
European Community, the Appellate Body reached the conclusion 
that no risk assessment had been undertaken. 
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Although governments have a sovereign right to decide what level 
of health risk they accept, the SPS Agreement (Article 5.5) prohibits 
governments from requiring different levels of health protection in 
different situations, if these differences are arbitrary or unjustifiable 
and result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade. The 
panel compared the EC ban on imports of meat treated with natural 
or synthetic hormones with the EC tolerance of naturally occurring 
hormones in untreated meat and other food, such as broccoli or 
eggs. The panel found these situations comparable, since they 
involved the same hormones and therefore the same potential 
adverse health effects. The levels of protection were different; in one 
case the ban existed, in the other case there was no limit on 
endogenously occurring hormones. The panel found this difference 
in levels of protection arbitrary or unjustifiable because the 
hormones had the same potential carcinogenic effect in both cases. 
The total residue level of hormones in meat from treated animals fell 
well within the range of levels found in meat from untreated 
animals. The level of endogenous natural hormones in products 
such as eggs and soy oil was much higher than the level in treated 
meat. The Appellate Body reversed this finding, however, arguing 
that there was a fundamental difference between added hormones 
and naturally occurring hormones in meat and other foods.  
The panel also compared the use of hormones for growth promotion 
to the European Community's allowed veterinary uses of hormones 
for therapy or herd management. Entire herds were often treated 
with hormones, for extended periods of time. The hormones were 
the same and the potential adverse health effects of consuming the 
meat would seem to be the same. Having already found the above 
violation, the panel decided there was no need to make a finding on 
this comparison. The Appellate Body concluded that the therapeutic 
use (of hormones) involved closer supervision of correct use and 
concluded that the difference was not arbitrary or unjustifiable. 
The panel also compared the ban on imports of hormone-treated 
meat with the use of growth promoters (such as the anti-microbials 
carbadox and olanquindox) in swine production. Here the panel 
found an unjustifiable difference in the levels of protection. 
Carbadox and olaquindox are known to be carcinogenic yet the 
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European Community allowed their use without setting maximum 
residue levels. The panel reasoned that this unexplained difference 
in protection showed that imports faced discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade. The panel found three additional 
factors to support this finding. When the ban on imports was 
initially introduced, the European Community was trying to reduce 
its beef surpluses by increasing domestic consumption. Secondly, 
before the ban on hormone treatment, the percentage of hormone 
treated animals in Europe was significantly lower than in Canada 
and the United States. In addition, the hormones had been used in a 
sector where the European Community was trying to limit 
surpluses. In contrast, carbadox and olaquindox were used in the 
surplus-free swine sector. Regarding other growth-promoters, the 
Appellate Body agreed that the distinction in the levels of protection 
was arbitrary or unjustifiable, but it did not agree that this resulted 
in discrimination or a disguised restriction of international trade. 
The European Community invoked the "precautionary principle" to 
defend its ban. It argued that the precautionary principle was a 
customary rule of international law or, at least, a general principle of 
law. Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement permits Members to take 
provisional actions in cases where relevant scientific evidence is 
insufficient. However, the European Community did not invoke 
Article 5.7, explictly stating that the import ban was not a 
provisional measure. The Appellate Body did not take a position on 
the status of the precautionary principle in international law. 
However, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the 
precautionary principle (to the extent it is not explicitly incorporated 
in Article 5.7) does not override the provisions of the SPS 
Agreement. 
Implementation 
The panel report, modified by the Appellate Body, was adopted on 
13 February 1998. Because the parties could not agree on a 
"reasonable period of time" for the European Community to 
implement the findings, an arbitrator determined that this period 
was 15 months. Shortly before this deadline expired the European 
Community stated it would not be in a position to comply as it had 
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commissioned 17 scientific studies which would take longer than 15 
months to conclude. The parties were unable to agree on 
compensation by the European Community for the lack of 
implementation, so the United States and Canada requested the 
right to suspend trade benefits they had previously given to the 
European Community. The parties could not agree on the amount of 
benefits to be suspended, and the original panel was asked to 
arbitrate. On the recommendation of the arbitrators, the Dispute 
Settlement Body authorised the United States to raise tariffs by 100 
percent on EC products worth US$116 million per year, while 
Canada was authorised to suspend concessions with a value of 
CAN$11.3 million per year. As of October 2000, both countries were 
continuing to apply these tariffs, as the European Community has 
not yet brought its measure into conformity with the SPS 
Agreement. 
Case 2: Australian restrictions on salmon imports 
The complaint by Canada against Australia's import restrictions on 
fresh chilled and frozen salmon was the first dispute regarding 
measures taken to protect animal health from the potential 
introduction of diseases. In 1975, Australia prohibited imports of 
fresh chilled and frozen salmon, allegedly to avoid the introduction 
of exotic fish diseases into Australia. The importation of heat-treated 
salmon, including canned salmon, was permitted under conditions 
established by Australia. Following formal consultations with 
Canada under the GATT (WTO precursor) dispute settlement 
provisions in 1994, Australia agreed to undertake an analysis of the 
disease risks of importing uncooked salmon and to examine, in the 
first instance, adult, wild, ocean-caught Pacific salmon from Canada 
and the United States.  
A draft risk assessment of imports published in May 1995 concluded 
that if specific certification conditions were met, imports of adult, 
wild, ocean-caught Pacific salmon posed a negligible risk to 
Australia. A final risk assessment, published in December 1996, 
concluded that possibly 20 exotic fish diseases could be introduced 
by imports of salmon, and that although the probability was small, 
the economic consequences could be great. On the basis of this final 
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report, the Australian government maintained its ban on the 
importation of fresh chilled and frozen salmon. 
Canada requested a panel under the WTO dispute settlement 
procedures, claiming that salmon imported for human consumption 
was very unlikely to lead to the introduction of fish diseases. 
Canada's main arguments were: (i) Australia's requirements were 
neither based on international standards nor on a proper risk 
assessment; (ii) the level of risk accepted by Australia with respect 
to salmon was inconsistent with the level of risk Australia accepted 
from other fish; and (iii) there were less trade restrictive measures 
which Australia could impose in order to ensure its chosen level of 
health protection.  
A panel was established in April 1997. The panel consulted scientific 
experts chosen, in consultation with the parties, from lists of experts 
provided by the International Office of Epizootics (OIE). Expert 
advice was sought on fish diseases, risk assessment and the OIE.  
Legal issues and findings 
The panel observed that Australia had conducted a risk assessment 
on adult, wild, ocean-caught Pacific salmon, and assumed that this 
risk assessment met the requirements of a risk assessment contained 
in Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. However, the panel 
found that the actions Australia had taken were not based on the 
risk assessment, i.e. there was no rational relationship between this 
risk assessment and the import ban on Pacific salmon. For all other 
types of salmon, the panel found that Australia had not done a risk 
assessment and was thus in violation. The panel considered that 
Australia's action prohibiting imports of fresh chilled or frozen 
salmon could also be described as a requirement that the salmon be 
heat-treated. 
The Appellate Body rejected the panel premise that the heat-
treatment requirement was the SPS measure at issue. The Appellate 
Body examined Australia's risk assessment on the basis of the 
definition of a risk assessment found in Annex A of the SPS 
Agreement. The Appellate Body concluded that the risk assessment 
(of Pacific salmon) met the first criteria of the definition, in that it (i) 
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identified the diseases in question, as well as the associated biological 
and economic consequences. However, the Appellate Body found 
that the risk assessment did not (ii) evaluate the likelihood of entry, 
establishment or spread of these diseases, as well as the associated 
biological and economic consequences; and did not (iii) evaluate the 
likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases according 
to the SPS measures which might be applied. It concluded that 
Australia had acted inconsistently with Article 5.1. It further 
concluded that no risk assessment had been done for the remaining 
types of salmon. 
With respect to Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, the panel 
compared Australia's ban on salmon imports with the allowed 
importation of whole frozen herring for bait and the allowed 
importation of live ornamental finfish (aquarium fish). The panel 
looked at (i) differences in the levels of protection adopted in 
different, but comparable situations; (ii) if these differences were 
arbitrary or unjustifiable (iii) and whether they resulted in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade. Although in all 
situations there was at least one disease in common, the panel found 
that the levels of protection were quite different. Salmon 
importation was prohibited, herring were allowed in without 
controls, and ornamental fish were allowed with few controls. The 
panel found the differences in protection to be arbitrary or 
unjustifiable, since bait was directly introduced into the aquatic 
environment, and ornamental fish often became released into the 
wild. Based on these arbitrary or unjustifiable differences, the 
violation of Article 5.1, the sudden change in conclusions between 
the 1995 and 1996 versions of the risk assessment, and the lack of 
restrictions on the internal movement of fish, the panel concluded 
that the ban on salmon imports was discriminatory or resulted in a 
disguised restriction on trade. The Appellate Body upheld this 
finding. 
The panel next examined whether Australia violated Article 5.6 of the 
SPS Agreement, which requires that a measure be no more trade-
restrictive than needed to achieve the appropriate level of protection. 
It examined if other measures: (i) were reasonably available, taking 
into account technical and economic feasibility; (ii) achieved 
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Australia's appropriate level of protection; and (iii) were significantly 
less restrictive to trade. 
The panel noted that Australia's risk assessment identified seven 
technically and economically feasible options and indicated that it 
was "extremely difficult to distinguish between the levels of risk" that 
each option presented. Some of the options were clearly less trade-
restrictive than the import ban/heat treatment requirement imposed 
by Australia. The Panel concluded that less trade-restrictive measures 
existed which could have been used by Australia (WTO 1998b). 
The Appellate Body reversed the finding on grounds that the panel 
had based its considerations on the heat-treatment requirement, not 
on the import prohibition. Because of insufficient factual findings, the 
Appellate Body found itself unable to conclude whether Australia 
had violated Article 5.6 (WTO 1998c). 
Implementation 
The parties were unable to agree on a 'reasonable period of time' for 
Australia to implement the findings. An arbitrator set the reasonable 
period of time for compliance as 8 months after adoption of the 
reports. Australia claimed it had fully implemented the panel and 
Appellate Body recommendations in July 1999, two weeks after this 
deadline expired. Australia had carried out a new import risk 
assessment for fresh chilled and frozen salmon for human 
consumption and other non-viable marine finfish, and a separate 
risk analysis for live ornamental fish. Based on the 1999 risk 
assessment, Australia's new actions allowed the importation of all 
kinds of Canadian salmon, under certain conditions.  
Canada challenged Australia's claim of implementation and 
requested authorisation to take retaliatory trade action on 
Australian exports worth CDN$45 million. Australia asked for 
arbitration over this amount of "retaliation". The Dispute Settlement 
Body asked the original panel to consider Australia's compliance 
(Article 21.5 of the DSU) and to decide the appropriate level of 
"retaliation" (Article 22.6 of the DSU). Both countries agreed to wait 
for the panel decision on compliance before proceeding with 
arbitration over possible trade actions.  
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The same panel Member s had also been charged with examining a 
complaint by the United States against Australia on the same issue. 
However, the United States also decided to wait for the judgement 
on compliance before pursuing its complaint. 
Determination of compliance 
Based on its new risk assessment for all fresh chilled and frozen 
salmon, Australia set new conditions on imports. In addition to 
requiring that fish be eviscerated, head and gills removed, washed 
internally and externally and certified, Australia specified that the 
product had to be processed to a "consumer-ready" state to be 
released from quarantine. The definition of what constituted 
consumer-ready product included a requirement that skin be 
removed from all products larger than 450 grams. Salmon that was 
not in consumer-ready form would have to be processed to 
consumer-ready form in approved premises to reduce risks from 
improper disposal of large quantities of skin, bone, etc. 
The panel noted the compliance deadline had not been strictly met 
and that some of the new measures on fish other than salmon (to 
comply with the consistency requirement) were to be phased in at 
later dates.  
Next, the Panel considered whether Australia's measures affecting 
salmon imports were based on a risk assessment. It found that the 
new risk assessment met the requirements of the SPS Agreement, i.e. 
it identified the diseases and evaluated the likelihood of entry, 
establishment or spread of these diseases, as well as the associated 
biological and economic consequences according to the SPS measures 
which might be applied. However, the Panel found that the 
requirement for salmon products to be in a specified consumer-
ready form was not based on a risk assessment and thus was contrary 
to Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.  
The Panel also found the definition of the consumer-ready product 
to be more trade restrictive than required to achieve the desired 
level of health protection, in violation of Article 5.6. Australia 
argued the consumer-ready requirement was to limit any risk from 
untreated waste from salmon processing plants. The Panel thought 
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that less trade-restrictive requirements, such as consumer 
packaging, would also avoid unsafe processing and achieve the 
desired health protection.  
The report of the panel on compliance was adopted without appeal 
on 20 March 2000. Australia and Canada started consulting, and 
reported on 18 May 2000 that a mutually agreed solution had been 
reached.  
Case 3: Japan's variety-by-variety testing requirement 
The third panel process relating to the SPS Agreement was a 
complaint by the United States against Japan. To help assure that 
imported fruit did not harbour codling moth, Japan permitted entry 
only of those fruit varieties which had been subjected to extensive 
testing as to the efficacy of fumigation treatment. Japan claimed this 
measure was a provisional measure necessary to protect plant 
health. The United States claimed that there was no scientific 
justification for requiring each variety of a particular fruit (ie., each 
distinct variety of apple) to be separately tested. The main US 
arguments were that the Japanese requirement was not based on 
scientific principles and was maintained against scientific evidence 
that showed it was not necessary.  
The panel was established in November 1997. It consulted 
entomology and fumigation experts chosen in consultation with the 
parties, from lists provided by the IPPC. 
Legal Issues and Findings 
Both parties agreed the codling moth presented a risk to Japan. The 
panel focussed on whether there was sufficient scientific evidence 
(required by Article 2.2) supporting the need for the variety testing 
requirement. It concluded that there was no rational relationship 
between the scientific evidence submitted by Japan and the action 
that had been taken (WTO 1998d). The Appellate Body upheld this 
finding (WTO 1999). 
Japan invoked Article 5.7, claiming that its measure was provisional. 
According to this article, in cases where relevant scientific evidence 
Chapter 4  WTO dispute settlement framework and operation  67 
 
is insufficient, Members may provisionally adopt SPS measures on 
the basis of available pertinent information. They must then seek the 
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of 
risk, and review the measure within a reasonable period of time. 
The panel found no evidence that Japan had actively sought to 
obtain additional information to review its measure within a 
reasonable period. The Appellate Body agreed with the panel.  
The panel also considered whether Japan had adopted the least 
trade-restrictive measure which would provide its desired level of 
health protection. The United States proposed product-by-product 
testing. The panel concluded it did not have sufficient evidence to 
determine if this option would achieve Japan's appropriate level of 
protection. The experts advising the panel suggested a second 
option. If there were differences in the way fruit varieties responded 
to the treatment, these would be related to different levels of 
sorption of the fumigant by the fruit variety in question. Testing for 
differences in sorption levels was relatively easy. The panel 
considered that the determination of sorption levels could be a less 
trade-restrictive alternative to the varietal testing requirement. 
The Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding on the product-by-
product testing method proposed by the US. Regarding the 
determination of sorption levels, the Appellate Body found that the 
panel had made an error of law by considering an alternative that 
had not been proposed by the United States, who bore the burden of 
proof that an alternative measure existed. 
According to Annex B, Members must publish all SPS regulations. 
Japan had not published the variety testing requirement. Japan 
argued the testing requirement was not actually an SPS regulation 
because it was not mandatory, the exporting countries were allowed 
to demonstrate quarantine efficiency by other means. The panel and 
Appellate Body found that measures had to be published regardless 
of whether they were mandatory, and that Japan had therefore acted 
inconsistently with this obligation.  
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Implementation 
The United States and Japan agreed that it would be reasonable to 
give Japan until the end of 1999 to implement the rulings. 
Throughout 2000, both parties continued to report that they were 
close to finding a mutually acceptable solution. 
Economic considerations in dispute settlement 
The WTO agreements, including the SPS Agreement, are legal texts. 
The dispute settlement system is a quasi-judicial procedure. Little 
consideration was given to economic arguments or considerations 
during the actual examination of the three disputes outlined above, 
other than in the calculation of allowable retaliation. The text of the 
SPS Agreement makes reference to economic factors in only three 
provisions: Article 5.3, Article 5.6 and the definition of a risk 
assessment in Annex A. 
Nonetheless, economic factors are important in a country's 
implementation of the SPS Agreement. One concern is the 
potentially high cost of undertaking an appropriate risk assessment 
(required by Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement). It should be 
remembered that the legal requirement is that a measure be based 
on a risk assessment, not that the importing country undertake this 
risk assessment itself. In judging whether a risk assessment is 
indeed "appropriate to the circumstances", it is conceivable that a 
future dispute panel might give consideration to arguments of the 
affordability of a particular risk assessment, in particular if a 
developing country is defending its actions. 
The definition of a risk assessment, in the case of risks to animal or 
plant health, as contained in Annex A is: 
"The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or 
spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing 
Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
which might be applied, and of the associated potential 
biological and economic consequences ...". 
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According to Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, in assessing the risk 
to animal or plant health and in determining the measure it will 
apply, a Member is to take into account as relevant economic factors  
"... the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales 
in the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or 
disease; the costs of control or eradication in the territory of 
the importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of 
alternative approaches to limiting risks." 
Some of these economic factors were considered in the risk 
assessments put forward by Australia in the salmon dispute. The 
panel implicitly accepted the factors considered by Australia and the 
manner in which they were included in the risk assessment. 
However, if in some future dispute the economic factors considered 
in a risk assessment were challenged, they could be subjected to 
intensive scrutiny by a panel. 
The third provision of the SPS Agreement which contains a 
particular reference to economic considerations, Article 5.6, requires 
that a government put in place the least trade restrictive measure 
which is capable of achieving its appropriate level of health 
protection, taking into account economic and technical feasibility. 
One difficulty panels face in examining compliance with this 
provision is the vagueness of the way governments describe their 
'appropriate level of protection'. It is difficult to determine if a 
measure achieves the appropriate level. Panels therefore examine 
other forms of possible action that seem to address the principal 
risks, and seek expert advice as to the technical and economic 
feasibility. 
In the salmon dispute, the panel considered that any action taken to 
appropriately reduce risk which had been identified as a possible 
response in Australia's own risk assessment could be considered to 
be technically and economically feasible. In the variety testing 
dispute, experts advising the panel identified an alternative testing 
procedure that was much simpler and less costly than the procedure 
prescribed by Japan, hence the panel considered that this alternative 
was economically feasible. It should be noted that in both of these 
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disputes, the Appellate Body overturned the panel's ruling, 
although not because of the question of economic feasiblity.  
Implementation - suspension of concessions  
In contrast to the examination of compliance with the legal 
obligations of a WTO agreement, economic considerations are a 
critical element during the implementation phase. When a country 
fails to bring its measures into line with its WTO obligations within 
the prescribed "reasonable period of time", the preferred option is 
that it provide compensation for the resulting loss of trade 
opportunities. When there is no agreement on compensation, the 
complainant in the dispute can request authorisation to suspend 
trade benefits previously given to the non-complying country. The 
complainant party identifies the value of trade benefits it wishes to 
suspend, and provides a list of products (tariff lines) that may be 
affected. In the few cases to date in which retaliation has been 
sought, the party affected by the suspension has challenged the 
proposed level of retaliation, and the matter was referred to the 
original dispute settlement panel for arbitration on the appropriate 
level. 
The task of the arbitrators is to determine the normal annual level of 
imports from the complainant that would have existed if the 
challenged party had fully implemented the panel and Appellate 
Body findings at the end of a 'reasonable period of time'. In the beef 
hormones case, the United States requested the right to suspend 
concessions on imports from the European Comunity valued at 
US$202 million, and Canada sought authorisation for suspension on 
CDN$75 million. The arbitrators had to determine what the annual 
value of EC imports of hormone-treated beef from the United States 
and from Canada would have been if the European Community had 
lifted its import restrictions on 13 May 1999.1 The WTO procedures 
do not provide for retroactive compensation, for lost trade 
opportunities during years when the measure was in place, in this 
case since 1988. 
                                                 
1 The decision of the arbitrators is contained in WTO documents 
WT/DS26/ARB (US case) and WT/DS48/ARB (Canadian case).  
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The arbitrators considered both the potential trade in high-quality 
beef and in edible beef offal. EC imports of high-quality beef from 
the United States and Canada are limited by a tariff-rate quota of 
11,500 tons. This quantitative constraint exists irrespective of the 
hormones ruling. The quota represents a negligible portion of total 
EC beef production, and tariff rate quotas allocated to other 
suppliers of high quality beef are usually filled. Given the high 
production and export capabilities of both the US and Canadian 
beef industries, the arbitrators assumed that without the hormone 
ban, the European Community would import at least 11,500 tons of 
high quality beef from the United States and Canada. 
The arbitrators estimated the share of this quota that would 
normally be filled by each country. The estimate was based on the 
respective historic shares with adjustments to reflect the general 
trend of Canada's increasing share of high-quality beef markets. 
The parties to the dispute each provided per unit prices and 
estimates of the expected value of high quality beef. The arbitrators 
considered the current value of high quality US and Canadian beef 
(not hormone treated) in the EC market, and what effect changes in 
cuts and quantities might have on prices if hormone-treated beef 
were permitted. The arbitrators eventually decided that the US 
suggested price, very close to the EC suggested price, was 
reasonable. 
From the quantity and unit value calculations, the arbitrators 
estimated the total value of high quality beef from the United States 
and Canada which could be expected to enter the European 
Community annually had the ban on hormone-treated beef been 
removed in May 1999. However, the arbitrators made further 
adjustments to this calculation. They deducted the value of US and 
Canadian high quality beef (not hormone treated) that was actually 
entering the EC market despite the ban. They also took into account 
the effects on current US export levels of an EC "hold and test" 
procedure for all shipments of US high quality beef that the 
European Community had imposed on the grounds that some of the 
US meat contained prohibited hormones.  
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The calculation of lost trade opportunities for edible beef offal from 
the United States and Canada was more complicated because there 
was no quota setting potential maximum import levels. The 
arbitrators took as a base the average annual US (or Canadian) 
exports of offal to the European Community in the years before the 
ban. A number of adjustments were made to account for the decline 
in EC consumption – recognising that a portion of this decline could 
be due to the hormone ban itself. The arbitrators calculated the 
difference between the trend in import volumes for the years 
immediately following the imposition of the ban (extrapolated from 
actual import volumes preceding the ban) and the actual import 
volumes for these years. The annual average difference was then 
added to actual imports in each of the years 1995-97 and used to 
calculate the expected EC consumption in the absence of the ban.  
The arbitrators then considered the probable per unit value of edible 
beef offal. The United States and European Community suggested 
very similar prices, a lower level was suggested by Canada. The 
arbitrators noted the US price was lower than the current actual 
price but was considered reasonable because prices could be 
expected to fall if the ban were lifted, as a result of the impact 
increased imports would have upon the European price. 
In making their calculations, the arbitrators deducted the value of 
US and Canadian edible beef offal coming from non-treated animals 
that currently entered the EC market. A complication arose because 
a portion of EC imports of edible beef offal is destined for pet food, 
not for human consumption. Offal for pet food is not subject to the 
hormone ban, but is included in data under the same tariff line as 
that destined for human consumption. The parties did not agree as 
to what proportion of potential US and Canadian offal exports 
would go into pet food. The European Community was unable to 
substantiate its claim that over 31per cent was destined for pet food 
so the arbitrators used the US and Canadian estimates (5 and 10 per 
cent, respectively) to reduce their calculation of the total value of US 
and Canadian exports of edible beef offal that would be entering the 
European Community except for the hormones ban. 
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The arbitrators finally judged that if the European Community had 
complied with the findings of the WTO dispute settlement panel 
and Appellate Body by the set deadline, the United States could 
have expected to export an additional US$116.8 million per year of 
high quality beef and edible beef offal to the European Community. 
The value of the lost trade to Canada was estimated as a maximum 
of CDN$11.3 million per year. The Dispute Settlement Body thus 
authorised the United States and Canada to suspend trade benefits 
on an equivalent value of trade from the European Community. 
Conclusion 
To date, economic factors have been of little importance in the 
consideration of disputes over sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
despite the economic implications of the SPS Agreement for 
countries. These include the benefits of imports, the potential losses 
associated with pest or disease introduction, the costs of 
undertaking a risk assessment, and of implementing appropriate 
measures.  
Another potential economic concern to governments is the cost of 
involvement in a formal dispute under the WTO procedures. 
Although the WTO does not collect a fee or charge governments 
using the dispute resolution system, governments face important 
financial and resource costs when they are bringing a challenge, or 
defending their requirements. Nonetheless, one should not 
exaggerate these costs, as in many cases the actual costs are reduced 
because most of the participants are already in place and thus can be 
considered as a fixed cost to their governments. The variable costs 
include additional travel, special studies and overtime for 
employees, as well as opportunity costs of time and resources. 
Given these costs, it might be expected that a complaint would only 
be brought concerning export products of major economic 
importance, ie. those which have an important political constituancy 
in the exporting country. There is no doubt that the potential 
economic gains in the hormones and variety testing disputes are 
substantial; they seem to be considerably less in the salmon case. 
However, the WTO dispute settlement process does not screen 
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complaints nor refuse those where potential trade gains would be 
minimal.  
Each dispute considered at the WTO is judged on its own merits. 
Economic factors are of most direct relevance only when the legal 
decisions have not been implemented, and the value of 
compensation or retaliation for lost trade opportunities must be 
determined. Although the economic evaluation of lost trade 
opportunities will be unique to each dispute, the hormones case 
provides a useful example of the methodologies that might be used, 
the factors which may be examined and the manner in which 
adjustments may be made to reflect the relevant economic 
considerations. 
Countries trade for economic benefits. Economics, by nature, is the 
basis of any trade discussion. The need to protect human, animal 
and plant health leads governments to impose restraints on trade. 
The SPS Agreement and the WTO dispute resolution system 
provide a legal and institutional framework for regulating these 
restraints on the economic process. The focus of the SPS Agreement 
and the WTO process on health and legal, rather than economic 
considerations, should thus come as no surprise. 
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Implications of recent SPS dispute settlement 
cases 
GAVIN GOH AND ANDREAS ZIEGLER 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (hereafter, the SPS Agreement) imposes science-based 
disciplines on quarantine risk management. Article 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement provides a basic obligation that SPS measures be applied 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, be based on scientific principles and are not maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence. This is given specific 
application by Article 5.1 which requires that measures be based on 
a scientific risk assessment. Given its "science-based" focus, to what 
extent can economic considerations be incorporated into quarantine 
decision-making under the SPS Agreement? 
In this chapter we show that the SPS Agreement, as interpreted by 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body in the disputes EC – Hormones, 
Japan – Varietals and Australia – Salmon, permits and indeed requires 
economic analysis in quarantine decision-making. Any risk 
assessment must evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or 
spread of the pest or disease, as well as the associated potential 
biological and economic consequences. Moreover, a Member’s 
appropriate level of protection reflects its optimal balance between 
                                                 
  The authors wish to thank Joan Hird and Vanessa Findlay for their 
constructive comments on the paper. The views expressed and the 
responsibility for any errors are the authors' own. 
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the economic benefits of trade and the potential biological and 
economic impact of pest or disease establishment.  
Economic considerations are also relevant to the capacity of 
Members to adopt WTO-consistent measures. Under Article 5.6, 
Members are only required to take less trade-restrictive alternative 
measures where these are demonstrated to be technically and 
economically feasible. However, a number of potential problems 
relate to the legal test of Article 5.5 which gives rise to a 
presumption of WTO-inconsistency where a Member adopts 
different measures on different products; the obligations of 
Members in relation to pre-1995 measures; and the reasonable 
period of time for implementing WTO findings. 
The 'appropriate level of protection' 
The SPS Agreement recognises the sovereignty of WTO Members to 
determine their own appropriate level of protection. Paragraph 6 of 
the preamble to the SPS Agreement declares as an objective the 
harmonisation of SPS measures on the basis of international 
standards and guidelines "without requiring Members to change 
their appropriate level of protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health". Accordingly, the appropriate level of protection is 
defined as "the level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member 
establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health within its territory" (Annex A, 
paragraph 5). A Member may adopt SPS measures which result in a 
higher level of protection than would be achieved by international 
standards or guidelines, if these do not meet the Member’s 
appropriate level of protection (Article 3.3).  
A balance of economic considerations 
A Member’s appropriate level of protection reflects its individually 
acceptable level of risk. It is a political determination which seeks to 
balance the economic benefits of trade to the particular Member 
against the potential biological, economic and environmental 
consequences of pest and disease establishment. In the case of 
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Australia, the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service (AQIS)1 
recently stated: 
"Australia has the sovereign right to determine its ALOP 
[appropriate level of protection] which reflects government 
policy and community expectations. This element of 
quarantine policy precedes and is separate from the 
establishment of quarantine measures by AQIS." 
"A guide to the ALOP may be found in community and 
industry acceptance of quarantine policy and practice over the 
years. It reflects value judgements of the Australian 
community that take into account the benefits of trade and 
community access to imported goods and the consequences of 
pest or disease introductions on industry, the environment 
and society in general." (AQIS 1999a). 
The SPS Agreement does not require that an appropriate level of 
protection be expressed in quantitative terms, for example a 
minimum magnitude of economic consequences. However, the 
Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon considered that ―this does not 
mean, however, that an importing Member is free to determine its 
level of protection with such vagueness or equivocation that the 
application of the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement, such as 
Article 5.6, becomes impossible".2 
Australia’s appropriate level of protection has been consistently and 
explicitly stated by the Commonwealth government to be a high or 
very conservative level aimed at reducing risk to very low levels, 
while not based on a zero-risk approach. This reflects Australia’s 
status as a significant agricultural producer and exporter, the 
biodiversity of Australia’s environment including the variety of 
plants and animals produced, and Australia’s relative freedom from 
exotic pests and diseases as an island continent. It therefore 
strongly, but not exclusively, reflects economic considerations such as 
                                                 
1 The responsibility for quarantine risk analysis (import and export) has 
now been taken out of AQIS and now resides with Biosecurity Australia, a 
group within the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry - Australia 
2 WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 206. 
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the potential economic impact of pest or disease establishment and 
the benefits of trade. 
It is also noted that the economic asset value of a product is not 
limited to its commercial value as can be determined in the market-
place. There is, for example, a socio-economic value in the 
protection of wild fish for recreational fishing. Similarly, the 
environmental impact of pests and diseases can have associated 
economic costs. 
Distinctions in the 'appropriate level of protection' 
Given finite resources for risk management, a Member is unlikely in 
practice to have in place measures which meet its appropriate level 
of protection in respect of all products. Measures will be adopted on 
a product-by-product basis, on the biological or economic 
significance of the product. It is therefore within a Member’s 
prerogative to adopt minimal risk management measures where the 
biological and economic consequences will be minimal, and even to 
utilise pests or diseases as biological control agents for species with 
negative economic value (for example, rabbit calicivirus). An AQIS 
policy memorandum describes Australia as adopting a "managed 
risk" approach to quarantine: 
"The current Government has endorsed the 'managed risk' 
approach to quarantine. This is the only appropriate approach 
in view of increasing international trade and tourism and the 
finite resources available to AQIS to prevent entry of 
unwanted disease agents at the border. There is also a constant 
threat of introduction of unwanted diseases via natural routes, 
such as wind-borne spread of pests and vectors of disease and 
the discharge of ballast water by international shipping." 
(AQIS 1999b) 
While Members are free to adopt different measures for different 
products, they must act in a manner consistent with Article 5. This 
requires that Members "avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions 
in the levels [of protection] it considers appropriate in different 
situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised 
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restriction on international trade". The Appellate Body in EC - 
Hormones emphasised that the goal of consistency "does not 
establish a legal obligation of consistency of appropriate levels of 
protection ... the goal set is not absolute or perfect consistency, since 
governments establish their appropriate levels of protection 
frequently on an ad hoc basis and over time, as different risks present 
themselves at different times. It is only arbitrary or unjustifiable 
inconsistencies that are to be avoided."3  
The legal test under Article 5.5 
The Appellate Body has identified three elements that must be 
satisfied for a Member to be acting inconsistently with Article 5.5 of 
the SPS Agreement: 
1. the Member adopted different appropriate levels of protection in 
several "different situations"; 
2. the levels of protection exhibit differences which are "arbitrary or 
unjustifiable"; and 
3. the measure embodying those differences results in 
"discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade".4 
Under the first element, situations exhibiting different levels of 
protection cannot be compared "unless they are comparable, that is, 
unless they present some common element or elements sufficient to 
render them comparable".5 The Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon 
considered situations to be comparable where they involve: (1) a 
risk of entry, establishment or spread of the same or a similar 
disease, e.g. where different species are host to the same or similar 
disease agent; or (2) the same or similar associated potential 
biological and economic consequences.6 
                                                 
3 WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 213. 
4 WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 140. 
5 EC – Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 217. 
6 WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 146. 
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The legal test established under Article 5.5 – in particular the first 
element – does not reflect scientific principles and effectively 
reverses the burden of proof against Members maintaining SPS 
measures. Under the first element, situations are comparable where 
they involve "a risk of entry, establishment or spread of the same or 
a similar disease, or a risk of the same or similar associated potential 
biological and economic consequences".7 As a starting point, the 
definition of risk assessment in Annex A refers to an evaluation of 
the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease 
according to the measures which might be applied, and the 
associated potential biological and economic consequences. The 
replacement of the word "and" with "or" in the Annex does not 
reflect the disease-by-disease basis of quarantine risk management, 
nor that quarantine risk is comprised of the risk of entry, 
establishment or spread of a disease and the associated 
consequences. It therefore exposes a Member to undefined claims of 
differential treatment between products on broad economic 
grounds.  
In the Article 21.5 Salmon implementation panel,8 Canada sought to 
make broad distinctions between Australia’s treatment of imported 
salmon on one hand, and the measures Australia applied on 
domestic fish (including wild native fish) which may or may not 
share diseases in common with salmon. This was rejected by one of 
the scientific experts to the panel. Dr McVicar advised that what was 
relevant was the measures for the specified diseases in the same fish 
species or the same diseases in other products, for example other 
salmonids, non-salmonids and ornamentals. The fact that a country 
adopted more relaxed controls for other non-specified diseases, for 
example for wild fish products or indigenous diseases with limited 
distribution, was not relevant to the discussion on salmonids. Each 
product and each disease warranted independent evaluation.9 
                                                 
7 WT/DS18/RW, para. 7.90; also WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 146. 
8 This examined, pursuant to Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, the measures taken by Australia to comply with the 
panel/Appellate Body findings on Australia – Salmon. 
9 WT/DS18/RW, Annex 1 para. 31. 
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It is also scientifically invalid to assume that diseases in common 
between different species involve the same risk of entry, 
establishment or spread. Different strains of the same disease agent 
may show marked differences in pathogenicity, infectiveness and 
therefore risk. For example, some atypical strains of the disease A. 
salmonicida do not cause significant disease in salmonids when they 
come from non-salmonids.10 Dr McVicar also warned against the 
unrestricted use of published host-disease lists: ―The dangers 
associated with the use of such data as a basis for risk assessment is 
illustrated by the ease by which it is possible to break down natural 
barriers of host susceptibility under experimental conditions". This 
was recognised in international regulations where experimental 
studies cannot be used as evidence of host susceptibility.11 
Canada sought to argue the different measures applied by Australia 
for the disease VHSV on pilchards on the one hand, and salmon on 
the other. The Article 21.5 Salmon panel concluded that while VHSV 
was a disease in common between salmon and pilchards, the 
differential treatment and any difference in the appropriate level of 
protection was not arbitrary or unjustifiable under the second 
element of Article 5.5. However it was Australia, the responding 
Member, that had demonstrated this. The following diagram (Figure 
5.1) is useful for illustrative purposes. 
Two issues need to be discussed here. Firstly, in determining the 
measures to be applied on salmonids and non-salmonids, the 
potential biological and economic consequences of each VHSV 
strain on all susceptible species were taken into account. It was 
assessed that the marine strain of VHSV has limited consequences 
for species of fish occurring in Australia, including salmonids. By 
contrast, the biological and economic consequences of the 
freshwater strain of VHSV was assessed to be far more significant. 
Secondly, while VHSV is a recognised disease of salmon, the 
occurrence of VHSV in pilchards was assessed to be an exceptional 
event. There has been only one recorded instance of VHSV in 
pilchards in the cooler waters of North America. Australia sources 
                                                 
10 WT/DS18/RW, para. 6.82. 
11 WT/DS18/RW, Annex 1, para. 28 and 35. 
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Figure 5.1: Disease and fish interactions
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its pilchards from warmer waters where VHSV has not been 
reported. 
It could therefore be concluded that given different strains of VHSV 
exhibit differences in pathogenicity among different species, the 
likelihood of entry, establishment and spread of VHSV for pilchards 
(B) was considerably lower than for salmonids (A). Furthermore, the 
risk of entry, establishment and spread of VHSV from pilchards to 
salmonids (C) was not considered to be significant. The different 
measures applied by Australia on pilchards and salmonids did not 
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in levels of 
protection. 
Canada also sought to compare the different measures applied by 
Australia on diseases of imported salmon on the one hand, and on 
domestic fish such as redfin perch for the disease EHNV.12 It was 
again Australia that successfully demonstrated that: EHNV had 
                                                 
12 Epizootic haematopoietic necrosis virus (EHNV). 
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minimal impact and would not be expected to have particularly 
significant consequences if spread; the primary host of EHNV was 
redfin perch, a wild recreational fish found in most regions where 
salmonids were located, including Tasmania; and that EHNV was 
not a disease reported in salmon. The different situations did not 
therefore involve a risk of entry, establishment or spread of the same 
or a similar disease, or the same or similar associated potential 
biological and economic consequences. 
It is apparent that the legal test under Article 5.5 effectively reverses 
the burden of proof in a WTO dispute. It gives rise to a natural 
presumption of WTO-inconsistency where different measures are 
applied on different species for unspecified pests and diseases. It is 
then incumbent for the Member maintaining the SPS measures to 
submit scientific evidence, under the second and third elements, to 
rebut this.  
A more appropriate test would be to require the complaining 
Member to demonstrate that different situations involve the risk of 
entry, establishment or spread of the same or similar disease, and the 
same or similar associated potential biological and economic 
consequences, for them to be comparable under the first element of 
Article 5. This would reflect scientific and economic realities and the 
product-by-product approach of quarantine risk management. 
Import risk analysis (IRA) 
Article 2.2 imposes a basic obligation on Members that SPS 
measures be based on scientific principles and not maintained 
without scientific evidence. This is given specific application by 
Article 5.1 which requires that SPS measures be based on a risk 
assessment: 
"Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the 
circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or 
health, taking into account risk assessment techniques 
developed by the relevant international organizations." 
Annex A paragraph 4 provides a definition of "risk assessment": 
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"Risk Assessment – The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, 
establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the 
territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the 
associated potential biological and economic consequences;" 
The Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon considered that a risk 
assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 must: 
i. identify the pests or diseases whose entry, establishment or 
spread a Member wants to prevent within its territory, as well as 
the potential biological and economic consequences associated 
with the entry, establishment or spread of these pests or diseases; 
ii. evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these 
pests or diseases, as well as the associated potential biological 
and economic consequences; and 
iii. evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of 
these pests or diseases according to the SPS measures which might be 
applied.13 
Article 5.1 also requires that the measures be based on the risk 
assessment. A measure is based on a risk assessment if there is "a 
rational relationship between the measure and the risk 
assessment".14 These requirements are broadly reflected in the three 
stages of risk analysis – (1) hazard identification, (2) risk assessment 
and (3) risk management - for example in the OIE International 
Animal Health Code (1999) guidelines on the conduct of animal and 
animal product risk analysis. The extent to which economic 
considerations can be incorporated into quarantine decision-making 
shall be examined for each stage. 
Hazard identification 
The OIE International Animal Health Code defines hazard 
identification as "identifying the pathogenic agents which could 
                                                 
13 WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 121. 
14 EC – Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 193. 
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potentially produce adverse consequences associated with the 
importation of a commodity". (OIE 1999, chapter 1.4.2.2). In essence, 
hazard identification is "a categorisation step, identifying biological 
agents dichotomously as potential hazards or not". Whether a pest 
or disease is a potential hazard will clearly flow from the biological 
and economic consequences associated with its entry, establishment 
or spread. 
As a "categorisation step", hazard identification does not require a 
minimum magnitude of economic consequences for a pest or 
disease. It is sufficient that it identifies the potential biological and 
economic consequences associated with the entry, establishment or 
spread of the diseases. The risk of entry, establishment and spread, 
and whether the associated biological and economic consequences 
meets the appropriate level of protection, is examined under the risk 
assessment stage. 
For example the 1999 IRA on salmonids identifies disease agents of 
concern as those which are infectious, and either exotic to Australia 
or present in Australia but subject to official control, and if the 
disease agent is OIE-listed or would be expected to cause significant 
harm in Australia. Significant harm is defined as including 
significant economic harm e.g. increased mortality, reduced growth 
rates, decreased product quality, loss of market access, increased 
management costs (AQIS 1999a, p. 10). 
Risk Assessment 
A risk assessment must evaluate the likelihood of entry, 
establishment or spread of the pest or disease, as well as the 
associated potential biological and economic consequences.15 Article 5.3 
SPS Agreement expressly requires Members to take into account 
economic considerations in risk assessment and risk management: 
In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and 
determining the measure to be applied for achieving the appropriate 
                                                 
15  WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 121. 
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level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection from such risk, 
Members shall take into account as relevant economic factors:  
 the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the 
event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease;  
 the costs of control or eradication in the territory of the importing 
Member; and  
 the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to 
limiting risks. 
The OIE International Animal Health Code identifies four steps in risk 
assessment: release assessment, exposure assessment, consequence 
assessment and risk estimation. The consequence assessment 
describes the potential consequences of a given exposure to a pest or 
disease agent. There must be a causal process "by which exposures 
produce adverse health or environmental consequences, which may 
in turn lead to socio-economic consequences". Examples of 
economic consequences include surveillance and control costs, 
compensation costs and potential trade losses (OIE 1999, chapter 
1.4.2.4). 
The 1999 IRA on salmonids largely reflected the OIE guidelines. 
Quarantine risk was defined as comprising two related factors – the 
probability of the entry and establishment of a disease agent in 
Australia, and the expected impact or significance (consequences) of 
such establishment (AQIS 1999a, p. xiv). The consequences of the 
establishment can have biological effects, economic effects on 
industry and environmental effects (AQIS 1999a, pp.11-12). 
Biological effects include morbidity and mortality, as well as 
economic considerations such as the costs of controlling or 
eradicating a disease, the destruction of in-contact healthy fish and 
the effect on productivity in subsequent generations. The 1999 IRA 
states that economic effect is normally evaluated in terms of the 
costs arising from the biological effects and the commercial 
implications for domestic and international marketing of affected 
animals and their products.  
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While Biosecurity Australia does not take into account the economic 
effects of trade competition when considering the risks associated 
with importation, this may be relevant under the third test of Article 
5.5. The Article 21.5 Salmon panel accepted Australia’s evidence that 
salmon from New Zealand was generally considered to be amongst 
the most competitive in the Australian market (ABARE 1999), but 
that given its low disease imports from New Zealand were subject 
to less restrictions than imports from other sources. This indicated 
that the measures applying on salmon did not result in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade 
inspired to avoid import competition, but were rather quarantine 
measures to protect Australia against diseases.16 
The 1999 IRA classified the impact or significance of the 
establishment of disease into five categories: catastrophic, high, 
moderate, low or negligible (AQIS 1999a, pp. 12-13: box 1.5, 1.6). 
These categories are stated to "lie within a continuous range of 
consequences" and are indicative of expected outcomes in terms of 
biological and economic consequences. The economic consequences 
included economic effects at an enterprise/industry/ national level 
such as product marketing. 
The then AQIS then employed a risk evaluation matrix to evaluate 
quarantine risk before and after the implementation of risk 
management measures. For each disease, the matrix determined 
whether the risk of establishment and its consequences would meet 
Australia’s appropriate level of protection in the absence of specific 
risk management measures (AQIS 1999a, pp. 12-14: figure 1). For 
example, the risk of a disease with a negligible probability of 
establishment and catastrophic consequences was acceptable and no 
specific risk management necessary. The risk of a disease with 
moderate probability of establishment and low consequences, 
however, was not acceptable and importation could not be 
permitted without further risk management. 
                                                 
16 WT/DS18/RW, para. 7.106. 
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Risk management 
A risk assessment must evaluate the likelihood of entry, 
establishment or spread of these diseases according to the SPS 
measures which might be applied.17 The measures must also be 
"based on" the risk assessment. Article 5.3 requires that in 
determining the measure to be applied for achieving the appropriate 
level of protection, Members take into account relevant economic 
factors. Economic considerations will be relevant to risk 
management in:  
i. determining and implementing measures which meet the 
appropriate level of protection;  
ii. assessing the economic feasibility and cost-effectiveness of 
measures; and 
iii. ensuring measures are not more restrictive than necessary in 
their economic impact on trade. 
Firstly, the OIE International Animal Health Code defines risk 
management as "the process of deciding upon and implementing 
measures to achieve the Member Country’s appropriate level of 
protection, whilst at the same time ensuring that negative effects on 
trade are minimised" (OIE 1999, chapter 1.4.2.5). Given the 
appropriate level of protection is a Member’s expression of its 
tolerance of biological and economic consequences of pest and 
disease establishment, balanced against the economic benefits of 
trade, determining measures which meet the appropriate level of 
protection implies economic considerations. It is also an evaluation 
of the degree to which risk management options reduce the 
likelihood and/or magnitude of adverse biological and economic 
consequences (OIE 1999, chapter 1.4.2.6). 
Secondly, given the finite resources for quarantine management, 
measures must be assessed on their practicality and cost-
effectiveness. Article 5.3 lists as a relevant economic factor the 
relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks. 
                                                 
17 WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 121. 
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Similarly, the OIE guidelines provide for an evaluation of feasibility 
– focusing on technical, operational and economic factors – in 
implementing risk management options. The 1999 IRA on 
salmonids states: "In developing measures, Australia must consider 
matters such as practicability and ease of implementation, cost of 
compliance, cost-effectiveness of the measures and impact on trade, 
subject to the over-riding requirement that measures reliably 
achieve the ALOP." (AQIS 1999a, p.140). 
Thirdly, Article 5.6 requires that Members ensure that measures "are 
not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account 
technical and economic feasibility". Footnote 3 provides that a 
measure is more trade-restrictive than required whenever "there is 
another measure, reasonably available taking into account technical 
and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of 
sanitary and phytosanitary protection and is significantly less 
restrictive to trade". 
The 1999 IRA on salmonids concluded that the risk associated with 
the commercial processing of imported salmonids would not meet 
Australia’s appropriate level of protection. Accordingly, commercial 
processing would only be permitted in approved premises with 
conditions on location, waste disposal and related matters (AQIS 
1999a, pp.146-148). To prevent the diversion of imported product to 
commercial processing in non-approved premises, the then AQIS 
would only permit the release from quarantine of "consumer-ready" 
product e.g. skin-on fillets of less than 450 grams in weight. This 
was defined as product the uncontrolled processing of which would 
not give rise to significant amounts of waste. The consumer-ready 
requirement was based on economic practicality – it was not 
economically feasible for the then AQIS to monitor all possible 
processing sites to ensure that unapproved commercial processing 
did not take place. 
In the Article 21.5 Salmon case, Canada’s claim that alternative 
measures were reasonably available was based on an assertion that: 
"Individually, each of the measures required by Australia can be 
presumed to be reasonably available, taking into account technical 
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and economic feasibility".18 Australia argued that the feasibility of 
one measure may be dependent on the existence of another. It could 
not therefore be presumed that individual measures or sets of 
measures were technically and economically feasible in practice.19 
The Article 21.5 panel agreed with Canada that since the current 
Australian requirements were reasonably available taking into 
account technical and economic feasibility, a regime without the 
consumer-ready requirements would be so.20 The panel also 
considered individual and commercial packaging before release 
from quarantine would also be reasonably available given that 
similar requirements were imposed by New Zealand.21 
It is not clear from the language of Article 5.6 the extent to which 
"technical and economic feasibility" incorporates a subjective 
standard. However, a panel is likely to accord the importing 
Member due deference on technical and economic feasibility where 
the Member was a developing country. This will reflect the 
preamble to the SPS Agreement which recognises the special 
difficulties of developing country Members in formulating and 
applying SPS measures in their own territories. There may also be 
scope under Article 5.1 to take into account the technical and 
economic capacity of developing country Members, i.e. a risk 
assessment as appropriate to the circumstances. 
The 'precautionary principle' 
Finally, some comment can be made on the 'precautionary principle' 
and its relationship to the SPS Agreement. The precautionary 
principle is an emerging principle of (international) environmental 
law which provides that mere lack of scientific certainty on potential 
adverse effects should not prevent a country from taking action to 
                                                 
18 WT/DS18/RW, para. 4.274. 
19 WT/DS18/RW, para. 4.276. 
20 WT/DS18/RW, para. 7.146. 
21 WT/DS18/RW, para. 7.147. 
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protect the environment.22 In the context of quarantine, the question 
arises whether a Member can invoke the precautionary principle in 
situations of lack of scientific certainty on the potential biological or 
economic consequences of pest and disease establishment. The issue 
goes towards the balance, implicit in the SPS Agreement, between 
science-based decision-making and the potential consequences of 
pest and disease establishment. 
The Appellate Body in the EC - Hormones case considered that the 
precautionary principle was "reflected" in the right of Members to 
take provisional measures under Article 5.7, and in the right to 
determine their own appropriate level of protection under Article 
3.3 and the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the SPS Agreement. 
A panel examining whether sufficient scientific evidence warranted 
the measure should also "bear in mind that responsible, 
representative governments commonly act from perspectives of 
prudence and precaution where risks are irreversible". The 
precautionary principle does not, however, justify measures 
otherwise inconsistent with specific provisions of the SPS 
Agreement.23 Uncertainty of the potential economic consequences of 
pest and disease establishment does not therefore permit a Member 
to override the science-based obligations of the SPS Agreement. 
Economic considerations and pre-1995 measures 
In common with almost all WTO Members, Australia maintains a 
positive list system of quarantine. Under the Quarantine Act 1908 
and the Quarantine Proclamation 1998, if the import of a product is 
not expressly permitted, it is prohibited. This prohibition may or 
may not be based on a proper risk assessment or an international 
standard. 
Given the limited technical capacity of Members to conduct risk 
assessments, and the fact that Members are receiving new import 
                                                 
22 See for example Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development which provides for a precautionary approach to environmental 
protection. 
23 WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 124. 
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requests on a constant basis, to what extent does the SPS Agreement 
require that all pre-1995 measures be based on a proper risk 
assessment? In particular, does the SPS Agreement provide a 
derogation for pre-1995 measures from the general risk assessment 
obligations and if not, to what extent does Article 5.7 provide a 
plausible defence or justification?  
The general obligations of the SPS Agreement apply to pre-1995 
measures 
The Appellate Body in EC – Hormones rejected the argument that the 
application of Articles 5.1 to 5.5 of the SPS Agreement was limited to 
measures enacted after the entry into force of the SPS Agreement. 
The SPS Agreement did not contain any express provision which 
limited its application or any provision to post- 1 January 1995 
measures. In the absence of such a provision, it cannot be assumed 
that the negotiators intended that central provisions of the SPS 
Agreement, such as Articles 5.1 and 5.5, do not apply to measures 
enacted before 1995 but which continue to be in force thereafter.24 
The WTO Agreement, unlike the GATT of 1947, did not contain 
"existing legislation" exceptions or "grandfather rights".  
Importantly, the Appellate Body recognised that the requirement 
that an SPS measure be based on a risk assessment imposed 
practical and economic burdens on Members in relation to the many 
pre-1995 measures in existence. The Appellate Body noted that 
"Article 5.1 stipulates that SPS measures must be based on a risk 
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, and this makes clear 
that the Members have a certain degree of flexibility in meeting the 
requirements of Article 5.1."25 The Appellate Body did not define the 
term "as appropriate to the circumstances." 
Article 5.7: provisional measures 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement permits Members to adopt 
provisional measures. Where relevant scientific evidence is 
                                                 
24 WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 128. 
25 WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 129. 
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insufficient, Members may provisionally adopt SPS measures on the 
basis of available pertinent information. In such circumstances, 
Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary 
for a more objective assessment of risk and review the measure 
accordingly within a reasonable period of time. 
While the burden of proof in a WTO dispute lies with the 
complainant, the responding Member bears the burden in invoking 
Article 5.7 to rebut claims of inconsistency with Articles 5.1 and 2.2. 
The Appellate Body in Japan – Varietals considered that Article 5.7 
"operates as a qualified exemption from the obligation under Article 
2.2 not to maintain SPS measures within sufficient scientific 
evidence".26 Article 5.7 sets out four requirements, relating to initial 
application of the measure and continuing compliance: 
i. the measure is adopted where relevant scientific information 
is insufficient; 
ii. the measure is adopted on the basis of available pertinent 
information; 
iii. the Member seeks to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk"; and 
iv. the Member reviews the measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time.  
Given that WTO obligations do not have retrospective application, 
the fact that a pre-1995 measure did not satisfy the first two 
requirements of Article 5.7 at the time it was introduced does not 
preclude justification under Article 5.7. It is however uncertain 
when or even if the first two requirements must be satisfied in 
relation to pre-1995 measures. Neither the Panel nor the Appellate 
Body in Japan – Varietals examined the first two elements of Article 
5.7. 
One interpretation is that a Member is required to demonstrate, as 
on 1 January 1995, that all pre-1995 measures were continuing to be 
                                                 
26 WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 80. 
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maintained in a situation where relevant scientific information was 
insufficient and that the measure was maintained on the basis of 
available pertinent information. This ignores the practical 
impossibility of such compliance. An alternate interpretation is that 
a Member must demonstrate at the time of a WTO dispute panel, 
that the measure was being maintained according to the first two 
requirements. 
Where a panel does proceed to examine the first two requirements 
of Article 5.7, it is uncertain what must be demonstrated in terms of 
the scientific evidence. The term "sufficient" under Article 2.2 has 
been interpreted to be a relational concept, which "requires the 
existence of a sufficient or adequate relationship between two 
elements, in casu, between the SPS measure and the scientific 
evidence".27 Extrapolating the reverse interpretation in relation to 
"insufficiency" is however unhelpful.  
It is nevertheless clear from the Article 5.1 jurisprudence in Salmon 
and Hormones that the scientific evidence does not have to be 
conclusive. Experts advising a panel would probably be asked about 
the sufficiency of scientific data that might be available in order to 
arrive at a scientific judgment. A complainant could also be 
expected to document available data and to compare the 
"sufficiency" of such data drawn upon in risk assessments on other 
products by the importing Member and other Members. A panel 
could well be influenced by evidence that other WTO Members had 
undertaken risk assessments based on the same data. 
The Appellate Body noted that the SPS Agreement did not set out 
explicit prerequisites on the additional information to be collected, a 
specific collection procedure, or what actual results must be 
achieved. However, Article 5.7 states that the additional information 
is to be sought in order to allow the Member to conduct "a more 
objective assessment of risk". The information sought must therefore 
be germane to conducting a risk assessment, i.e. the evaluation of 
the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease, 
                                                 
27 WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 73. 
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according to the measures which might be applied.28 In Japan – 
Varietals, the information collected by Japan was found not to 
examine the appropriateness of the SPS measure at issue and did 
not address the core issue as to whether varietal characteristics 
cause a divergence in quarantine efficacy.29 
On the fourth requirement, it is noted that "review the measure" 
within the reasonable period of time does not equate to "complete a 
risk assessment". "Review the measure" only requires that Members 
commence a risk assessment - if there was sufficient scientific 
evidence for a more objective assessment of risk - within a 
reasonable period of time.  
The Appellate Body in Japan - Varietals considered that what 
constitutes a '"easonable period of time" has to be established on a 
case-by-case basis and depends on the specific circumstances of each 
case, including the difficulty of obtaining the additional information 
necessary for the review and the characteristics of the provisional 
SPS measure.30 In that case, the scientific experts had advised that 
studies to determine whether varietal differences mattered for 
quarantine efficacy could be carried out relatively easily, i.e. it was 
relatively easy to collect the necessary additional information. While 
the obligation "to review" the varietal testing requirement has only 
been in existence since 1 January 1995, Japan had not reviewed the 
measure "within a reasonable period of time".31  
Practical implications for WTO members 
The Appellate Body in Hormones recognised the practical difficulties 
associated with pre-1995 measures and appeared to leave open 
some flexibility for Members in interpreting "as appropriate to the 
circumstances" under Article 5.1. This does not, however, displace 
the Article 5.1 requirement that there must be some sort of risk 
assessment on which the measures are based on. "As appropriate to 
                                                 
28 WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 92. 
29 WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 92; WT/DS76/R, para. 8.56. 
30 WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 93. 
31 WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 93; WT/DS76/R, para. 8.56. 
96  Part I  The multilateral rules under WTO 
 
the circumstances" therefore qualifies the standard of the risk 
assessment and not whether there should be a risk assessment per se. 
Article 5.7 is therefore the relevant provision in respect of pre-1995 
measures. 
There is insufficient jurisprudence to determine the extent to which 
Article 5.7 provides a plausible defence or justification for pre-1995 
measures. A strictly literal interpretation of Article 5.7 - read in the 
context of the Appellate Body’s statements that SPS provisions do 
not confer "grandfather rights" – would preclude Article 5.7 as such 
a defence. Balanced against this is the impossibility of Members' 
compliance – given practical and economic realities – under this 
interpretation. 
It will ultimately be a question of "reasonableness" to be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, balancing the rights and obligations of the 
importing Member and the Member seeking quarantine access. 
Relevant factors might include: the bona fides of the parties, i.e. 
whether the measure was being maintained as a disguised 
restriction to trade; the technical and economic capacity of the 
importing Member to conduct only a limited number of risk 
assessments at any one time; the number of import requests 
received; when the import request was first brought to the attention 
of the importing Member; and the ease of collecting additional 
information and reviewing the measure. 
In practice, WTO panel and appeal processes could take up to 14 
months from the date of the request for consultations to the date of 
adoption of the panel/Appellate Body reports by the DSB. A 
Member will then have a reasonable period of time to implement 
the DSB findings. Given that full WTO processes could take 
anywhere between 18 to 28 months, Members would be reluctant to 
initiate complaints which could well be overtaken by events, i.e. the 
completion of a proper risk assessment.  
In cases where a risk assessment is scheduled or in progress, WTO 
panels are likely to accord a Member time to complete it. Article 5.7 
only requires Members to "review ... the measure accordingly within 
a reasonable period of time", it does not provide that Members must 
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conduct risk assessments within this period. Where no risk 
assessment was scheduled or in progress, the question will turn on 
what constitutes the reasonable period of time for reviewing the 
measure. On a balance of rights and obligations, there is little 
economic detriment to an exporting Member in respect of a pre-1995 
measure maintained by a Member, but for which no import requests 
have been made. It is also a question of reasonableness, given the 
practical and economic constraints on Members, whether a Member 
is required to review all pre-1995 measures regardless of whether or 
not there is any economic interest in importing a particular product. 
A number of practical conclusions can be made. Firstly, the refusal 
to conduct simultaneous risk assessments may not, by itself, preclude 
the application of Article 5.7. A panel interpreting the 'reasonable 
period of time' may take into account the practical constraints on 
Members conducting risk assessments on all requested products of 
all Members at the one time. Where resources are limited, it may be 
reasonable for a Member to refuse simultaneous risk assessments to 
maintain equity between importing Members. However, this will 
only be one factor to be considered in the "reasonableness" matrix. 
Secondly, while Members are likely to be accorded time to complete 
a risk assessment, it is uncertain what this period of time is. 
'reasonable period of time' in Article 5.7 only relates to the 
requirement to "review" the measure. It does not provide guidance 
on the time to conduct a proper risk assessment. Panels are likely to 
consider the practice of other WTO Members, the complexity of the 
subject matter and the resource constraints on the importing 
Member. Panels may also take into account domestic legal processes 
such as delays from Australian Administrative Decisions Judicial 
Review challenges. 
Finally, in terms of an importing Member’s work program, priority 
for conducting risk assessments should be given to products for 
which import requests have been received, according to their 
economic significance, and with priority to the earlier requests. This 
reflects the likelihood of WTO challenge by exporting Members. 
There is little risk of a WTO challenge with respect to historical 
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measures covering products for which there was little or no interest 
in trade. 
Implementation of WTO dispute settlement findings 
Article 21.3 of the Disputes Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
provides that in the event of a finding of WTO-inconsistency - for 
example that an SPS measure was not based on a proper risk 
assessment - the Member has a 'reasonable period of time' to bring 
its measures into conformity.  
Where parties fail to agree on a period, this is determined by 
binding arbitration. The guideline for arbitration is that the 
reasonable period of time should not exceed 15 months from the 
date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report. This period 
may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular 
circumstances (Article 21.3 (c) DSU).  
Arbitrators have to date interpreted 15 months to be the outer limit 
for the reasonable period of time. In both Korea – Alcoholic Beverages 
and Australia – Salmon, the arbitrators noted that the 15 month 
period was a guideline and not an obligation.32 According to the 
arbitrators, the reasonable period of time is the minimum period at 
which a Member can implement within its legal system. Where 
implementation could be effective by purely administrative and 
non-legislative means, the reasonable period of time could be 
considerably shorter. Conversely, arbitrators have provided parties 
longer time frames where implementation necessitated legislative 
amendment. 
This distinction between legislative and administrative 
implementation arbitrarily discriminates between different 
Members on their systems of government. It is also incorrect to 
assume that administrative implementation is necessarily faster than 
legislative implementation. Most non-legislative systems embrace 
strong natural justice and administrative law requirements, for 
example Australia’s Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 
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1977. These impose minimum time-frames and consultation 
requirements for administrative decision-making and acceleration of 
processes could give rise to risks of judicial challenge.  
Importantly, the reasonable period of time does not take into account 
economic factors such as the resources and time necessary to 
conduct a proper risk assessment.33 Implementation may be 
bywithdrawal of the measure. This is consistent with Article 21.1 of 
the DSU which declares the prompt compliance with 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB as essential for the 
effective resolution of disputes. 
In Australia – Salmon, the arbitrators repeated that the reasonable 
period of time should be the shortest period possible within the 
legal system of the Member to implement the WTO findings. 
Conducting risk assessments was not pertinent to the determination 
of the reasonable period of time. Given that implementation could 
be effected by administrative means, the reasonable period of time 
was determined to be eight months i.e. 6 July 1999. The then AQIS 
conducted accelerated import risk analysis processes for salmonids, 
other marine finfish and live ornamental fish, and new measures 
were announced on 19 July 1999. 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that economic considerations are very much a 
part of, and are not inconsistent with, science-based quarantine 
decision-making under the SPS Agreement. Firstly, a Member’s 
appropriate level of protection reflects economic considerations 
such as the economic benefits of trade and the potential economic 
impact of pest or disease establishment.  
Secondly, in conducting a risk assessment a Member must evaluate 
the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of the pest or 
disease, as well as the associated potential biological and economic 
consequences. Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement expressly requires 
Members to take into account economic considerations in risk 
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assessment and risk management such as: the potential damage in 
terms of loss of production or sales from the entry, establishment or 
spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or eradication in the 
territory of the importing Member; and the cost-effectiveness of 
alternative approaches to limiting risks.  
The SPS Agreement is however less accommodating of economic 
considerations on the technical and economic capacity of Members 
to implement WTO-consistent measures. Firstly, the legal test of 
Article 5.5 gives rise to a presumption of inconsistency where a 
Member adopts different measures on different products and does 
not reflect scientific or economic practice. Secondly, pre-1995 
measures remain a potentially serious issue for importing Members. 
However, panels and Members are likely to adopt a flexible 
approach to pre-1995 measures to take into account the practical and 
economic constraints on full compliance. Finally, the reasonable 
period of time for implementing WTO findings does not include the 
time or resources necessary to conduct a proper risk assessment. 
This reflects the fundamental object of the DSU which is the prompt 
settlement of disputes. 
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The 'appropriate level of protection': a European 
perspective 
SPENCER HENSON 
As traditional barriers to agricultural trade have diminished, there 
has been increased attention focused on the impact of sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures on trade. The implementation of the 
SPS Agreement has defined a series of rights and principles for the 
regulation of SPS measures that have the potential to impede trade. 
Furthermore, the enhanced transparency of SPS measures provided 
for under the Agreement, and the desire to avoid the great economic 
costs associated with the WTO's dispute settlement procedures, are 
engendering greater discipline in the application of SPS measures 
amongst Members. Simultaneously, however, the increased 
application of SPS measures and growing use of new technologies, 
for example biotechnology, are likely to generate increased tensions 
and disputes between trading partners regarding the legitimacy of 
these measures. 
The SPS Agreement confirms the right of Members to implement 
SPS measures provided they satisfy the requirements of the Treaty, 
in particular a commitment to apply measures that are least trade 
distortive. Furthermore, the Agreement permits Members to define 
their own 'appropriate level of protection' (ALOP), that level of 
protection deemed to be acceptable and which the SPS measures 
applied aim to achieve. This chapter explores the concept of ALOP 
as applied in the European Union (EU). It describes the concept of 
ALOP as defined by the SPS Agreement, explores how this concept 
is applied by the EU and evaluates the extent to which this accords 
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with the Agreement. Two key issues associated with the EU's ALOP 
are explored, namely the 'precautionary principle' and the role of 
'other legitimate factors' in establishing SPS measures. 
Food safety concerns in the European Union 
Before proceeding to explore the concept of ALOP as applied in the 
EU, it is important to recognise the social and political environment 
within which SPS measures, and more specifically food safety 
controls, are developed and applied in the European context. Food 
safety is a highly sensitive issue in the EU, probably more so than in 
other developed countries. Food safety issues typically receive 
extensive coverage in the media and as a result there is a public 
debate about the safety, or otherwise, of food products and 
technologies. A case in point is agricultural biotechnology, which 
has received greater and increasingly negative media attention in 
the UK, for example, than the United States (Figure 6.1). 
Furthermore, the EU has been plagued by a series of high-profile 
food safety problems, the most notable of which are BSE and 
contamination of animal feed with dioxins. These have served to 
heighten consumer concerns about food safety and raised questions 
about the efficacy of existing controls. 













































Source: Kalaitzandonakes and Marks (1999). 
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There is evidence that consumers in the EU lack confidence in 
institutions charged with regulating food safety, both at the 
Community and Member State levels, both in terms of the 
information they provide and their ability to ensure food is 'safe' to 
eat. For example, Figure 6.2 presents the results of a pan-European 
study on consumer attitudes towards food safety undertaken for the 
European Commission in 1998. These results suggest a distinct lack 
of trust in producers, food retailers, national governments and pan-
European institutions with respect to information on food safety. 
Furthermore, there are perceptions that existing food safety controls 
lack transparency and are too closely oriented to the needs and 
demands of agricultural producers and the food industry, rather 
than the protection of public health and other consumer interests. 
Thus, food safety has become a major political issue both within the 
Member States and the Commission, with a perceived need to 
demonstrate that consumer interests are paramount and that a high 
level of precaution is applied to ensure food is as safe as possible. 
Figure 6.2: Proportion of respondents considering that persons or 





























































Source: INRA (1998). 
 
Responding to consumer concerns and the consequent political 
pressure to enhance the level of protection afforded consumers, a 
program of reforms has been implemented within the Commission 
as well as individual Member States (CEC 1997, 2000a; James, 
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Kemper and Pascal 1999). On the one hand, proposal have been put 
forward for the revision of EU food safety legislation, with the 
objective of enhancing the coverage and efficacy of existing controls. 
On the other, institutional structures have been, and continue to be, 
reformed in an attempt to engender consumer confidence. For 
example, in 1997, responsibility for food safety policy within the 
Commission was moved from the Directorate General (DG) 
responsible for agriculture to that responsible for consumer 
protection. At the same time, the system of expert committees 
through which scientific advice is provided to the Commission was 
reformed to enhance transparency and ensure consumer interests 
are to the fore. More recently, proposals have been published for a 
European Food Authority, separate and independent of the 
Commission. These changes serve to further illustrate the political 
sensitivity of food safety within the EU. 
The SPS Agreement and the 'appropriate level of 
protection' concept 
The SPS Agreement asserts the right of Members to take SPS 
measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 
provided they are consistent with the provisions of the Agreement 
(Pauwelyn 1999).1 For the purposes of the SPS Agreement, SPS 
measures are defined as any measures applied to: 
 protect animal or plant life or health from risks arising from the 
entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying 
organisms or disease-causing organisms; 
 protect human or animal life from risks arising from additives, 
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, 
beverages or feedstuffs; 
 protect human life or health from risk arising from diseases 
carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests; and 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed discussion of the provisions of the SPS Agreement 
see Chapters 2 and 4 in this volume, by Roberts and Stanton. 
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 prevent or limit other damage from the entry, establishment or 
spread of pests. 
The basic tenants of the Agreement are that measures should only 
be applied under the following circumstances: 
 to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; 
 if based on scientific principles; and 
 not maintained, with one exception (see later), without sufficient 
scientific evidence. 
It can be inferred, therefore, that Members do not have a right to 
take such measures unless these conditions are satisfied (McGovern 
1995). 
The SPS Agreement places great emphasis on the need for SPS 
measures not to be "maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence". Providing the measures applied by Members satisfy this 
requirement, however, they are free to define their own ALOP. The 
Agreement does not explicitly define ALOP, but notes that many 
Members refer to it as the level of risk. This suggests that ALOP is 
the level of risk that Members deem 'acceptable' in establishing an 
SPS measure. Implicit in the Agreement is an obligation to 
determine the ALOP. This does not need to be specified in 
quantitative terms, but Members are not at liberty to determine the 
level of protection with such ambiguity that the provisions of the 
Agreement cannot be applied effectively. 
Although zero risk is not a meaningful scientific objective of SPS 
measures, it can be the level chosen by a Member as its ALOP (WTO 
1998c). In this case, the Member would presumably aim to achieve 
the lowest level of risk that could be scientifically determined. If a 
Member fails to define their level of protection with sufficient 
precision, it may be established by dispute panels on the basis of the 
measure applied (WTO 1998c). 
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The requirement to base SPS measures on "sufficient scientific 
evidence" is presumed to be satisfied by measures that "conform" to 
the standards, guidelines and recommendations defined by the 
international standards organisations.2 The Appellate Body has also 
identified a category of measures that, whilst not conforming to 
international standards, are based on them, as is specified in the 
language of the SPS Agreement (WTO 1998a). The SPS Agreement, 
thus, aims to encourage the harmonisation of SPS measures amongst 
WTO Members and implicitly their ALOP. 
Whilst Members are free to implement SPS measures that result in a 
level of protection that differs from those based on the standards 
specified by the international standards organisations, in such 
circumstances specific scientific justification is required. Members 
are required to demonstrate that such measures are based on a risk 
assessment, as appropriate under the circumstances, of the risks to 
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk 
assessment techniques developed by the international standards 
organisations. The SPS Agreement provides two definitions of risk 
assessment: 
 the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread 
of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member 
according to the SPS measures which might be applied, and of 
the associated potential biological and economic consequences; 
and 
 the evaluation of the potential for the adverse effects on human 
or animal health arising from the presence of additives, 
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, 
beverages of feedstuffs. 
The expression "as appropriate in the circumstances" gives Members 
a degree of flexibility in satisfying the requirements of the 
Agreement (Pauwelyn 1999). This reflects the difficulties that 
Members face in adjusting SPS measures in force prior to the 
Agreement (WTO 1998a). The existence of unknown or uncertain 
                                                 
2 Most notably Codex Alimentarius, the International Office of Epizooties 
(OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). 
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elements does not negate the requirement to undertake a risk 
assessment (WTO 1998c). 
The first of these definitions of risk assessment is associated with the 
first, third and fourth categories of SPS measure detailed above, as 
defined by the SPS Agreement, namely those broadly associated 
with the risks associated with pests and diseases. Such an 
assessment consists of three key stages (WTO 1998c): 
 identify the relevant pest or disease(s) and the associated 
biological consequences. 
 evaluate the likelihood of the entry, establishment or spread, and 
of the consequences (for each pest or disease if several have been 
identified). 'Some' evaluation is not sufficient. Likelihood means 
probability, assessed either quantitatively (for example, a 
probability of 0.32) or qualitatively (for example, high 
probability). 
 carry out these evaluations according to the measures that might 
be applied. 
The second definition of risk assessment has a narrower focus and is 
associated with the second category of SPS measure detailed above, 
namely, the risks to human and animal health associated with foods, 
beverages and feedstuffs. In this case, the specific form of the 
assessment has not been clearly defined, although it would clearly 
need to examine the alternative measures that might be applied in 
order to identify that which is best suited to the risk involved. 
The Appellate Body has determined that the obligation to base SPS 
measures on a risk assessment does not imply a requirement to 
establish a quantified minimum level of risk. However, the risk 
must be more than a theoretical uncertainty arising because science 
is unable to provide absolute evidence that a substance is safe. 
Furthermore, there must be an objective relationship between an 
SPS measure and a risk assessment, rather than simply taking the 
assessment into account when promulgating the measure. Merely 
obtaining the data required to undertake a risk assessment is not 
sufficient to justify that a measure is justified scientifically (WTO 
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1999d). This does not mean, however, that a Member may not rely 
on a divergent opinion coming from a qualified source, for example, 
especially where there is a clear and imminent threat to life (WTO 
1998a). 
As described above, the SPS Agreement obliges Members not to 
maintain measures without sufficient scientific evidence. When a 
Member has reason to believe that an SPS measure implemented by 
another Member restricts (or has the potential to restrict) its exports 
and is not based on the relevant international standards, guidelines 
or recommendations, an explanation of the rationale for the measure 
must be provided on request. Furthermore, the Appellate Body has 
ruled that failure to provide evidence of this when requested to do 
so would be a strong indication that it did not exist (WTO 1999). 
Thus, it has encouraged dispute settlement panels to draw adverse 
inferences where a Member fails to provide information in its 
possession. 
In cases where "relevant scientific evidence is insufficient", a 
Member may provisionally adopt measures "on the basis of 
available pertinent information". However, Members must seek to 
obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective risk 
assessment and must review the measure within a "reasonable 
period of time". What is considered "reasonable" will depend on the 
particular circumstances involved (WTO 1999). In the case of the 
report of the panel on measures affecting imports of salmon, for 
example, 20 years was not regarded as "provisional" (WTO 1998b). 
The SPS Agreement, aims to engender consistency in the application 
of the concept of ALOP against risks to human, animal or plant life 
or health. Thus, Members are required to avoid arbitrary and 
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of protection considered to be 
appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions act to impede 
trade. However, this does not imply that the ALOP adopted by a 
Member is expected to be absolutely consistent (WTO 1998a), only 
that any differences should be non-arbitrary and justifiable. 
Furthermore, consistency is seen as a long-term objective and 
implicitly aimed at preventing discrimination between Members 
where identical or similar conditions prevail (WTO 1998a). 
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In judging consistency, situations can only be compared if they 
possess some "common elements" (WTO 1998a; Pauwelyn 1999). 
These elements are indicated by the definition of risk assessment 
applicable to the measure (see above). In the case of the first 
definition, situations may be compared where they involve the same 
or a similar disease or a risk associated with the same or similar 
biological or economic consequences, irrespective of whether the 
products involved are the same. It is sufficient, for example, that 
situations have in common the risk of entry, establishment or spread 
of a particular disease (WTO 1998c). The SPS Committee is currently 
developing guidelines to provide practical guidelines on the 
interpretation of consistency. These are likely to include, for 
example, differences in consumer perceptions of risks to human 
health. 
In summary, the SPS Agreement permits Members considerable 
flexibility in determining the level of protection they deem 
appropriate given their own particular circumstances, and to apply 
measures in order to achieve this level of protection. In so doing, 
however, Members are required to demonstrate scientifically that 
the measures applied to achieve the desired ALOP are justified and 
that the ALOP is applied consistently. The specific rules laid down 
by the SPS Agreement are, however, subject to interpretation and 
their specific meaning is only being established through case law 
(Selheimer 1998; Pauwelyn 1999; Thomas 1999). Indeed, issues such 
as the scientific justification of measures and consistency of the 
ALOP have been key elements of the three disputes on which the 
Dispute and Appellate Panels have ruled to date. 
The European Union's ALOP 
Whilst there is general agreement between the signatories to the SPS 
Agreement on the need for SPS measures to be based fundamentally 
on scientific evaluation, risk assessment is not an accurate process of 
measurement, but of approximation often based on scientifically 
plausible hypotheses rather than established facts (Somogyi 1999). 
As a result it is virtually unavoidable to introduce elements of value 
judgement when undertaking risk assessment. Consequently, whilst 
attempts have been made to develop international guidelines on, for 
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example, principles and procedures for test methods and means of 
evaluation, it is extremely difficult to reach an international 
consensus regarding an appropriate value for the ALOP (Somogyi, 
Gori and Appel 1999). This is apparent, for example, in discussions 
and negotiations in the international standards organisations, in 
particular Codex Alimentarius. 
Explicit reference to the EU's ALOP is made in the Treaty 
establishing the Community. The European Commission is required 
to adopt a "high level of protection" under Article 95 (3) of the 
Treaty: 
"The Commission, in its proposals envisaged ...... concerning 
health, safety, environmental protection and consumer 
protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking 
account in particular of any new development based on 
scientific facts. Within their respective powers, the European 
Parliament and the Council will also seek to achieve this 
objective." 
Likewise, Article 152 states that: 
"A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in 
the definition and implementation of all Community policies 
and activities." 
Whilst what is considered a "high" level of protection will be 
interpreted and determined in the context of specific areas of 
environmental and consumer protection, the Treaty appears to 
commit the institutions of EU to pursuing a relatively cautious 
approach given the state of current scientific knowledge. 
The European Commission takes a rather wide perspective when 
determining the ALOP applied in the application of SPS measures. 
Reference is made to the need to balance the rights and freedoms of 
individuals, industry and organisations with the need to reduce the 
risk of adverse effects to human, animal or plant life or health or the 
environment (CEC 2000a). This perspective appears to differ 
somewhat from the policy of certain other countries, for example the 
US, which purport to focus specifically on the scientific basis for any 
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measures applied. This is evident, for example, from the dispute 
between the EU and US over restrictions on the use of growth 
hormones in beef production. The EU, in justifying these 
restrictions, cited consumer anxiety over the safety of beef and 
implicitly equated these perceptions with the requirement to protect 
public health (Carter 1997). The US, however, asserted that these 
restrictions lacked any scientific basis and were motivated by 
protectionism. 
As well as differences in the range of factors deemed salient when 
establishing the ALOP, methodological approaches to risk 
assessment can also differ between countries. Such differences exist, 
for example between the US and EU, particularly in the case of 
carcinogenic substances (Somogyi 1999). In the US, specific methods 
of quantitative risk assessment are applied, whereby data from 
animal experiments are extrapolated to derive a 'virtually safe dose' 
(VSD) with the theoretically possible incidence in humans of the 
particular form of toxicity associated with the substance. In the EU, 
however, a case-by-case evaluation based on the 'weight of 
evidence' approach is applied (Scientific Committee for Food 1996). 
Whereas this approach also takes as a starting point data from 
animal experiments, determination of the likely potency of the 
substance is derived by consideration of a wide range of other 
toxicological data. 
Whilst it is evident that the EU strives to achieve a high ALOP in the 
context of SPS measures, there are clearly inconsistencies in the level 
of protection applied by individual Member States and to different 
products. Thus, for example, whilst there are concerns about the 
safety of genetically-modified crops for which no risk to human 
health has been demonstrated to date, products such as 
unpasteurised cheese, which are acknowledged to be 'high risk', are 
widely consumed in certain Member States (see Box 6.1). These 
differences reflect consumer perceptions of the risk associated with 
food and, in turn, social demands for different levels of protection. 
In the case of unpasteurised cheese, whilst there have been debates 
about the need for stricter regulation, consumer demand for such 
products limits the scope of regulators. 
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Box 6.1: Cheese manufactured from unpasteurised milk cheese in 
the EU 
Although there is significant evidence of considerable consumer concerns about 
food safety within the EU, there is widespread consumption of some foods which 
scientists judge to be 'high risk'. One example is cheese manufactured from 
unpasterised milk, which is consumed widely in Member States such as France, 
Belgium and Italy. In these countries, where a wide range of cheese from small-
scale producers is available, the fact that cheese is made from unpasteurised milk is 
frequently judged to be a positive quality characteristic. The European Commission 
has introduced harmonised requirements to permit these products to move freely 
within the EU and they are now widely available in many Member States (Maze, 
Letablier and Valceschini 1996). Indeed, new cheeses produced from unpasteurised 
milk have been introduced in other Member States, for example UK and Ireland. 
The European Commisison has argued, most notably within Codex Alimentarius, 
that good hygiene practice in the production of cheese from unpasteurised milk 
can ensure an appropriate level of food safety. However, many countries do not 
permit such products to be manufactured, or require extended periods of 
maturation before they can be marketed. Examples include the US and Canada. 
The 'precautionary principle' 
An aspect of the EU's ALOP that has caused controversy 
internationally is the 'precautionary principle'. Whilst the need for a 
precautionary approach to risk analysis is generally accepted 
amongst high income countries (OECD 2000), there are clearly 
differences of opinion, in particular regarding whether precaution is 
purely an element of risk assessment, or also extends to risk 
management. The European Commission has recently published a 
consultation document on the 'precautionary principle' which 
outlines its views on the role of precaution and how it might be 
applied in the promulgation of SPS measures (CEC 2000a). At the 
current time, the 'precautionary principle' is defined within the 
Treaty, although only with respect to protection of the environment 
(Article 174):3 
"Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high 
level of protection taking into account the diversity of 
situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be 
based on the precautionary principle and on the principles 
                                                 
3 The notion of the precautionary principle, at least in broad terms, is also 
incorporated into the law of certain EU Member States, for example Germany. 
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that preventive action should be taken, that environmental 
damage should as a principle be rectified at source and that 
the polluter should pay." 
However, the Commission has determined that the principle is 
applicable more generally to situations where (CEC 2000a): 
".... scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain 
and there are indications through objective scientific 
evaluation that there are reasonable grounds for concern that 
the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, 
animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the chosen 
level of protection." 
Furthermore in April 1999, the Council of Ministers adopted a 
resolution urging the Commission (Council of Ministers 1999): 
"To be in the future even more determined to be guided by the 
precautionary principle in preparing proposals for legislation 
and its other consumer-related activities and develop as clear 
and effective guidelines for the application of this principle." 
This suggests that the Commission might actually be obliged by EU 
law to adopt the 'precautionary principle' when faced with scientific 
uncertainty, although the definition of the principle is yet to be fully 
established. 
The Commission's views on the legitimacy of the 'precautionary 
principle', at least within the context of the EU, is supported by 
recent EU case law. For example, in its ruling on measures 
restricting exports of beef from the UK to control the spread of BSE 
(Cases C-157/96 and C-180/96), the Court of Justice stated that: 
"Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of 
risks to human health, the institutions may take protective 
measures without having to wait until the reality and 
seriousness of those risks become fully apparent." 
This conclusion has subsequently been confirmed by further rulings 
of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. 
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Furthermore, the Commission's view is that the use of the 
'precautionary principle' is sanctioned by the SPS Agreement, 
although the term itself is not explicitly used. Broadly, this views 
seems to be supported by the Appellate Body which has stated that, 
although the 'precautionary principle' cannot be invoked as a 
general principle of international law to limit the obligations of the 
SPS Agreement, it is reflected in the text of the Agreement (WTO 
1998a). Furthermore, in determining whether there is sufficient 
scientific evidence, at least where there is risk of damage to health, 
prudence is a valid approach.4 
Within the context of the EU, the application of the 'precautionary 
principle' is seen to involve a three-stage iterative process (Carr 
2000): 
 A risk assessment is undertaken to identify potential risks to 
human, animal or plant life or health. If the scientific evidence is 
insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and there are reasonable 
grounds for concern, the precautionary principle may be 
invoked. 
 In the light of the risk assessment and the remaining 
uncertainties a decision is taken whether to invoke the 
'precautionary principle'. This needs to balance the freedom and 
rights of suppliers with the actions required to achieve the 
desired ALOP, the acceptability of the risk and, in certain 
circumstances, public opinion. 
 If the 'precautionary principle' is adopted, the measure to be 
applied needs to be selected from those available. Possible 
measures range from regulatory actions to the initiation of a 
research project or forms of risk communication. The 
Commission specifies that such precautionary measures should 
be: (i) proportional to the ALOP; (ii) non-discriminatory in their 
application; (iii) non-discriminatory in their application; (iv) 
consistent with similar measures already taken; (v) based on an 
examination of the potential costs and benefits of action or lack of 
                                                 
4 It is evident, however, that under the SPS Agreement, the adoption of 
precautionary measures is a right rather than an obligation. 
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action; and (vi) subject to review in the light of new scientific 
evidence. 
The Commission, therefore, clearly sees the 'precautionary principle' 
as not negating the need for science-based risk assessment, but an 
additional stage once an assessment has been undertaken. 
Furthermore, it is risk assessment that indicates the potential need 
for the 'precautionary principle' to be applied, by indicating 
potential harmful effects on human, animal or plant life or health 
combined with uncertainties in the available science. Similarly, the 
choice of precaution-based SPS measures is based on science-based 
principles and obligations under the SPS Agreement, as detailed in 
point (iii) above. 
In contrast, decisions regarding the application, or not, of the 
'precautionary principle' itself are seen as political, taking into 
account the desired ALOP and other salient factors, including public 
opinion. The Commission's communication, however, says little 
about how such political and other considerations can be integrated 
in a structured way with science-based risk assessment. This is the 
issue that is of most concern to many of the EU's trading partners 
and in their eyes, therefore, it tends too raise almost as many 
questions as it answers.5 
A key message that comes from the Commission's communication is 
the central role of scientific evidence and risk assessment in the 
application of the 'precautionary principle'. Furthermore, it 
promotes the view that scientific uncertainty is generally temporary 
and can be overcome in time through further research (Carr 2000; 
Wynne 2000). This suggests that the precautionary principle is 
regarded as a temporary measure, and thus in accordance with the 
SPS Agreement. 
A key question regarding the 'precautionary principle', as defined 
by the European Commission, is the extent to which it differs from 
the precautionary approach that many high-income countries 
                                                 
5 The USA, for example, has responded to the Commission’s 
Communication with a list of questions regarding such elements of the 
document in discussions within the OECD and Codex Alimentarius. 
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purport to apply (see, for example, OECD 2000). Precaution or 
prudence is generally accepted to be a routine element of risk 
assessment, whereby conservative assumptions are applied where 
there is uncertainty in scientific evidence.6 The 'precautionary 
principle', however, is regarded as an element of risk management 
and additional to any elements of precaution inherent to the process 
of risk assessment, which is invoked when a full assessment of the 
risk is not possible and the chosen ALOP may be in jeopardy. 
It has been suggested that adoption of the 'precautionary principle' 
represents a shift in the burden of proof, by requiring the safety of 
an activity to be proven before it is permitted (Mathee and 
Vermersch 2000). Traditionally, policy-makers have applied the 
preventive principle, which is based on scientific proof that a 
violation of preventive measures will result in the occurrence or 
increase of damage to human, animal or plant life or health. Thus, 
the preventive principle requires scientific identification of the risks 
involved, perhaps after having incorporated a specific safety factor 
to allow for scientific uncertainty regarding the level of risk. The 
'precautionary principle' on the other hand allows, and might even 
oblige, governments to adopt measures, in the absence of scientific 
certainty, if a reasonable risk of serious and/or irreversible damage 
exists. It implies that a certain activity is assumed to be dangerous 
until proven safe. It has been suggested that this may conflict with 
obligations under the SPS Agreement, which require Members that 
adopt a measure to demonstrate the scientific rationale on which 
they are based (Matthee and Vermersch 2000). 
The European Commission's policy on the application of the 
'precautionary principle' has not been without its critics within the 
EU. There are concerns, for example, that the 'precautionary 
principle' is open to 'misuse' by organisations with a vested interest 
in exaggerating the hazards and dangers of new technologies 
(Gremmen and van den Belt 2000a; 2000b). It is thus feared that the 
                                                 
6 Examples include: (i) use of safety factors when extrapolating the results 
of animal-based studies to humans; and (ii) use of safety factors and/or 
algorithms to extrapolate from Lowest Observed Effect Levels to No Observed 
Effect Levels. 
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principle will become devalued if there are insufficient safeguards 
to prevent this occurring. Furthermore, the European Parliament 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy 
has emphasised the need for the Commission to clearly define the 
'precautionary principle' if the concept is to be successfully applied 
(European Parliament 2000). 
It is evident that there are very different views on the meaning of 
the 'precautionary principle' and the legitimacy of applying it to risk 
management decisions between the EU and its major trading 
partners (OECD 2000). For example, the United States has voiced 
concerns about the potential for the 'precautionary principle' to be 
used as a disguised form of trade protection. Furthermore, it has 
emphasised the need for transparency in any application of 
precaution where decisions regarding SPS measures are not fully 
supported by current scientific evidence (Agra Europe 2000). There 
have been efforts, however, within the Codex Committee on 
General Principles to derive a generally acceptable definition, at 
least in the context of food safety. Most notably, the US, EU, and 
certain other Members have proposed the following (Codex 
Alimentarius 2000): 
"When relevant scientific evidence is insufficient to objectively 
and fully assess risk from a hazard in food7, and where there is 
reasonable evidence to suggest that adverse effects on human 
health may occur, but it is difficult to evaluate their nature and 
extent, it may be appropriate for risk managers to apply 
precaution through interim measures to protect health of 
consumers without awaiting additional scientific data and a 
full risk assessment......."8 
However, an alternative definition has been proposed by other 
Members, most notably Malaysia: 
"Where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, precaution 
can be exercised as an interim measures to protect the health 
of consumers. However, additional information for a more 
                                                 
7 It is recognised that hazard identification is a crucial step in this process. 
8 Some Members refer to this as the 'precautionary principle'. 
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objective risk assessment should be sought and the measures 
taken reviewed accordingly within a reasonable timeframe." 
Both definitions have been inserted into the draft Codex Working 
Principles as alternatives, which have been returned from step five 
to step three of the standards-setting process. It should be 
emphasised, however, that a number of Members continue to 
contest that the concept of a 'precautionary principle' is not 
generally recognised or defined in relation to food safety and that 
precaution is anyway inherent to the risk analysis processes as 
recognised in the current Working Principles. It is evident, therefore, 
that the 'precautionary principle' will remain a dominant issue in 
relations between the EU and its major trading partners. 
A good example of the application of the 'precautionary principle' in 
the EU is the regulation of genetically-modified (GM) crops (see Box 
6.2). In the face of considerable political and social pressure, the 
Commission has been forced to adopt a highly cautious approach to 
the approval of GM crops, despite the fact that this has created 
tensions with some of its major trading partners, in particular the 
US. The implication is that the approval of GM varieties of, for 
example, maize in the EU lags behind that in other developed 
countries (Table 6.1). Furthermore, it reflects a fundamental shift in 
the focus of the debate over the regulation of these products from a 
burden of proof that they do not pose a risk to human health 
towards positive scientific evidence that they are safe. 
 
'Other legitimate factors' 
A second concern that has been raised by the EU's major trading 
partners is the role of factors other than science in decisions 
regarding the implementation of SPS measures, specifically as part 
of risk management. Whilst the Commission emphasises the 
prominent role of science-based risk analysis, it also acknowledges 
that (CEC 2000b): 
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".... other legitimate factors relevant for the health protection of 
consumers and for the promotion of fair practices in food 
trade can also be taken into account." 
 
Table 6.1: Approval of genetic-modification processes for maize in 
various countries as of October 2000 
Process Country 
USA Japan EU Canada 
Mon810     
T25     
Mon810/T25   x  
GA21   x  
DBT418   x  
DLL25   x  
T14   x  
CBH351  x x  
E176     
Bt11     
Mon810/GA21   x  
Mon809  x   
Mon202  x x  
 
The Commission gives examples of such 'other legitimate factors', 
including environmental considerations, animal welfare, sustainable 
agriculture, consumer expectations regarding product quality, fair 
information and definition of the essential characteristics of 
products and their process and production methods. 
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Box 6.2: Regulation of GM crops in the EU 
The EU has adopted a cautious approach to the regulation of genetically-modified 
(GM) crops, arguably more cautious than other major trading nations such as the 
US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Within the EU, regulation of GM crops is 
supposed to proceed in a step-by-step manner, with precaution being progressively 
relaxed as more experience is gained and initial uncertainties reduced through 
research (Carr, 2000). In reality, however, as GM crops have become available for 
commercial exploitation, precaution has actually been tightened, reflecting 
growing objections to these products in a number of Member States, most notably 
Denmark and Austria. Furthermore, when GM crops have actually been 
introduced to the market, for example soya beans in 1996-97, objections have 
intensified across most Member States. This is reflected in the level of media 
attention given to GM crops. 
In response to these concerns, control measures have been implemented by 
commercial companies and/or Member State governments. Examples include 
labelling requirements and monitoring of environmental impacts. Subsequently, 
many of these initiatives have been adopted by the European Commission and 
become Community-wide requirements. For example, shipments of grains must be 
labelled unless conventional and GM crops are segregated, or the grain used only 
for animal feed. Furthermore, there have been considerable delays in the approval 
of new GM crop varieties. Indeed, no new products have been approved since June 
1998 (Table 6.1). 
The regulation of GM crops in the EU has concerned many of its major trading 
partners, most notably the US and Canada, who have questioned the scientific 
basis on which these controls are based. They argue that there is no scientific 
evidence that GM crops harm to human health or the environment. Some critics 
have gone further and accuse the EU of taking protectionist measures to enable the 
European biotechnology sector to 'catch-up' with its North American competitors 
(Carr 2000). The Commission, however, has defended its actions by reference to the 
'precautionary principle' which (it is claimed) is established in international law, at 
least with respect to protection of the environment. 
The Commission and a number of Member States have undertaken risk 
assessments of GM crops, although with a more broad focus than, for example, in 
North America. However, there is an on-going debate within the EU over the range 
of potentially harmful effects of GM crops that should be included within the scope 
of a risk assessment. The potential indirect effects of GM crops were initially 
excluded from these assessments, even though some Member States (for example 
Denmark) considered them to be relevant considerations. More recently, however, 
a growing number of Member States (for example UK and France) have pressed for 
the risk assessment of GM crops to have a broader focus, in line with consumer 
concerns. For example, the Commission has argued that the potential spread of 
herbicide-tolerant weeds as a result of the introduction of GM crops is not a 
harmful effect, but merely a normal economic problem for farmers. Some Member 
States, however, regard agriculture as part of the natural environment and that 
such effects are a relevant component of a risk assessment (Carr 2000). 
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Furthermore, the EU and certain other Members have promoted 
discussion within the Codex Committee on General Principles on 
the role of factors other than science in risk management. The 
current draft Working Principles includes a reference reflecting this, 
although it is acknowledged that there will need to be considerable 
redrafting before agreement can be reached on this point within 
Codex (Codex Alimentarius 2000): 
"Risk management should follow a structured approach, be 
grounded on science-based risk assessment and take into 
account other legitimate factors as appropriate. ......" 
The Commission is aware that the incorporation of such factors into 
the process of risk analysis may fall foul of its commitments under 
the SPS and TBT Agreements and has attempted to focus on the 
relationship between these 'other' factors and environmental and 
consumer protection. A case in point is animal welfare (CEC 2000a), 
which the Commission has attempted to align with the activities of 
the proposed European Food Authority whose remit is food safety, 
and which it has said "need to be integrated more fully into food 
policy" (CEC 2000b). This reflects recognition within the 
Commission that the rationale for taking such factors into 
consideration in the development of SPS measures must be, at least 
in part, science-based if tensions within the WTO are to be avoided. 
A good example of the role of 'other legitimate factors' within the 
EU is the regulation of Recombinant Bovine Somatropin (rBST) (see 
Box 6.3). In this case, first concerns about the impact on the market 
for dairy products, and in particular farm incomes, and 
subsequently the implications for animal health and welfare have 
motivated the measures applied – a moratorium followed by a ban 
on use of rBST. Furthermore, the Commission has pursued this line 
of reasoning in negotiations over Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) 
for rBST in Codex Alimentarius, which have been rejected by most 
other Members. 
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Box 6.3: Regulation of Recombinant Bovine Somatropin (rBST) in 
the EU 
Recombinant Bovine Somatropin (rBST) is the manufactured form of BST, which 
naturally occurs in cow's milk. The manufactured form is a genetically-engineered 
synthetic analogue of the natural hormone which can be employed to boost milk 
yields and, therefore, is subject to EU requirements for the approval of veterinary 
medicines. The use of rBST has been subject to a moratorium in the EU since 1993, 
although foods produced using rBST can be imported from Third Countries. On 16 
December 2000, a permanent ban on the use of rBST in the EU was introduced. 
A total of 20 countries permit the use of rBST, including the US, Mexico and South 
Africa (Bureau and Doussin 1999). The use of this hormone has, however, been 
controversial even in countries where its use is widespread (Jarvis 2000; McGuirk 
and Kaiser 1991; Kronfeld 1993). Concerns encompass three main issues: 1) safety 
of milk produced using rBST; 2) impact on the health and welfare of dairy cattle; 3) 
impact on the milk markets, in particular incomes of small producers. These 
concerns have been voiced even more strongly in countries that do not currently 
permit the use of rBST, including the EU and Canada. 
Although concerns have been raised in the EU about the safety of milk produced 
using rBST, to date no firm evidence has been presented of any detrimental affect 
on human health. Indeed, the Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products 
concluded in 1993 that rBST is safe for use (CEC 1993). Furthermore, in July 1999 
the European Medicine Evaluation Agency Committee determined that "there are 
no public health grounds for establishing a Maximum Residue Level for BST", 
reaffirming that Third Countries that use the hormone could continue importing 
dairy products. The Commission is, nevertheless, funding further studies into the 
impact of rBST on human health in an attempt to bridge 'gaps' in current scientific 
knowledge (Agra Europe 1999). 
The original rationale of the moratorium on the use of rBST in the EU was concern 
that it would exacerbate existing milk surpluses. Subsequently, however, the 
continuation of the moratorium and introduction of a permanent ban on its use has 
been based on animal health and welfare considerations. In particular, there are 
concerns that use of rBST increases the risk of mastitis, foot and leg disorders and 
reproductive problems, as well as potentially severe reactions to the injection of the 
hormone itself. 
Codex Alimentarius has attempted to agree MRLs for rBST, but these were blocked 
in 1995, 1997 and 1999, and the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food 
Additives (JECFA) has confirmed it is safe. The vote to defer a decision has on each 
occasion been based predominantly on the concerns of certain Members regarding 
either the impact on animal health/welfare and/or the fact that the safety of milk 
produced using rBST has not been proven. Furthermore, the Commission has 
pressed for "other legitimate factors than scientific analysis" to be taken into 
consideration, although this has not been endorsed by most other delegations 
(Bureau and Doussin 1999). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the concept of ALOP as 
applied in the EU and the social and political environment within 
which it is determined in the EU context. Whilst all developed 
countries undoubtedly strive to achieve a high level of protection, it 
is evident that the perspective of the EU differs to that of its major 
trading partners, most notably the US. In particular, whilst science-
based risk assessment is central to the regulatory process, other 
factors play a more prominent role, both in terms of the level and 
manner in which precaution is applied and the range of socio-
economic factors regarded as salient in determining the ALOP. In 
turn, this is reflected in the SPS measures that are applied, 
particularly in the case of food safety, as the selective cases illustrate. 
The EU's approach to determining the ALOP has raised tensions in 
bilateral relations with a number of Third Countries, with claims 
that it uses SPS measures in a manner that is protectionist and which 
may be incompatible with the SPS Agreement. In response, the 
Commission has attempted to both justify and clarify its position 
through, for example its Communication on the 'precautionary 
principle' (CEC 2000a). Furthermore, the Commission has made 
efforts to engender recognition of the 'precautionary principle' and 
'other legitimate factors' in determining the ALOP within Codex 
Alimentarius. It is evident, however, that, whilst these efforts have 
served to fuel debate on these issues, considerable differences in 
opinion remain between the EU and its major trading partners, and 
that these are likely to be the source of friction into the future. 
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7 
The 'appropriate level of protection': an 
Australian perspective  
DIGBY GASCOINE  
The appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, 
otherwise referred to as the acceptable level of risk, is defined in the 
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures as the "level of protection deemed appropriate by the 
[WTO] Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory." It 
is well established that the determination of its appropriate level of 
protection is a matter in which the national sovereignty of a Member 
prevails, consistent with Article 2.1 of the Agreement which says 
that "Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health." However the SPS Agreement requires that "Members 
should, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection, take into account the objective of 
minimizing negative trade effects" (Article 5.4). 
Members are also obliged, under Article 5.5 of the Agreement, to 
"avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels 
[considered] to be appropriate in different situations, if such 
distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction as 
                                                 
  The views expressed are the author's and are not necessarily those of the 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Australia or of Biosecurity 
Australia (the unit within the Department which is responsible for import risk 
analysis). 
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international trade." No guidance is provided by the Agreement on 
what might constitute an arbitrary or justifiable distinction or as to 
what kind of justification might be offered. However the statement 
in the same paragraph that in developing guidelines to further the 
practical implementation of this provision, the SPS Committee "shall 
take into account all relevant factors including the exceptional 
character of human health risks to which people voluntarily expose 
themselves" strongly implies that these risks might justifiably be 
managed in a different way from other sanitary risks. 
"Risk" is not defined, but from the definition of risk assessment in 
Annex A of the SPS Agreement it is clear that risk is to be regarded 
as a function of both the potential for entry, establishment and 
spread of a pest or disease in an importing country and the 
magnitude of the consequences. There is no suggestion that risk in 
this context is to be considered in a relative rather than an absolute 
sense. 
Elaborating the concepts in the SPS Agreement 
Drawing these elements together, and expressing their implications 
in a practical way, a WTO Member may understand its obligations 
in relation to ALOP to be as follows: 
 all SPS measures applied by a Member which are intended to 
protect animal or plant life or health should reflect a consistent 
approach to risk management, consistent at least to the extent 
necessary to avoid discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade; 
 a similar consistency of approach must be followed with respect 
to human health risks, save for exceptional risks which are 
voluntarily accepted; 
 the Members must decide, therefore, what ALOP will be the goal 
across the board for all measures intended to protect animal and 
plant health, and similarly for human health, and apply the 
relevant ALOP uniformity; and 
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 ALOP for a Member should restrict trade as little as possible so 
long as the necessary health protection can be achieved by the 
measures applied. 
In simple graphical terms, a Member's ALOP can be thought of as 
the boundary between points in a two-dimensional 
(probability/consequences) space which reflect either acceptable or 
unacceptable levels of SPS risk associated with particular trade 
flows, as shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Relationship between the probability of disease 















Consistency in risk management requires that the line representing 
ALOP be some kind of iso-quant such that where SPS measures are 
necessary to limit risk associated with trade in commodities A and 
B, the result is that a similar degree of risk is accepted i.e. Pa x Da 
equals Pb x Db where P is the probability of damage occurring and 
D is the amount of damage measured in some appropriate unit. 
Points below the ALOP line would generally represent risk 
associated with trade in commodities for which no SPS measures 
need be applied. Exceptionally points below the line might also 
reflect risk in situations where SPS measures do have to be applied 
but the only measures available which are technically and 
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risk. At the origin are clustered all those potential trades which 
cannot occur because the only measure or set of measures which is 
capable of reducing risk to an acceptably low level is one which is so 
strict as to effectively prevent trade from occurring. All other points 
illustrating actual risk associated with trade where SPS measures are 
applied must be on the line; otherwise the measures being applied 
would not be the least trade-restrictive consistent with maintaining 
ALOP. Points lying above the ALOP line represent all potential 
commodity trades for which measures would need to be applied to 
reduce risk to an acceptably low level. 
Rationally a WTO Member would wish to position its ALOP frontier 
so as to maximise the ratio of net benefits from trade (taking into 
account differentials in consumer and producer surpluses 
attributable to trade) to the associated risks of damage from 
introduction of exotic pests and diseases. The choice of discount rate 
might have some bearing on the optimal position if there is reason 
to believe, for example, that the stream of net benefits from trade is 
likely to occur sooner than the stream of costs from pest or disease 
incursions (at least for those pests and diseases which take some 
time to establish and spread to the point of becoming economically 
important). Superficially, it is not impossible that a more optimal 
position may be obtainable by a Member choosing to either raise or 
reduce its ALOP. 
As noted above, according to Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement, a 
Member must take into account the objective of minimising negative 
trade effects when determining its ALOP. The theoretical 
optimisation strategy described here does take into account the 
maximisation of net benefits of trade and therefore, presumably 
would conform with Article 5.4. 
It is conceivable that a Member may from time to time wish to re-
position its ALOP. A new government may be elected with a 
different attitude to risk acceptance than its predecessor; or a 
significant change in national pest or disease status (such as the 
successful eradication of a disease which has been a major 
impediment to export sales) may have occurred. In this event, the 
objective of consistency would seem to require that appropriate 
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adjustments to the stringency of measures in place be made across 
the board; the revised ALOP cannot be reflected only in new SPS 
measures. 
An alternative interpretation 
The outline given here is not the only interpretation that has been 
put on the relevant Articles and definitions in the SPS Agreement. 
Some have argued that it would be in conformity with the 
provisions of the Agreement for a Member to select an appropriate 
level of protection in relation to each decision it makes on the 
application of sanitary or phytosanitary measures. One advantage 
suggested for this approach is that it would allow the application of 
cost/benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis to optimise trade 
benefits over risks to animal/plant/human health. 
Whether such an approach is acceptable in terms of Article 5.5 
would depend upon the defence which would be offered against 
criticism that each such decision would be arbitrary or unjustified 
and, if discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade resulted from the decision, would be in violation of the 
Article. In fact any such decision would also have to be tested 
against Article 2.3, which incorporates into the SPS Agreement the 
fundamental GATT tenets of national treatment and non-
discrimination. ("Members shall ensure that their sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminate between Members where identical or similar 
conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of 
other Members.") 
In reality, following this approach would result in a Member 
maintaining an SPS regime in which the degree of restriction by SPS 
measures on trade in a particular commodity from a particular 
country would reflect in part the relative economic competitiveness 
of domestically produced and imported supplies of the commodity. 
For example, quarantine controls on imports of a commodity from 
either of two countries which had the same disease status would 
have to be stricter on that supplier country which had the less 
efficient export industry because its product would contribute 
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relatively less to the creation of consumer surplus (net of any 
reduction in producer surplus) in the importing country. Similarly, 
SPS restrictions applied by the importing country would be 
modulated so as to be relatively less strict on commodities where 
the international competitiveness of the domestic industry was 
lowest. 
It follows that commodity-by-commodity (or trade-by-trade) cost 
benefit analysis as a basis for establishing SPS measures cannot be 
consistent with the goal of a non-discriminatory GATT-type trade 
regime. 
ALOP in practice 
In practice, no WTO Member has articulated its ALOP with any 
degree of precision, although there are one or two examples where 
responsible national authorities have given partial expression to 
acceptable risk in quantitative terms (e.g. the acceptable number of 
exotic pest incursions as a consequence of trade in a particular 
commodity over a specified period). In part this may be a reflection 
of the political sensitivity inherent in acknowledging that any level 
of risk is acceptable: stakeholders are likely to be more comfortable 
with a policy statement that risk of illness or death from, say, 
pesticide residues in food is to be minimised than with a statement 
that a certain number of illnesses or deaths per million of exposed 
population per year is regarded by government as acceptable. A 
much more important explanation, however, is that it is practically 
impossible for governments to provide any degree of precision in 
describing ALOP, either qualitatively or quantitatively. The reasons 
include the complexities of analysing risks involved with biological 
systems and the lack of relevant technical and economic data. 
Australian Governments have used various qualitative descriptors 
for the appropriate level of protection in relation to risks to animal 
or plant life or health. The terms used are typified by a statement 
such as "Australia takes a very conservative approach to the 
management of quarantine risk, with the intention of reducing risk 
to negligibly low levels." Recent work within the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Australia has sought to find 
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ways of expressing Australia's ALOP more precisely, but this work 
has yet to bear fruit. 
However, each WTO Member maintains SPS measures, and each of 
these measures is a reflection of a risk management decision. On this 
basis a Member's historical ALOP can theoretically be ascertained 
by scrutinising the measures it has put in place in the past and is 
still maintaining, in so far this set of measures reflects a reasonably 
consistent ALOP approach. 
As to how WTO Member governments know that the ALOP being 
applied is optimal, it seems likely that this judgment is made not on 
the basis of detailed and comprehensive analysis of quarantine risks 
accepted and trade advantages foregone, but on the basis of the 
progressive accumulation of evidence on the performance of 
measures in place. Performance will be indicated by the number and 
significance of incursions of pests and diseases that are apparently 
attributable to failure of SPS controls, and by the apparent effect of 
SPS controls on volumes of trade (which, given appropriate 
analysis, are indicative of benefits to purchasers of imported goods). 
Normally such information will be in anecdotal form, and will be 
evaluated in an impressionistic way. Re-evaluation of ALOP is 
likely to be provoked by some shock, such as incursion of a pest or 
disease which may cause very significant damage. 
Other considerations for government in judging whether the 
established ALOP is indeed appropriate may include whether the 
ALOP bears a rational relationship to other sources of sanitary or 
phytosanitary risk that are not capable of being addressed by the 
imposition of measures. Thus, for example, a WTO Member that is 
highly vulnerable to SPS risk by virtue of natural movements of 
pests or diseases across borders may see limited value in applying 
very strict border measures if their contribution to reduction of 
aggregate risk is small. 
For those making the risk management decisions, policy guidance 
from the political level often may consist of the absence of any 
indication from government that the new measure being 
promulgated, or the existing measures in place, are unacceptable or 
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inappropriate from a risk management perspective – in other words, 
"keep doing what you're doing unless we tell you to stop". Risk 
managers therefore make a judgement as to whether a proposed 
measure conforms with the national ALOP by making comparisons 
with other measures which are already in place and which have not 
attracted negative comment or been rejected by government. This 
approach at least has the advantage that it fosters consistency 
("avoidance of arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions," etc.) over time 
and across different sources of risk. The procedure is facilitated (as 
is conformity with the SPS Agreement) if risk management decision-
makers make pair-wise comparisons between situations that are as 
alike as possible. 
As a practical matter, risk management decisions almost invariably 
rely on expert judgement – that is, the judgement by experienced 
analysts of sanitary and phytosanitary risks. Greater quantification 
of risks is a goal for many government agencies which have 
responsibility for designing and applying SPS measures, but the lack 
of essential empirical data greatly constrains use of the good 
methodology available for this purpose. 
Conclusion 
The concept of appropriate level of protection is central to the SPS 
Agreement. It is readily apparent that if effective disciplines of the 
kind set out in the Agreement were not applied to risk management 
via the provisions relating to ALOP, the Agreement's ability to 
prevent egregiously trade-distorting actions would be crippled. 
Economic analysis has a useful role to play in further teasing out the 
meaning and implications of the ALOP concept, and in particular its 
relationship to the theory of comparative advantage, the proper 
treatment of externalities (SPS measures have the effect of both 
limiting and internalising the cost of externalities such as 
pest/disease risks), and so forth. While there is arguably no scope 
for economic analysis to contribute to decision-making on 
individual measures via cost/benefit analysis, it remains possible 
that analysis along these lines could make a significant contribution 
to the examination of ALOP per se, especially if it were possible to 
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conduct an array of studies on the benefits and costs of measures 




The 'appropriate level of protection': a New 
Zealand perspective 
HUGH R. BIGSBY 
One of the outcomes of the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was the provision for 
reductions in a range of agricultural trade barriers. In particular, 
certain types of barriers, such as tariffs, export subsidies, embargoes, 
import bans, quotas, supply management regimes, domestic price 
supports, licensing and exchange controls, were able to be dealt 
with by converting them into 'tariff-equivalent' levels of protection 
through a system of 'tariffication'. The key success of this approach 
was that different 'quantifiable' trade barriers could then be 
compared, reduced or negotiated in a common framework of tariffs. 
What remained to be resolved after the Uruguay Round were a 
range of trade barriers that were largely non-quantifiable in terms of 
tariff-equivalent levels of protection. These barriers, termed 
'Technical Barriers to Trade' (TBT), included rules and standards 
directed at health, safety or the environment.  
A key feature of TBT's, which differentiates them from quantifiable 
trade barriers, is that they are not specifically targeted at trade or 
production issues. Under GATT rules, countries are "generally 
allowed" to adopt health, safety or environmental policies which 
take precedence over other rules. The caveat to this, however, is that 
these policies are only allowed as long as the purpose of the policy 
or standard is to meet a legitimate domestic objective, and as long as 
domestic and foreign producers are treated in the same manner. 
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Among the most prevalent types of TBT's are those that deal with 
concerns about human, animal and or plant health (Hillman 1978, 
1991). With the reduction in quantifiable barriers to trade, concern 
has been raised that countries will turn to TBT's as a way of blocking 
imports rather than just meeting legitimate sanitary and 
phytosanitary concerns (Ndayisenga and Kinsey 1994). This concern 
has led to major efforts internationally to ensure that sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures do not evolve as major trade barriers.  
Under the World Trade Organization (WTO), TBT's related to 
animal and plant health issues are dealt with under the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. Under the umbrella of the SPS 
Agreement, the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) 
has produced standards for determining the 'appropriate level of 
protection' (ALOP), or justified quarantine measures, for plants 
(FAO 1996). The major problem faced by the IPPC is the lack of a 
system that can convert diverse technical or scientific barriers 
related to plant health into a common framework which would 
allow comparison of quarantine measures within a trade, or 
economic, forum. A common theme of the activity of the IPPC is a 
need to develop systems that will provide a measure of the ALOP. 
This in turn will show whether health or phytosanitary standards 
are being imposed in a way that is consistent with both internal and 
external standards. 
Another important change with the Uruguay Round's SPS 
Agreement has been a move to focus on risk assessment and 
management with an overall objective of minimising negative trade 
impacts (Papasolomontos 1993). This is a considerable departure 
from past practice in the quarantine area. Historically SPS has been 
the domain of scientists, and the key criteria for applying trade 
barriers has been an assessment of probability of occurrence (Smith 
1993; Patterson 1990). This is an objective, but one-sided, application 
of standards in a trading environment. Under the Uruguay Round, 
risk assessment now requires consideration of economic 
consequences as well as probability of occurrence. In addition, risk 
management now requires the consideration of trade-offs in 
probability of establishment and economic consequences, and in the 
context of choosing the least trade-distorting path. 
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This chapter presents a risk analysis system, an iso-risk framework, 
which addresses the problems created by TBTs in the post-Uruguay 
Round environment. The iso-risk framework does this by combining 
the key elements of risk analysis, probability of occurrence and 
economic impact, into a single analytical system, providing a 
quantifiable measure of the level of protection associated with a 
quarantine measure. 
An iso-risk framework 
The major problem presented by TBTs is the lack of a system which 
can convert diverse technical barriers related to plant or animal 
health into a common framework which allows for comparison in a 
trade forum. What kind of a measure will adequately combine the 
key features of risk analysis, risk of introduction and economic 
consequences, in a way that facilitates comparison and negotiation? 
The greatest need is to convert barriers to values that are common in 
a trade environment, typically currency measures. A way to elicit 
the value of a TBT is by measuring implicit or explicit economic 
effects that are created by the barrier. This could be done in the 
context of measuring the value of events related to a TBT. Examples 
of this could include measuring the additional costs associated with 
compliance with a regulation, new labelling or packaging, or 
reducing residues. This could also be done in the context of 
measuring the value of an outcome without a technical barrier in 
place. In this case the consequences of an economic impact such as a 
pest infestation could be measured. 
An important component of assessing risk or levels of protection is a 
methodology that uses both economic effects and probability of 
introduction to manage risk (FAO 1996). Although the FAO's draft 
standards do not specify how to combine economic effects and 
probability of introduction, the implication is that they should be 
considered together to measure 'pest risk'.  
A common way for these two factors to be combined is to calculate 
pest risk as, 
Pest Risk = Economic Effect x Probability of Introduction 
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Use of both the probability and consequences of a particular event to 
express risk appears in many areas of risk analysis (Kaplan and 
Garrick 1981, Cohrssen and Covello 1989, Miller et al.. 1993, Ministry 
of Health 1996). The framework discussed here follows this 
approach and comes from discussions during the development of 
the draft Pest Risk Analysis Standards by the IPPC working group 
(Orr 1995) and has been further developed in New Zealand (Bigsby 
1996; Bigsby and Crequer 1998; Bigsby and Whyte 1998, 2000). 
Calculated this way, pest risk represents the expected value of the 
economic effect of pest introduction during the time period for 
which the probability of introduction has been assessed. If a 
quarantine authority used this definition for pest risk, risk 
management options would be considered in the context of some 
benchmark or acceptable level of pest risk (equivalent to ALOP) and 
the need to alter the probability of introduction or the economic 
consequences of establishment. A critical component is the 
establishment of a benchmark level of acceptable pest risk, so that 
subsequent management strategies can be systematically evaluated 
against the benchmark. 
Pest versus commodity risk assessment 
Many quarantine risk assessments focus on the risk associated with 
a particular pest. However, trade restrictions and most pre-entry 
quarantine measures are directed at entire commodities rather than 
particular pests. In this chapter, 'commodity' refers to a specific 
product and country/pathway combination. The important 
distinction here is that commodities with more types of pests will 
represent a greater risk, per unit, than commodities with fewer 
types of pests. A purely pest-based analytical approach, while useful 
for some types of analyses, such as categorising pests into 
quarantine and non-quarantine, may not give a measure of the 
overall risk associated with a commodity.  
Commodity-based risk assessments, such as those produced by the 
USDA (USDA 1996), rely on assessments of each pest associated 
with a commodity. Similarly, ALOP can be defined for a commodity 
by considering the appropriate levels of protection for each 
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individual pest of the commodity. Given the distinction between the 
two different approaches, risk assessment for individual pests and 
commodities will be discussed separately. 
Pest evaluation 
The iso-risk framework for individual pests is illustrated in Figure 
8.1. Pest 1, with an economic impact of EI1 and a probability of 
establishment of r1, has a pest risk1 of PR1, where 
PR1 = EI1 x r1 
Pest 2 has an economic impact of EI2 and a probability of 
introduction of r2. As can be seen in Figure 8.1, different pests, 
having different potential economic consequences and probabilities 
of introduction, may still share the same value of pest risk. Both PR1 
and PR2 lie on the same line where all combinations of (EIi x ri) 
have the same value (hence, the 'iso-risk' line). Note that the iso-risk 
line is straight only when both the x and y axes are plotted with 
logarithmic scales. 
A key requirement for carrying out risk assessment, or determining 
entry conditions, is a pre-determined benchmark level of pest risk, 
or ALOP, from which to base decisions. In Figure 8.1 there will be 
an infinite number of iso-risk lines representing different levels of 
pest risk, with higher iso-risk lines indicating higher pest risk. Iso-
                                                 
1 Pest risk is depicted in Figure 8.1 as a point estimate or single value. This is 
done for purposes of illustration in developing the general methodology in 
this chapter. In practice, there would be a problem in providing only a point 
estimate because it gives no quantitative picture of the uncertainty 
surrounding either the probability of establishment or economic impact 
values used in the pest risk estimate. This means that there is no information 
on whether a particular estimate represents the most likely value, or one of a 
host of equally likely values over a wide range (for example, Cohrssen and 
Covello 1989). Since pest risk is actually based on a probability distribution 
for both risk of introduction and economic impact, rather than being a point 
estimate, a plot of pest risk would be an area. Given a distribution of 
outcomes, a decision maker would be in a position to make a better-informed 
assessment of the appropriate management actions for a particular pest than 
with only a point estimate. 
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risk lines allow pests to be compared to each other, and compared to 
a particular acceptable level of pest risk. This ability to compare in 
turn provides the basis for determining appropriate actions. In 
particular, the result of pest risk management should be a pest risk 
that does not exceed the ALOP, with a reasonable level of 
confidence. In the context of Figure 8.1, since all points on an iso-risk 
line have the same expected value, the ALOP represents the highest 
iso-risk line that will be accepted by a quarantine authority. 
 














r1 r4 r3 r20.0 1.0
 
 
Given this definition, individual pests can be evaluated against an 
ALOP. If the pest risk of a particular pest is greater than the ALOP, 
actions should be taken to reduce pest risk to the ALOP. For 
example, if the iso-risk line in Figure 8.1 has been determined to be 
the ALOP, a pest with a pest risk of PR3 would be subject to actions 
to reduce the risk to acceptable levels. The pest corresponding to 
PR4 falls within acceptable limits, and requires no additional 
quarantine actions. 
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Commodity-based risk assessment 
The pest risk of a commodity (PRC) can be considered as the 
cumulative expected value of all the associated pests for that 





(Ri x Ei)  
where Ri is the probability of establishment of pest i, Ei is the 
economic impact of pest i, and n is the number of pests associated 
with the commodity. Since PRC is the sum of a number of 
individual pest risks, it can take any value from 0 to , as is shown 
in Figure 8.2. 
With this approach, a quarantine authority could consider 
commodities having similar values of PRC, regardless of the 
number or type of pests involved, with the same level of concern. A 
benchmark ALOP can also be defined for commodities as follows: 
the ALOP is the highest value of commodity pest risk that will be 
accepted by a quarantine authority.  
In Figure 8.2, the ALOP would represent a cut-off point on the axis. 
Appropriate entry conditions would ensure that the commodity risk 
does not exceed the ALOP with a reasonable level of confidence.  
Application of the iso-risk framework 
The discussion thus far has been based on what is effectively a 
quantitative assessment of risk, or one that consists of a continuous 
set of numeric values from which to estimate ALOP (the iso-risk 
line). Some quarantine agencies have developed qualitative rather 
than quantitative guidelines for pest risk assessment. For example, 
APHIS-PPQ in the US has produced a set of guidelines that identify 
pest risk in terms of high, medium or low (USDA 1996). The 
difference between the two approaches is that a measure of pest risk 
based qualitative values results in discrete, categorical values.
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As long as pest risk is expressed in terms of probability of 
introduction and economic impact though, either approach can be 
expressed in terms of the iso-risk model. Applications of both the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to risk assessment using the 
iso-risk framework are provided in the following sections. 
Quantitative risk assessment 
Whyte (1998) provides an application of the iso-risk framework to 
Mediterranean fruit fly, Ceratitis capitata. Risk assessments for the 
Mediterranean fruit fly were used to examine risk assessment and 
management for pests entering New Zealand by both commercial 
and non-commercial pathways. The risk assessments showed that 
with no quarantine measures the annual probability of introduction 
was effectively 1.0. The economic consequences to producers of 
Mediterranean fruit fly establishment on an annual basis, after 
population stabilisation, were predicted to be $100 - $130 million 
(Whyte 1998). Using a midpoint for economic impact of $121 
million, the initial pest risk is $121 million. This is shown as Point 1 
in Figure 8.3, lying on an iso-risk line for $121 million.  
Chapter 8  ALOP: a New Zealand perspective  149 
 
For commercial pathways, the introduction of a probit 9 treatment 
or area freedom reduces the annual probability of introduction to 
about 0.0017 and the pest risk becomes $206,000. This is shown as 
the horizontal shift of pest risk from the initial position to the new 
probability of introduction at Point 2 in Figure 8.3 lying on an iso-
risk line for $206,000. For non-commercial pathways, the 
introduction of x-ray machines to international airports has reduced 
the annual probability of introduction to about 0.02 and the Pest risk 
becomes $2.42 million. This is shown as the horizontal shift of pest 
risk from the initial position to the new probability of introduction 
at Point 3 in Figure 8.3 lying on an iso-risk line for $2.42 million. 
















Note: Both axes are plotted in log scales 
 
While it might be tempting to imply from this limited example that 
New Zealand's ALOP lies between $0.206 and $2.42 million, 
additional measures to limit the risk of Mediterranean fruit fly 
establishment are also employed. In addition to the probit 9 
treatment for commercial pathways and the use of x-ray machines 
for non-commercial pathways, a detection and response system for 
Mediterranean fruit fly is also provided. A surveillance system 
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consisting of trimedlure trapping has been put in place that allows 
for rapid detection and response to an establishment.  
Using the cost of the 1996-97 Mediterranean fruit fly response of 
approximately $5.3 million and assuming a five percent chance that 
an eradication attempt would fail even with the early warning 
system (Bigsby and Whyte 1998, Whyte 1998), the effect of this 
additional risk management system can be estimated. The early 
warning and eradication program further reduces the probability 
for either pathway that there would be an establishment that had an 
economic impact. In terms of the iso-risk model, this system means 
that the expected annual economic impacts would be reduced to 
approximately $11.35 million for the either pathway. Given that the 
commercial pathway still has a probability of 0.0017 for an 
establishment, the new pest risk is $19,300, shown as Point 4 in 
Figure 8.3. For the non-commercial pathway the probability of 
establishment is still 0.02 so the new pest risk is $227,000, shown as 
Point 5 in Figure 8.3. This would reduce the implied ALOP based on 
this example to somewhere between $19,300 and $227,000. 
Qualitative measures of pest risk 
As was mentioned previously, some agencies, such as APHIS-PPQ 
in the US, have developed qualitative guidelines for pest risk 
assessment. This results in discrete, categorical values to express 
pest risk. However, as long as pest risk is expressed in terms of 
probability of introduction and economic impact, qualitative values 
can be adapted to fit the iso-risk model.  
An example of how this adaptation can work is the US pest risk 
assessment system (USDA 1996). Similar to the iso-risk framework, 
the US guidelines provide the basis for ranking pest risk based on 
potential consequence of introduction and likelihood of 
introduction. Rather than a dollar value though, potential 
consequence of introduction is comprised of five "risk elements". 
The risk elements, climate-host interaction, host range, dispersal 
potential, economic impact and environmental impact, are each 
given a score of high, medium or, with a score of high given 3 
points, medium 2 points and low 1 point. A cumulative score for the 
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five risk elements is then calculated. A similar process is carried out 
for likelihood of introduction, but with only two risk elements, 
quantity of commodity imported and pest opportunity (survival 
and access to suitable habitat and hosts). In each case, the 
cumulative risk element score results in a new risk rating of high, 
medium or low, again with the same corresponding risk scores for 
each as before. In the last step of the process, likelihood of 
introduction and consequences of introduction are combined by 
calculating a cumulative value based on the risk score for each 
component. The cumulative value provides a pest risk potential, 
rated high, medium or low depending on the score. 
If the raw risk scores for likelihood of introduction and 
consequences of introduction are used rather than the high, medium 
and low ranking, this system of scoring can be adapted to the iso-
risk framework. As is shown in Figure 8.4 the APHIS-PPQ system 
allows for a maximum score for consequence of introduction of 15 
and for likelihood of introduction of 18. Based on how the APHIS-
PPQ guidelines translate combinations of cumulative risk element 
scores for likelihood of introduction and consequences of 
introduction into risk management options, Figure 8.4 can also be 
separated into risk management zones (Bigsby and Whyte 1998). 
If Figure 8.4 is put in the context of Figure 8.1, the similarities in 
terms of iso-risk and management options can be seen. With the 
cruder measures of economic impacts and probability of 
establishment, the iso-risk line becomes less distinct, but nonetheless 
can be defined in terms of combinations that represent acceptable 
levels of risk. The major difference from Figure 1 is that there is now 
a zone of risk that creates a wide bound in which the actual, but 
undefined, iso-risk line lies. This wide bound arises due to the wide 
range of values from the cumulative risk element scores for either 
the consequence of introduction or the likelihood of introduction 
which are collapsed in the US system. In Figure 8.4, the iso-risk 
line/zone is defined by the shaded cells. Pests with risk values in 
the shaded cells represent unacceptable levels of risk for which 
quarantine measures might be undertaken. 
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An example of how a qualitative risk assessment could be adapted 
is a pest risk assessment for the import of Purple Passionfruit 
(Passiflora edulis) from Chile to the US (Firko and Podleckis 1996). 
Three potential pests associated with Purple Passionfruit were 
identified Ascochyta passiflorae, Brevipalpus chilensis, and Ceratitis 
capitata. Based on information provided by Firko and Podleckis 
(1996), the cumulative risk element scores for consequence of 
introduction and likelihood of introduction respectively are 9 and 10 
for Ascochyta passiflorae, 13 and 15 for Brevipalpus chilensis, and 15 
and 16 for Ceratitis capitata. These values are plotted in Figure 8.4.  
Since Firko and Podleckis (1996) provide a qualitative risk 
assessment only, they made no attempt to suggest risk management 
options or to fit them within the risk assessment framework. The 
expectation would be that risk management would modify the 
likelihood of introduction. This would move the combined 
cumulative risk for each of the potential pests horizontally to the left 
far enough to provide an acceptable level of risk. 
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One complicating factor with the use of qualitative inputs is that the 
categorical values are derived from a range of factors (risk elements) 
that have no common denominator. This means that "expected 
value" from combining an economic impact and a probability is not 
applicable here. Risk scores for consequence of introduction and 
likelihood of introduction can still be multiplied, but the resulting is 
something different than an expected value. The combined risk 
rating can still be used to rank a pest and to form an iso-risk line, but 
only relative to this risk rating system. 
Methodological issues 
The use of economic effects and probability of occurrence or 
introduction to calculate an expected value, while relatively 
straightforward, can only be done after considering what constitutes 
an appropriate measure of economic effects and probability of 
introduction. The iso-risk model described so far has been based on 
a broadly defined measure of economic impacts. There are however, 
a number of potential economic impacts that could be included in 
an assessment, ranging from potential pest-related damage to the 
benefits of lower world prices for commodities. This in turn raises 
the question about what the objective of the assessment should be, 
and in particular, whether it is designed to provide a safety 
standard or welfare maximisation. In a similar way, a broadly 
specified risk of introduction masks the fact that probability of 
introduction is related to the volume of trade. This raises a question 
of whether the risk assessment process is attempting to provide an 
envelope to risk or whether it will let risk fluctuate with trade levels. 
Safety standard versus welfare maximisation 
One of the issues to be considered is what should be included under 
economic effects in the model. Generally speaking, there are two 
broad perspectives on what should be included, each related to the 
underlying objective of the analysis. One is that the objective of the 
analysis should be safety and that the development of a safety 
standard is a key outcome. The other is that the objective of the 
analysis should be welfare maximisation. Which of these 
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perspectives is chosen is important because it will influence which 
economic effects are measured and how they will be interpreted.  
Before comparing these two perspectives, it is useful to look 
generally at how economic effects might be measured. In the context 
of pest risk assessment, at a basic level economic effects might be 
considered as either direct or indirect pest effects. Direct pest effects 
would be direct impacts of a pest on a host plant, and would cover 
host-specific impacts like yield loss or mortality. Indirect pest effects 
would be non-host specific impacts. These would be general effects 
that are created by the presence of a pest, but not specific to the pest-
host dynamic, including public health issues, restrictions on traffic 
flow, key ecosystem function compromised, research requirements, 
market access problems, and tourism. At a broader level, economic 
effects could extend to the market for the products covered by the 
analysis, expanding the analysis to include consumers. 
The types of economic analysis that are relevant are linked to the 
scope or level of economic activity that is being measured. 
Following the FAO (1996) guidelines, economic analysis can be 
grouped into partial budget, partial equilibrium, general 
equilibrium and non-commercial/environmental analyses. Partial 
budget analysis is the narrowest in scope and deals mainly with 
changes to the profits of individual producers. Examples of this 
approach in quarantine risk assessment include Cowley et al... (1993), 
DPIE (1997), Whyte et al. (1995), Whyte and Cowley (1996), and Whyte 
et al. (1998). Partial equilibrium analysis is wider in scope than 
partial budget, dealing with a production sector as whole rather 
than individual producers. Examples of this approach in quarantine 
risk assessment include James and Anderson (1998), Roberts et al.. 
(1999) and USDA (1991). General equilibrium analysis extends the 
analysis to encompass an entire economy, and allowing the effects 
on wages, exchange rates and national welfare to be measured (as in 
chapter 16 in this volume). These approaches form a progression of 
analytical opportunities that are available as the scope of an impact 
increases, moving from the narrowest to the widest in scope. 
With a safety perspective and safety standard objective, the key 
motivation is minimising the potential for negative outcomes. The 
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focus on negative outcomes in turn means that the economic 
analysis would be limited to the measurement of the negative 
impacts of a potential pest on an economy. This limits what is 
considered in an economic analysis rather than the level of the 
analysis. Since economic effects are linked to how a pest or disease 
manifests itself, the extent of physical effects a pest has on a host, the 
number of potential hosts, the effect of existing control measures, 
and the effect of existing management practices becomes important. 
In terms of the iso-risk framework, the safety standard objective 
means reducing potential negative effects towards an identified 
ALOP. An important outcome of this approach is that the 
benchmark for decisions (safety standard or ALOP) is constant 
across all decisions. 
With a welfare maximisation perspective, the objective becomes one 
of welfare maximisation rather than attempting to meet a particular 
standard. Benefits to consumers, as well as negative impacts on 
producers would be considered in the analysis. A possible outcome 
of this approach is that quarantine measures would be rejected 
because consumer benefits outweighed producer costs. The problem 
with this perspective as tool for setting quarantine policy is that the 
decision on how any particular commodity would be treated would 
depend on the nature of the market for the commodity. 
The Mediterranean fruit fly example discussed earlier provides an 
example of the issues raised in adopting a welfare-maximising 
approach rather than a safety approach to determining quarantine 
standards. The two pathways in this example could instead be two 
different commodities that carried the same pest but presented 
different risks. Using the safety approach, both commodities would 
be subject to sufficient and possibly different quarantine measures 
to reduce their pest risk to a common acceptable level. Under the 
welfare-maximising approach, if the commodity which had a high 
probability of introducing the pest also provided a higher net 
welfare gain to consumers if it was unregulated rather than 
regulated, the commodity would be unregulated. This would 
compromise the effect of the quarantine measure imposed on the 
other commodity and raise questions about the justification of the 
measure. 
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Global or individual appropriate level of protection 
One factor that must be considered is the 'level' of risk that will be 
considered. The choices of level of risk for a regulator are (1) 
whether there is a desire to fix total risk associated with all trade 
within a given period, or (2) whether there is a desire to fix the risk 
associated with a particular commodity or pest. A key factor in this 
decision is the correlation between the likelihood of introduction of 
a pest and the volume of trade that is carried out.  
In the case of fixing total risk associated with all trade, the regulator 
determines a maximum expected value that will be accepted, 
aggregated over all commodities imported during a particular 
period. In the case of fixing risk for particular commodities or pests, 
this means determining an acceptable level of PR or PRC. 
Combining all of these options creates a matrix of choices for a 
regulatory authority (Figure 8.5). 
There are two different management options available for fixing 
total risk. A commodity-based management regime to fix total risk 
is shown by Box A in Figure 8.5. In this strategy, the regulator fixes 
the total acceptable risk over all trade, and then manages that risk 
by varying the acceptable risk for each commodity traded. In terms 
of the iso-risk framework, this is equivalent to determining a 




Management of total risk is then done by managing PRC for each 
commodity. This is typically done by altering the likelihood of 
introduction. In order to stay within total risk, as trade volume 
increases or new commodities are introduced, more stringent 
phytosanitary measures would be required for some or all 
commodities. This could be done through changing any of the many 
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A pest-based management regime to fix total risk is shown by Box B 
in Figure 8.5. In this strategy, the regulator fixes the total acceptable 
risk over all trade, and then manages that risk by varying the 
acceptable risk for each potential pest. In terms of the iso-risk 
framework, this is equivalent to determining a maximum sum for 
PR over all n potential pests. 
 
Management of total risk is then done by managing PR for each 
potential pest. This again is typically done by altering the likelihood 
of introduction.  
In contrast to the fixed total risk, fixed individual risk means that 
the risk presented by any particular potential pest or commodity 
will be fixed, and the total risk will be variable, fluctuating with the 
level of trade. A commodity-based management regime to fix 
individual risk is shown by Box C in Figure 8.5. In this strategy, the 
regulator fixes the individual acceptable risk for a commodity, and 
then manages the risk directly for each commodity traded. In terms 
of the iso-risk framework, this is equivalent to determining PRC for 
each commodity traded, following the process discussed earlier. A 
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Box D in Figure 8.5. In this strategy, the regulator fixes the 
individual acceptable risk for a commodity, and then manages the 
risk directly for each pest. In terms of the iso-risk framework, this is 
equivalent to determining PR for each potential pest, following the 
process discussed earlier. In either case, total risk increases with the 
volume of trade. 
In essence, fixing total risk means that individual risk is variable. 
This complicates management since management efforts must 
change with changes to trade volumes. This can be done either by 
modifying the risk accepted for the marginal product traded, 
leaving the risk accepted for earlier volumes at a higher level, or by 
modifying the risk of all products imported. In a practical sense, 
fixing total risk (either A or B) is likely to be an inappropriate basis 
for developing phytosanitary standards.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a methodology, an iso-risk framework, 
for quantifying technical trade barriers that contain elements of risk 
of occurrence and economic impacts. The method provides a means 
for creating benchmarks and comparing quarantine treatments. This 
is an improvement on previous practice in that both economic and 
scientific criteria can be included in an analysis. This ensures that 
barriers can be treated on the basis of expected outcome rather than 
the technical characteristics of the barrier. As such, it is possible to 
move beyond simple considerations of whether the barrier involves 
an insect or a bacteria, and instead focus on whether a potential 
event behind the barrier is above, below or within an expected 
dollar value.  
The iso-risk framework provides a solution to some of the problems 
created by SPS in a trade environment. In particular it allows for the 
even treatment of technical barriers and satisfies the need for 
transparent and measurable criteria for justifying decisions to 
trading partners. Using iso-risk, equivalent treatment requires that 
technical barriers or SPS have similar outcomes. This means that 
two exporters can be subjected to different quarantine requirements, 
but not violate WTO rules on equal treatment since the outcomes of 
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the measures are similar. Justification of quarantine measures also 
becomes easier since decisions can be shown to be consistent within 
an overall domestic policy context.  
Development of standards for objectively comparing quarantine 
measures is going to require some consensus on the appropriate 
economic impact to measure, the appropriate calculation of risk of 
establishment, and the appropriate ALOP. Initially, a country would 
only be able to determine whether from an internal perspective it is 
treating its trading partners consistently using domestic definitions 
of economic impact and probability of establishment. This internal 
consistency of quarantine policy would be relative to a domestic 
ALOP. At a later stage, when a number of countries were basing 
decisions on iso-risk, it is possible that an international norm for 
ALOP would emerge. A country could then establish, or perhaps be 
challenged, as to whether its treatment of trading partners was 
consistent with international norms. 
The problem of arriving at an ALOP which adequately describes a 
regulatory agency's perception of acceptable pest risk in an iso-risk 
framework can be approached by starting with a country's current 
regulatory treatment of pests and commodities. To establish an 
ALOP, a sufficient sample of pests would first need to be evaluated 
for probability of entry and potential economic impacts after post-
quarantine treatment. ALOP should emerge from the pattern of 
plotted results, being represented by a line above which there would 
be no plots. An ALOP for commodities could be determined by a 
similar process. A value for ALOP implicit in existing quarantine 
regulations should emerge from the analysis. The process is not 
likely to be easy in practice since such an analysis may show 
inconsistencies in existing quarantine policies based on the resulting 
values of commodity and pest risk.  
While providing a clearer picture of ALOP, experience in New 
Zealand has shown that there is a significant increase in information 
and analysis required by a quarantine authority when it has to 
include economic impact assessment and a specific probability of 
introduction. In many cases, little will be known about the 
economics of particular crops, much less the expected economic 
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impact on a particular plant or probabilities of introduction. In 
addition to the problem of basic data, there is a problem with 
producing a rapid analysis for quarantine decisions if the level of 
detail implied by iso-risk is required for each commodity that is 
traded. Models to facilitate rapid analysis have been developed for 
New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry that calculate 
probability of introduction (Greer and Bigsby 1995; Greer et al. 1995) 
and economic impacts (Bigsby and Crequer 1995; Bigsby 1995) 
based a standardised set of factors.  
References 
Bigsby, H.R. (1995) Pest model - partial equilibrium model user's manual. 
AERU Report for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Wellington. 
Bigsby, H.R. (1996) Enhancement and further development of the 
economic impact assessment modules. Final Report for Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington. 
Bigsby, H.R. and J. Crequer (1995) Pest plant economic impact 
assessment model. Prepared for Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Regulatory Authority, Wellington. 
Bigsby, H.R. and J. Crequer (1998) 'Conceptual model for the 
management of pest risk,' in Statistics in ecology and environmental 
monitoring 2, edited by D.J. Fletcher, L. Kavalieris, and B.F.J. Manly, 
Otago Conference Series 6, Dunedin: University of Otago Press. 
Bigsby, H.R. and C. Whyte (1998) A Model of the Appropriate Level of 
Protection for New Zealand's Quarantine Security. MAF Policy Draft 
Technical Paper, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington.  
Bigsby, H.R. and C.F. Whyte (2000) 'Quantifying phytosanitary 
barriers to trade', in Interdisciplinary food safety research, edited by N. 
Hooker and. E. Murano, CRC Press. 
Cowley, J.M., R.T. Baker, C. F. Hill, and C.J. Barber (1993) Pest risk 
assessment, Mediterranean fruit fly (Ceratitis capitata). Report of the 
Chapter 8  ALOP: a New Zealand perspective  161 
 
PRA Committee, NZ Plant Protection Centre, Lynfield, to Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries Regulatory Authority, Wellington. 
Cohrssen, J.J. and V.T. Covello (1989) Risk analysis: a guide to 
principles and methods for analyzing health and environmental risks. 
United States Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office of 
the President, Washington, DC. 
DPIE (1997) Salmon import risk analysis, Canberra: Department of 
Primary Industries. 
FAO (1996) International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures. Rome: 
International Plant Protection Convention. 
Firko. M.J. and E.V. Podleckis (1996) Importation of purple passion fruit 
(Passiflora Edulis) from Chile into the United States. USDA-APHIS, 
Riverdale MD. 
Greer, G. and H. Bigsby (1995) Estimating the economic impacts of pest 
introduction. Report of the Agribusiness and Economics Research 
Unit, Lincoln University, to Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Policy, Wellington. 
Greer G., H. Bigsby and R. McAuliffe (1995) Pest Model - Partial 
Budget Model user's manual. AERU Report for the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington. 
Hillman, J. (1978) Nontariff Agricultural Trade Barriers. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Hillman, J. (1991) Technical barriers to agricultural trade. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
James, S. and K. Anderson (1998) 'On the need for more economic 
assessment of quarantine/ SPS policies', Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 42(4): 425-444, December. 
Kaplan, S. and B.J. Garrick (1981) 'On the quantitative definition of 
risk', Risk Analysis 1: 11-27. 
162  Part II  The 'appropriate level of protection' 
 
Miller, L., M.D.R. McElvaine, M. McDowell, and A.S. Ahl (1993) 
'Developing a quantitative risk assessment process', Review of Science 
and Technology of Office International des Epizooties 12: 1153-1164. 
Ministry of Health (1996) Managing risks - a concept paper. Report of 
the Food and Nutrition Section, Public Health Group, of the New 
Zealand Ministry of Health, Wellington. 
Ndayisenga, F. and J. Kinsey (1994) 'The structure of non-tariff trade 
measures on agricultural products in high-income countries', 
Agribusiness 10(4): 275-292. 
Orr, R.L. (1995) A plant quarantine risk-based framework for 
standardising the acceptable level of risk and appropriate level of 
protection. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA, 
Washington, DC. 
Papasolomontos, A. (1993) 'Present global activities in the 
harmonization of plant quarantine', in International approaches to 
plant pest risk analysis. Proceedings of the APHIS/NAPPO 
International Workshop on the Identification, Assessment and 
Management of Risks due to Exotic Agricultural Pests. NAPPO 
Bulletin 11, Alexandria, VA. 
Patterson, E. (1990) 'International efforts to minimize the adverse 
trade effects of national sanitary and phytosanitary regulations', 
Journal of World Trade, 24(2): 91-102. 
Roberts, D., T. Josling and D. Orden (1999) A framework for analysing 
technical trade barriers in agricultural markets. USDA-ERS Tech. Bull. 
1876. Washington, DC. 
Smith, J.R. (1993) Welcoming Remarks, in International approaches to 
plant pest risk analysis. Proceedings of the APHIS/NAPPO 
International Workshop on the Identification, Assessment and 
Management of Risks due to Exotic Agricultural Pests. Alexandria, 
Virginia. NAPPO Bulletin 11, Alexandria, VA. 
USDA (1996) Pathway-initiated pest risk assessment: guidelines for 
qualitative assessments, version 4.0. USDA-APHIS-PPQ, Riverdale, 
MD. 
Chapter 8  ALOP: a New Zealand perspective  163 
 
USDA (1991) Pest risk assessment on the importation of Larch from 
Siberia and the Soviet Far East. USDA-Forest Service, Misc. Pub. 1495, 
Washington, DC. 
Whyte, C.F. (1998) Appropriate levels of protection: equivalence of 
commercial and non-commercial pathways. Paper presented at the Pre-
AARES conference Workshop on Border Security and Risk Analysis, 
Lincoln University, Canterbury, 19 January. 
Whyte, C.F., R.T. Baker, and J.M. Cowley (1998) 'Procedures for 
plant pest risk assessment: biological risk assessment for 
Mediterranean fruit fly', in Statistics in ecology and environmental 
monitoring 2, edited by D.J. Fletcher, L. Kavalieris and B.F.J. Manly, 
Otago Conference Series 6, Dunedin: University of Otago Press. 
Whyte, C.F. and J.M. Cowley (1996) Effect of x-ray machines on the risk 
of fruit fly outbreaks in New Zealand. B. Assessment of the annual 
probability of fruit fly outbreaks in New Zealand from passenger baggage. 
Report to Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Policy, Wellington. 
Whyte, C.F., J.M. Cowley, R.T. Baker, C.F. Hill, C.J. Barber, and M. 
Braithwaite (1995) Economic risk assessment, Mediterranean fruit fly 
(Ceratitis capitata). Report of the PRA Committee of the NZ Plant 
Protection Centre for Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 




Beyond iso-risk to include benefits under the 
SPS Agreement 
GIL RODRIGUEZ, NICO KLIJN, ANNA HEANEY AND 
STEPHEN BEARE 
Countries restrict imports through quarantine controls to reduce the 
risks and expected costs of pest and disease incursions. Countries 
have also used trade barriers such as import tariffs and quotas to 
protect domestic industries against competition from imports. The 
higher benefits that could be obtained under freer trade regimes 
have prompted international agreements to liberalise trade under 
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and, its 
successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Under the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, a Member has the sovereign right to 
determine the level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection it 
deems appropriate and to institute plant and animal health and food 
safety measures to protect against bona fide risks. Sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, such as disease-free certification 
requirements, are instruments that importing countries use to lower 
the risk of pest and disease incursion. To prevent the use of SPS 
measures as disguised trade barriers, WTO Members can institute 
SPS measures provided they are: 
 based on a sound scientific assessment process; 
 not more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the desired 
level of protection against pests and diseases; and 
Including benefits under the SPS Agreement  165 
 
 nondiscriminatory - sanitary and phytosanitary measures must 
not discriminate between Members where identical or similar 
conditions prevail, including between their own territory and 
that of Members. 
Implementing SPS measures that meet these guidelines in a 
consistent manner within and between countries is proving to be 
difficult and several Member countries, including Australia, have 
been drawn into the lengthy and expensive WTO dispute settlement 
process. This inability to establish consistent SPS protocols may lead 
to a greater number of disputes in the future and reduce the 
effectiveness of the SPS Agreement to facilitate trade. 
While a Member Country is free to set an appropriate level of 
protection (ALOP), it is unclear how such a level of protection can 
be defined in terms of specific SPS measures. Under the Agreement, 
the criterion used by a Member to establish an ALOP could be, for 
example, a maximum probability of a disease incursion per time 
period or a maximum expected cost of incursion over the future in 
present value terms. However, none of these criteria are related to 
whether SPS measures are economically viable. That is, whether the 
expected benefits from reducing the risk of pest or disease 
incursions exceed the forgone gains from trade. 
The potential value of considering the expected benefits from 
accepting an import risk when establishing an SPS framework such 
as ALOP is considered in this chapter. It is shown that accepting 
high risks can be justified when there are net benefits from trade. 
Determining a criterion for setting the 'appropriate level 
of protection' 
There have been attempts to define a criterion for determining an 
appropriate level of protection within the guidelines of the WTO's 
SPS Agreement. Bigsby and Whyte (1999), for example, define 
ALOP as equivalent to the highest expected pest and disease cost 
associated with the import of any single commodity that is 
acceptable to society. The expected cost is the weighted sum of all 
costs of pest or disease incursion. These depend on the probability 
166  Part II  The 'appropriate level of protection' 
 
of incursion per time period, and all costs of an incursion per time 
period. The probability of incursion is the chance of a pest or disease 
occurring in that period. The economic factors that determine this 
cost are lost income from production forgone following the 
establishment and spread of a pest or disease, the costs of 
eradication and the cost effectiveness of alternative approaches to 
limiting risks (Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement). Sanitary and 
phytosanitary protocols could be applied when the expected disease 
costs associated with unrestricted imports of a good exceed the 
maximum acceptable expected cost to a Member Country. 
Bigsby and Crequer (1996) proposed an iso-risk approach. The cost 
of a pest or disease incursion refers to income from production 
forgone and the cost of eradication. The iso-risk line is a locus of 
points with combinations of risk and actual disease cost that result 
in the same expected cost (Bigsby and Whyte 1999): 
(1) probability of incursion*disease cost = constant 
In this context, if the criterion used for setting the ALOP is the 
highest acceptable expected pest and disease cost, then the iso-risk 
line defines the boundary between commodities with acceptable 
risks and those with unacceptable risks. An iso-risk line close to the 
origin denotes a low expected cost and if this expected cost was 
used to set the ALOP, a high level of sanitary and phytosanitary 
protection would be provided. The iso-risk line is further from the 
origin if higher expected pest and disease costs are acceptable to 
society. 
Limitations of using the iso-risk criterion for setting an 
ALOP 
While the use of the iso-risk criterion for setting an ALOP appears to 
be objective and straight forward, it has several limitations. First, the 
specification of a locus of iso-risk points is specific to the 
characteristics of a pest or disease incursion and it may not be 
possible to rank or compare different quarantine risks. The 
approach proposed by Bigsby and Crequer is valid, for example, 
when eradication occurs with certainty within the period of 
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incursion such that each new period starts with a disease-free state 
and another probability of incursion applies in this period. The 
problem becomes more complex when time is introduced into the 
analysis and it may not be possible to uniquely define an ALOP 
within the iso-risk framework.  
Consider the case of a disease with a constant probability per year of 
incursion through imports (p) and an annual cost of infection (c) 
where eradication is not cost-effective and not attempted. Over a 
long period of time the probability of incursion in that period 
approaches unity while the costs of an incursion late in the period 
are discounted and approach zero. Here we must consider the 
probability that an incursion will or will not occur over an 
increasing interval of time in order to determine the expected cost of 
an incursion. The expected cost of an incursion, from a disease free 

























which when set to a constant yields another iso-risk locus. The locus 
is still hyperbolic but different in shape from that of Bigsby and 
Crequer. A comparison of the iso-risk formulas is given in Figure 9.1 
(with a constant value of 100 and a discount rate of 7 per cent). The 
two classes of incursion cannot be compared directly using an iso-
risk approach. Pests and diseases for which cost-effective 
eradication takes place over an extended time period or where 
eradication is only partially effective may also constitute different 
classes of incursions, and cannot be compared directly under the 
iso-risk approach. 
Further, the state of science for SPS risk analyses is highly uncertain 
and in many instances there is insufficient evidence to undertake a 
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quantitative assessment of risks to human, animal or plant health 
(Powell 1997). Under conditions of uncertainty, relevant 
probabilities for scientific or economic risk are often unknown or 
ambiguous because of the scarcity of observations of events and of 
information on underlying causes. Within the Bigbsy and Crequer 
iso-risk framework, the expected cost is proportional to, and thus 
sensitive to, the probability of disease incursion in a time period 
(Heaney, Rodriguez and Abdalla 1999). This uncertainty can skew 
the distribution of costs and benefits. An ALOP based on a criterion 
of expected probabilities of disease incursion not higher than an 
expected maximum dollar amount may not adequately represent 
the risks of relaxing a quarantine restriction. 
Figure 9.1: Comparison of iso-risk formulas 
 
 
The limitations discussed above suggest that there is not a simple 
methodology that can be applied consistently for determining the 
expected cost of a pest or disease incursion. Data and analytical 
requirements are likely to be considerable and may vary 
significantly between different pests and diseases, and in different 
environments. As a result, most estimates of expected cost will be 
highly uncertain. 
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More importantly, establishing an ALOP on the basis of a maximum 
expected cost does not take into account the benefits from imports of 
individual commodities — benefits arise from importing goods that 
were previously not available or that were produced domestically at 
higher cost. Bureau, Marette and Schiavina (1998) argue that the 
settlement of international disputes on SPS issues should be based 
on cost/benefit analysis, rather than relying on scientific 
considerations. This is because a more systematic economic analysis 
would reflect also the interests of users, including final consumers, 
in the WTO dispute process. 
One implication of failing to consider the benefits of trade is the 
likelihood of distorting the setting of an ALOP to favour large rather 
than small industries. The potential reductions in income resulting 
from disease incursion are likely to be greater the larger the 
industries. If the ALOP was set in consideration of industries with a 
large gross value of output (GVO), then those with a small GVO 
would not be provided any protection from pest and disease 
incursions, even when the probability of incursion was sufficiently 
high to generate a net cost to Australia. Industries with a small GVO 
in Australia include horticulture and aquaculture. 
The cost/benefit issues 
The WTO Agreement aims to achieve open and nondiscriminatory 
trade and requires Member countries to adopt trade policies 
consistent with this aim. Cost/benefit analyses of alternative 
quarantine protocols could be used to systematically assess all 
components of welfare. Cost/benefit analysis could provide 
estimates of the forgone trade benefits and the probability 
distribution of potential costs of pest and disease incursions, 
allowing the ranking of potential protocols according to net benefits. 
Consequently, this information would enable a Member to identify 
the protocol that yields the highest net benefit.  
Benefits from unrestricted imports may outweigh the increase in the 
risks and costs of the incursions of pests and diseases. However, if 
imports of a commodity increase the risk of disease, there may be 
considerable costs to exporters. The introduction of disease leads to 
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higher costs of production due, for example, to increased use of 
inputs. Further, potential damage to the disease-free status of 
exporters could result in loss of access to some export markets and 
in other export markets the loss of export price premiums. 
However, the SPS Agreement does not explicitly endorse the 
consideration of benefits associated with different risk mitigation 
measures, and the relevant economic factors outlined in Article 5 
make no mention of welfare impacts on consumers (Roberts 1998). 
In the context of the Agreement, the assessment of SPS protocols 
tends to be limited to consideration of measures that will achieve the 
risk target, and of the costs of administering the protocol. The 
Agreement does not, however, specifically exclude the use of 
economic techniques (such as cost/benefit analysis) in assessing 
different protocols. 
If using cost/benefit analysis, however, Members must conform to 
the SPS consistency provision (Article 5). This provision ensures that 
Members apply measures consistently to different commodities that 
pose similar risk of introducing the same disease. Where different 
commodities pose similar risks, allowing imports of one commodity 
(based on higher net benefit from imports) while banning the other 
would contravene the SPS consistency provision (Article 5). 
There are a number of examples of cost/benefit analysis applied to 
Australian quarantine protocols. James and Anderson (1998) 
demonstrated that removing Australia's ban on banana imports 
would increase net social welfare in Australia by $100 million a year 
even if the domestic banana industry shut down as a result of 
imports. A US ban on Mexican avocados is another example of 
trade-restrictive phytosanitary measures that have consumer 
welfare losses that exceed the domestic benefits from preventing 
pest infestations (Orden and Romano 1996). 
These import protocols, implemented to lower phytosanitary risk to 
domestic producers, demonstrate how SPS decisions based on risk 
assessment only can lead to a decrease in social welfare. Such 
policies pay little regard to the benefits from trade forgone as a 
result of restrictive trade policy. Further, these studies demonstrate 
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that estimating benefits from trade through the relaxation of 
quarantine restrictions is not fundamentally more difficult or less 
objective than estimating the expected cost of an incursion. 
The inclusion of benefits in the decision making process through 
benefit–cost analysis is likely to lead to the implementation of SPS 
protocols that are less trade-restrictive than those based on risk 
assessment only (James and Anderson 1998). Moreover, cost/benefit 
analysis can account for changes in risk and benefits associated with 
imports over time. For example, the decision to import feed grains 
into Australia in a severe drought year and restrict imports of feed 
grains in other years may be optimal from a cost/benefit 
perspective. However, managing such a situation under the iso-risk 
approach to determining the ALOP would be very difficult. 
Recognition within the SPS Agreement that higher benefits justify 
taking greater quarantine risks will make it easier for countries to 
implement consistent quarantine policies across commodities and 
over time. 
Conclusion 
There is a trade-off between the benefits of importing commodities 
with a quarantine risk and the expected cost of potential pest or 
disease incursions. Benefits from unrestricted imports largely accrue 
to users of imports and import-competing goods. However, 
producers are likely to face considerable costs if imports of a 
commodity increase their risk of a pest or disease incursion. 
A criterion for setting a Member's ALOP that is based on risk of 
incursion, or on maximum expected cost does not take into account 
all the potential benefits and costs from imports. This is likely to 
result in the implementation of SPS protocols that are more trade-
restrictive than if the ALOP were determined using a full 
cost/benefit analysis. Furthermore, failure to account for trade 
benefits is likely to lead to the adoption of SPS measures that favor 
high-valued industries and may disadvantage small and emerging 
industries. 
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The failure of the SPS Agreement to allow for both risk and trade 
benefits to be considered in determining an ALOP may make it 
difficult for Members to maintain consistent SPS measures across 
commodities or over time. It may also push countries to adopt 
overly conservative levels of quarantine protection and limit the 
potential gains from the SPS Agreement. 
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Integrating import risk and trade benefit 
analysis 
RICHARD H. SNAPE AND DAVID ORDEN* 
Economists have long emphasised the gains from international 
trade, but have acknowledged that there can be external 
diseconomies, including pest and disease risks, associated with 
importing plant and animal products. The General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), both in the original 1947 version and in 
the 1994 World Trade Organization (WTO) extension of it, follows 
this lead, with the general rules constraining trade barriers and 
facilitating their reduction, but with allowance for exceptions, such 
as for quarantine purposes. 
Quarantine scientists and administrators, environmentalists, and 
farmers facing threats, competitive and pestiferous, from imports, 
tend to emphasise the risks to production and the environment from 
trading, rather than the gains to consumers from imported products. 
This attitude is reflected in the WTO Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The emphasis 
of the SPS Agreement is on the determination of risks from plant 
and animal imports, the appropriate level of protection against these 
risks, and securing consistent application of these criteria across 
similar products and from similar sources. There is little if any scope 
for distinguishing between products with similar risk according to 
the level of consumer benefit which would accrue if the products 
                                                 
*  Nothing in this paper should be taken as expressing the views of the 
Productivity Commission or the Australian Government. 
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were to be imported. Nevertheless the SPS Agreement is written as 
an "exception" to the general rules of GATT 1994. 
Some economists have called for more recognition of the gains from 
trade – in particular the gains to consumers from imported products 
– in the application of quarantine laws. A few recent studies have 
provided estimates of these gains and have shown that the benefits 
of trade exceed expected costs due to pest risks in certain cases (e.g. 
James and Anderson 1998, and Chapter 11 in this volume by Orden, 
Narrod and Glauber). Several chapters in this volume and elsewhere 
(e.g. Chapter 2 by Roberts and Roberts 2000) also examine 
conceptual and pragmatic dimensions of the relationship between 
risk evaluation and cost/benefit analysis in quarantine decisions. 
In this chapter we present a simple diagram to illustrate the risk-
focused versus cost/benefit approaches to policy decisions about 
trade of products that may pose SPS risks. In Figure 10.1, the 
horizontal axis measures the risk (weighted by probabilities) of 
trading particular products. Several authors have developed 'iso-
risk' diagrams, with the economic impact of the imports of pests or 
diseases (if they were to become established domestically) on one 
axis and the probability of such establishment and spread on the 
other (e.g. Chapters 8 and 12 in this volume by Bigsby and Binder 
respectively). The horizontal axis of our Figure 10.1 is simply the 
dollar value of their iso-risk curves. 
The vertical axis of Figure 10.1 shows the other net benefits from 
importing products that may carry pests or diseases. These are the 
traditional gains from trade. For any products which are tested or 
otherwise treated for quarantine purposes, the costs of treatment or 
testing should be taken into account in determining this other net 
benefit. Such testing or treatment would of course also reduce the 
risk (on the horizontal axis) of that product, as shown for example in 
movement from D' to D in Figure 10.1.  
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With both the risk and the other net benefits shown in dollar terms 
(and with consistent time discounting for both) a 45-degree line 
from the origin indicates the equating of these expected effects of 
trade. For a neutral policy attitude to risk, this line shows the 
boundary of positive trade-off of the benefits and risks of imports of 
particular products. Risk-averse policy would be shown by a steeper 
curve; risk-loving policy by a flatter one. Based on economic 
cost/benefit criteria, under a neutral policy attitude toward risk all 
products with coordinates that are located above the 45-degree line 
(when the cost-appropriate testing and treatment is accounted for) 
should be imported. Those products that cannot be raised above the 
line under any quarantine conditions and treatments should not be 
imported.  
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The general rules of the GATT can be viewed as focusing on the 
vertical axis of Figure 10.1. For products for which there is zero risk, 
the coordinates lie on this axis and so are above the 45-degree line 
(at the origin). The general GATT objective for these products is to 
facilitate the reduction of trade barriers. Reduction of these trade 
barriers is in the national economic interest of the importing country 
(leaving aside large-country optimal tariff and similar arguments). 
But for various political economy reasons, countries often fail to 
remove trade barriers unilaterally, which is detrimental also to 
exporters among their trading partners through lost market 
opportunities. The GATT general rules are an institutional response 
designed to facilitate mutually beneficial trade barrier reductions. 
The underlying aim is to achieve the gains from trade by facilitating 
the international movement among Members of the WTO of 
products that lie on the vertical axis of Figure 10.1 (involving no 
risk). 
The SPS Agreement as an exception to the GATT general rules can 
be viewed as predominantly concerned with the horizontal (not the 
vertical) axis of Figure 10.1. The first aim is to bind countries' 
policies away from the origin: if there is no credible scientific basis 
for risk, then quarantine policies are not to be established to limit 
trade. The second aim of the SPS Agreement is to require countries 
to select a point on the horizontal axis, such as point Z, that is a 
standard for their acceptable level of risk or appropriate level of 
protection (ALOP), and to apply it consistently for all products and 
for all country sources (including domestic sources). Essentially the 
aim is to evaluate products relative to a vertical line through point Z 
– to prevent arbitrary and unjustified quarantine distinctions 
between products, distinctions that could be used for protection 
against economic competition. Under the SPS Agreement, products 
to the left of the vertical line through Z should be permitted; those to 
the right of Z may be prohibited. 
Having determined Z, the application of the SPS Agreement would 
not distinguish between products A and B, even though, on a full 
cost/benefit analysis, product A should be imported, while product 
B should not (assuming it is in this location after the best possible 
quarantine treatment). Even worse from an optimum cost/benefit 
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policy perspective, under the ALOP principle and the specification 
of point Z, imports of product C would be allowed while those of D 
would not. By forcing this distinction, the SPS Agreement could 
preclude a country from implementing a desirable policy from a 
national cost/benefit perspective.  
It may be argued that a product at a point such as D poses no 
problem as far as the SPS Agreement is concerned because an 
importing country could decide to relax its quarantine rules to allow 
the imports of a product with a level of risk above Z, and exporting 
countries are not likely to complain in such cases. Moreover, if an 
importing country finds that a large number of products for which it 
has precluded trade have coordinates like D, it might conclude 
unilaterally that its ALOP is set too conservatively. A shift of the 
ALOP to the right would allow more gains from trade to be realised 
with a consequent increase in risk.1 Yet there remains concern that 
many countries have set Z too conservatively, almost 
indistinguishably from the vertical axis itself. The result may be too 
many products with coordinates like D that are excluded from trade 
by quarantine decisions, causing net economic losses.  
For the initially chosen Z, a different problem that arises with 
allowing trade of product D comes through precedent. A WTO 
Dispute Settlement Panel might later conclude that excluding 
product C but allowing product D was not consistent with the SPS 
requirement that an ALOP be applied consistently where similar 
sources of risk exist. 
Quite apart from the precedent set by allowing imports of D 
products, a problem with respect to trading partners and the 
potential importing country arises from products with coordinates 
such as C. Here a decision to exclude is trade restricting, and the 
decision to exclude cannot be justified under the SPS Agreement in 
terms of the ALOP set at Z (nor are quarantine procedures justifiable 
                                                 
1  Digby Gascoine and Ken Forsythe have pointed out that if past 
quarantine decisions are resulting in products being excluded that lie above the 
45-degree line, priority for re-examination should be given to those products 
whose coordinates are expected to be close to the country’s ALOP and furthest 
above the 45-degree line.  
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under the Agreement that might reduce risk and move the 
coordinates of C above the 45-degree line). The problem in this case 
is that just as countries are not expected to suffer net losses from 
other trade liberalisation measures under the GATT, no country 
should be required to bear a burden of risk costs that exceeds the 
other net benefits from trade (measured for the country as a whole). 
Yet, that is what application of the principles of the SPS Agreement 
to product C would require. 
Whether excluding products with coordinates such as D or 
admitting products with coordinates such as C proves more 
problematic under the SPS Agreement depends on how 
conservatively the acceptable level of risk is set. The SPS Agreement 
as interpreted allows for different levels of risk for plant, animal and 
human health. It may also turn out that the level of risk adopted as 
acceptable by a country is allowed by WTO Dispute Settlement 
Panels to be based on scale factors: for example, the dollar value of 
risk measured relative to the size (e.g. volume of sales) of the 
industry. These considerations could cause the location of Z to vary 
among products (or at least among classes of products), but the 
basic dichotomy would remain between a decision-rule based on 
setting a level of risk versus a decision rule based on comparing the 
other net benefits to risks.  
Should the SPS Agreement be amended to allow (or even require) 
Members of the WTO to make quarantine decisions based on 
cost/benefit assessments instead of ALOP? This would involve not 
just permitting an adjustment of risk by a scale factor, but also 
permitting distinctions between products according to the benefits 
(particularly to consumers) accruing from importing products. This 
might allow (or even require) countries to adopt best economic 
policy practices for the benefit of their citizens as a whole, and 
escape from the emphasis on producer benefits from import 
restrictions which so often dominate in trade (including quarantine) 
policy.  
But it can also be argued that the purpose of the SPS Agreement is 
simply to prevent countries from egregious arbitrary and 
unjustifiable distinctions between products on quarantine grounds, 
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and that if it achieves this it will have achieved a great deal. Taking 
into account other net benefits of trade could backfire, and open the 
door to protection against economic competition for particular 
producers or socio-economic groups in a country.2 This could 
undermine what was intended to be achieved under the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture. In such event, the alternative decision 
rule could facilitate what many observers have feared: that as other 
forms of protection are wound back, economic protection through 
quarantine provisions could be increased. The best could be the 
enemy of the good. 
References 
James, S., and K. Anderson (1998) 'On the need for more economic 
assessment of quarantine/SPS policies', Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 42(4): 425-44, December.  
Phillips, P.W.B. and W.A. Kerr (2000) 'Alternative paradigms: the 
WTO versus the biosafety protocol for trade in genetically modified 
organisms', Journal of World Trade 34(4): 63-75, August. 
Roberts, D. (2000) 'Sanitary and phytosanitary risk management in 
the post-Uruguay Round era: an economic perspective', in National 
Research Council, Incorporating science, economics and sociology in 
developing sanitary and phytosanitary standards in international trade, 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
                                                 
2  Pacé textiles and clothing protection in developed countries, and Article 
26 of the Biosafety Protocol for Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms 
(Phillips and Kerr 2000, pp. 72-3) 
PART III 
_________________________________________________________ 
Adding more economics to risk 
analysis 
11 
Least trade-restrictive SPS policies: an analytic 
framework is there but questions remain 
DAVID ORDEN, CLARE NARROD AND JOSEPH W. 
GLAUBER 
This chapter examines the choice among sanitary and phytosanitary 
policies of those that are least trade-distorting. In addressing this 
choice, we highlight the potential for complementarity between 
science-based risk assessment and economic-based cost/benefit 
analysis in regulatory decision processes. We make the argument for 
fuller integration of these approaches than is often the case. 
Integrating risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis 
simultaneously into the regulatory process provides decision 
makers with a rich two-dimensional nexus of information. It is too 
optimistic to expect that for all regulatory decisions a fully optimal 
policy choice can be achieved when only a single dimension of 
information is considered. The two-dimensional risk assessment-
economic analysis nexus gives decision makers an opportunity to 
evaluate the trade-offs that are faced when they choose among 
alternative regulatory measures. The criterion "least trade-
restrictive" (or more generally, "least trade-distorting") is one that 
policy makers can apply to these decisions. It is not a complete 
decision-making rule, nor is it the only criterion on which policy 
options might be ranked, but least trade-restrictive is a criterion 
mandated by the WTO for consideration in SPS policy 
determination. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides a 
brief discussion of the concept of a policy being least trade-
184  Part III  Adding more economics to risk analysis 
distorting. We follow by summarising results from two case studies 
that were re-analysed using somewhat different approaches than 
those utilised in regulatory decisions. The possibility for either 
convergence or divergence between the inferences drawn from risk 
assessment versus cost/benefit analysis is demonstrated for the case 
of regulation of avocados entering the United States from Mexico. 
The value of integrating cost/benefit analysis and risk assessment 
simultaneously into evaluation of risk management options is 
demonstrated for the case of setting internal US Karnal bunt 
quarantine rules. We draw on these two case studies in a final 
section to offer some conclusions about the criterion "least trade-
distorting" and about integrating risk assessment and cost/benefit 
analysis into regulatory decision-making. The conceptual 
framework for identifying a policy that is economically efficient as 
being least trade-distorting is well defined. The hard part is 
providing the risk and economic assessments on which such 
decisions rest in specific cases. In addition, decision makers may not 
want to consider the full range of options that risk assessment and 
cost/benefit analysis lay before them. 
What does least trade-distorting mean? 
What does it mean to say that a policy is least trade-distorting, and 
why is this phrase so appealing to trade negotiators, but less so to 
trade economists? The answers to these questions come from 
recognising that being least trade-distorting is only one attribute of a 
policy being most efficient at achieving a stated objective. That there 
is an objective other than trade liberalisation which the policy is 
intended to achieve is implicit in the notion that a given policy is 
least trade-distorting. But achieving that policy objective may itself 
not be optimal on economic grounds, such as those often used to 
argue for benefits of liberalised trade.  
The general theory of economically efficient policy intervention 
suggests that policies be directed specifically at the given objective, 
because such policies attain their ends without imposing other 
distortions on the economy. A subsidy to producers is a more 
efficient policy for increasing output than a tariff, for example, since 
the production subsidy does not raise prices paid by consumers, and 
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thus avoids distorting their optimal consumption decisions along 
with production levels. Likewise, if the policy objective is to 
subsidise use of labour, a wage subsidy is more efficient than a 
general production subsidy, which is more efficient than a tariff. In 
short, intervention policies should be targeted toward the intended 
objective, and the more precisely they can be targeted, the better. 
The more efficient the policy intervention, the less trade-distorting 
that policy will be for any given level of the objective achieved by 
the intervention. 
The theory of efficient policy intervention applies equally well to 
interventions aimed at correcting market failures. For example, if 
domestic production causes a negative local externality, a tax on 
production is the efficient policy, as opposed, for example, to an 
import subsidy that lowers the product price to producers and 
consumers. If the use of a particular input causes a negative 
externality, then the optimal policy instrument would be a tax on 
use of that input, not a tax on production per se.  
There is another consideration when policies are directed at 
externalities. When there is no externality, there is no optimal 
objective of the policy intervention inherent in standard economic 
welfare analysis; instead the level of the intervention has to be 
presumed to be set exogenously, or to emerge from an implicit 
political economy model. When there is an externality, not only is 
there a corresponding optimal policy instrument, but there is an 
inherently optimal level of intervention that maximises economic 
welfare. Policy can err by applying the wrong instrument, but also 
by applying the optimal instrument at too low or too high a level.  
Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations on trade can be optimal 
policy instruments when trade of a commodity is associated with 
the risk of incurring a negative externality of a deleterious effect on 
domestic plant, animal or human health. The SPS Agreement makes 
it perfectly clear that SPS regulations are not acceptable policies for 
achieving other objectives. They would not be least trade-distorting 
policies for these other objectives, and their use would raise 
additional problems.  
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Suppose one approaches the issue of SPS regulations along only the 
risk assessment dimension. If the mandate of regulatory authorities 
to protect the domestic economy from negative SPS externalities is 
stated in strong terms, as it often is, then product import bans and 
other severe quarantine measures emerge quite naturally as policy 
outcomes. A product ban is a high level of intervention to address 
an SPS externality, but a ban does eliminate the externality risk to 
the extent that trade is its proximate cause. Within the risk 
assessment dimension, there is room for dispute over whether an 
externality threat exists in a given situation. And a ban may or may 
not be least trade-distorting - perhaps there is another way to 
eliminate the externality risk, one that allows the product to be 
traded under some specified conditions. Either way, when the 
policy decision is perceived only in the risk assessment dimension, 
there is no impetus to ask whether the cost of the policy is 
warranted by the expected benefits; that is, whether the level of 
intervention needed to achieve the risk-reduction objective is also 
desirable on economic criteria, such as maximising the expected 
contribution of the affected markets to national welfare. 
There are dramatic alternatives to SPS-risk-induced policies such as 
product bans. If strong property rights could be assured to those 
who might suffer the damages from an externality, and if insurance 
markets were sufficiently developed, then one could do away with 
many SPS regulations, and let market outcomes evolve unfettered, 
with the externality internalised by the assignment of property 
rights. Neither WTO laws, nor other international laws, nor 
domestic liability laws, nor risk-sharing markets are strong enough 
for this option to emerge in the short term. 
Instead, the challenges to existing SPS regulations are coming 
primarily as requests for easing of the most severe trade-restricting 
policies. The key to these alternatives is often a systems approach to 
risk management, whereby a set of procedures are specified that in 
principle reduce the externality risk associated with trade of a 
commodity. Requests for adoption of systems approaches rest on a 
firm foundation in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (WTO 1994). Specifically, Article 5.6 
states that: 
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"Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when 
establishing or maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection, Members shall ensure that such 
measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to 
achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection, taking into account technical and economic 
feasibility." 
The footnote 3 in the Agreement states that: 
"For purposes of paragraph 6 of Article 5, a measure is not 
more trade-restrictive than required unless there is another 
measure, reasonably available taking into account technical 
and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly less 
restrictive to trade." 
Three basic questions about policy decisions arise when a systems 
approach is considered. A set of procedures to be applied to a 
commodity in order for it to qualify for importation are specified 
with the objective to reduce risk, perhaps to (essentially) zero, 
equivalent to a product ban. First, a risk assessment question arises: 
does the specified set of procedures achieve the risk objective? 
Second, a least trade-distorting question arises: does the specified 
set of procedures distort trade the least among possible options? 
Finally, a larger economic efficiency question arises: is the targeted 
level of risk reduction itself justified by the economic welfare effects 
that are associated with it? The latter two questions bring the 
cost/benefit dimension into policy considerations, along with the 
risk assessment dimension.  
Convergence and divergence between risk assessment 
and cost/benefit analysis: the case of importation of 
Mexican avocados by the US 
Our first case study illustrates the potential for convergence or 
divergence between policy decision criteria based on risk 
assessment versus cost/benefit analysis. In many cases, sound 
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science and sound economics will correspond—as when pest risks 
have expected economic costs that outweigh the benefits of trade. 
These cases provide an implicit economic rationale for the scientific 
focus of international SPS agreements. However, some SPS 
regulations may have economic net costs even if they have solid 
scientific justification. In these latter cases, a regulation is not good 
economic policy in terms such as maximising expected national 
welfare, even if the regulation does not violate the SPS Agreement 
of the WTO.  
One of the most contentious SPS disputes between Mexico and the 
United States concerns US restrictions on importation of Hass 
avocados.1 Mexico argues that its principal avocado producing 
region has low incidence of pests of quarantine significance, that the 
Hass avocado is not a preferred host for some pests of concern, and 
that a systems approach to handling fruit for export has proven 
effective in eliminating risks of pest infestations being carried 
abroad. The US avocado industry, which is concentrated in southern 
California, bitterly contests opening its domestic market to exports 
from Mexico. The industry acknowledges that it receives prices well 
above those of Mexican exports, but argues that its fear is not 
competition in the marketplace but risks of pest infestations 
associated with trade. Domestic US producers challenge Mexican 
assessments of pest risks and the effectiveness of the systems 
approach to risk management. 
The US Department of Agriculture is caught in the middle of this 
controversy. Its Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS) and Agricultural Research Service (ARS) have engaged in 
intense bi-national technical negotiations with Mexican authorities 
about pest risk evidence and export protocols that might sustain 
easing of the import ban. Following four years of negotiations, in 
September 1994, APHIS accepted a Mexican work plan proposing a 
systems approach to pest risk mitigation. With some further 
safeguards, a proposed rule was published by USDA in July 1995 to 
allow imports into the northeastern United States of Mexican 
                                                 
1 Roberts and Orden (1996) provide a detailed analytic chronology of the 
avocado dispute. 
Chapter 11  Least trade-restrictive SPS policies  189 
avocados grown and processed under specified conditions. Imports 
were to be limited to the winter months when the risk of 
establishment of pests is further mitigated by adverse weather. 
The geographic and seasonal restrictions of USDA’s proposed rule 
implied that the partial easing of the avocado import ban opened 
less than five per cent of the annual US market to Mexican products. 
The domestic avocado industry fought against even this limited 
trade rule, but in February 1997 USDA announced it would ease the 
avocado ban. Since that time, limited avocado trade has been 
allowed. By 2000, Mexico requested additional access to the US 
market, and subsequent regulatory assessments are pending. 
To evaluate the economic impacts of US-Mexico avocado trade, 
Orden and Romano (1996) examined the effects of full or partial 
easing of the import ban.2 Estimates are derived of a linear supply 
function that is inelastic in the short run (0.28, when lagged quantity 
is held constant) and elastic in the long run (1.18, when quantity is 
in a steady state). A linear estimate of demand is inelastic (-0.45) but 
estimation of a nonlinear demand specification yields a price 
flexibility of -0.65, corresponding to an elasticity of -1.53. Thus, the 
estimated supply and demand functions provide point estimates 
that span a range from inelastic to elastic behavioral responses. 
Orden and Romano apply the elastic values as a long-run model 
and the inelastic values as a short-run model in which producers 
and consumers are less price responsive. For both models, the 
assumption is made that Mexican supply is perfectly elastic at the 
wholesale price for delivery of avocados from Mexico to New York 
                                                 
2 Orden and Romano draw on specifications of avocado supply and 
demand derived from Evangelou et. al. (1993), in which supply is a linear 
function of lagged farm-level prices and production and demand is a linear 
function of wholesale prices, and Carman and Cook (1996), who utilised a 
nonlinear Box-Cox transformation on demand. Previous economic analyses of 
the effects of importation of Mexican avocados either had not considered 
impacts on consumers (Garoyan 1995; Carman and Cook 1996), had evaluated 
the effects of a pest infestation while restricting supply to domestic sources 
(Evangelou et. al. 1993), or had assumed there was essentially zero pest risk 
(USDA 1995). Each of these analyses was incomplete in an important 
dimension. 
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of $878/ton, as calculated by Garoyan (1995). The assumption of a 
perfectly elastic supply is most plausible for a partial easing of the 
import ban. It is arguably an oversimplification for evaluation of the 
effects of the quarantine being removed completely, since the 
expanded traded might put upward pressure on the Mexican price. 
In Orden and Romano’s models of partial easing of the avocado 
import ban, the domestic US market is divided into two sub-
markets—the northeastern regional winter market and the national 
aggregate for all other regions and seasons. The quantity of 
California avocados shipped to the northeastern region during the 
four winter months at prevailing domestic prices was reported by 
Garoyan to have averaged 3,819 tons during 1986-95. In modelling 
limited trade, the domestic price in the northeastern winter regional 
market is assumed to fall to the free-trade level for imports from 
Mexico, inducing greater consumption than at higher past domestic 
prices. An aggregate price for the rest of the US market is 
determined by an equilibrium of domestic supply and demand with 
the northeastern winter demand excluded.3  
Estimates of the probabilities of pest infestations are pivotal to 
regulatory decisions about avocado imports. Firko (1995) made the 
estimates utilised by APHIS. Among four potential pests (fruit flies, 
seed weevil, stem weevil, and seed moth), he estimated that the 
maximum probability of an infestation occurring in the US for 
partial easing of the import ban under a systems approach to risk 
mitigation was AM = 0.00345, the probability of a pest infestation 
associated with the introduction of stem weevil. Firko estimated that 
the probability of infestation of stem weevil had a minimum value 
Am = 1.35x10-6. These risk estimates were considered too low by the 
domestic industry. Nyrop (1995) calculated that the time expected to 
pass before an infestation of stem weevils occurred under the 1995 
proposed rule ranged from less than one year to 20 years. The 
                                                 
3 Forming a single national aggregate excluding the northeastern winter 
market is an oversimplification that ignores seasonal supply constraints and 
demand fluctuations. The added seasonal complexity would imply greater 
adjustments outside of the northeastern region during the winter season, but 
less effects during other seasons. 
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corresponding probabilities of pest infestation were treated by 
Orden and Romano as NM = 1.0 and Nm = 0.05. The four alternative 
probability estimates from Firko and Nyrop (AM, Am, NM, Nm) 
were used to characterise the range of risks of pest infestation (from 
essentially zero to certainty) that might be associated with either 
partial easing or complete removal of the ban.  
The final parameters affecting the economic analysis are estimates of 
the costs from increased production expenses and lost productivity 
associated with a pest infestation, which are modelled as a 
proportional shift in the domestic supply function. Evangelou et al. 
(1993) had estimated that weevil infestation would cause a 41 per 
cent increase in marginal cost due to increased application of 
pesticides and a 20 per cent reduction in yield, but argued these 
estimates were somewhat overstated. Thus, Orden and Romano 
considered several possible impacts on production. The largest 
impacts were assumed to involve a 60 per cent increase in marginal 
costs and a 20 per cent reduction in yield (denoted 60-20). The 
smallest impacts were assumed to be a 20 per cent increase in 
marginal costs with no reduction in yield (20-0). 
The effects of free trade when a pest infestation might adversely 
affect domestic production are illustrated in Figure 11.1(a). The 
domestic price PD1 falls to the world price PW and consumer surplus 
increases (by C+D+E) whether or not an infestation occurs. Producer 
surplus falls by C+D (the trade effect) and additionally by G (the 
infestation effect) if pests raises production costs and lower yields 
with certainty, shifting domestic supply from S to S'. Consumers are 
always better off, producers are always worse off, and the net effect 
on welfare (E-G) can be positive or negative. On a probabilistic 
basis, the expected domestic supply function will lie between S and 
S', with its location depending on the assumed level of pest 
infestation risk. 
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The analysis is more complicated when only limited quantities of 
imports are allowed, as shown in Figure 11.1(b). Ignoring regional 
sub-market considerations, which are not depicted in Figure 11.1(b) 
for simplicity, the limited imports would lower the domestic price 
from PD1 to PD2 if there were no pest infestation, rather than to the 
world price level. Pest infestation reduces domestic supply and 
affects the domestic price in the opposite direction from imports. 
With limited trade, the equilibrium domestic price can rise or fall. 
When the domestic price rises, as shown from PD1 to PD3 in Figure 
11.1(b), consumers are worse off (by c+d). Producers surplus rises 
(by c) with the higher price but falls due to higher production costs 
(by f+i+k). Producers may be better or worse off than at the initial 
equilibrium (better if c>f+i+k). Producers may also be better or 
worse off than with trade but without a pest infestation (better if 
c+e>i+k). Whatever the outcome for producers, social welfare falls 
(by d+f+i+k) compared to its level at the initial equilibrium, or 
compared to its level at price PD2 with trade but without pest 
infestation (by d+f+i+k+g).4  
Model results 
The expected economic effects of trade are shown for the avocado 
case in Table 11.1 for a long-run model with estimated elastic supply 
and (nonlinear) demand. The initial equilibrium with avocado 
imports prohibited occurs in this estimated model at a domestic 
price of $1385 and output of 132,430 tons. Consumer surplus is 
$134.4 million and producer surplus is $91.6 million. If trade were 
completely liberalised and no pest infestation occurs, the domestic 
price falls to $878, consumption increases to 222,722 tons, and 
domestic production declines to 83,904 tons. Consumer surplus rises 
by $87.5 million, producer surplus falls by $55.2 million, and the net 
                                                 
4 If the net effect of trade and a pest infestation is for the equilibrium 
domestic price to fall (not shown), consumers are made better off and producers 
worse off than without trade or pest infestation, consumers gain less and 
producers may lose more or less than with trade but without pest infestation, 
and net welfare may rise or fall (compared to the initial equilibrium) depending 
on whether the net consumer gain from lower prices exceeds the infestation 
losses of producers. 
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welfare gain is $32.4 million (14 per cent of initial consumer plus 
producer surplus). 
A pest infestation exacerbates the adverse effects of free trade on 
domestic producers through a lower price, and reduces the net 
welfare gain. In the worst case scenario of certain infestation (NM = 
1.0) and highest costs (60-20), producer surplus falls by an 
additional $18.4 million in the long-run model. There remains a net 
welfare gain even in this case, although it is reduced to $13.9 
million. Thus, even when free trade is bad phytosanitary policy, it is 
good economic policy, in the sense of raising net national welfare. 
For probabilities of pest infestation at Nyrop’s minimum (Nm) or 
lower, the effect of an infestation on expected producer surplus is 
less than $2 million, and the expected net welfare gain remains 
above $30 million. 
The partial easing of the avocado import ban under USDA’s rule has 
smaller economic effects than free trade when no pest infestation 
occurs, as shown in the lower half of Table 11.l. The net national 
welfare gains is $2.5 million (about 2 per cent of initial total 
consumer plus producer surplus). In the northeastern region, winter 
consumption increases and consumer surplus rises by $2.5 million 
(not shown separately in the Table) as the price falls to that of 
exports from Mexico. The domestic price for the aggregate US 
market with the northeastern winter demand excluded falls by 1.3 
per cent (from $1385 to $1368), as domestic consumption displaced 
from the northeastern winter market is absorbed by a combination 
of expanded consumption elsewhere and reduced domestic supply. 
Consumer surplus increases by $2.2 million outside of the northeast, 
but producer surplus falls by a similar amount (the net welfare gain 
is only $33,337 outside of the northeastern winter market). Thus, the 
limited opening of trade under the proposed partial easing of the 
import ban has positive effects on northeastern winter consumer 
surplus, and limited positive effects on other consumers and 
negative effects on domestic producers. 
When imports are restricted under partial easing of the import ban, 
increased marginal costs and lowered yields reduce producer 
surplus by $45.8 million for the worst-case scenario of a pest 
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infestation. The reduced supply pushes the equilibrium domestic 
price up (excluding the northeastern winter market) from $1385 to 
$1795. The price increase offsets $31.1 million of the loss of producer 
surplus, leaving a net loss of $14.7 million, still almost seven times 
as large as the effect from limited trade alone. A larger economic 
effect of the pest infestation is felt by consumers outside of the 
northeastern winter market. With the increased domestic price in 
the worst-case scenario, their consumer surplus falls by $43.5 
million. Thus, negative economic impacts of pest risk are borne by 
consumers outside the northeastern winter market as well as 
producers when trade is opened only to a limited extent. 
The potential losses to consumers and producers under certainty of 
a pest infestation are large enough that the net welfare loss is still 
$13.6 million under the lowest assumed costs to production (20-0) 
from the infestation. Thus, for high probabilities of pest risk, the 
limited easing of the avocado import ban is both bad phytosanitary 
policy and bad economic policy. Under the assumption of highest 
pest-infestation costs, expected consumer surplus rises at risk 
probabilities as high as the Nyrop minimum risk level (Nm), but the 
expected gains of consumer surplus is less than the expected loss of 
producer surplus with limited trade for this level of pest infestation 
risk. Only at lower risk levels, or lower infestation costs, is a partial 
easing of the import ban a regulatory decision that raises expected 
net economic welfare. 
Sensitivity of the economic results to the elasticity assumptions is 
illustrated by comparing the above results to the outcomes from a 
short-run model with inelastic estimates of supply and demand, 
shown in Table 11.2. For the estimated short-run model, the initial 
equilibrium with avocado imports prohibited occurs at a domestic 
price of $1950 and output of 140,496 tons. Consumer surplus is 
$189.1 million and producer surplus is $230.9 million. Under the 
assumption of free trade without pest infestation, consumer surplus  
 
 







































































Effects under Free Trade 
 











































































































































































































































Table 11.1b: Expected economic impacts of avocado imports from Mexico with free trade or limited trade (long-run model) 
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Table 11.2b: Expected economic impacts of avocado imports from Mexico with free trade or limited trade (short-run model) 
















































































 (and risk) 
(60-20) 
 






































































































 (and risk) 
(20-0) 
 





































































































200  Part III  Adding more economics to risk analysis 
 
increases by $180.5 million, producer surplus falls by $137.6 million,  
and the net welfare gain is $43.0 million (10 per cent of the initial 
sum of consumer and producer surplus). Pest infestations 
compound losses of producer surplus under free trade in the short-
run model, but again there is a net welfare gain even when pest 
infestation occurs with certainty and has high cost.  
As before, the effects on producers and consumers with limited 
trade and no pest infestation are much smaller than under free 
trade. The domestic price (outside the northeastern winter market) 
falls to $1899 in the short-run model, total consumer surplus 
increases by $12.2 million, producers surplus falls by $7.1 million, 
and the net welfare gain is $5.1 million. For the worst-case scenario 
of certain pest infestation and high costs, the domestic price is 
pushed up to $2540 in the short-run model with limited imports. 
Consumer surplus falls by $66.6 million (gain of $5.2 million in the 
northeastern winter market, but loss of $71.8 million elsewhere). 
Partial easing of the import ban is only good economic policy when 
low risk probabilities and costs are assumed, as in the long-run 
model. 
With the domestic price pushed up to $2540 in the short-run worst-
case scenario, producers are better off when limited imports are 
associated with a pest infestation than when limited trade occurs 
without an infestation (producer surplus is greater by $8.5 million). 
Generally, when trade is only partially opened, producers are 
expected to be better off in the short-run model the higher the 
probability of pest infestation (this was not the case in the long-run 
model). Producers are even slightly better off with limited trade and 
pest infestation than they are at the initial equilibrium under the 
assumption of highest costs of an infestation.  
To summarise, the economic analysis for US policy on imports of 
Mexican avocados suggests that free trade would raise consumer 
surplus, lower producer surplus, and increase national welfare even 
if pest infestations were certain to occur. With the partial easing of 
the ban and limited imports that have been adopted, expected 
consumer and net welfare gains from trade are relatively small and 
can be exceeded by the expected costs of pest infestation when risks 
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of infestation are high. With limited trade and high probabilities of 
pest risk, consumers bear more of the economic costs from the risk 
of pest infestation than do producers. At lower pest-risk levels, 
expected consumer surplus increases, and the expected gains offset 
expected producer surplus losses, so expected net welfare rises. In 
the long-run model (with elastic supply and demand) pest 
infestations add to the losses of producers that result from allowing 
limited trade. But in the short-run model (with inelastic supply and 
demand) the increased producer surplus from higher domestic 
prices more than offsets the loss of producer surplus from higher 
costs and lower yields, so pest infestation risks have the net effect of 
lessening the decrease in expected producer surplus compared to 
limited trade without pest infestation. 
Integrating risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis in 
quarantine design: the case of the US Karnal bunt 
regulations 
The preceding analysis illustrates the possibilities for convergence 
or divergence between risk-reduction objectives versus cost/benefit 
objectives, but it does not explicitly bring cost/benefit analysis to 
bear on the design of quarantine procedures. Doing so requires an 
evaluation of how various aspects of the systems approach affect 
risk reduction, and the expected levels of benefits and costs realised. 
For avocados, limiting imports on a geographic and seasonal basis 
were one component of the systems approach to risk mitigation. An 
approximation to the upper bound on the efficacy of this dimension 
of risk management can be derived under the assumption that an 
infestation is certain to occur with full trade liberalisation, whereas 
with limited trade the risk is reduced to the minimum level 
determined by Firko (1995). Under this crude assumption, the trade 
limitations are effective as part of the systems approach to risk 
reduction, but achieving that risk reduction reduces expected 
welfare gains.  
Glauber and Narrod (2000) present a more systematic analysis of the 
marginal risk reduction effects and expected benefits and costs 
associated with various protocols of an SPS regulation. They re-
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work the original USDA risk analysis used to design a quarantine to 
prevent the spread of Karnal bunt within the United States in 1996. 
This case study illustrates how cost/benefit analysis can be 
integrated with risk assessment to assess the marginal efficacy of 
specific components of a quarantine policy.  
Karnal bunt is a fungal disease affecting wheat, rye and triticale. 
While posing no risk to human health, Karnal bunt can cause 
production losses to wheat in the form of reduced yields due to the 
infestation of kernels and reduction in the quality of wheat flour. 
Karnal bunt was first detected in the United States (in Arizona, New 
Mexico and Texas) in March 1996. As a result, USDA quickly 
established testing for Karnal bunt teliospores, and regulations that 
quarantined all of Arizona and portions of New Mexico and Texas 
to avoid spread of the disease to other wheat growing regions of the 
country. Glauber and Narrod provide a detailed account of the 
regulation associated with the quarantine. They also review the risk 
assessments by Podleckis and Firko (1996a, b, c, d; 1997) that were 
used in design of the quarantine, and the cost/benefit analysis that 
was conducted. 
In their analysis, Glauber and Narrod recreate the original Karnal 
bunt risk model, which focused on measuring risk of individual 
potential pathways for disease spread. With movement of positive-
tested grain and seed outside of the quarantine area prohibited, 
these pathway for spread of the disease from negative-tested wheat 
still included: (1) millfeed (by-products of wheat milling that is fed 
to cattle); (2) transporting grain from the quarantined area to 
domestic grain storage facilities, mills and export elevators; (3) use 
outside the quarantine area of combines and other harvesting 
machinery; (4) infection through railcars that had transported 
infected wheat; and (5) planting of wheat seed originating in the 
quarantined area. These pathways led to regulations being 
considered on the following articles: (1) farm machinery and 
equipment used to produce wheat; (2) conveyances from field to 
handler, such as farm trucks and wagons; (3) grain elevators, 
equipment and structures at facilities that store and handle grain; (4) 
conveyances from handler to other marketing channels, such as 
railroad cars; (5) plant and plant parts, such as grain for milling, 
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grain for seed, and straw; (6) flour and milling byproducts; (7) 
manure from animals fed wheat/wheat byproducts from the 
quarantine area; (8) used sacks; (9) seed-conditioning equipment; 
(10) byproducts of seed cleaning; (11) soil-moving equipment; (12) 
root crops with soil; and (13) soil. 
Glauber and Narrod modified the initial risk assessment analysis to 
examine the overall level of risk of a Karnal bunt outbreak from any 
source originating in the quarantined area. They estimated the 
probability of at least one outbreak of Karnal bunt occurring outside 
the quarantined area, p*, as: 
p* = 1 - (1 - p1)(1 - p2)(1 - p3)(1 - p4)(1-p5) 
where:  
 p1 = probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the 
quarantined area from millfeed;  
 p2 = probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt in host fields 
outside the quarantined area from grain in transit to mills or export 
elevators; 
 p3 = probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the 
quarantined area from combines or other harvesting machinery; 
 p4 = probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the 
quarantined area from railcars after grain is unloaded at mills or 
export elevators; 
 p5 = probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the 
quarantined area from seed. 
Glauber and Narrod found that the probability of outbreak via a 
given pathway was positively correlated with the number of railcars 
or other conveyances transporting grain or seed outside of the 
quarantined areas. Thus, a higher infestation of Karnal bunt within 
the quarantined area would mean less negative-tested wheat 
available for export or domestic milling purposes, lowering the 
probability of outbreak outside of the quarantined area. This 
interaction was incorporated into the risk assessment.  
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Glauber and Narrod’s analysis addresses the sensitivity of the 
overall level of risk of a Karnal bunt outbreak outside of the 
quarantine area, and finds it to be mostly influenced by the riskier 
pathways. Changes in the probability of outbreak in a given 
pathway with relatively low probability may be large in absolute 
terms, but have little effect on the overall level of risk. By focusing 
on individual pathways, the risk reducing potential of a specific 
protocol of the quarantine may be overestimated. For example, in 
the initial analysis a controversial requirement to heat-treat millfeed 
to eliminate risk of spread of Karnal bunt through manure of 
animals consuming this by-product was justified by USDA on the 
basis of the relatively sharp reduction in the risk of outbreak from 
contaminated millfeed from the heat-treatment procedure. When 
this factor is isolated, the results indicate that the millfeed treatment 
requirement reduced the mean risk of Karnal bunt outbreak from 
contaminated millfeed from 1 in 15,674 to 1 in 68 million. Yet the 
effect of the heat-treatment protocol was negligible in reducing the 
overall level of risk. Likewise, restrictions on the movement of 
negative-tested seed outside the quarantine area had a relatively 
small effect on the overall risk of outbreak.  
Model results 
In their reassessment of the original risk analysis for the Karnal bunt 
quarantine, Glauber and Narrod consider eight quarantine options 
by which risk of spread of the disease could be reduced. These 
options are based on four basic protocols. The first protocol 
restricted the movement of positive-tested grain and seed outside 
the quarantine area, but allowed all negative-tested grain and seed 
to move without significant additional restrictions. The second 
protocol required that all railcars be cleaned after delivery of wheat 
from the quarantined area. The third protocol restricted the 
movement of negative-tested seed outside of the quarantine area. 
The fourth protocol required the heat treatment of millfeed from 
quarantine-area wheat. These protocols were chosen as the focus of 
the analysis because they imposed the largest costs on the wheat 
industry in the Southwest when the quarantine was imposed and, as 
a result, were controversial.  
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Stochastic assessments of the effects of the eight options on reducing 
the risk of an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the quarantine area 
are shown in Table 11.3. The options are based on the four protocols, 
singly and in combination. The baseline (option 1) reflects the least 
restrictive policy, with the quarantine protocol limited to restrictions 
on the movement of positive-tested grain and seed. Grain and seed 
that twice tested negative for Karnal bunt teliospores would be free 
Table 11.3: Probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt under eight 
quarantine options 
Quarantine Option Probability of outbreak1 
 Mode Median Mean 95th 
percentile 
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1 Expressed in scientific notation; e.g., 6.03E-03 = 6.03 x 10-03 = .00603. 
2 Benchmark procedure includes prohibition of movement of positive testing 
grain and seed from quarantined area; all negative-testeed grain and seed 
moved in sealed hopper cars; all combines disinfected before leaving 
quarantined area. Options 2-8 include benchmark procedures plus additional 
protocols as indicated. 
3 ( ) denotes percentage of risk relative to baseline. 
Source: Glauber and Narrod (2000) 
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to move to domestic and export locations with no additional 
restrictions. Railcars would not be required to be cleaned. Options 2, 
3 and 4 consider the other protocols individually in combination 
with the baseline restrictions. Of the individual protocols 
considered, railcar cleaning (option 2) had the largest effect on the 
overall level of risk of outbreak because of the relatively high risk of 
contamination through railcars. Restrictions on the movement of 
negative-tested seed (option 3) and millfeed treatment requirements 
(option 4) had minimal effects on the overall level of risk. Options 5 
through 8 include combinations of the proposed protocols. Among 
these, option 8 reflects the system put in place by APHIS following 
the discovery of Karnal bunt in Arizona. Taken together, the 
protocols in option 8 reduced the mean level of risk by 97 per cent 
compared to the baseline (option 1). 
The original USDA regulatory impact analysis assumed that failure 
to implement the quarantine would jeopardise US exports to those 
countries that maintained restrictions against wheat from Karnal 
bunt infected countries at the time the disease was discovered in 
Arizona. The United States was exporting about 1.2 billion bushels 
of wheat annually in 1995-96, with an estimated value of $3 to $4 
billion. About one-half of US wheat exports were shipped to 
countries that had Karnal bunt restrictions. Thus, effects on the 
wheat market from spread of the disease beyond the quarantine 
area were considered that ranged from a 10 per cent net loss of 
export markets to a 50 per cent loss. For example, a decrease of 10 
per cent in exports was estimated to cause a $0.22 per bushel drop in 
the wheat price and reduce wheat sector income by over $500 
million per year. A decrease of exports of 50 per cent was estimated 
to cause the price of US wheat to fall by 30 per cent and lower net 
sectoral income by $2.7 billion annually. These estimates took into 
account a dampening effect on domestic wheat prices as wheat for 
export was routed into the domestic consumption market, animal 
feed outlets, and inventory. In the impact analysis accompanying 
the final Karnal bunt regulations on compensation, USDA (1997) 
concluded that: 
"...our quarantine measures were appropriate and justifiable 
when compared with the magnitude of the benefits achieved. 
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Even a 10per cent reduction in wheat exports would have a 
significant effect on wheat sector income. It is estimated that a 
10 per cent decline in wheat exports would cause a decline in 
wheat sector of over $500 million."  
USDA emphasised the 10 per cent loss of export markets in its 
assessment because substitution and arbitrage opportunities made it 
unlikely that a Karnal bunt outbreak would lead to more than this 
amount of trade being diverted from countries imposing restrictions 
because of the disease. 
In reviewing the USDA argument, Glauber and Narrod note that the 
original impact analysis failed to consider changes in consumer 
welfare resulting from lower domestic prices if wheat were diverted 
from export markets. Using observed price and domestic demand 
levels, and applying the domestic demand elasticity assumed by 
USDA, they estimate consumer surplus effects for each level of 
wheat export diversion. The resulting estimated annual effects on 
net welfare measured by consumer plus producer surplus ranged 
from $261 million for a 10 per cent loss in exports to $976 million 
assuming a 50 per cent reduction in exports. 
Glauber and Narrod also conclude that the effects due to an 
outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the quarantined area should be 
evaluated on the basis of net present value of annual losses over the 
full period in which an outbreak is expected to have an adverse 
effect. Using an 8 per cent discount rate and assuming losses 
sustained for ten years, they estimate that the discounted welfare 
effects ranged from just over $2 billion ($2.016 billion) for a 10 per 
cent loss of exports to nearly $7.5 billion for a 50 per cent loss.  
In the original regulatory analysis, USDA estimated that the costs of 
the Karnal bunt regulations in 1996 incurred by producers, handlers, 
and other affected parties would be $44 million. These costs arose 
from six requirements: 1) plowdown of fields planted with infected 
seed ($1.2 million); 2) diversion of infected grain to animal feed ($4.2 
million); 3) cleaning and disinfecting of railcars ($0.6 million); 4) loss 
of seed value ($6.0 million); 5) loss of value of negative-tested grain 
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from millfeed treatment costs ($28.0 million); and 6) other assorted 
costs ($4.1 million).  
Cost/benefit analysis for the eight quarantine options can be 
completed under the assumptions given above. For the baseline 
(option 1), the costs of destroying crops planted with contaminated 
seed and diverting positive-tested wheat to feed markets and is $5.4 
million. The probability of an outbreak outside the quarantine area 
was reduced from certainty with no protocol to 0.0549. For a 10 per 
cent diversion of exports with present value of costs of $2.016 
billion, the expected loss due to an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside 
of the quarantined area is $110.7 million, and the welfare gain from 
utilising the baseline option is $1.905 billion dollars. Each of the 
other quarantine options also shows a large expected cost/benefit 
ratio.  
A large expected cost/benefit ratio does not imply, however, that 
each option is an economically efficient quarantine policy. Three 
options: 3 restrictions on seed movements; 4 millfeed treatment; and 
7 restrictions on seed movements and millfeed treatment) achieve 
little risk reduction compared to the baseline (option 1). Four other 
options: 2 railcar cleaning; 5 railcar cleaning and restriction on seed 
movement; 6 railcar cleaning and millfeed treatment; and 8 railcar 
cleaning, restrictions on seed movement, and millfeed treatment) are 
more efficient policies in providing expected benefits for a given 
level of outlays. These options, along with the baseline (option 1), lie 
on or near an expected cost/benefit frontier, as shown in Figure 
11.2. Options 3, 4 and 7 are economically inefficient. Greater levels 
of risk reduction and expected benefits can be achieved with lower 
cost by other choices.  
The results in Figure 11.2 also show that most of the expected 
benefits of any quarantine procedure are achieved by the baseline 
(option 1). Using additional protocols adds to quarantine costs, but 
adds little to expected benefits. Consider the efficient baseline 
(option 1) and options 2, 5 and 8—in which the three protocols of 
railcar cleaning, restrictions on seed movement, and millfeed 
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Source: Glauber and Narrod (2000). 
 
treatment are added sequentially. The expected benefits of each 
option, the marginal cost of each added protocol, and the expected 
marginal benefits of that protocol, at the mean value of risk and the 
more conservative 95th percentile of risk, are shown in Table 11.4. 
The results demonstrate that the use of railcar cleaning (option 2) 
provides $104 million in additional benefits for additional costs of 
only $0.6 million. The addition of a protocol restricting the 
movement of negative-tested seed (option 5) imposes an additional 
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evaluated at the mean probability estimate. The added seed protocol 
is shown to be marginally cost effective when evaluated using the 
more conservative 95th percentile value for the risk of outbreak. 
Finally, the protocol of millfeed treatment (option 8) adds $28 
million to quarantine costs at the margin, but has a marginal benefit 
that is less than $0.1 million.  
As shown in Table 11.3 (and Figure 11.2), options 2 and 6 achieve 
nearly identical reductions of risk, as do options 5 and 8. Within 
each pair there is an efficient choice: 2 dominates 6, and 8 is 
dominated by 5. If the very similar levels of risk associated with 
 
Table 11.4: Expected benefits, marginal costs and marginal 
benefits of alternative 
Quarantine options (million dollars) 





Probability of outbreak 
evaluated at: 







1,905.1 5.4 1,905.1 1,594.5 
Option 2--Railcar 
cleaning 











2,012.0 28.0     0.1     0.0 
Source: Glauber and Narrod. 
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these two choice-pairs are both considered acceptable by decision 
makers, then option 2 emerges as the most efficient among all four 
options, and thus is the least trade-distorting (including, in this case, 
trade in the internal market). 
To summarise, Glauber and Narrod find that the original Karnal 
bunt regulatory impact analysis ignored the effects of the quarantine 
policies on consumers, and therefore tended to overestimate the 
benefits of the quarantine. The original analysis also failed to look at 
the expected marginal benefits and costs of various quarantine 
protocols. Had the expected marginal effects been considered in the 
quarantine decisions, it is likely that at least two of the more 
controversial protocols, seed restrictions and the millfeed 
requirement, would have received closer scrutiny and possibly been 
rejected.5 The use of restrictions on movement of positive-tested 
grain and seed, together with railcar cleaning, results in significant 
risk reduction in an efficient manner.  
Conclusion 
This chapter highlights the potential for complementarity between 
science-based risk assessment and economic-based cost/benefit 
analysis in regulatory decision processes. In particular, we use two 
case studies to highlight a key point: that economic cost/benefit 
analysis ought to play an explicit role in decision-making about SPS 
                                                 
5 Indeed, in subsequent USDA assessments, implications similar to those 
from the marginal benefit-cost analysis worked their way into the quarantine 
regulations, but for somewhat different reasons. During a national survey of 
elevators in the fall of 1996, USDA detected Karnal bunt-like spores in a number 
of grain facilities in the Southeast. It was determined that the teliospores were 
for a fungus that affects ryegrass but not wheat. As the spores were 
indistinguishable from Karnal bunt teliospores, USDA did not impose a 
quarantine. In 1997, USDA changed the standard to define quarantine areas 
based on the presence of bunted kernels rather than Karnal bunt teliospores. 
The immediate effect of the regulatory change was the removal of the millfeed 
treatment requirement. In 1998, USDA relaxed the quarantine to allow 
commercial seed to move outside of the quarantine area. With these changes 
much of the original quarantine area returned to normal marketing. Karnal 
bunt losses in recent years have been small and confined to positive-tested 
grain.   
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regulations. The SPS Agreement of the WTO does not require 
countries to take into account cost/benefit analysis in making 
regulatory decisions—doing so might be considered a ―WTO-plus 
good regulatory practice,‖ as opposed to one, as Donna Roberts has 
previously described it, that is ―merely legally defensible‖ (Roberts, 
Orden, and Josling 1999). A WTO-plus approach to regulation is 
unlikely to bring objections from trade partners since the results are 
likely to open trade opportunities otherwise precluded. The WTO 
agreement does require that countries employ measures that are 
least trade-restrictive. This requirement alone can push countries 
some distance toward economically sensible SPS regulatory 
decisions, since for any given objective in terms of achieving a 
specified level of risk, the least trade-distorting policies are those 
that achieve the risk objective most economically efficiently.  
The avocado case study demonstrates the possibilities for either 
convergence or divergence between the policy implications from 
risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis. The USDA decision that a 
systems approach to risk management kept pest-infestation risk low 
enabled regulators to partially ease a longstanding ban on avocado 
imports from Mexico. This was a move to a less trade-distorting 
policy, and for this move there is convergence of decision-making 
criteria, at least in the sense that the limited-trade decision is only 
estimated to have a net positive effect on expected national welfare 
when pest risk is relatively low. The cost/benefit analysis also 
suggests an increase in welfare from a free trade policy even if pest 
infestation occurs with certainty. Free trade has not been considered 
a viable decision in recent policy determination, but additional steps 
toward trade opening will be evaluated. There is simultaneity 
between the rule, pest risk, and expected welfare. The more trade is 
opened, the higher may be the infestation risk, but also because of 
more trade, the less sensitive are the expected net welfare gains to 
the level of risk. One can imagine additional moves toward less 
trade-distorting policies that raise infestation risk (while still 
keeping that risk below a level deemed acceptable) and 
simultaneously yield substantial net economic benefits. For 
example, what is the risk associated with avocado imports into the 
entire eastern United States over the full year? Perhaps such a policy 
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captures most of the expected economic gains from free trade with 
relatively little additional risk exposure. 
The Karnal bunt analysis by Glauber and Narrod, allows evaluation 
of just such relationships between quarantine options. Among eight 
options, they show a limited approach that restricts the movement 
of positive-tested grain and seed together with railcar cleaning 
achieves much of the potential risk reduction and expected welfare 
gains for the least direct cost. By highlighting the marginal cost and 
benefit of each protocol, they identify the most efficient options, and 
hence the options that would be least trade-distorting because they 
impose the least costs on producers within the quarantine area. Two 
of their option pairs achieve nearly identical reductions of risk. 
Within each pair, there is an efficient and an inefficient choice. 
Moreover, if the very similar levels of risk associated with these two 
choice-pairs are both considered acceptable by decision makers, 
then the single benchmark-railcar cleaning option emerges as being 
the most efficient among the four options. Cost/benefit analysis can 
not make risk management decisions for policy makers, as between 
the two similar risk levels in the Karnal bunt case. But cost/benefit 
analysis can help policy makers choose the efficient protocol if they 
are willing to consider such a trade-off, and understand the costs 
incurred, and for what ends, if they are not. 
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12 
Quarantine decision-making in Australia 
MONIKA BINDER 
A fundamental economic question about the Australian 
Government's decision-making process governing the import of 
animals, plants and their products is posed in this chapter. Does the 
process generate measures that not only reduce quarantine risk but 
are also consistent with the best possible use of Australia's 
resources? In other words, is Australia as a whole getting value for 
money from import decisions?  
The chapter looks at import risk analysis (IRA) — the analytical tool 
that underpins quarantine decisions — as well as cost/benefit 
analysis (CBA) — an analytical tool of economists. It then examines 
the scope for incorporating CBA in import decision-making under 
the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement). The determination of the acceptable level 
of risk, and of risk conservatism.  
Import risk analysis 
The decision-making process that currently applies to requests to 
import animals, plants and their products is illustrated in Figure 
12.1. It is administered by Biosecurity Australia within the 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry — Australia  
                                                 
  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Productivity Commission. 
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Figure 12.1: Import decision-making process 
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(AFFA). (Until recently, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection 
Service (AQIS) was the administrating agency.) It distinguishes 
between routine and non-routine matters, involves the 
establishment of a risk analysis panel in non-routine matters, 
includes public consultation at particular stages, and sets out an 
appeal mechanism. It is distinct from the determination of the 
Government's response to any industry adjustment effects from 
allowing imports; that matter is handled separately (and 
independently) by another part of AFFA (DPIE 1997, p. 41). 
A core element of the process is IRA. This was viewed by the Nairn 
Committee and the National Task Force as encompassing: 'risk 
assessment', 'risk management' and 'risk communication'. As Box 
12.1 shows, their definitions of each of these terms are fairly similar, 
although the terminology does not accord strictly with that 
contained in the SPS Agreement, nor with the international 
guidelines of the International Office of Epizootics (OIE) and the 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). It also differs 
from the approaches of other nations' quarantine regulators. 
OIE and IPPC guidelines are relevant to Biosecurity Australia's IRAs 
(AQIS 1998 and 1999, p. 10). The current OIE 'model' of IRA was 
finalised in 1999. The current IPPC model was issued in 1996, with a 
new draft circulated for comment in 1999. The basic components of 
all these models are summarised in Table 12.1 using the terminology 
of the relevant organisation. Although the terminology frequently 
differs, all the models involve the identification of the risk of 
concern, the estimation of that risk, and an identification and 
evaluation of options to reduce that risk. The table also highlights 
where the models permit a degree of economic input. 
Although individuals confront and manage many risks from day to 
day, there are some risks that warrant government involvement. 
These risks generally involve an 'externality'. This arises when 
individuals who engage in activities expose others to the risks and, 
moreover, do not themselves bear the full consequences when those 
risks are realised. (Risk analysts frequently describe these risks as 
'involuntary risks'.) 
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Box 12.1: Components of import risk analysis 
 
 
The Nairn Committee and the National Task Force on imported fish and fish 
products identified three common components in IRA: 'risk assessment', 'risk 
management' and 'risk communication'. They defined these components as 
follows: 
IRA component Nairn Committee National Task Force 
Risk assessment The process of identifying 
and estimating the risk 
associated with an import 
and evaluating the 
consequences of taking 
those risks. 
The process of identifying, 




associated with the import 
of an animal, plant or 
product. 
   
Risk management The process of identifying, 
documenting these risks 
and implementing measures 
to reduce these risks and 
their consequences.  
Measures that can be 
applied before, during and 
after an import to reduce 
the risk to an acceptable 
and manageable level. 
   
Risk 
communication 
The process of interactive 
exchange of information 
and opinions between risk 
managers and stakeholders. 
The process of 
communicating the risk 
assessment results and the 
risk management decision 
to the regulators of import 
programs and to other 
interested parties such as 
industry and the public. 
Sources: Nairn et al (1996, p. 85); DPIE (1996, p. 108). 
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Table 12.1: Basic components of three IRA models 
 
OIE Guidelines (1999) IPPC Guidelines (1996) IPPC Draft Guidelines 
(1999) 
Hazard identification  Initiating the pest risk 
analysis process 
Initiation 
 Pest risk analysis 
initiated by a pathway 
Initiation points 
 Pest risk analysis 
initiated by a pest 
review of earlier pest 
risk analyses 
Identification of pest risk 
analysis area 
 Conclusion Information 
  Conclusion 
Risk assessment Pest risk assessment Pest risk assessment 
Release assessment Geographical and 
regulatory criteria 
Pest categorisation* 
Exposure assessment Economic importance 
criteria* 
Probability of introduction 




Introduction potential Degree of uncertainty 
Risk estimation Conclusion Conclusion 
Risk management Pest risk management Pest risk management 
Risk evaluation Options to reduce risk (Acceptable) level of risk 




Implementation Conclusion Acceptability of risk 
Monitoring and 
review 
 Identification and selection 
of appropriate risk 
management options* 
  Phytosanitary certificates 
and other compliance 
measures 
  Conclusion 
Risk communication Documentation Documentation 
*indicates that a degree of economic input is required within the particular 
component of the IRA model.  
 
Sources: OIE (1999, section 1.4), IPPC (1996) and IPPC (1999). 
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Quarantine risks involve externalities. Importers of animals, plants 
or their products seldom have sufficient incentive (due to an 
absence of market price signals) to reduce the disease or pest risks 
associated with their imports. This is because, if diseases or pests 
were introduced, the associated costs would not be borne fully, or at 
all, by importers, but by local producers. Little recourse is available 
to local producers (say from common law negligence actions) to 
recover these costs from importers. 
However, even though a prima facie economic rationale exists for 
governments to reduce quarantine risks, community well being 
overall may not be enhanced if the total cost of such intervention 
exceeds the total benefit. A fundamental trade-off is between the 
benefit to producers from reducing a particular quarantine risk and 
the cost to consumers from being denied cheaper products or 
products of different qualities or varieties.  
A formal economic approach to help decide the full extent of the 
trade-offs involved in measures to reduce quarantine risk is CBA. 1  
CBA involves: 
 identifying and measuring all the costs and benefits of a measure 
in reducing a quarantine risk to particular community groups 
relative to a situation of unrestricted trade;2 
 determining the extent of net benefits (or net costs) to the 
community as a whole from implementing the measure; 
 ranking the measure against alternative risk-reducing measures 
according to the magnitude of its net benefit (or net cost); and 
 choosing the measure with the highest net benefit.  
                                                 
1 A limited version of CBA is cost effectiveness analysis, which focuses on 
the costs of achieving a particular target. Compared with CBA, this type of 
analysis does not consider the full range of tradeoffs involved in particular 
measures.  
2 Here, the costs and benefits are measured by 'opportunity costs' and 
'willingness to pay', respectively. 
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A result which found that all quarantine risk-reducing measures 
under consideration relative to unrestricted trade yielded net costs 
suggests that community well being would be enhanced by not 
placing restrictions on imports of the product.  
Nature of costs and benefits 
So what are the costs and benefits of measures to reduce quarantine 
risk relative to a situation of unrestricted trade? 
The key costs include the cost to consumers arising from reduced 
import availability or increased import prices, and the cost to 
government (net of charges) of administering the measure. The 
extent of the cost to consumers will depend on the level of the 
import parity price (that would occur if trade were unrestricted) 
relative to domestic price that arises because of the measure in place, 
as well as the extent to which consumers are responsive to price 
changes (price elasticities of demand).3  
The key benefits of measures to reduce quarantine risk are: 
 a reduction in the expected cost to producers of disease or pest 
control; 
 a reduction in the expected cost to producers of output losses 
associated with disease or pest entry and establishment; and 
 the maintenance of Australia's disease or pest-free status (which 
facilitates access to export markets and benefits Australian 
consumers). 
The magnitude of the benefits are often uncertain. In the absence of 
measures to reduce quarantine risk, different outcomes may occur 
for producers. One outcome is that diseases or pests do not enter 
and establish, in which case there would be no change in costs of 
production and output levels (and, thus, no benefits from 
introducing a measure to reduce quarantine risk). An alternative 
                                                 
3 It is assumed that the domestic and imported products are identical. If 
they are not, then there would be costs from excluding imports which are 
associated with loss of variety or seasonality. This does not affect the essence of 
the analysis. 
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outcome is that diseases or pests do establish and substantially 
reduce output and access to export markets (which may mean there 
are not benefits from introducing a measure to reduce quarantine 
risk).  
Acceptable level of risk 
CBA does not involve specifying the acceptable level of risk 
explicitly. Underlying a measure with the highest net benefit is a 
level of risk which, if the measure is chosen, the community 
implicitly 'accepts' - zero being just one of a range of accepted risk 
levels. In this sense, from a community wide perspective, the 
acceptable level of risk is 'optimal'. Moreover, the optimal risk does 
not necessarily coincide with risk minimisation. This is very 
different to the meaning of acceptable level of risk given in the SPS 
Agreement and by quarantine regulators.  
One way of visualising this is Figure 12.2. The top panel shows the 
community benefits and costs of reducing quarantine risk for a 
particular product below Ro , which is the level of quarantine risk 
which would exist in the absence of any risk reducing measures. 
Associated with each level of risk below Ro is a particular measure. 
The shape of the benefits curve assumes that there are decreasing 
marginal (or incremental) benefits to the community from reducing 
quarantine risk below Ro. The cost curve assumes that the marginal 
costs of reducing risks below Ro increase as the level of risk 
approaches zero. The level of risk associated with the highest net 
benefit to the community of a risk-reducing measure is given by R*, 
the benefits of reducing risk to this level is B* and the costs are C*. 
The lower panel, which derives a net benefit curve, shows this result 
more clearly.  
The acceptable level of risk which emerges from a CBA will 
typically vary between products, including products with the same 
quarantine risk. An issue raised later in this chapter is whether such 
differences might amount to discrimination under the SPS 
Agreement and thus bar CBA from having a role in import decision-
making. 
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Figure 12.2: An example of benefits and costs of quarantine risk 
reduction 





Benefits of risk reduction


















Net benefit (or cost) outcomes 
A number of different net benefit or cost outcomes may arise from a 
CBA of quarantine risk-reducing measures: indeed, a matrix of 
outcomes could be envisaged. Table 12.2 provides a stylised 
example of what this might look like for three disease or pest events 
for the same product and three measures. The data used assume 
that the net benefit to the community declines as the degree of 
disease or pest incursion increases and also as the measure becomes 
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more restrictive (with import protocol B being more restrictive than 
import protocol A). In this example, nine net benefit outcomes are 
possible.  
Whether or not probabilities could be assigned to these outcomes 
would depend crucially on the risk assessments undertaken in the 
IRAs. If probability estimates could not be assigned, various 
decision rules such as 'maximin' or 'minimax regret' could be used 
to assist in the choice of measure. Indeed, a rule could be designed 
to reflect the community's attitude to risk. However, given that the 
SPS Agreement provides that SPS measures must be based on 'risk 
assessments', it is questionable whether such rules could be used. 
Moreover, the choice of decision rule is subjective; no one rule is 
objectively superior to the other. 
If probability estimates could be assigned, then expected values 
could be estimated for each measure. For example, Table 12.2 gives 
indicative probabilities for the three disease or pest events. The 
probabilities of the adverse events (that is, events involving disease 
or pest incursion) decline as the measures become more restrictive. 
Conversely, probabilities of no disease or pest incursions increase. 
Thus, using the indicative probabilities in the table, the expected net 
benefit of allowing unrestricted imports is: 0.7 x 100 + 0.2 x 70 + 0.1 x 
60 = $90 million.  
If the community's attitude to risk is 'neutral', the measure to be 
applied would then be the one yielding the highest expected net 
benefit. However, as will be seen later, this might not be an 
appropriate rule where the community is risk averse.  
Accommodating risk aversion in cost/benefit analysis 
Risk aversion implies that a measure to reduce quarantine risk 
which yields an expected net cost to the community might 
nonetheless be accepted. This is because a lower, but more certain 
level of community well being (or wealth), is preferred to a higher, 
but uncertain, level.  
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Table 12.2: A stylised matrix of net benefit outcomes 
 



















100 0.7 70 0.2 60 0.1 90 
Import 
protocol A 
80  0.8 65 0.15 50 0.05 76 
Import 
protocol B 
30 0.9  20 0.075 5 0.025 29 
 
The results of CBA could be extended in various ways to 
accommodate risk aversion (as well as other risk attitudes). One 
approach where probability estimates are absent is to apply 
particular decision rules ('maximin' or 'minimax regret') which 
emphasise worst case outcomes. Other approaches where 
probability estimates are available are discounting and expected 
utility maximisation. Because of the questionable legitimacy of using 
decision rules under the SPS Agreement, only those approaches 
based on the availability of probability estimates, and their main 
limitations, are reviewed below.  
Before reviewing them, it is worth noting that risk aversion could 
also be encompassed in the 'risk assessment' component of IRAs. 
This could arise, for example, where Biosecurity Australia estimates 
quarantine risks using worst case (rather than likely) scenarios, or 
applies a 'safety margin' to its risk estimates. In this situation, the 
use of any of the techniques reviewed below could lead to a 'double 
accounting' of risk aversion if these risk estimates were to be used in 
CBA.  
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Discounting 
Where probability estimates are available, a rough approach for 
taking account of risk aversion is to apply a simple discount to the 
results of CBA. For example, an expected net cost (or benefit) for a 
measure could be deflated by particular dollar amounts.  
Although this approach is simple to use and makes transparent an 
assumed degree of risk aversion, the size of the discount is 
inevitably a matter of subjective judgement.  
Expected utility  
Another approach to accommodating risk aversion where 
probability estimates are known is to apply a utility function which 
reflects the decision maker's subjective valuation of alternative risky 
prospects (probability distributions of wealth or gambles). A utility 
function would be based on specific assumptions about the decision 
maker's preferences. It could be applied to choosing amongst 
alternative risky prospects, with the aim of maximising the expected 
utility value.  
The following stylised example shows how this approach can be 
applied. Suppose a utility function exists which reflects the decision 
maker's aversion to risk (say): U(w) = log10w where w is a net 
benefit (or cost) outcome from applying a particular measure. Now 
suppose the removal of an import ban is considered. There are two 
possible net benefit outcomes from unrestricted trade: $100 million 
with probability 0.7 (where no diseases or pests enter or establish) 
and $60 million with probability 0.3 (where diseases or pests enter 
and establish). The expected value of this net benefit is: 0.7 x $100 
million + 0.3 x $ 60 million = $ 88 million. The expected utility of the 
net benefit is: 0.7x U($100 million )+0.3x U($60 million)  0.7 x log 10 
($100 million) + 0.3 x log 10 ($60 million) = 0.7 x 8 + 0.3 x 7.8 = 7.93.  
Now consider another measure which replaces an import ban with 
an import protocol. The net benefit outcomes are $80 million with 
0.8 probability (where there are no diseases or pests) and $50 million 
with 0.2 probability (where diseases or pests enter and establish). 
The expected value of net benefit is $74 million and the expected 
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utility of net benefit is: 0.8 x U($80 million) + 0.2 x U($50 million)  
0.8 x log 10 ($80 million) + 0.2 log 10 ($50 million) = 0.8 x 7.9 + 0.2 x 7.7 
= 7.86.  
In choosing between the two measures — removal of the import ban 
and imposition of an import protocol — the aim is to maximise the 
expected utility value. Hence, the measure involving removal of the 
import ban would be preferred because the expected utility value of 
this measure is higher than that of the protocol.  
There have been various criticisms of the theoretical underpinnings 
of the expected utility approach. They have generally focused on the 
realism of the assumptions (or axioms) concerning the decision 
maker's preferences over risk prospects, which invariably demand a 
good deal of rationality.  
Is there a role for cost/benefit analysis? 
As noted earlier, CBA has the potential to inform import decision-
making by providing an insight into the community-wide resource 
effects of measures to reduce quarantine risk.  
However, CBA has not played a role in IRAs undertaken in the past 
by Biosecurity Australia's predecessor, AQIS, or indeed, in other 
countries' quarantine regimes. The economic input which applied 
was of a limited nature. In its handbook on the import decision-
making process, AQIS stated: 
"The social and economic considerations arising from the 
potential impact of pests and diseases that could enter and 
establish in Australia as a result of importation are taken into 
account, but the potential competitive economic impact of 
prospective imports on domestic industries is not within the 
scope of AQIS' import risk analysis. Relevant economic 
considerations in quarantine risk analysis include the cost of 
programs required to manage disease and pest outbreaks, the 
cost to industry of loss of markets due to an outbreak [of pests 
or disease]." (AQIS 1998, p. 11). 
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Further, AQIS said of considerations such as the effect of exposing 
domestic industries to substantially greater import competition and 
consequent structural adjustment pressure: 
"The Government may in such circumstances seek relevant 
economic analysis and consider options available for an 
appropriate response. Such considerations may occur in 
parallel with but will in no way influence the import risk 
analysis performed in accordance with the procedures 
described in [the Handbook]." (AQIS 1998, p. 11). 
And recently it said at the 2000 Outlook conference: 
"In setting its [appropriate level of protection], a World Trade 
Organization Member strikes a balance between the risk of 
pest or disease incursion (and the associated potential for 
damage) and the benefits of trade (which include access to 
produces of other countries for both consumption and 
production improvement)." (Gascoine, Wilson and McRae 
2000, p. 176). 
This limited economic input is apparent in a recent IRA report by 
AQIS on the importation of crocodile meat from Zimbabwe. In that 
report, economic input comprised during: 
 risk assessment (under the heading of 'consequence assessment') of 
qualitative assessments of surveillance and control costs, 
compensation costs (to local producers), potential trade losses 
and adverse effects on other industries; and 
 risk management of qualitative assessments of the impact of 
options on the consequence assessment (AQIS 2000). 
An issue thus arises as to whether CBA should play a greater part in 
import decision-making and, in particular, in determining the 
measure to be applied to achieve, in the parlance of the SPS 
Agreement, an 'appropriate level of Protection'.  
Various arguments have been put forward against such a proposal 
(for example, see Sinner 1999). These arguments generally focus on 
the potential for CBA to breach the SPS Agreement.  
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One argument is that, in deciding amongst measures to be applied 
to reduce quarantine risk, Article 5.3 does not include consideration 
of the competition- or trade-related impacts of allowing or 
restricting imports on consumers or producers. This Article 
provides that: 
"In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and 
determining the measure to be applied for achieving the 
appropriate level of [SPS] protection from such risk, Members 
shall take into account as relevant economic factors: the 
potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the 
event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease; 
the costs of control or eradication in the territory of the 
importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of 
alternative approaches to limiting risks." 
Although the language in this Article is clearest with respect to the 
costs of diseases or pests, it simply does not address the 
competition- or trade-related impacts of allowing or restricting 
imports on consumers or producers. There is nothing in the Article 
to suggest that only specified factors must be taken into account in 
choosing amongst measures to reduce quarantine risk.  
A second argument against the use of CBA is that Article 2.3 could 
be breached. This Article provides that measures must not 
'arbitrarily or unjustifiably 'discriminate between Members where 
'identical or similar conditions prevail' and not be applied in a 
manner constituting a 'disguised restriction on international trade'. 
The concern here about the use of CBA is that it might lead to 
divergent results for Members where identical or similar conditions 
prevail, thus leading to complaints about arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination. Divergent results could arise, for example, in 
relation to two products from two countries with similar quarantine 
risks, which face different demand and supply conditions in 
Australia. Here, it is possible that one CBA suggests that the 
preferred measure is to restrict imports, while the second CBA 
suggests that imports be allowed. 
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However, this argument may really be one against defining the 
scope of CBAs (and even IRAs) too narrowly, not against CBA itself. 
For example, it is possible that divergent results would not arise for 
'generic' CBAs, that is, CBAs which focus on a product from all 
countries, not just a particular country, or on products which are 
close substitutes. Even if the argument were valid, one option would 
be to not act in accordance with divergent results from a CBA.  
A third argument against the use of CBA is that it could lead to 
'distinctions' in the levels of acceptable risk in 'different situations' 
and thus breach Article 5.5. This Article (known as the consistency 
requirement) provides that: 
"With the objective of achieving consistency in the application 
of the concept of appropriate level of [SPS] protection against 
risks to human life or health, or to animal and plant life or 
health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable 
distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in 
different situations, if such distinctions result in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade."  
The WTO's Appellate Body in the Hormones and Salmon cases 
provided guidance on the interpretation of this Article. For the 
Article to be breached, the Appellate Body stated that three elements 
must be present: 
 the Member imposing the measure complained of has adopted its 
own acceptable levels of risk in several different (but comparable) 
situations; 
 those acceptable levels of risk must exhibit arbitrary or 
unjustifiable differences in their treatment of different situations; 
and 
 the arbitrary or unjustifiable differences result in discrimination 
or a disguised restriction of international trade.  
The SPS Committee's guidelines on this Article appear to largely 
codify the views of the Appellate Body (WTO 2000). 
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Although differing levels of acceptable risk could emerge from CBA 
in different situations, this does not mean that they are 'arbitrary or 
unjustifiable'. Indeed, it could be argued that linking acceptable risk 
levels to CBAs is a way of avoiding a breach of this Article as it 
ensures decisions are backed by objective analysis.  
A final argument is that the use of CBA is limited by Article 3.1 
which requires measures to be 'based on 'international guidelines (as 
well as standards and recommendations) where they exist, except as 
otherwise provided in the Agreement. Nonetheless, as the Appellate 
Body noted in the Hormones case, the Article does not necessarily 
mean that compliance with international guidelines is mandatory; 
merely, that they be considered in the establishment of the measures 
to be applied. Thus, there is still scope for CBA to be used even 
where there are international guidelines, standards and 
recommendations advocating a specific SPS measure.  
Interestingly, OIE and IPPC guidelines do not appear to discount 
the use of CBA in their IRA models. Although the OIE model is non-
committal on the nature of economic input in risk management, 
both IPPC models explicitly allow the choice of measures to be 
based on CBA. Indeed, the IPPC Draft Guidelines provide that in 
selecting measures to reduce pest risk, 'cost/benefit analysis for 
each of the minimum measures found to provide acceptable security 
may be estimated' (IPPC 1999, section 3.4).  
Thus, there does not appear to be anything in the wording of the 
relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement, WTO Appellate Body 
guidance to date, or in the OIE and IPPC guidelines that expressly 
rules out the use of CBA in the risk management component of 
IRAs. Provided that the minimum requirements of the SPS 
Agreement in respect of 'risk assessment' and determining the 
'appropriate level of protection' are satisfied, it would be in the 
interest of the overall Australian community that CBA (or at least 
cost-effectiveness analysis) be applied. 
This is not to say that a CBA should be undertaken in every case. It 
(and, indeed, a full IRA) is resource intensive and, accordingly, 
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should be rationed. The following are some suggestions about how 
and when it could be used. 
A CBA could be unnecessary if Biosecurity Australia assesses the 
quarantine risk in a particular case to be 'zero or negligible'. This 
approach is similar to ensuring that the assessed risk falls within a 
target or threshold level of risk before proceeding into the risk 
management component of IRA. (Indeed, as discussed below, a 
target of 'zero or negligible' risk could be perceived as an 'acceptable 
level of risk'). 
Generic or more broadly based CBAs could be undertaken. For 
example, instead of focusing on a particular product from a 
particular country, a CBA could be extended to encompass a 
particular product from all countries. In taking this approach, 
however, consideration may need to be given as to whether the 
scope of IRA overall could feasibly be broadened.  
Qualitative CBAs, which are not so data intensive, could be 
undertaken. In this regard, adherence to the guidelines on 
Regulatory Impact Statements - effectively a template of CBA - set 
out by the Office of Regulation Review (1998) may prove sufficient. 
The acceptable level of risk 
The SPS Agreement gives Members a right to determine their own 
level of acceptable risk (or, in the words of the SPS Agreement, 
'appropriate level of protection') provided they: 
 take into account the objective of 'minimizing negative trade 
effects' (Article 5.4); and 
 meet the consistency requirement (Article 5.5). 
Although it is not clear from the SPS Agreement what acceptable 
level of risk means — it is tautologically defined — the WTO's 
Appellate Body provides some guidance. In the Salmon case, the 
Appellate Body said that: 
 it is a prerogative of the Member concerned; 
234  Part III  Adding more economics to risk analysis 
 it is an 'objective' and its determination is an element in decision-
making which 'logically precedes and is separate' from the 
establishment or maintenance of a measure; 
 it could be zero risk; and 
 while it need not be quantitative, it should not be vague or 
equivocal. 
According to comments by the Government and AQIS, Australia's 
acceptable level of risk is low, but not zero. The Government has 
said 'there will always be an element of risk' with imports (DPIE 
1997, p. 10). AQIS has said that 'quarantine policies are based on the 
concept of the management of risk to an acceptably low level' (AQIS 
1998, p. 11). AQIS said that 'a guide to the [appropriate level of 
Protection] is community and industry acceptance of [previous] 
quarantine decisions taken' (AQIS 1999, p. 15, and Senate Rural and 
Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee 2000, p. 82).  
Apart from these comments, there is no guidance as to what 
'acceptably low' means or how the concept is applied in individual 
cases. Indeed, the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 
Legislation Committee (2000, p. 97) expressed disquiet recently over 
the vagueness of the concept, when it said: 
"The Committee is concerned about the difficulty of defining 
'Appropriate Level of Protection'. …. putting in place 
quarantine measures determined against a concepts which is 
inherently vague and unsubstantiated, and which can only be 
inferred from analysing decisions on quarantine applications, 
is a recipe for inviting confusion and criticism."  
In general, there are a number of approaches to determining 
whether a quarantine risk is acceptable. As noted earlier, CBA is one 
approach. Alternative approaches involve the following: 
 Expressly identifying a risk target or threshold and then 
comparing the particular quarantine risk of concern against this 
target. There are various ways of expressing the risk target. For 
example, the IPPC Draft Guidelines (IPPC 1999, section 3.1) 
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suggested that 'acceptable level of risk' may be expressed in 
'reference to existing phytosanitary requirements, indexed to 
estimated economic losses, expressed on a scale of risk tolerance 
or [expressed] in comparison with the level of risk accepted by 
other countries'. 
 Examining the risks associated with decisions taken in respect of 
other similar products with similar risks, from the application of 
a particular technology or process, or from certification that a 
product is 'disease or pest free', and then comparing these risks 
with the particular quarantine risk of concern (see Box 12.2). 
 Focussing on particular trade-offs (but not CBA trade-offs) such 
as between the particular risk of concern and the benefits of trade 
('risk benefit analysis') or between the particular risk of concern 
and other risks ('comparative risk analysis'). 
A common feature of these alternative approaches is that they 
involve limited or no consideration of the community wide trade-
offs associated with importing a product with quarantine risk.  
Given the significance of the concept under the SPS Agreement and 
the lack of clear guidance to date by either the Government or by 
Biosecurity Australia (or its predecessor AQIS), it appears that 
issuing detailed guidelines on acceptable risk would make 
transparent this crucial aspect of import decision-making. At the 
very least, more detail could be given by Biosecurity Australia in its 
IRA reports about what is, in a particular case, the 'acceptable' risk 
and how it is determined. This approach was effectively endorsed 
by the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation 
Committee (2000, p. 97) recently when it said: 
"the standard against which the risk is being determined must 
be subject to some standards, guidelines or definition. … 
[Furthermore] the determination of the [appropriate level of 
Protection] is a matter for Government and not one which is 
appropriate for individual agencies. Nor should the 
determination of the [appropriate level of Protection] be seen 
to be within the scope of one particular agency's functions."  
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Box 12.2: Inferring risk acceptability 
 
One approach to determining whether an assessed quarantine risk is acceptable 
or not is to compare it with the quarantine risks associated with other situations 
(such as previous quarantine decisions). The diagram below, which focuses on 
risk as a function of probability and adverse consequences, is one way of 
conceiving what this involves. It plots risks in different situations and identifies 
which risks have been accepted and which have not. Indeed, an imaginary 
frontier of acceptable risk levels could be drawn. A slight variant of this 
approach is the ‘risk evaluation matrix’ devised by AQIS (see Senate Rural And 
Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee 2000, p. 144). 
Although this approach ensures consistency in decision making, it does not of 




Conservatism in IRA 
Conservatism in IRAs can occur during the risk assessment (for 
example, in the choice of data, assumptions and risk estimation 
techniques) and in risk management components.  
It could be argued that this is consistent with Australia's 
conservative attitude to risk. However, applying a conservative 
approach to both risk estimation and to risk management can 
unnecessarily bias decision-making away from measures which 
Adverse consequences 
Probability 
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enhance community well being. Indeed, as noted earlier, it could 
lead to a kind of 'double accounting' of risk attitudes. 
In principle, it would be preferable if the assessment of risk 
involves, as far as possible, an objective appraisal of data and 
information. This means avoiding the incorporation of particular 
risk attitudes in risk assessment. Otherwise, risk estimates could be 
biased towards the 'high end' and risk attitudes would be better 
incorporated in deciding among the measures to reduce risk. For 
example, risk attitudes could be incorporated in the choice of risk 
target to be achieved or, if CBA is used, in applying a specific risk 
aversion factor or decision rule.  
Conclusion 
Biosecurity Australia's predecessor, AQIS, has done much in recent 
years to address the shortcomings of its previous approach to IRA 
and import decision-making (see the following chapter in this 
volume, by Tanner). There is now a more formalised appellable 
decision-making process with greater opportunity for stakeholder 
participation. There is also in place a program of review of IRAs on 
aquatic animals. As well, quarantine proclamations have been 
rationalised, and the informative quality of IRAs has increased 
markedly.  
That said, there is scope for futher improvement. Provided the 
minimum requirements of the SPS Agreement are met, 
consideration by Biosecurity Australia of the well-being of the 
Australian community should be paramount in its import decision-
making process. Implementing measures to reduce quarantine risk, 
although yielding benefits, is not cost-free. In the context of IRA, 
priority attention should be given to incorporating some form of 
CBA (or cost-effectiveness analysis), issuing general guidelines on 
the 'acceptable level of risk' (or at least expressing its meaning more 
clearly in particular IRA reports) and avoiding a double accounting 
of risk attitudes in IRAs.  
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13 
Quarantine reform: Australia's recent 
experience 
CAROLYN TANNER* 
Three years after the Australian government announced major 
changes to Australia's quarantine system, quarantine-related issues 
continue to elicit strong interest from the media, some industries 
and foreign governments, and quarantine remains high on the 
policy agenda. It is therefore time to ask: what have been the major 
outcomes of reforming the Australian quarantine system and what 
now are the key issues from an economic perspective? 
This chapter addresses these questions by first briefly reviewing the 
background to and major tenets of the report of the Australian 
Quarantine Review Committee (Nairn et al. 1996) which formed the 
basis for the government's fundamental reforms to the quarantine 
system announced in August 1997 (DPIE 1997). The chapter 
examines the broad outcomes resulting from the government's 
reforms before focusing on the key issues of managed risk (in 
particular, import risk analysis) and the continuum of quarantine 
(that is, expanding the scope of quarantine to include pre-border, 
border and post-border activities that assist in achieving the 
quarantine objective).  Finally some comments are made about the 
performance of quarantine delivery and the goal of quarantine from 
an economic perspective. 
                                                 
*  The author wishes to thank Mal Nairn, Andrew Inglis, Mike Nunn and 
Warren Vant for helpful comments and Mark Kethro, Warren Vant and Neil 
McWaters for assistance with the tables. 
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Australian quarantine reform 
The efficacy of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 
(AQIS) — the organisation responsible for the development of 
Australia's quarantine policy and programs — was called into 
question in the early 1990s by the entry into Australia of a 
succession of exotic pests and diseases that attracted wide media 
attention1. Concern about the adequacy of Australia's quarantine 
system was exacerbated by a highly politicised and public debate 
concerning the entry conditions for a number of products on which 
AQIS and industry representatives were unable to reach common 
ground for deciding issues on their scientific merit. As Nairn et al. 
(1996, p.3) observed, the debate was 'resource-intensive and time-
consuming' and led to 'community concern about Australia's 
quarantine services'. 
Coincident with the controversy concerning the Australian 
quarantine system, major developments were occurring in world 
trade and other areas relating to quarantine, including: 
 the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, which opened up trade 
opportunities and enhanced exporters' expectations with respect 
to market access; 
 the negotiation of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement), which defined the 
rights and obligations of Members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) with respect to the development and 
implementation of quarantine controls; 
 the increasing use of the 'clean, green' reputation by food 
exporting nations such as Australia, partly in response to 
increased consumer concern for food safety; 
                                                 
1  With the restructuring of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry — 
Australia (AFFA) which occurred in mid-2000, these activities have been 
relocated in the Market Access and Biosecurity group of AFFA, but the same 
staff are involved. To avoid confusion and for consistency with the Handbook, 
staff conducting IRAs will be referred to as AQIS staff throughout this chapter. 
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 rapid increases in the volume of world trade and international 
passenger movements (in the order of 10 per cent per year); and 
 significant scientific advances in surveillance and identification 
techniques for animal and plant pests and diseases (Nairn et al. 
1996, pp 3–4). 
In response to mounting criticism of the Australian quarantine 
system from primary producer groups, the scientific community 
and the general public, the then government set up an independent 
review of Australia's plant and animal quarantine policies and 
procedures in December 1995, chaired by Professor Malcolm Nairn. 
Following a general election in March 1996, the review was 
endorsed by the Coalition Government and the Review Committee's 
report was presented to the new Minister for Primary Industries and 
Energy (the Hon. John Anderson MP) in November 1996. 
The report - Australian Quarantine: A Shared Responsibility - proposed 
fundamental changes to the culture of the quarantine service and 
the way quarantine policies are developed and put into effect. 
Central to the Nairn Review's recommendations was the need to 
develop a 'partnership approach' that embraced industry, 
governments and the wider community. The basic tenets of the 
Nairn Review can be summarised as follows: 
 development of a partnership approach to quarantine policies 
and programs involving the whole Australian community - the 
general public, industry and governments; 
 establishment of a statutory authority to develop national 
quarantine policy and ensure national delivery of quarantine 
services; 
 establishment of a more balanced approach to animal and plant 
health and quarantine by providing additional inputs for plant 
health and quarantine; 
 development of a more formally structured process for 
conducting risk analyses to provide a scientifically based 
foundation for a policy of manageable risk; 
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 acknowledgment of the importance of quarantine to the natural 
environment; 
 expansion of the scope of quarantine by recognising the 
importance of activities in all three elements of quarantine - pre-
border, border and post-border - as a continuum; and 
 enhancement of the focus on pre-border and post-border 
activities of the continuum of quarantine in the achievement of 
Australia's quarantine goal (Nairn et al. 1996, pp. 11–12). 
In its response (DPIE 1997), the government accepted the basic 
principles and recommendations of the Nairn Review — with the 
exception of the recommendations to set up a statutory authority to 
be responsible for quarantine policy and programs, and to establish 
a key centre for quarantine-related risk analysis — and provided 
funding in the order of A$76 million over a four-year period.2 
Key outcomes 
In its response to the Nairn Review, the government stressed the 
importance of Australia's quarantine system for potential 
agricultural exports and the need for 'a credible quarantine policy 
that is consistent with international rules and standards' (DPIE 1997, 
p. 8). The government emphasised the need to 'accept the 
international rules with which we expect our trading partners to 
comply' and to base quarantine decisions 'on the weight of scientific 
evidence and judgement' (DPIE 1997, p. 8). In providing additional 
funds to enhance the quarantine system, the government placed 
particular emphasis on increasing community awareness, applying 
the principle of 'manageable risk' (based on science) to quarantine 
decisions, protection of Australia's unique environment and 
recognition of the continuum of quarantine (that is, quarantine 
needs to be seen as a continuum of pre-border, border and post-
border measures). Greater emphasis was also to be given to 
improved consultation in import risk analysis, increased monitoring 
                                                 
2 The government's response was a joint response to the Nairn Review and 
to the National Task Force on Imported Fish and Fish Products (DPIE 1996). 
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for pests and diseases, and enhanced national preparedness and 
response capacity (especially for plants and aquatic animals).3 
In providing significant funding for quarantine - at a time of overall 
budgetary stringency - the government demonstrated its 
commitment to maintaining a strong quarantine system (Tanner and 
Nunn 1998). Consistent with the government's endorsement of the 
underlying rationale of the Nairn Review of a 'shared responsibility', 
two-thirds of the funding has been provided by government, with 
the remainder being contributed by industry through the 
application of AQIS's existing full cost-recovery policy. 
The Government's endorsement of the partnership approach 
established a framework for a change in the culture of quarantine 
that recognises that quarantine is not the sole responsibility of 
government but that all members of the community as well as 
industry and governments need to be involved. Overall, the reforms 
that have been made to the Australian quarantine system have led 
to greater transparency, which is consistent with Australia's 
international obligations and trade objectives as a major agricultural 
exporter and leader of the Cairns Group. At the same time, the 
quarantine system has been strengthened and its focus extended 
beyond the border. Strengthening the pre-border and post-border 
elements of the continuum of quarantine is particularly important in 
managing the quarantine threats inherent in increasing volumes of 
trade and numbers of tourists (Tanner and Nunn 1998). 
In its response to the Nairn Review, the government indicated that it 
had been guided by 'seven key quarantine themes': 
 managed risk (based on science); 
 a continuum of quarantine; 
 community responsibility; 
 consultative decision-making; 
                                                 
3 For the allocation of additional funds to major functional areas, see DPIE 
(1997, p. 10). 
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 external input to quarantine policy; 
 enhanced capacity in plant quarantine protection and policy; and 
 delivering quarantine objectives (DPIE 1997, p. 9). 
The seven quarantine themes set out above are clearly inter-related 
and have led to a suite of reforms. Arguably, the first two are of 
greater significance and will be discussed in more detail. 
Managed risk 
At the time of the Nairn Review, import risk analysis (IRA) was a 
highly controversial issue, and addressed in many submissions. 
Despite the changes that have been made to the IRA process, 
Australia's quarantine risk analyses continue to attract criticism 
from Australia's major trading partners, some domestic stakeholders 
— particularly those whose economic interests are affected by the 
IRAs — and the media. In addition to the scrutiny of the WTO 
Panels, the IRAs carried out by the then AQIS for uncooked Pacific 
salmon products have been the subject of a recent Senate Committee 
inquiry (Senate 2000).4  
Each of Australia's quadrilateral partners has expressed concerns 
about Australia's quarantine regime — for example, New Zealand 
with respect to apples, Canada with respect to salmonids and 
pigmeat, and the United States with respect to chicken meat, 
pigmeat, salmonids and table grapes — as have the ASEAN 
countries, notably Thailand (on durian and chicken meat) and the 
Philippines (on tropical fruits). The European Union (EU) has long 
held and expressed concerns about Australia's quarantine policies as 
they affect EU plant and animal exports. It is well recognised in 
international trade circles that such concerns about Australia's 
quarantine policies can have an adverse impact on market access for 
Australian export products, as recent events in the Philippines 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that the 1996 IRA on salmon was undertaken prior to 
the new IRA process being implemented and the 1999 IRA was conducted 
under an accelerated procedure due to time constraints arising from the WTO 
proceedings. 
246  Part III  Adding more economics to risk analysis 
clearly demonstrated. Recently, Australia's quarantine goals have 
also come under scrutiny by economists (see, for example, James 
and Anderson (1998) and Rodriguez et al. (2000) - the particular 
issues raised by economists are addressed in the next section). 
The Nairn Review endorsed the government's 'managed risk' 
approach to quarantine. This is the only appropriate approach in 
view of the increasing levels of international trade and tourism and 
the finite resources available to AQIS to prevent establishment of 
pests and diseases. There is also the constant threat of pests and 
diseases entering through 'the natural movement of wildlife, such as 
migratory birds, or [being] borne long distances on wind or sea 
currents' (Nairn et al. 1996, p. 21). The community therefore needs to 
accept a pragmatic approach to quarantine that is consistent with 
increasing trade and tourism and the threat of disease and pathogen 
entry through natural pathways. 
The Nairn Review identified a number of fundamental principles 
that should apply to import risk analysis, similar to those that apply 
in other disciplines such as food safety (ANZFA 1996) and 
environmental sciences (Norton, Beer and Dovers 1996). In 
summary, risk analysis should be: 
 conducted in a consultative framework; 
 based on science and politically independent; 
 transparent and open; 
 consistent with other government policy and Australia's 
international obligations; 
 harmonised to take account of international standards, guidelines 
and recommendations; and 
 subject to appeal on process (Nairn et al. 1996, pp. 89–90). 
These six principles were endorsed in the government's response 
and incorporated into the new IRA process that came into effect in 
1997 (DPIE 1997 p. 21). The major differences between the new IRA 
processes and the previous practice adopted by AQIS is in the 
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'duration, timing and consultative requirement, and the provision 
for an appeal mechanism' (Tanner and Nunn, 1998 p. 450). The AQIS 
Import Risk Analysis Process Handbook, which was published in 
August 1998, sets out — for stakeholders and other interested 
parties — the process that Biosecurity Australia follows in  
 
Table 13.1: Plant and animal quarantine decisions, 1993/1994 to 
1999/2000 
Number of  1993/ 1994/ 1995/ 1996/ 1997/ 1998/ 1999/ Totals 
decisions 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  
         
         
Plant 5 13 11 5 8 7 5 54 
Reviews 2 5 5 5 8 1 3 29 
IRAsa 3 8 6   6 2 25 
Animal  15 13 16 20 14 22 20 120 
Reviews 9 6 8 16 7 12 5 63 
IRAsa 6 7 8 4 7 10 15 57 
         
Total 20 26 27 25 22 29 25 174 
Reviews 11 11 13 21 15 13 8 92 
IRAs 9 15 14 4 7 16 17 82 
a. Caution should be used in comparing activity before and after the new IRA 
process (which was introduced in September 1997). The new process is more 
extensive, thorough, consultative, transparent and significantly more resource 
intensive. Before the new process, all the animal quarantine decisions followed 
a period of stakeholder consultation while for plant issues a large percentage 
(50%) were based on pre-existing policy and required minimal consultation. 
Those included above as 'IRAs' are ones that involved new policy and more 
extensive analysis than those counted as reviews. 
Source: Biosecurity Australia. 
conducting an IRA. As shown in Table 13.1, many of the import 
requests received by Biosecurity Australia can be addressed 
relatively quickly without the need for a formal IRA process. Those 
requests that involve significant variations in established policy 
require an IRA to be carried out. For the period 1993/94 to 
1999/2000, 174 plant and animal quarantine decisions were made in 
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response to requests to import products or material not previously 
permitted. Of these decisions, more than half could be dealt with 
using the less formal review process, whilst the remainder - some 82 
decisions - involved more complex issues, requiring a full IRA. 
Although caution needs to be exercised in comparing data before 
and after the introduction of the new IRA process, Table 13.1 
indicates that the proportion of requests being addressed via IRAs 
has increased. This is largely a function of the increased funding of 
risk analysis that has allowed a greater number of IRAs to be 
undertaken simultaneously. 
An IRA may be conducted on a 'routine' or 'non-routine' basis, 
depending on the complexity of the issues involved, but either way 
there is opportunity for extensive consultation with stakeholders 
who may lodge appeals if not satisfied that the process — as set out 
in the AQIS Handbook — has been followed. Routine IRAs are 
handled 'in-house' by Biosecurity Australia, with scientists and 
other experts both within Biosecurity Australia and outside being 
consulted, as required. More complex proposals (non-routine risk 
analyses) involve the establishment of an expert panel (called a risk 
analysis panel or RAP) to conduct the IRA. Staff of Biosecurity 
Australia's Plant and Animal Quarantine Policy Branches are 
responsible for assigning priorities to import requests, conducting 
IRAs, developing risk management options and making 
recommendations to the Director of Quarantine as to which option 
meets Australia's appropriate level of protection (ALOP) or level of 
manageable risk in the least trade-restrictive way.5 These staff are 
also responsible for arranging stakeholder consultations and the 
negotiation of the final import protocol with the exporting country's 
relevant agency. 
The process is designed to ensure that the risks of entry, 
establishment and spread of pests and diseases, and their potential 
                                                 
5 With the restructuring of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry — Australia 
(AFFA) which occurred in mid-2000, these activities have been relocated in the 
Market Access and Biosecurity group of AFFA, but the same staff are involved. 
To avoid confusion and for consistency with the Handbook, staff conducting 
IRAs will be referred to as AQIS staff throughout this chapter. 
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impacts are fully evaluated. Imports are only permitted where such 
risks can be managed in a way that is consistent with Australia's 
very conservative approach to quarantine risk management. The 
ALOP is essentially Australia's quarantine goal and the import 
decisions and quarantine protocols are the means of achieving that 
goal. The concept of ALOP is discussed in detail above in Chapters 6 
to 10 of this volume. Suffice to say here that Australia's ALOP is not 
quantified (nor is any other country's). Despite being relatively 
straightforward in concept, ALOP is not easy to define and is often 
not well understood by stakeholders. Consistency in the application 
of the concept is 'achieved by reference to existing Australian 
policies and procedures, by reference to relevant international 
standards, guidelines and recommendations, and through the 
contribution of experienced risk analysts' (Tanner and Nunn 1998, 
p.451).6 The additional funding for risk analysis provided by the 
government has allowed additional scientific staff to be hired by 
AQIS and outside expertise to be contracted, as appropriate. 
The transparency of the overall process has increased since the 
publication of the Handbook. In addition, Biosecurity Australia 
maintains public files for all IRAs (accessible to all parties), a register 
of stakeholders is established for each IRA, and registered 
stakeholders receive progress reports on the IRAs.7 As of mid-2000, 
26 IRAs had been completed under the new procedures that were 
implemented in 1997. A further 46 IRAs are in process and over 150 
requests for import market access — some dating from the early 
1990s — await consideration. 
                                                 
6 As discussed in AQIS (1999a), while Australia's ALOP is illustrated by 
the body of quarantine decisions, inevitably 'outliers' will occur. This is 
particularly the case with older decisions or in cases where new scientific 
evidence has emerged or new technologies have been developed. Review of 
such decisions is an on-going process. 
7 Biosecurity Australia is developing a publication on the technical 
guidelines used in undertaking an IRA and developing risk management 
procedures to complement the Handbook and to make the overall process more 
transparent. The method of analysis used by Biosecurity Australia is based on 
the international standards produced by the Office International des Epizooties 
(OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and are 
consistent with the requirements of the SPS Agreement. 
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Experience with the new IRA process suggests that the majority of 
IRAs — particularly those involving products that do not compete 
directly with Australian industry or provide new genetic material — 
are not controversial. Criticism of AQIS and the new IRA process 
has often come from industries that perceive their economic 
interests are threatened by entry of competing product from 
overseas if quarantine restrictions were lessened or removed. Of the 
IRAs completed under the new process, the IRAs on table grapes 
and durians have been particularly contentious. Since the right to 
appeal was introduced, there have been appeals in 12 IRAs, with the 
stakeholder concerns ranging from the priority accorded the IRA 
and the composition of the Risk Analysis Panel to criticisms of the 
risk analysis itself (see Table 13.2 for details of appeals and their 
outcome). Major criticisms by stakeholders include claims that the 
then AQIS: 
 failed to attach sufficient weight to scientific evidence submitted 
by domestic industry (or judgements of their nominated experts); 
 lacked sufficient scientific basis for the conclusions reached; 
 failed to explain adequately how it reached its conclusions both 
about the assessment of risk and the efficacy of the proposed risk 
management procedures for reducing the risk; 
 was not sufficiently conservative in interpreting the ALOP; and 
 did not consult widely enough when the routine process was 
used. 
The two Import Risk Analysis Appeal Panels that considered the 
appeals on durians and table grapes each concluded that the then 
AQIS did not fail to consider significant bodies of relevant scientific 
evidence but that AQIS had failed to provide sufficient transparency 
in respect to certain technical matters. Notwithstanding these 
criticisms, the process exhibits a higher degree of transparency and 
stakeholder involvement, compared with the earlier process used by 
the then AQIS and the IRAs conducted by major trading partners. 
Notwithstanding, there is still room for greater understanding by 
stakeholders of the underlying principles of the IRA process and the 
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international framework within which Australia operates, greater 
transparency in the risk analysis itself and more consultation with 
stakeholders in the early stages. 
Overall, the changes that have been made to the IRA process, 
together with additional funding, have enhanced the technical 
capacity of Biosecurity Australia to undertake IRAs and ensured 
that the six fundamental principles of risk analysis are met. The 
process is clearly structured, transparent and consultative. It is 
common practice to involve outside experts in both routine and 
non-routine IRAs, thus ensuring a strong scientific and technical 
basis for risk analysis and quarantine decisions. While continuing to 
maintain a very conservative quarantine policy, recent decisions 
clearly indicate that Biosecurity Australia is implementing a 
managed risk approach (based on science), consistent with 
Australia's international obligations. In commenting on the 
effectiveness of Australia's quarantine protocols, Gascoine et al. 
(2000, p. 177) note that Australia's import protocols '… are among 
the most stringent in the world' and that 'no pest or disease 
incursions have been attributed to import decisions by the then 
AQIS'.8 
                                                 
8 See AQIS (1999b) for a list of pest and disease incursions since 1997 and 
likely source of introduction. 
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Table 13.2:  Summary of appeals received in Australia 






 RAP membership 
 Consultation process 
Director of 




Bulk maize from 
the United States 
 Priority accorded to 
the IRA 
Director APC Dismissed: not an 
appealable matter 





 RAP membership 
 Scope 
- Encompassed into 
a broader 
accelerated IRA 
Live and novel 
veterinary 
vaccines 







 RAP membership Director APC Dismissed 
Hatching eggs of 
domestic ducks 
 No details provided - Withdrawn 




 RAP membership 




 Transparency of the 
process 
 Risk analysis failed 
to consider a 
significant body of 







the basis that 
AQIS had failed to 





 Transparency of the 
process 
 Risk analysis failed 
to consider a 
significant body of 
relevant scientific or 
technical information 
IRAAP Upheld on 
transparency on 
the basis that 
AQIS had failed to 








Director APC Dismissed 
Camelids from 
Chile and Peru 
 ALOP IRAAP Not an appeal-
able matter 
Source: AFFA 
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Continuum of quarantine 
Putting into effect the concept of a continuum of quarantine — 
involving pre-border measures to reduce the threat of entry, well-
targeted border controls and post-border measures such as 
monitoring and surveillance to detect incursions at an early stage, 
backed up by emergency response plans to contain, control or 
eradicate pests and diseases when incursions occur — is one of the 
major outcomes of the quarantine reform. Although border activities 
continue to be central to the quarantine system, greater emphasis is 
now placed on pre-border and post-border activities than was the 
case in the past. 
Pre-border measures 
Pre-border measures are essentially a means of managing the 
quarantine risks off-shore. Measures include the identification, 
surveillance and monitoring of quarantine threats off-shore and 
managing these risks through co-operative programs of training, 
research and education; pre-clearance of goods off-shore; and 
promotion of quarantine awareness among Australian and overseas 
travelling and trading communities. Major initiatives include 
accrediting fumigation treatment providers, establishing timber 
certification standards for Canada and the United States, and 
extensive awareness promotions in the travel industry and with 
national Olympic committees in the period leading up to the 
Olympic Games in Sydney. The Northern Australia Quarantine 
Strategy (NAQS) has achieved considerable success in looking for 
and identifying threats in Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. 
The government has endorsed the expansion of pre-clearance 
activities as part of the pre-border phase of importation. Pre-border 
activities, which are monitored at the border, include pre-cleared 
fruit and vegetables from a number of countries including New 
Zealand and Japan, pre-cleared military and agricultural equipment, 
and inspection of athletes' personal effects and equipment before 
their return to Australia (used for the Olympic Games in Atlanta 
and the Commonwealth Games in Malaysia). Since Australian 
troops were deployed in East Timor, Biosecurity Australia staff have 
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been stationed in East Timor and additional staff have been 
stationed in Darwin to mitigate the threat posed by the frequent 
movement of personnel and equipment between East Timor and 
Australia. 
Border measures 
The implementation of the government's response to the Nairn 
Review has seen the deployment of additional staff and other 
resources aimed at improving border integrity. The focus of the 
Nairn Review's recommendations was that there should be better 
targeting of border activities to focus on paths identified as 
involving high risk of pest and disease incursion. As a result there 
has been significant data collection and analysis in a number of 
areas (including air passengers, air couriers and international mail 
exchanges, and external container inspections) to assist in risk 
profiling. In addition, performance indicators have been identified 
and a number of border activities have been reviewed and 
documented to achieve national consistency and to ensure 
appropriate risk management. A priority area for border programs 
is to continue to work with industry towards co-regulatory 
arrangements that are designed to outsource low-risk quarantine 
functions to industry, thus freeing AQIS resources to concentrate on 
higher risk areas. 
Post-border measures 
Effective monitoring and surveillance for pests and diseases are 
essential if Australia is to fulfil its international obligations under 
the SPS Agreement. Article 6.3 requires countries to establish 
scientifically that they are free from pests and diseases, rather than 
simply claiming such freedom. The Nairn Review identified 
deficiencies in the post-border area of quarantine, particularly in 
relation to plants and aquatic animals. The establishment of the 
position of Chief Plant Protection Officer (analogous to the Chief 
Veterinary Officer) and of Plant Health Australia (analogous to 
Animal Health Australia) has enhanced Australia's plant health 
infrastructure and ability to respond to disease incursions. Aquatic 
animal health capacity has been increased through the appointment 
of experts to a special Fish Health Unit in AFFA (and additional 
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experts to Biosecurity Australia to carry out IRAs). An emergency 
response plan - AQUAPLAN - has been developed for aquatic 
animals along the lines of the AUSVETPLAN which has proved 
very effective for livestock diseases. The benefits of regular 
monitoring and early detection of pests and diseases were clearly 
demonstrated by the detection and subsequent eradication of black-
striped mussels in Darwin harbour in 1998. This pest has the 
potential to impose significant costs on shipping through the fouling 
of hulls. 
Notwithstanding the improvements made in the post-border area as 
a result of the additional funding following the Nairn Review, the 
1999 Australian National Audit Office report - Managing Pest and 
Disease Emergencies - identified the need to further enhance 
emergency planning for and response to animal and plant pest and 
disease incursions. Under a new program, the government will 
allocate $22.3 million over the next four years to enhance Australia's 
emergency management capacity for animal (including aquatic 
animals) and plant diseases and pest emergencies and secure a 
national approach to animal and plant health infrastructure. 
Economic considerations 
Performance of quarantine delivery 
A key question in any analysis of Australia's quarantine reforms is 
how effective and efficient have the reforms been in achieving their 
goal? The goal of Australia's quarantine policy (the ALOP) is clearly 
articulated in Recommendations 1 and 2 of Nairn et al. (1996): 
 that the vision for quarantine be 'that Australia will 
maintain its relative freedom from unwanted pests and 
diseases while fulfilling national and international 
obligations in a responsible manner'; and 
 that the goal of national quarantine should be to prevent 
the establishment and spread within Australia of exotic 
pests and diseases that are deemed to have a significant 
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deleterious effect on humans, animals, plants or the natural 
environment. 
Australia's ALOP - which can best be described as 'very 
conservative' (AQIS 1999a) - is achieved through a managed risk 
approach to quarantine. 
As previously indicated, analysis of incursion data shows that there 
has been no increase in the rate of pest and disease incursions since 
the time of the Nairn Review and - more importantly - no increase in 
the rate of establishment (AQIS 1999b). Of the 19 incursions 
reported to the National Office of Animal and Plant Health in the 
period 1997 to 1999, 10 have been eradicated (or are in the process of 
being eradicated), three were of no economic significance, one is 
controlled by normal management procedures, two are still being 
evaluated, and three have established, for which management 
programs are in progress. This result has been achieved at a time of 
increases in the number of international visitors, aircraft movements 
and entry of vessels, and the amount of international mail and cargo 
entering the country. Enhancement of pre-border and post-border 
quarantine, together with increased use of risk profiling to target 
resources in areas of highest risk in all parts of the quarantine 
continuum have contributed to the improved effectiveness and 
efficiency of the system. Greater quarantine awareness and the 
development of a partnership approach with industry (involving co-
regulatory arrangements) have contributed to the improved 
performance of the quarantine system. 
A good example of how risk profiling and better targeting of 
resources can improve effectiveness and efficiency of the system is 
the international mail program. More than 160 million articles of 
mail enter Australia each year, many containing items of high-risk 
quarantine concern such as foodstuffs, plant material, seeds and 
animal products. The increased funding provided to the 
international mail program has been used for extra staff and 
detector dogs and the introduction of scanning equipment. In 
conjunction with the Australian Customs Service, AQIS has refined 
its approach to targeting mail items of quarantine concern. The 
number of high-risk items seized has increased as has the number of 
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seizures per officer and the number of seizures compared with the 
number of items of quarantine interest referred for closer 
examination (AQIS 1999c). 
Consistency in the application of quarantine protocols is an 
important aspect of performance from a National Competition 
Policy perspective and one that attracted considerable comment at 
the time of the Nairn Review. The differences in the delivery of 
quarantine services reported by the Nairn Review were an 
inevitable outcome of the changes that have occurred in quarantine 
delivery nationally. Before 1994, all Commonwealth quarantine 
services were delivered under agency arrangements by State 
quarantine services, on behalf of the Commonwealth. In October 
1994, a meeting of the Agriculture and Resource Management 
Council of Australia and New Zealand (ARMCANZ) resolved to 
transfer delivery of quarantine services to the Commonwealth. 
However, failure by the Ministers from Northern Territory, Western 
Australia and Tasmania to agree to such a transfer has resulted in a 
situation where AQIS officers perform Commonwealth quarantine 
services in most States while State officers appointed as Quarantine 
Officers by the Commonwealth perform the border functions in 
Northern Territory, Western Australia and Tasmania (Nairn et al. 
1996, p. 121).  
Differences in delivery of quarantine services between States have 
the potential to be anti-competitive and to encourage the 
undesirable practice of 'port shopping'. AQIS has expended 
considerable effort in developing a nationally consistent quarantine 
service through documenting various procedures, increased staff 
training, introduction of performance indicators and regular 
program reviews. Although the 'mix' of service delivery persists, 
differences in service delivery no longer appear to be a major issue 
for stakeholders. 
Regular oversight of AQIS and now Biosecurity Australia's 
performance is undertaken by the Quarantine and Exports Advisory 
Council (QEAC) which was established as part of the government's 
response to the Nairn Review. Its terms of reference include, inter 
alia, to oversee the implementation of the Nairn Review and Fish 
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Task Force Reports, to provide advice on AQIS's program delivery 
and to help AQIS to evaluate its performance. The regular reports 
that have been made to QEAC during its three years of operation 
demonstrate improved levels of effectiveness and efficiency, 
supported by the use of performance indicators and regular surveys 
of client satisfaction. Overall, the reforms to the quarantine service 
have led to a better allocation of resources through the use of risk 
profiling and targeting resources to areas of highest quarantine risk. 
The goal of quarantine 
As already indicated, Australia's goal of quarantine (ALOP) is set at 
a 'very conservative' level that is consistent with Australia's trade 
profile as a major exporter of agricultural products and the trade 
benefits that flow from maintaining Australia's relative freedom 
from pests and diseases. Under the SPS Agreement, it is up to the 
Member Countries of the WTO to determine their appropriate level 
of sanitary and phytosanitary protection. To achieve this level of 
protection, Member s can apply quarantine measures that protect 
against potential pests and diseases provided such measures are: 
 based on a sound scientifically based assessment procedure; 
 not more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the desired 
level of protection; and 
 non-discriminatory. 
The methods currently used by Biosecurity Australia for 
undertaking IRAs and determining quarantine protocols are 
consistent with the SPS Agreement. 
Not surprisingly, if the ALOP is changed, the range of products that 
can be imported — and the associated trade flows — will change. 
This has been demonstrated by a recent ABARE study by Heaney, 
Rodriguez and Abdalla (1999), who use an iso-risk approach 
developed by Bigsby and Whyte (1999) to define the boundary 
between commodities with acceptable risks and those with 
unacceptable risks. Heaney et al. (1999) show that for the six 
commodities studied (apples, bananas, chicken, pilchards, salmon 
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and wheat), none would be imported at a very conservative ALOP 
(of $700 per year) except for chicken meat from the United States. If 
the ALOP is raised to $24.5 million per year, imports of pilchards 
and bananas, as well as chicken meat from the United States, would 
be permitted. At an ALOP of $33 million per year, all of the case-
study commodities would have unrestricted access. 
One might expect that the debate would now be focused on 
quantifying the ALOP for Australia but — at least amongst 
economists — the debate seems to have shifted to whether the 
current approach used by Biosecurity Australia, which is clearly 
consistent with the SPS Agreement, should be replaced by a 
cost/benefit approach to quarantine policy (James and Anderson 
1998; Rodriguez et al. 2000). From a purely economic perspective, a 
cost/benefit approach is preferable because it allows all the costs 
and benefits associated with the import decision to be considered.9 
The Biosecurity Australia approach, which is focused on 
scientifically based risk analysis, considers only the following 
economic factors: 
 the potential damage (in terms of loss of production or sales in 
the event of entry, establishment or spread of the pest or disease); 
 the costs of control or eradication of an outbreak, and the costs of 
programs to manage such responses; 
 the costs of the loss of markets either nationally or 
internationally; and 
 the relative cost effectiveness of alternative approaches to 
limiting risks (Gascoine et al. 2000). 
The Biosecurity Australia approach excludes from any analysis 
important trade-related benefits resulting from consumers gaining 
access to imported product at competitive prices and agricultural 
producers obtaining access to superior genetic material. The 
                                                 
9 See Rodriguez et al. (2000) for a discussion of the various costs and 
benefits associated with a quarantine decision. 
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omission of these benefits may lead to a sub-optimal outcome for 
society as a whole. 
Although a cost/benefit approach to quarantine decision-making 
has considerable appeal to economists, some fundamental factors 
need to be taken into account, including: 
 Is a cost/benefit approach compatible with the SPS Agreement? 
 Is further change in quarantine decision-making desirable at this 
stage, given the relatively recent introduction of the SPS 
Agreement and the recent reforms to the Australian quarantine 
system? 
 Are the data available to undertake cost/benefit analyses of 
quarantine decisions? 
 Will the greater complexity of cost/benefit analyses lead to a 
higher level of disputation and more appeals to the WTO? and 
 Will developing countries, in particular, have the resources to 
implement such an approach? 
The question of compatibility with the SPS Agreement is something 
that will probably have to be tested legally before a definitive 
answer is possible. Certainly there are those such as Roberts (1998) 
who argue that there is scope to include welfare impacts on 
consumers within 'relevant economic factors' (Article 5.3 of the SPS 
Agreement). However, the inclusion of benefits to consumers is 
likely to lead to violation of the consistency requirement. Article 5.5 
ensures that Members apply measures consistently to different 
commodities that pose a similar risk of introducing the same 
diseases. Where different commodities pose similar risks, allowing 
imports of one commodity (based on higher net benefits from 
imports), while banning the other, would contravene the SPS 
consistency provision. Violation of this provision was one of the key 
issues in the WTO Australia—Salmon case. Whilst renegotiation of 
the SPS Agreement to accommodate cost/benefit analysis is always 
an option, it would not seem prudent to do so at this time as some 
countries may wish to weaken the current provisions. 
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Much of the wording of the SPS Agreement is fairly general and 
imprecise but its meaning is being clarified through the legal 
dispute settlement process.10 The SPS Agreement is still relatively 
new and many countries are still coming to grips with the changes 
necessary to make their quarantine decision-making processes 
consistent with the agreement. Although minor changes to the way 
quarantine decisions are made in Australia are likely to occur — 
indeed, some changes will be required by the recent restructuring of 
AFFA — major changes to the framework would be undesirable 
while the recently introduced reforms are still settling down. 
The idea of applying cost/benefit analysis to quarantine, while 
gaining support in recent years, is not particularly new. Hinchy and 
Fisher (1991) argued very persuasively for the use of cost/benefit 
analysis in quarantine almost a decade ago. The desirability of 
applying cost/benefit analysis to quarantine decision-making to 
justify the allocation of resources to the quarantine services was 
clear to the Nairn Review. However, the approach proved infeasible 
due to data limitations. One suspects that little has changed in the 
intervening period. Many developing countries are finding it 
difficult to undertake the necessary scientific and technical analysis 
to meet the current requirements of the SPS Agreement and to 
comply with quarantine protocols. Any change to the current SPS 
Agreement that increases its complexity would disadvantage 
developing countries in particular and is likely to lead to an increase 
in trade disputes. 
From a trade perspective, the application of the current SPS rules is 
leading to greater market access and increased trade. Market access 
for Australian animal, plant and food products has been opened up 
or maintained in no less than 640 cases since 1993/94. In 1998/99, 44 
new markets were opened and over 100 existing markets were 
protected from market disruption or closure. On the import side, the 
number of products for which entry is permitted is increasing. The 
additional resources allocated to risk analysis through the 
government's reforms have increased the number of IRAs being 
                                                 
10 See Pauwelyn (1999) for an excellent discussion of how the first three 
SPS disputes have clarified the SPS Agreement. 
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conducted simultaneously but a backlog of requests still exists, 
creating some trade tensions. 
Conclusion 
The reforms that have been made to the Australian quarantine 
system have improved the effectiveness and efficiency of quarantine 
delivery. This has been achieved through increased use of risk 
profiling to target resources to areas of highest risk and greater 
focus on pre-border and post-border activities. Fundamental to the 
changes to the quarantine system has been the development of a 
partnership approach between the general public, industry and 
governments. This is being developed through initiatives to increase 
quarantine awareness, enhanced consultation and the development 
of co-regulatory agreements with industry. 
Despite the changes that have been made to the risk analysis process 
to make it more transparent, consultative, structured and 
independent, to ensure it is based on sound science and to make the 
process appealable, IRAs continue to attract controversy. While 
there is scope for further enhancing the transparency of the risk 
analysis itself and the amount of consultation involved, the greatest 
deficiency at present appears to be the lack of clarity of the ALOP 
and the level at which it is set. Economists have a role in 
contributing to this debate. The current very conservative level 
effectively takes no account of the significant trade-related benefits 
that result from importation of many products. Shifting to a higher - 
but still conservative - ALOP would be tantamount to recognition of 
those benefits. Cost/benefit analysis has a useful role to play in 
quantifying those benefits to ensure a more informed debate on the 
level at which Australia sets its ALOP. 
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14 
Evaluating economic consequences of 
livestock diseases: a US perspective 
KENNETH W. FORSYTHE JR. 
This chapter provides an overview of selected approaches to 
evaluating the economic consequences of livestock diseases.  The 
presentation focuses on general types of analysis that may be 
needed, some examples of analytical tools, and discusses the 
linkages between some of the available tools. While the context of 
this discussion is primarily in the area of livestock diseases, these 
same concepts apply broadly and may be useful in the 
phytosanitary area as well.  
Also discussed in the chapter is the international context for 
applying these analytical tools in terms of the World Trade 
Organization's Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the 
SPS Agreement) and the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) 
International Animal Health Code (OIE, 1999). In addition, the 
practicalities of consequence evaluation in regulatory environments 
are discussed as well as potential analysis trade-offs in the face of 
very limited resources. 
Economic analysis is essential to understanding the risks of livestock 
diseases. As discussed in a recent workshop conducted by the US 
Department of Agriculture, "when decision-making is complex, 
economic analysis is often useful for putting probabilistic outcomes, 
                                                 
 The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the position of the US Department of Agriculture. 
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which are the results of risk assessment, in perspective. For 
example, economics can translate the impacts of a disease outbreak 
termed 'serious' by veterinarians into economic losses to the 
livestock sector, which might then be compared to total livestock 
revenues. Thus, economic analysis can provide a basis for 
comparing different sources or types of risks. For example, two 
diseases could be equally likely to occur and take hold in a livestock 
population, but in terms of economic impacts one could be 
devastating and the other relatively benign." (USDA 1998, p.4) 
The SPS Agreement 
Economic evaluation of risk is recognised as necessary part of the 
overall risk assessment process defined by the SPS Agreement. This 
agreement defines risk assessment as "the evaluation of the 
likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or 
disease...according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which 
might be applied, and of the associated potential biological and 
economic consequences…". It is clear from this definition that 
consequence analysis is intended as part of the risk assessment 
process and that it consists of at least two major elements, a 
biological element and an economic element.  
How information about economic consequences of disease 
introduction is to be used in decision-making and establishing 
appropriate levels of protection, however, has been the subject of 
considerable debate. Two provisions of the SPS Agreement give 
some indication of the role of economic analysis in the risk 
assessment process. These provisions are contained in Articles 5.3 
and 5.4. 
Article 5.3 states that "In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or 
health and determining the measure to be applied for achieving the 
appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection from 
such risk, Members shall take into account as relevant economic 
factors:  
 the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the 
event of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease; 
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 the costs of control or eradication in the territory of the importing 
Member; and  
 the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to 
limiting risks." 
Article 5.4 states that "Members should, when determining the 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, take into 
account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects." This 
statement recognises the fact that pest or disease risk mitigation 
measures can have negative economic consequences on the benefits 
that both the importing country and exporting country obtain when 
engaging in trade. It instructs Members to minimise these negative 
consequences. The need to determine whether such consequences 
are minimised by the selected measures implies a need to evaluate 
the consequences that these measures and alternative measures may 
have on the potential benefits of trade.  
At a recent workshop conducted by the US Department of 
Agriculture it was stated that "Formulating guidelines for 
international trade in animals, plants, and animal, plant, and food 
products continues to pose special challenges. Traded animals, 
plants, and animal and plant products can carry with them diseases 
(or disease-causing additives, contaminants, toxins, or organisms) 
and pests that can threaten the health of native plants and animals, 
cultivated crops, livestock populations, or humans. It is therefore 
widely accepted in the international community that, despite the 
benefits of trade, nations must be allowed to provide protections 
against legitimate pest and disease threats. The Uruguay Round's 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(the WTO/SPS Agreement) reflects that consensus. It recognises the 
sovereign rights of nations to provide these protections while, at the 
same time, it delineates a set of principles designed to ensure that 
SPS measures do not pose 'a disguised restriction on international 
trade' and, when SPS measures are imposed, 'to minimise their 
negative effects on trade.' Thus, the SPS Agreement strives for 
balance between the desirable benefits and undesirable risks of 
international trade" (USDA 1998, p.3).  
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In same workshop, however, it was also discussed that the word 
"benefits" does not appear in the SPS Agreement. Considerable 
controversy surrounds the question of how consumer benefits might 
be used in combination with disease consequence information to 
decide on the appropriate level of protection and the application of 
SPS measures (USDA 1998, p.10).   
There appears to be general agreement that the economic 
consequences of entry may be considered in a risk assessment. 
Many also argue, however, that explicit calculation of the benefits of 
trade and comparison of these benefits to the estimated 
consequences to determine the acceptable level of risk would be a 
violation of not only Article 5, but also of Article 2 of the SPS 
Agreement requiring measures to be based on scientific principles. If 
the expected costs of the trade (defined as the product of the 
likelihood of entry and establishment and the associated biological 
and economic consequences) were equivalent in two separate 
instances, but the welfare benefits were unequal, then from this 
perspective it would be economics, and not science, that determined 
the SPS measure chosen. 
Roberts (1998) uses an example to illustrate the complex debate over 
using trade benefits in conjunction with economic consequences as 
part of determining what an acceptable level of risk might be. She 
illustrates a hypothetical case where the expected costs of an animal 
disease introduction are identical for two different decisions. One 
decision is regarding a poultry import, the other a beef import.  
In the example, based on objective analysis, there is a greater benefit 
to the beef importation than to the poultry importation. In fact, the 
difference in benefit is such that the analysis shows that for the beef 
importation the benefits exceed the risk and consequence-based 
costs, but for the poultry importation they do not. From an objective 
economic efficiency standpoint, a sensible decision by regulators 
may be to allow the beef importation, but disallow the poultry 
importation. 
Both decisions in the example involve legitimate disease hazards 
with substantive probabilities of disease-based production and 
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economic losses. If the importing country is publicly and 
transparently presenting the basis for its decision, there is no issue 
regarding whether any action taken on either decision involves a 
disguised protectionist barrier. In each case there is a real and 
recognised disease threat present. The question that remains is, 
what is the importing country permitted to do under its SPS 
obligations in making its own decisions regarding how much risk it 
is willing to accept in each case? 
One viewpoint is that the country whose import request for poultry 
is turned down, given that the beef import is accepted, would be 
justified in arguing that this decision is evidence of arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination that is prohibited by SPS Article 2. This 
is despite the objective analysis and rationale presented for the 
decision. 
An opposing viewpoint is based on the SPS Agreement's 
commitment to the principle of sovereignty. From this perspective, 
the importing country is justified in its decision that takes into 
account the benefits derived from the trade. It is justified provided 
that the benefits information was used in a scientifically sound and 
transparent manner and that the same approach to decision-making 
is applied consistently to all SPS-related decisions; including those 
decisions relating to domestic disease and pest control. From this 
viewpoint, the importing country would be in compliance with 
Article 2. 
A third viewpoint, positioned somewhat between the other two, is 
that benefits information can be used to help guide the 
establishment of a country's overall acceptable level of protection 
(ALOP). From this perspective, a country sets a single ALOP for all 
SPS decision-making strictly in terms of the expected costs of the 
trade (defined again as the product of the likelihood of entry and 
establishment and the associated biological and economic 
consequences). In other words, a threshold (representing the ALOP) 
is set and defined as a level of expected costs that would be accepted 
for all SPS-related decisions. The benefits of trade could also be 
estimated, but only for the purpose of informing policymakers 
about the efficiency, or lack thereof, of the existing ALOP threshold. 
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Policymakers might then take this benefits information into account 
for the purpose of considering periodic revisions to the overall 
ALOP.  
This latter approach avoids the discriminatory problems suggested 
in Roberts' example above because the individual decisions do not 
depend on the benefits associated with the different commodities. 
Instead, since each individual decision from the beef and poultry 
trade example is evaluated against the current overall ALOP, and 
since the expected costs for each were identical, if the beef trade was 
viewed as acceptable, then the poultry trade would be accepted as 
well. Or, if the expected costs of the poultry trade were viewed as 
being unacceptably high, then the beef trade would be refused as 
well. Over time, by accumulating information about benefits gained 
and foregone over many individual decisions, policymakers might 
publicly and transparently adjust the overall ALOP on a periodic 
basis to attempt to maximise the gains and minimise the foregone 
opportunities.  
From an economic efficiency standpoint, this latter approach seems 
likely to present a second-best solution when compared to the 
alternative of basing each individual decision on a balancing of the 
benefits of trade versus the expected costs. However, policymakers 
may deem this efficiency loss to be an acceptable cost of complying 
with SPS non-discrimination requirements. Obviously, variations on 
all of the above themes are possible. 
The question ultimately comes down to, what information can an 
importing country take into consideration, and in what manner, in 
determining its appropriate level of protection or acceptable level of 
risk? Clearly, it would be inappropriate to set SPS restrictions in 
place based on benefits information when there is no legitimate pest 
or disease risk (no pest or disease-based consequences). The less 
obvious issue is if or how benefits information can be combined 
with pest or disease-based consequence information in deciding on 
the appropriate level of protection once a legitimate risk of disease 
introduction has been established. None of the formal challenges 
handled through the SPS dispute resolution process has yet 
addressed this question, so the answer remains elusive. 
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Recognition of the need to balance the benefits of trade against risk-
based disease consequences and costs is given in the International 
Animal Health Code published by the Office International des 
Epizooties (OIE 1999). OIE is the animal health standard setting 
body recognised in the SPS Agreement Article 3.4. In describing the 
accepted principles of risk management, the OIE states "the objective 
is to manage risk appropriately to ensure that a balance is achieved 
between a country's desire to minimise the likelihood or frequency 
of disease incursions and their consequences and its desire to import 
goods and fulfil it obligations under international trade 
agreements." While the word "benefits" is not explicitly used by OIE, 
the concept of balancing risk and disease-based consequences 
against trade benefits in decision-making is evident in the Code. 
The International Animal Health Code 
The overall framework for risk analysis described in the Code 
consists of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management, 
and risk communication. The definitions for these four components 
are as follows (OIE 1999): 
Hazard identification – "identifying the pathogenic agents which 
could potentially produce adverse consequences associated 
with the importation of a commodity." 
Risk assessment - the Code describes four interrelated steps for 
risk assessment: release assessment, exposure assessment, 
consequence assessment, and risk estimation.  
(a) release assessment – describes the biological pathways 
necessary for an importation activity to introduce pathogenic 
agents into a particular environment, and estimates the 
probability of that complete process occurring. 
(b) exposure assessment – describes the biological 
pathways necessary for exposure of animals and humans in 
the importing country to the pathogenic agents and estimates 
the probability of exposure. 
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(c) consequence assessment – describes the relationship 
between specified exposures to a biological agent and the 
consequences of those exposures. Examples of consequences 
include: (1) animal infection, disease, and production losses, 
(2) public health consequences, (3) surveillance and control 
costs, (4) compensation costs, (5) potential trade losses, (6) 
adverse consequences to the environment. 
(d) risk estimation – integrates the results from the release, 
exposure, and consequence assessments to produce overall 
measures of risk. 
Risk management – the process of deciding upon and 
implementing measures to achieve the Member Country's 
appropriate level of protection, whilst at the same time 
ensuring that negative effects on trade are minimised. The 
objective is to manage risk appropriately to ensure that a 
balance is achieved between a country's desire to minimise the 
likelihood or frequency of disease incursions and their 
consequences and its desire to import goods and fulfill its 
obligations under international trade agreements. Risk 
management includes an evaluation of the degree to which a 
[measure] reduces the likelihood and/or magnitude of 
adverse biological and economic consequences. 
Risk communication - the process by which information and 
opinions regarding hazards and risks are gathered from 
potentially interested and affected parties and by which the 
results of the risk assessment and proposed risk management 
measures are communicated to decision makers and interested 
parties in the importing and exporting countries. 
The evaluation of consequences is therefore specified as a part of 
risk assessment in both the SPS Agreement and in the OIE Code. In 
both cases, this evaluation is to consist of both biological and 
economic components. Leaving aside the issue of how the economic 
consequence information is to be used in decision-making, let us 
turn now to the issue of how these consequences can be evaluated. 
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Biological/epidemiological consequences 
The evaluation of economic consequences of a pest or disease 
introduction cannot take place in isolation. It must be conducted in 
concert with a biological/epidemiological evaluation of the 
potential spread and impacts of the pest or disease. The tools for 
conducting these different types of analysis must therefore be 
compatible with one another so that they can be linked in some 
logical way. 
There are a variety of different analytical tools available that can 
assist with the biological and epidemiological aspects of 
consequence modelling. A few that are commonly used include 
state-transition models, Markov Chains, Reed-Frost models, SEIR 
models (Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, and Removed), and 
various spatial analysis tools (Haining 1998; Martin et al. 1987; Olsen 
and Schaffer 1990; Miller et al. 1994; Miller et al. 1997).  
Ultimately, the objectives of using these tools include determining 
the number, type, and temporal distribution of herds, flocks, fields, 
groves, etc. of animals, birds, plants, trees, etc. that may be affected 
if the pest or disease agent were introduced into the importing 
region. This information, combined with information about the 
biological and physiological effect of the pest or disease agent on the 
individual susceptible host (for example the individual animal or 
plant), provides the linkage to the economic evaluation of 
consequences. 
It is important to keep in mind that, in general, these tools would be 
used to evaluate pest or disease events that have not actually 
occurred. The purpose of the evaluation is usually to support 
decision-making about whether or not to take a certain pest or 
disease risk by importing a commodity under certain conditions. It 
may therefore be necessary to use epidemiological investigations 
into past events in the same or similar circumstances to generate 
estimates of various model values for a variety of possible scenarios. 
There is, however, always a great deal of uncertainty and variability 
about the way that a pest or disease agent may interact with 
susceptible hosts and their environment. This uncertainty and 
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variability must be addressed and then also reflected in the resulting 
economic values. Dealing with this uncertainty and variability is an 
extremely challenging aspect of estimating potential biological and 
epidemiological consequences before they occur. 
Economic consequences 
Armed with information obtained about the potential biological and 
epidemiological consequences of a pest or disease agent, the 
evaluation of economic consequences may begin. The evaluation of 
economic consequences must take place at two broad levels. These 
are the microeconomic level and the macroeconomic level. 
The microeconomic level of evaluation takes into account the firm-
level effects or effects on individual herds, flocks, etc. This can be 
done using an economic tool known as partial budgeting. Partial 
budgeting looks at only those aspects of a firm's budget that are 
affected by the change being analysed. In this part of a disease 
consequence analysis, for example, the biological and physiological 
effects that a disease has on individual animals, as well as the costs 
of veterinary care, vaccines, etc. are translated into a monetary 
impact to the firm. Because there are many different types of firms 
that may be affected by the pest or disease agent, partial budget 
impacts would have to be estimated for each different type. The 
partial budget impacts on firms that are not necessarily directly 
affected by the disease but that are indirectly affected by 
quarantines or other control measures should also be included. 
In a broader context, although not microeconomic in nature, the 
budget impacts to the government of control, eradication, 
monitoring and surveillance that result from the introduction of 
exotic pests and diseases must also be assessed. Although a separate 
process, the estimation of government budget impacts at the 
macroeconomic level is similar from a procedural standpoint to the 
estimation of partial budget impacts at the microeconomic level.  
The combination of the information about the biological and 
epidemiological consequences of pest or disease spread and the 
information about partial budget impacts provide a basis to begin a 
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macroeconomic analysis. The macroeconomic analysis evaluates the 
industry-level or regional-level impacts of the pest or disease 
introduction. The biological/epidemiological and partial budget 
information can be linked to the macroeconomic evaluation by 
using it to estimate the magnitude and temporal distribution of 
shifts in the industry's supply function during and in the wake of 
the pest or disease epidemic.  
Impacts on consumers' demand functions are possible as well. In the 
event that the pest or disease introduction has a public health 
impact through the consumption of a particular commodity, 
consumers are likely to avoid this commodity and consume one or 
more unaffected substitute commodities. Even if there is no real 
public health impact, the simple perception of such an impact could 
lead to similar consumption behaviour. 
The discussion below will focus primarily on the evaluation of shifts 
in the industry's supply function that directly result from a pest or 
disease incursion. These concepts, however, can also be applied to 
shifts in consumers' demand functions.  
Once the magnitude and temporal distribution of the pest or disease 
induced industry supply shifts have been estimated, they can be 
used as input in determining the effects of the incursion on 
economic welfare. The economic welfare analysis specifically 
evaluates how: (i) market prices and quantities adjust as the pest or 
disease spreads through the domesticated livestock population, and 
(ii) consumers and producers are affected by the adjustments in 
market prices and quantities.  
These effects on consumers and producers are measured in terms of 
changes in the difference between what consumers are willing to 
pay and what they actually pay for products (a measure of utility 
known as consumer surplus), and in producers' revenue beyond 
their variable costs (a measure of returns to fixed investment known 
as producer surplus) (Houck 1986; Just et al. 1982). These welfare 
effects can be modelled over time to capture the effects as the pest or 
disease spreads. 
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Economic welfare analysis is a standard tool that has been used 
widely for public policy analysis as well as the analysis of the 
impacts of various animal and plant health programs (Ebel et al. 
1992; Forsythe and Corso 1994; Forsythe and Evangelou 1993; Haley 
and Dixit 1988; Lichtenberg et al. 1988; Miller et al. 1994; Ott et al. 
1995; Roberts et al. 1997).  
Single market impacts 
The most straightforward application of economic welfare analysis 
is to examine only those economic impacts in the single market that 
is directly affected by the disease. Even if the disease in question 
affects multiple species, these impacts could be measured separately 
and independently of one another. This approach would not, of 
course, account for any interaction effects between markets that are 
simultaneously affected by a multi-species disease such as foot-and-
mouth disease. This type of modeling is known as partial price 
equilibrium modeling. 
Partial price equilibrium means that the model results are based on 
maintaining commodity price equilibrium in a limited portion of an 
overall economy (Houck 1986). Markets not explicitly included in 
the model are assumed to have a negligible influence on the model 
results.  
Multi-market impacts within the agricultural sector 
Multi-market applications of economic welfare analysis can evaluate 
the effects of changes in closely related markets that result from a 
pest or disease-induced change in any one market. 
Cross-commodity effects, for example, are effects on the demand or 
supply of a commodity that result from price changes in 
commodities that are substitutes or complements (Hirshleifer 1984). 
These effects can occur on both the demand and supply sides of a 
market.  
For example, beef is a potential substitute for pork both on the 
demand and supply sides. If the price of beef goes up, consumers 
may demand more pork because it has become relatively cheaper, 
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and vice-versa. Likewise, if the price of beef goes up, some 
producers may shift resources away from pork production into beef 
production, and vice-versa. Because of the fixed nature of 
investment in production activity these types of shifts may only 
happen in response to long-term events, such as if a pest or disease 
becomes endemic in a new region. Hamburgers and buns are a 
classic example of a complementary relationship on the demand 
side. The strength and nature (substitute or complement) of the 
relationship between such markets can be represented and captured 
in the analysis. 
Multi-market analyses can also capture vertical market effects, such 
as changes in the derived demand for inputs into commodity 
production (Haley and Dixit 1988).  For example, a change in the 
price of beef will affect the demand for the corn that serves as an 
input into beef production. Clearly, a major disease event that 
impacts the beef market will also be felt in the corn market. The 
magnitude of such impacts can be captured in a multi-market 
model. 
Macroeconomic consequences in non-agricultural sectors 
The economic consequences of major pest or disease events are not 
limited to the agricultural sector. The impacts in other sectors of the 
economy resulting from major events in the agricultural sector can 
be evaluated using tools such as input-output accounting and 
modelling. 
Input-output accounting describes commodity flows from 
producers to intermediate and final consumers. Total industry 
purchases of commodities, services, labour, land, capital, 
management, and imports are equal to the value of the commodities 
produced, some of which are exported. 
Purchases of goods and services by consumers (final demand) are 
the stimulus for the model. Industries producing goods and services 
for final demand create these goods and services by purchasing 
inputs (goods and services) from other producers. These other 
producers, in turn, purchase goods and services from yet another set 
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of producers. This intermediate buying of goods and services 
(indirect purchases) in a regional economy continues until leakages 
(out-of-region purchases) stop the cycle. The larger the region, the 
smaller will be the leakages. 
These indirect and induced (household spending) purchases can be 
mathematically derived and are the summation of the round-by-
round purchases. The resulting totals, when normalised, yield 
multipliers that describe the change in output (or employment, 
wages and salaries, value added, etc.) for each unit change in final 
demand. 
An economic impact analysis to the different economic sectors can 
then be conducted by specifying a series of expenditures and 
applying them to the region's multipliers. In the case of a disease 
impact analysis these expenditures might be derived from a single 
market or multi-market analysis within the agricultural sector. The 
multipliers can then be used to estimate effects through the 
remainder of the economy. 
The basis of a multiplier rests upon the difference between the initial 
effect of a change in final demand and the total effect of that change. 
Total effects can be calculated either as direct (direct production 
function purchases) and indirect (inter-industry production function 
purchases) effects, or as direct, indirect and induced (plus 
household spending) effects. Direct effects are production changes 
associated with the direct purchases or final demand changes. 
Indirect effects are production changes in backward-linked 
(supplier) industries caused by the changing input needs of directly 
affected industries (for example, additional purchases to produce 
additional output). Induced effects are the changes in household 
spending caused by changes in household income generated from 
the direct and indirect effects (USDA 2000). 
Level of detail in analyses 
Clearly, the evaluation of biological and economic consequences of 
pest and disease incursions can become extremely complex. This 
evaluation, however, can also vary greatly in terms of the amount of 
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detail incorporated into any given analysis. The choice of the level of 
detail to incorporate is frequently dictated by available resources, 
time and data. This choice is particularly important in regulatory 
environments where there may be a great number of decisions to be 
made about a great many pests and diseases. The difficulty of the 
choice is compounded by the potential severity of the consequences 
of many of these pests and diseases. 
Models of lesser detail, given that they are appropriately specified, 
may be viewed as approximations to models of greater detail. The 
level of detail should also be appropriate to the specific question 
addressed by the analysis and based on some initial judgement 
about the likely magnitude of the impacts that a decision based on 
this analysis may have. 
The guidance regarding risk analysis provided in the OIE Animal 
Health Code is very general and recognises that "No single method 
of import risk analysis has proven applicable in all situations, and 
different methods may be appropriate in different circumstances" 
(Article 1.4.1.1). This guidance also applies to the assessment of 
biological and economic consequences. Quantitative risk assessment 
is defined in the Code as simply "An assessment where the outputs 
of the risk assessment are expressed numerically" (Article 1.4.1.3). A 
risk analysis or assessment may also follow a qualitative approach 
which "does not require mathematical modelling skills to carry out 
and so is often the type of assessment used for routine decision-
making" (Article 1.4.1.1). As such, many analyses that are referred to 
as qualitative are in fact purely narrative descriptions of potential 
risks and consequences.  
Quantitative analyses, even at a "broad-brush" level, can serve as 
valuable supplements to qualitative or descriptive analyses. At a 
minimum, the simple act of assembling a model that describes the 
various interrelationships of the problem at hand may lend valuable 
insight into the impacts of potential alternative decisions. Even if the 
model is not solved numerically, using mathematical language to 
describe the problem may lend greater rigour to the problem 
description. The more rigour with which the problem can be 
described, the less likely that some critical piece of information will 
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be inadvertently overlooked, or that subjective opinions will 
influence the outcome or resulting policy decisions.  
In effect, there is a continuum of analysis "levels" that can be applied 
to any problem. The more complex the analysis the more it will 
likely cost in terms of time and resources and in diversion of these 
resources from other problems that may be pressing (opportunity 
cost). "Rational decision-makers recognise that it is costly to obtain 
information and make complex calculations. Although additional 
information and techniques that improve one's decision-making 
capabilities are valuable, often this potential benefit is less than its 
expected cost. Therefore, the sensible consumer [of analyses] will 
conserve on these limited resources, just as he [or she] conserves on 
other scarce resources" (Gwartney et al. 1982, p.9).  
It does not necessarily follow, therefore, that the most complex or 
sophisticated application of an available analytical tool is the best 
choice in every situation. In some cases, however, a more 
sophisticated application may result in resource savings in addition 
to greater quality in the resulting decision. It is therefore useful to 
have a variety of analytical techniques available, of varying degrees 
of complexity and sophistication, so that the most efficient use of 
available analytical resources can be made for the problem at hand. 
In general, the simpler the model or the approach may be, the more 
restrictive it is likely to be. Even a highly restrictive model can 
provide useful insights into decision-making, as long as the decision 
maker is aware of the restrictions and their implications. By 
definition, a model is a simplified representation of reality that will 
always be subject to restrictions. The choice of how far to move 
along the analysis level continuum is a matter of balancing the 
benefits derived from adding additional complexity that relieves 
restrictive assumptions, versus the cost in terms of depleting scarce 
resources and obtaining additional information. 
 
 
Chapter 14  Evaluating economic consequences of livestock diseases  281 
References 
Ebel, E.D., R.H. Hornbaker, and C.H. Nelson (1992) 'Welfare effects 
of the national pseudorabies eradication program', American Jounral 
of Agricultural Economics 74(3): 638-45, August.  
Forsythe, K.W., and B.A. Corso (1994) 'Welfare effects of the national 
pseudorabies eradication program: comment', American Jounral of 
Agricultural Economics 76(4): 968-71, November.  
Forsythe, K.W., and P. Evangelou (1993) 'Costs and benefits of 
irradiation and other selected quarantine treatments for fruit and 
vegetable imports to the United States of America', in Cost-benefit 
aspects of food irradiation processing, proceedings of an international 
symposium on cost/benefit aspects of food irradiation processing, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, and the World Health 
Organization, Aix-en-Provence, France, 1-5 March. 
Gwartney, J.D., R. Stroup, and J.R. Clark (1982) Essentials of 
economics, New York: Academic Press. 
Haining, R. (1998) 'Spatial statistics and the analysis of health data', 
in GIS and health, edited by A. Gatrell and M. Loytonen, London: 
Taylor and Francis. 
Haley, S.L. and P.M. Dixit (1988) 'Economic welfare analysis: an 
application to the SWOPSIM modeling framework', US Department 
of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Staff Report No. 
AGES871215, August. 
Hirshleifer, J. (1984) Price theory and applications, 3rd ed. New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Houck, J.P. (1986) Elements of agricultural trade policies, New York: 
MacMillan.  
Just, R.E., D.L. Hueth, and A. Schmitz (1982) Applied welfare 
economics and public policy, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
282  Part III  Adding more economics to risk analysis 
Lichtenberg, E., D. D. Parker, and D. Zilberman (1988) 'Marginal 
analysis of welfare cost of environmental policies: the case of 
pesticide regulation,' American Journal of Agricultural Economics 70(4): 
867-74, November.  
Martin, S.W., A.H. Meek, and P. Willeberg (1987) Veterinary 
epidemiology: principles and methods, Ames, IA: Iowa State University 
Press. 
Miller, G.Y., D.L. Forster and J. Tsai (1994) 'A benefit-cost analysis of 
the national pseudorabies program.' Final Report from Contract No. 
53-6395-2-114, RF Project No. 760341/726861, USDA Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service, Hyattsville, MD, and the Ohio State 
University, Department of Veterinary Preventive Medicine and 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, June. 
Miller, W.M. (1999) 'A State-transition model of epidemic foot-and-
mouth disease', in A study of the Potential Economic Impact of Foot-and-
mouth disease in the United States edited by E.H. McCauley, J.C. New, 
N.A. Aulaqi, W.B. Sundquist, and W.M. Miller, TB-1597, St. Paul: 
University of Minnesota. 
OIE (1999) 'International Animal Health Code - 1999 edition', 
Chapter 1.4.2, Paris: Office International des Epizooties. 
Olsen, L.F., and W.M. Schaffer (1990) 'Chaos versus noisy 
periodicity: alternative hypotheses for childhood epidemics', Science 
pp. 499-504, 3 August. 
Ott, S.L., A.H. Seitzinger, and W.D. Hueston (1995) 'Measuring the 
national economic benefits of reducing livestock mortality', 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 24: 203-211. 
Roberts, D. (1998) 'The WTO SPS Agreement: overview and 
implications for animal health and animal product decision making', 
paper presented at the USDA Workshop on the Use of Economic 
Analysis in Evaluating Animal and Animal Product Import 
Requests, Riverdale, MD, 24-25 March. 
Chapter 14  Evaluating economic consequences of livestock diseases  283 
Roberts, D., T. Josling and D. Orden (1997) Technical barriers to trade: 
an analytic framework, Agricultural Economic Report, USDA 
Economic Research Service, November. 
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (2000) Potential 
Impact of the Contagious Equine Metritis Organism on the equid industry 
in the US, Washington, DC, June. 
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Office of Risk 
Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Economic Research 
Service (1998) The use of economic analysis in evaluating animal and 
animal product import requests: a report on a USDA Workshop, paper 
presented at the USDA Workshop on the Use of Economic Analysis 
in Evaluating Animal and Animal Product Import Requests, 





Specific health and environmental 




Measuring the effect of food safety standards 
on African exports to Europe 
TSUNEHIRO OTSUKI, JOHN S. WILSON AND MIRVAT 
SEWADEH 
Many of the most important food safety issues in international trade 
today impact on developing countries. These countries, especially 
those in Sub-Saharan Africa, seek to expand access to international 
agricultural markets and integrate more fully into the global trade 
system. Questions of how to balance risk, expanding trade in 
agricultural products, and health concerns are at the forefront of 
trade debate. This chapter provides a case study of trade between 
Africa and Europe in agricultural products, from African exporters 
perspective. It presents results from empirical data and analysis on 
the trade effect of harmonisation of food safety standards within the 
European Union which we offer as a contribution to trade policy 
discourse on SPS standards and the multilateral trading system. 
Concern about the health risks of food and appropriate sanitary 
standards has been increasing in industrialised countries over the 
past decade (Pinstrup-Andersen 2000). Debate over food safety has 
been especially prominent in Europe (Nielsen and Anderson 2000). 
The use of import bans and regulatory intervention by the European 
                                                 
  This chapter and the empirical results presented draw on Otsuki, Wilson 
and Sewadeh (2001). The authors would like to thank Keith E. Maskus and Kyd 
Brenner and participants in a World Bank seminar on 11 October 2000 for 
helpful comments. Financial support for this work from the UK Department for 
International Development is gratefully acknowledged. 
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Commission is increasingly justified, in part, under the 
'precautionary principle' which seeks to mitigate against risk even 
under conditions in which science has not established direct cause 
and effect relationships. The European Commission's approach has 
been challenged in trade policy talks, therefore, on the basis that 
import restrictions have been employed without sufficient support 
from internationally recognised science.  
The cost of regulatory intervention by any nation with the intent to 
protect human health can be significant. This is especially true for 
developing countries attempting to penetrate developed country 
markets. In low- and middle- income countries, the share of food 
exports in total trade remained high at approximately 13  per cent in 
the 1990s (World Bank calculations, based on the GTAP database). If 
increasingly restrictive sanitary and phytosanitary measures limit 
market access, these countries may incur significant export losses. 
Many questions remain, however, including how to approach the 
trade-off between appropriate levels of risk to human health and 
costs of differing levels of protection as determined by technical 
barriers to international trade. In addition, we know little about the 
specific impact of harmonised standards shared across national 
boundaries, in contrast to divergent national standards. 
Measuring the trade effect of sanitary and phytosanitary standards 
is particularly complex (Orden and Roberts 1997). Notwithstanding 
these complexities, it is clear the costs of regulatory intervention can 
be high relative to non-intervention. Food exports subject to 
regulatory standards may involve rejection of imports following 
border inspection. Between June 1996 and June 1997, the US 
rejection level of food additives imports from developing countries 
averaged 3 per cent of total food imports (Henson et al. 2000).  The 
loss arising from rejection is not limited to the value of the product. 
It also includes transportation and other export costs, all of which 
are incurred by the exporter. Compliance requirements on exporters 
impose non-trivial costs on developing countries, such as the cost of 
upgrading production systems, processing and storage equipment, 
and quality control stations. 
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How regulatory costs for exporters compare with possible gains in 
higher sanitary and phytosanitary levels in importing countries is a 
key part of trade policy debate. Information on how standards affect 
trade flows when an international standard is in place and shared 
bilaterally, as opposed to conditions in which differing national 
standards are imposed on exporters, is increasingly valuable. As 
recently reviewed in Maskus and Wilson (2001a) the empirical 
evidence and information on the trade impact of standards is 
extremely limited. The importance of providing estimates of how 
standards impact trade flows is clear. 
In this chapter we examine a European Commission proposal to 
harmonise aflatoxin standards, as announced in 1998 and scheduled 
for enforcement in 2000. This proposal raised a number of disputes 
between the European Union (EU) and trade partners in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The case serves as a good example of 
the trade-off between acceptable levels of risk, how harmonised 
standards affect trade, and contrasting perspectives of developed 
and developing countries in international trade disputes. This 
chapter provides empirical evidence to inform discussions of these 
issues through a case study of aflatoxins standards and trade in food 
between Africa and Europe.  
Based on the Food and Agriculture Organization's cross-country 
survey on food safety standards, we develop an econometric 
method to statistically measure the trade flow effect of standards 
imposed through EU domestic regulation. The results are then used 
to calculate potential export revenue gains and losses from different 
standards. We examine trade in cereals, fruits, nuts and vegetables 
between 15 member states of the European Union and 9 African 
countries in the ten years prior to 1998. Instead of identifying cost 
elements to comply with the standards, we examine changes in 
trade flows, as they are a direct consequence of differing approaches 
to regulation which intersect debate on how best to address these 
issues within the WTO rules-based trading system. 
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How are aflatoxins regulated in international markets? 
Aflatoxins are a group of toxic compounds which contaminate 
certain foods and can result in acute liver carcinogens in the human 
body. They were discovered in 1960 following the deaths of 100,000 
turkeys in the United Kingdom and high incidences of liver disease 
in ducklings in Kenya and hatchery trout in the United States (US 
Food and Drug Administration 2000). The major aflatoxins of 
concern are designated B1, B2, G1, and G2, and these toxins are 
usually found together in foods (UNDP-FAO, 2000). Aflatoxin B1 is 
usually predominant and the most toxic of the four categories and 
has been identified in corn and corn products, groundnuts and 
groundnuts products, cottonseed, milk, and tree nuts such as Brazil 
nuts, pecans, pistachio nuts, and walnuts (FAO-WHO, 1997). 
Aflatoxins have acute and chronic toxicity in animals. Their toxicity 
in humans, however, has been encountered only rarely. In 
developed countries, aflatoxin contamination rarely occurs at levels 
that cause acute carcinogens in humans, therefore studies on human 
toxicity from ingestion of aflatoxins have focused on their 
carcinogenic potential. A number of studies have revealed an 
association between liver cancer incidence and the aflatoxin content 
of the diet. These studies have not established a cause and effect 
relationship, but do suggest an association. A 1997 report by the 
joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) 
concluded that "aflatoxins should be treated as carcinogenic food 
contaminants, the intake of which should be reduced to levels as 
low as reasonably achievable" (FAO-WHO 1997). JECFA analysed 
the potential human health impact of aflatoxin for two hypothetical 
levels (10 parts per billion (ppb) and 20 ppb). It estimated that 
reducing the standard from 20 ppb to 10 ppb in countries where the 
percentage of carriers of hepatitis B1 is around one per cent (e.g. 
members of the EU) would result in a drop in the population risk of 
approximately 2 cancer deaths a year per billion people.  
In 1997 the European Commission proposed a uniform standard for 
total aflatoxins setting the acceptable level of the contaminant in 
certain foodstuffs. For example, it set a standard at 10 ppb in 
groundnuts subjected to further processing and at 4 ppb in 
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groundnuts intended for direct human consumption (this category 
includes cereals, edible nuts, dried and preserved fruits). It also 
established a level for aflatoxin M1 which is usually present in milk 
at 0.05 ppb. 
The Commission's proposal on aflatoxins raised serious concerns 
among exporters of food products subject to the proposed directive 
(Henson et. al 2000). Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, India, Argentina, Canada, 
Mexico, Uruguay, Australia and Pakistan, among others, requested 
that Europe provide the risk assessments on which it had based its 
proposed standard. In comments submitted to the WTO, a 
representative of Gambia maintained that the proposed standard 
would "effectively restrict entry of Gambia's groundnuts and 
essentially the groundnuts from producer countries in the 
developing world to the European Union" (WTO, February 1998). A 
number of developing countries argued that the measure 
constituted an unjustifiable trade barrier and a violation of the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (WTO, 
G/SPS/R/12, 1998b; WTO, G/SPS/R/14, March 1999).  
EU trading partners raised objectives to the new directive and the 
Commission relaxed the proposed aflatoxin levels in cereals, dried 
fruits and nuts (see Table 15.1). A July 1998 Commission directive, 
established the total aflatoxin standard in groundnuts subject to 
further processing at 15 ppb (8 ppb for B1), and in other nuts and 
dried fruit subject to further processing at 10 ppb (5 ppb for B1). It 
established a more stringent standards on cereals and dried fruits, 
and nuts intended for direct human consumption at 4 ppb (2 ppb for 
B1). According to the directive, EU members are to implement the 
necessary laws to comply with the new standards before 1 January 
2001. For 8 EU members (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden) the new directives 
meant that they must reduce the acceptable aflatoxin levels in their 
imports of groundnuts by more than 50 per cent. 
While the European Commission established a 4 ppb levels for total 
aflatoxins in cereals, dried fruits, and nuts intended for direct 
human consumption, it set the standard for aflatoxin B1 at 2 ppb for 
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food products intended for direct human consumption (See Table 
15.1).  
These levels are significantly more stringent than those set by 
CODEX, which does establish a standard of B1 but assumes that 50-
70 per cent - or around 7.5-10.5 ppb of the total aflatoxin level of 15 
ppb - is usually accounted for by aflatoxin B1 contamination. 
Therefore, the international standard suggests that products which 
contain levels of aflatoxin B1 as high as 10 ppb would be acceptable 
for all types of food products. This is true if the total level of 
aflatoxins does not exceed 15 ppb. Similarly, U.S regulations, which 
set a 20 ppb standard for all types of groundnuts, would effectively 
allow B1 contamination levels that are as high as 14 ppb. Moreover, 
the FAO has recommended that testing a single 20 kg sample for 
aflatoxin content would yield results that are reliable enough to 
eliminate the risk for the consumer and that stricter requirements 
would not bring more significant safety measures (Saquib 2000). 
Dependence of African food exports on the EU market 
and compliance costs of aflatoxin standards 
Western Europe and other high-income countries are the major 
export destinations for developing countries. According to our 
calculation based on GTAP 1995 data, Western Europe is the major 
destination for exports from the Middle East and Africa, with a 
share of 57 per cent compared to only 16 per cent of trade between 
countries in these regions. Africa and the Middle-East are likely, 
therefore, to be strongly affected by regulatory reforms in European 
import markets due to their high dependency on these markets. 
Developing countries are vulnerable to regulatory changes in 
developed countries also due to a relative scarcity of public 
resources to finance compliance with new and more restrictive 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards. While middle-income 
developing countries have shifted their exports to processed food, 
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Table 15.1: The European Commission's proposal of maximum 
allowable aflatoxins levels 
  Aflatoxins:  
maximum admissible levels(1) 
(ug/kg) 
 Products B1 B1 + B2 + G1 + G2 M1 
2.1.1 Groundnuts, nuts and dried fruit    
2.1.1.1 Groundnuts, nuts and dried fruit 
and processed products thereof, 
intended for direct human 
consumption or as an ingredient in 
foodstuffs 
2(4) 4(4) - 
2.1.1.2 Groundnuts to be subjected to 
sorting, or other physical treatment, 
before human consumption or use as 
an ingredient in foodstuffs 
8(4) 15(4) - 
2.1.1.3 Nuts and dried fruit to be subjected 
to sorting, or other physical 
treatment, before human 
consumption or use as an ingredient 
in foodstuffs 
5(4)(5) 10(4)(5) - 
2.1.2 Cereals (including buckwheat, 
Fagopyrum sp.) 
   
2.1.2.1 Cereals (including buckwheat, 
Fagopyrum sp.) and processed 
products thereof intended for direct 
human consumption or as an 
ingredient in foodstuffs 
2 4 - 
2.1.2.2 Cereals (including buckwheat, 
Fagopyrum sp. To be subjected to 
sorting, or other physical treatment, 
before human consumption or use as 
an ingredient in foodstuffs 
- - - 
2.1.3 Milk (raw milk, milk for the 
manufacture of milk-based products 
and heat-treated milk as defined by 
Council Directive 92/46/EEC of 16 
June 1992 laying down the health 
rules for the production and placing 
on the market of raw milk, heat-
treated milk and milk-based 
products 
- - 0.05 
Source: European Commission Regulation No. 1525/98, Brussels 
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 countries in the lowest-income regions such as Africa still largely 
depend on raw food exports (Ng and Yeats 1999). Furthermore, as 
Finger and Schuler (1999) note, the cost of compliance with WTO 
obligations related to the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards in the least-developed countries can exceed 
total government budgets for all expenditures and Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the least-developed region in the world. Thirty-eight out of 
50 SSA countries fell into the lowest income group of the World 
Bank's classification in 1999. Fast technological changes have 
enhanced inspection capacities in developed countries and allowed 
them to adopt progressively more restrictive sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards. Securing sales into these major markets is 
expected to become more challenging and costly over time for poor 
countries.  
Empirical analysis 
There is a limited number of empirical studies that have estimated 
the trade effect of technical standards. Quantifying the effect of 
standards entails complexity since standards affect market demand 
and supply in various ways. Unlike an analysis of the trade effect of 
tariff barriers, an analysis of standards requires quantifying the 
stringency of standards. Because of this difficulty, the majority of 
non-tariff-barrier (NTB) studies have attempted to measure tariff 
equivalent of these barriers (Calvin and Krissoff 1998; Paarlberg and 
Lee 1998). Since the tariff equivalent in these studies is a derived 
measure of stringency of NTBs, a hypothesis on whether NTBs will 
affect trade flow or a country's welfare cannot be tested. An 
independent measure of stringency of NTBs is necessary for an 
econometric examination of this kind of hypotheses. 
Econometric approaches have been used to estimate the effect of 
standards on trade flows (Swann et al. 1996; Moenious 1999). These 
two studies employ counts of binding standards in a given industry 
as a measure of stringency of standards. While a direct impact of 
standards on trade flow can be estimated, the application of results 
to policy making is limited. In an econometric analysis of the impact 
of standards, Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001) employ a direct 
measure of the severity of food safety standards expressed in 
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maximum allowable contamination. The severity of standards was 
thereby comparable across countries and results had clear 
implications for policy. 
We use an econometric approach to determine the effect of 
European aflatoxin standards on African exports. The framework in 
our empirical study follows the gravity-equation model that was 
developed in Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001). A gravity-
equation model is a widely used method to explain trade patterns 
between countries using each country's measures of 'mass' and 
geographical distance between countries. In most countries, 
aflatoxins standards on foods, for example, are specified for both 
aflatoxin B1 alone, and total level of aflatoxins B1, B2, G1 and G2 
(FAO, 1995). In practice, for the  passing the B1 standard is more 
difficult than passing the standard for the total level of aflatoxins. 
This is the standard that is more likely to affect trade flows. 
Our specification of the gravity equation is as follows: 
(1) ln(Mijk) = b0+b0k+b1kln(PCGNPi) + b2kln(PCGNPj) + b3kln(DISTij) 
+ b4kYEAR + b5kCOLij + b6kln(STik)+
k
ij  
where Mijk denotes value of trade from African country j to EU 
Member Country i. It is obtained from trade data of the United 
Nations Statistical Office, which include bilateral trade value across 
time. We use data for the time period between 1989 and 1998. 
Parameter b's are coefficient. PCGNP is real per capita GNP in 1995 
US dollars. DIST is geographical distance between country i and j, 
and YEAR is a year. COL is colonial tie dummy. It equals one if a 
colonial tie exists between country i and j, and is zero otherwise. STik 
is maximum aflatoxin level imposed on import of food product, k, 
by EU importing country i. It is obtained from FAO survey of 
mycotoxin standards on food and feed stuffs in 1995 (FAO, 1995). 
While not explicated, dummies for exporting countries are included 
in order to control for unobserved factors such as production 
environment and product quality that may vary across these 
countries. The term kij  is the error term and is assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean zero.  
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We selected product categories for examination where data are 
available. We first conduct the analysis at an aggregate level that is 
defined by the two-digit STIC Revision 2 classification. The value of 
trade of 'cereals and cereal preparations' and 'fruits, nuts and 
vegetables' are regressed on the variables presented above.  
United Nations trade data for 15 European countries and 9 African 
countries are used for value of trade flow. The European countries 
include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, and United Kingdom. The African countries include Chad, 
Egypt, Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, and 
Zimbabwe. We use a fixed-effect model for importing countries as 
cross-sectional groups, since the error term is considered to reflect 
common characteristics within a group of observations associated 
with each country. 
We show in Table 15.2 that standards for aflatoxin B1 have 
significant negative effects on trade flows of both cereals and fruits, 
nuts and vegetables. It suggests that there are some sub-product-
categories in both groups that were sensitive to the standards. In 
particular, most cereals were subject to the aflatoxins standards, 
according to an FAO survey. Since a double-log specification is 
used, the coefficient of a variable can be interpreted as an elasticity. 
The coefficient estimate for cereals implies that a 10 per cent 
tightening of the aflatoxins standards (a 10 per cent smaller 
maximum level of contamination) will reduce trade flow by 14.3 per 
cent for cereals and 3.0 per cent for fruits, nuts and vegetables. 
Table 15.2 also suggests that colonial ties have significant positive 
implication for trade. The effect is greater for fruits and vegetable 
perhaps because they were specifically produced for exports (such 
as tropical fruits and nuts) under colonial rule. Colonial ties tend to 
develop dependency of former colonies in terms of language and 
cultural assimilation, undocumented trade rules appear, and appear 
as non-market barriers. Separating their effect from standards is 
therefore necessary.  
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Table 15.2: Regression results on the value of exports from Africa 
to Europe at the SITC 2-digit level  
(double-log specification) 
Products  Cereals and cereal preparations Fruits, nuts, and 
vegetable 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 63.4272 0.706 38.3051 0.817 
GNP per capita in 
Europe 
1.4254** 2.665 3.0476** 11.618 
GNP per capita in 
Africa 
-0.9890 -1.028 0.9378* 1.769 
Geographical 
distance 
-4.8551** -4.201 -3.6408** -7.323 
Aflatoxin B1 
Standards 
1.0517** 4.144 0.4327** 4.008 
Year -0.0132 -0.285 -0.0184 -0.779 
Dummy for 
colonisation ties 
2.1195** 4.866 3.2571** 14.316 
Number of 
observations 
346  865  
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.2566  0.6636  
1. Fixed-effect models for importing countries are estimated. 
2. * and ** imply significance at the 10 and 5 per cent levels under a two-tail test, 
respectively. 
 
The 'fruits, nuts and vegetables' category includes fresh, dried and 
preserved fruits and vegetables. Dried and preserved fruits, nuts 
and vegetables have been a particular focus of aflatoxin regulations 
since drying and preserving processes tend to grow fungus that 
contain aflatoxins. Consequently, we repeated the analysis under a 
greater disaggregation of these product categories. We focus on 
dried and preserved fruits, groundnuts and other nuts.  
Table 15.3 shows the elasticity of aflatoxin B1 standards on trade 
flows in different product sub-categories. The table suggests that the 
standards' effect is significant both on groundnuts and the other 
nuts, while the magnitude of the effect is greater on groundnuts. It 
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also indicates that the standard's effect on 'dried or preserved fruits' 
is significant. Thus, products under the category of 'fruits, nuts and 
vegetable' that the focus of the Commission's new regulation are 
expected to be affected as and when this regulation comes into force 
in 2001. 
Table 15.3: Elasticity of aflatoxin B1 standards on the value of 
exports from Africa 
 Elasticity of Standards 
Cereals and cereal preparations 1.0517** 
Fruits, nuts and vegetables   
Coconuts, Brazil and cashew nuts  0.7419* 
Groundnuts and other edible nuts  1.2950** 
Dried or preserved fruits 0.7705** 




This section provides results on how trade flows between Africa and 
Europe would vary with respect to the maximum allowable 
aflatoxin B1 level imposed by the 15 European countries. This 
simulation analysis is performed for two commodity groups, cereals 
and cereal preparations, and dried fruits and edible nuts. The 
simulation is based on the coefficient estimates reported in the Table 
15.3. In the analysis, an upper and a lower bound for the change in 
trade flow are imposed in order for the result to reflect the fact that 
negative exports are not possible and the capacity constraints on 
exports. Thus trade flows will not increase or decrease by more than 
100 per cent.  
There is a significant difference between the two scenarios. As 
shown in Table 15.4, the predicted loss of cereals trade flow under 
the Commission's new standard is US$177 million, or 59 per cent 
lower than the value of EU-Africa cereal trade in 1998. The 
predicted value of trade flow of dried and preserved fruits and 
edible nuts under the Commission's new standard is US$220 
million, or 47 per cent lower than the trade of these products in 
1998. The total loss of cereals, dried fruits and nuts trade 
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consequently is estimated to be approximately US$400 million per 
year. 
We also compare trade flows under two regulatory scenarios: an 
international standard indicated by guidelines set by CODEX, and 
the Commission's new standard at 2 ppb. CODEX provides a 
baseline for the maximum allowable total aflatoxin levels at 15 ppb. 
The CODEX baseline for maximum allowable level of aflatoxin B1 is 
imputed at 9 ppb by referring to average aflatoxin B1 composition in 
total aflatoxins. The predicted total trade flow under the 
Commission's new standard is US$380 millions or 76 per cent lower 
than that under the CODEX standard in the case of cereals. It is 
US$290 millions or 53 per cent lower than that under the CODEX 
standard in the case of dried fruits and nuts.  
Table 15.4. Comparison of predicted European imports from 
Africa under alternative scenarios: cereals, dried fruits 
and nuts (US$ million) 
 Predicted value of 
import 





















Cereals -177 (-59%) +202 (+68%)  120 500 380 (76%) 
Dried fruits 
and nuts 
-220 (-47%) +66 (+14%) 252 539 287 (53%) 
 
The simulation with respect to varying maximum allowable 
aflatoxin B1 levels is presented in the graphs in Figure 15.1 and 
15.2.1 The graph in Figure 15.1 shows value of flow of cereals trade 
from the 9 African countries to the 15 European countries associated  
                                                 
1 It is assumed that the EU countries harmonise the standard at each 
maximum allowable aflatoxin B1 level 
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Figure 15.1: Predicted trade flow under varying maximum 
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Note: The Codex level of maximum allowable aflatoxin B1 standard is assumed 
to be 9 ppb. 
 
Figure 15.2: predicted trade flow under varying maximum 
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with the aflatoxin standard levels between 0 and 25 ppb. The graph 
in Figure 15.2 shows the case for dried fruits and edible nuts trade. 
The upward slope of these graphs result from the relationship that a 
tighter standard (a lower number than the maximum allowable 
level) leads to a smaller trade flow. These figures also indicate the 
values of trade flow corresponding to the levels of maximum 
allowable aflatoxin B1 associated with the imputed CODEX 
maximum allowable aflatoxin B1 standard and the Commission's 
new standard. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides an economic analysis of risk assessment from 
a development perspective and presents empirical evidence on the 
trade effect of a tougher food safety standard. We estimate the 
elasticity of aflatoxin standards on the value of trade flows from 9 
African countries to 15 European countries. Our results suggest that 
cereals, dried fruits and edible nuts trade were negatively affected 
by aflatoxins standards in Europe before the new European 
Commission's harmonisation of aflatoxins standards. A 10 per cent 
lower maximum allowable level of contamination reduces trade 
flows by 11 per cent for cereals and 4.3 per cent for fruits, nuts and 
vegetables. Among fruits, nuts and vegetables, groundnuts are 
found to be especially sensitive to the aflatoxin standards.  
There are several areas for further consideration in a public policy 
context based on these results. One implication of the new standard 
on aflatoxins in Europe is the potential application of the risk 
reduction level to other contaminants in food. The EU directive was 
developed based on the JECFA risk assessment used by CODEX to 
establish a less stringent international standard. The fact that the EU 
decided to regulate aflatoxin B1 directly to achieve deaths risk 
reduction is not without cost. The JECFA risk assessment suggests 
that 0.2 deaths per billion risk reduction will be achieved by 
reducing the aflatoxin B1 maximum allowable level by 1 ppb2, 
                                                 
2 JECFA estimated that implementing a 10 ppb total aflatoxin standard, 
population potency is 39 cancer deaths per year per billion people, with 
uncertainty range between 7 and 164 people. In comparison, a 20 ppb standard 
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which implies for the case of cereals, dried and preserved fruits and 
edible nuts that 1.4 deaths per billion risk reduction will be achieved 
under the Commission's new standard (2 ppb) as opposed to the 
level that follows the CODEX guideline (9 ppb). According to our 
simulation analysis, achieiving this will cause an export loss of 
US$670 million per year from the African countries. 
The standard is also relevant to obligations under the WTO's SPS 
Agreement. The Agreement recognises the rights of Member 
countries to determine the "appropriate levels of protection" of 
human health. The level set by Europe and our findings on the 
magnitude of the trade effect, however, raise important questions 
for consideration. These include the costs of a proliferation of 
national standards set in absence of CODEX setting an 
internationally agreed level for B1 directly, as well as how the WTO 
addresses the economic trade-off of individual interpretations of the 
"appropriate level of protection" and "least trade-distorting" in SPS 
cases. 
References 
Calvin, L. and B. Krissoff (1998) 'Technical barriers to trade: a case 
study of phytosanitary barriers and US-Japanese apple trade', 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 23(2): 351-366. 
European Commission (1997) Commission Regulation (EC) No. 194/97 
of 31 January 1997, Brussels: The European Commission.  
European Commission (1998) Commission Regulation (EC) No. 
1525/98 of 16 July 1998, Brussels: The European Commission. 
                                                                                                                                               
will yield potency rates equal to 41 cancers per year per billion people with 
uncertainty range between 8 and 173 cancer deaths. This implies that the 20 ppb 
standard will lead to 2 additional cancer deaths per billion people compared to 
the 10 ppb standard. The estimates assumed a population with 1 per cent 
carriers of hepatitis (i.e. European population) and used potency values equal to 
0.3 cancers per year per 100,000 people among carriers of Hepatitis B and .01 
cancers per year per 100,000 population among non-carriers. 
Chapter 15  Effect of food safety standards on African exports to Europe  303 
 
Finger, M. J., and P. Schuler (1999) Implementation of Uruguay Round 
commitments: the development challenge, mimeo. The World Bank, 
Washington DC. 
Food and Agriculture Organization (1995) Worldwide regulations for 
micotoxins 1995: a compendium. Rome : FAO. 
Food and Agriculture Organization and World Health Organization 
(1997) Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives, Rome: 17-
26 June.  
Henson, S., R. Loader, A. Swinbank, M. Bredahl, and N. Lux (2000) 
Impact of sanitary and phytosanitary measures on developing countries, 
Reading: Center for Food Economics Research, University of 
Reading. 
Maskus, K.E. and J.S. Wilson (eds.) (2001) Quantifying trade effect of 
technical barriers: can it be done? Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press (forthcoming). 
Moenius, J. (1999) Information versus product adaptation: the role of 
standards in trade, mimeo. 
Ng, F. and A. Yeats (1998) On the recent trade performance of Sub-
Saharan African countries: cause for hope or more of the same? mimeo, 
The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Nielsen, C.P, and K. Anderson (2001) 'GMOs, trade policy, and 
welfare in rich and poor countries' in Quantifying trade effect of 
technical barriers: can it be done? edited by K.E. Maskus and J.S. 
Wilson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (forthcoming). 
Orden, D. and D. Roberts (eds.) (1997) Understanding technical 
barriers to agriculture trade, Proceedings of a Conference of the 
International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, University 
of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics, St. Paul, MN. 
Otsuki, T., J.S. Wilson, and M. Sewadeh (2001) 'What price 
precaution? European harmonisation of aflatoxin regulations and 
304  Part IV  Specific health and environmental risks from trade 
 
African food exports', mimeo, The World Bank, Washington, DC 
(forthcoming). 
Paarlberg, P.L. and J.G. Lee (1998) 'Import restrictions in the 
presence of a health risk: an illustration using FMD,' American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 80: 175-183. 
Pinstrup-Andersen, P. (2000) 'Food policy research for developing 
countries: emerging issues and unfinished business', Food Policy 25. 
Saquib, M. (2000) A study of the impact of environmental requirements 
on India's export performance and the scoping study for environmentally 
friendly products, Bangkok: United Nations Development 
Programme and Food and Agriculture Organization.  
Swann, P., P. Temple, and M. Shurmer (1996) 'Standards and trade 
performance: the UK experience', Economic Journal 106: 1297-1313. 
US Food and Drug Administration (2000) Foodborne pathogenic 
microorganisms and natural toxins handbook. Washington DC: USDA. 
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~mow/chap41.html 
UNDP/FAO (1998) Regional network inter-country cooperation on 
preharvest technology and quality control of food grains (REGNET) and 
the ASEAN grain postharvest programme, Bangkok: United Nations 
Development Programme. 
http://www.fao.org/inpho/vlibrary/x0036e/x0036e00.htm. 
WTO (1998a) Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Submission by The Gambia, G/SPS/GEN/50, World Trade 
Organization, Geneva. 
WTO (1998b) Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Summary of the meeting held on 15-16 September 1998, G/SPS/R/12, 
World Trade Organization, Geneva. 
WTO (1999) Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Summary of the meeting held on 10-11 March 1999, G/SPS/R/14, World 




GMOs, the SPS Agreement and the WTO 
KYM ANDERSON AND CHANTAL POHL NIELSEN 
This chapter addresses the question: how might a new quarantine 
issue, namely genetically modified organisms (GMOs), impact on 
the World Trade Organization's rules and their interpretation by its 
Dispute Settlement Body. It suggests that the GMO issue is almost 
certain to affect the way the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Agreement is interpreted and, should it come under sufficient 
pressure, re-negotiated. Since national quarantine policy officials are 
involved in both dispute settlement and rules-negotiating at the 
WTO, this chapter provides a glimpse of what might be in store for 
them in those capacities as well as in their work as quarantine 
decision-makers in the future. The chapter also includes an 
empirical analysis of the trade and welfare effects that could be 
involved in GMO cases. This has two purposes. First, it provides 
some idea of the potential trade and welfare effects of SPS policy 
reactions to the GMO issue. Second, it illustrates a methodological 
approach that, to the authors' knowledge, is more comprehensive 
than any used by previous analysts for estimating the market effects 
of quarantine policies. The methodology would be inappropriate for 
cases involving just one small product in a small country. However, 
for across-the-board reviews of quarantine measures, and for cases 
involving major products and major traders –(as with GMOs) the 
economy-wide, general equilibrium approach used here is very 
relevant. And it will become even more so as and when economic 
assessment becomes more of a mainstream activity in quarantine 
analysis in the future (if not by quarantine officers, then certainly by 
agricultural policy advisors and trade negotiators concerned with 
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the domestic and trade effects of SPS measures both at home and 
abroad).  
While the use of modern biotechnology to create GMOs through 
agricultural research has generated exuberance by those looking 
forward to a new 'green revolution', GMOs have also attracted 
strong criticism. The opposition is coming from groups concerned, 
among other things, about the safety of consuming genetically 
modified foods, the environmental impact of growing genetically 
engineered crops, and the ethics related to using that technology per 
se. Scepticism toward genetic engineering has been particularly rife 
in Western Europe, which has stunted that region's contribution to 
the development and use of genetically engineered crop seeds and 
foods. In contrast, farmers in North American and several large 
developing countries (notably Argentina and China) have actively 
developed and adopted GM crops, and citizens there generally 
(perhaps unwittingly) have accepted that development and 
consume the foods generated by it. Meanwhile many other 
countries, including Australia and New Zealand, are in the process 
of introducing strict labelling requirements on GM foods and feed.  
Environmental, food safety and ethical concerns with the 
production and use of GM crops have been voiced so effectively as 
to lead to the recent negotiation of a Biosafety Protocol (UNEP 2000) 
with its endorsement of the use of the precautionary principle. 
However, if that Protocol were to encourage discriminatory trade 
barriers or import bans, or even just long delays in approving the 
use of imported GM seeds, it may be at odds with countries' 
obligations under the World Trade Organization. The next section of 
this chapter provides a brief overview of the trade policy issues at 
stake here. It suggests that these issues have the potential to lead to 
complex and wasteful trade disputes. The extent to which that 
potential is realised depends in large part on the economic stakes 
involved. They can only be determined by quantitative economic 
modelling, using – pending more reliable knowledge -- assumptions 
about the sizes of any shifts in the farm product supply (or demand) 
curves. The following section of the chapter illustrates one approach 
to such modeling. A well-received empirical model of the global 
economy (GTAP) is used to quantify the effects on production, 
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prices, trade patterns and national economic welfare of certain 
countries' farmers adopting GM maize and soybean crops without 
and then with trade policy or consumer responses in Western 
Europe (where opposition to GMOs is most vocal). The results 
suggest such policy or consumer responses can alter significantly 
the potential size of the global GMO dividend and its distribution. 
The chapter concludes by drawing lessons from the analysis for the 
future of quarantine policy making, for the SPS Agreement, and for 
the WTO's attempts more broadly to reduce excessively 
protectionist technical barriers to trade and provide an effective 
mechanism for resolving trade disputes.  
GMOs, agricultural trade policies, and the WTO 
National policy reactions to GMOs 
Genetic modification or engineering is a new biotechnology that 
enables direct manipulation of genetic material (inserting, removing 
or altering genes) and thereby accelerates the development process, 
shaving years off R&D programs. Protagonists argue that genetic 
engineering entails a more-controlled transfer of genes because the 
transfer is limited to a single, or just a few selected genes, whereas 
traditional breeding risks transferring unwanted genes together 
with the desired ones. Antagonists, however, argue that the side 
effects in terms of potentially adverse impacts on the environment 
and human health are unknown – and probably unknowable 
without decades of further research and use.  
GM techniques and their applications have developed very rapidly 
since the introduction of the first genetically modified plants in the 
1980s. Transgenic crops currently occupy about 4 per cent of the 
world's total agricultural area (compared with less than 0.5 per cent 
as recently as 1996). Cultivation so far has been most widespread in 
the production of GM soybeans and maize, accounting for 54 per 
cent and 28 per cent of total transgenic crop production in 1999, 
respectively, with the United States accounting for almost three-
quarters of the total GM crop area. Other major GM crop producers 
are Argentina, Canada, China, Mexico and South Africa, but India 
and several Eastern European countries also have a number of 
308  Part IV  Specific health and environmental risks from trade 
 
transgenic crops in the pipeline for commercialisation (James 1999; 
European Commission 2000). 
The resistance to GMO production and use also has developed 
rapidly in numerous countries, especially by well-organised 
activists in Western Europe. That triggered the imposition in 
October 1998 of a de facto moratorium on the authorisation of new 
releases of GMOs in the European Union (EU), and even stricter 
standards are mooted in the EU's revised Directive 90/220 of 
August 2000. These moves could be a prelude to a future EU ban on 
both the production and importation of food containing GMOs 
(following the EU ban on imports of beef produced with the help of 
growth hormones). Before the imposition of the moratorium, 
releases of GMOs were reviewed on a case-by-case basis and had to 
be approved at every step from laboratory testing through field 
testing to final marketing. By contrast, the permit procedure in the 
United States is far simpler and faster.  
There are also marked differences in national labelling 
requirements. The US Food and Drug Administration does not 
require labelling of GM foods per se, but only if the transgenic food 
is substantially different from its conventional counterpart. The EU, 
by contrast, requires labelling of all foodstuffs, additives and 
flavours containing 1 per cent or more genetically modified material 
(Regulations 1139/98 and 49/2000). Individual countries within the 
EU have added further requirements (OECD 2000). Numerous non-
European countries, including some developing countries, also have 
enacted GMO consumer legislation. Australia and New Zealand are 
to introduce mandatory labelling for all foods containing GMOs (ie, 
a zero threshold), following a poll showing more than 90 per cent 
approved such a move. Some developing countries also are reacting: 
Brazil has introduced restrictive conditions on imports of GM 
products, and Sri Lanka has taken the extreme step of banning the 
imports of GMOs, pending further clarification as to their 
environmental and food safety impacts. 
Identity preservation systems to enable reliable labelling of food can 
be costly, however, and more so the more stages of processing or 
intermediate input use a crop product goes through before final 
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consumption. A recent European survey suggests full traceability 
could add 6-17 per cent to the farmgate cost of different crops 
(European Commission 2000). Who bears those costs, and are the 
benefits sufficient to warrant them? Products containing GMOs that 
are not verifiably different from their GM-free counterparts are not 
going to attract a price premium, so their producers would not 
volunteer to label them as containing GMOs, given (a) the cost of 
identity preservation throughout the food chain and (b) the negative 
publicity about GMOs which is likely to lower the price of goods so 
labelled. Coercion would therefore be required -- but for benefits 
that are difficult to perceive, since the label has virtually no 
information content (in contrast to, for example, the positive health 
warning on cigarette packets) because there are no known risks of 
consuming GMOs. 
A non-regulatory alternative to positive labelling regulations is to 
encourage the voluntary use of negative labels such as 'this product 
contains no GMOs' (Runge and Jackson 2000). With perhaps the 
majority of processed foods now containing some GMOs, this 
market alternative would require labels on a much smaller and 
presumably declining proportion of products. And that subset, like 
organic food, could attract a price premium, perhaps sufficient to 
cover the cost of identity preservation and labelling. That still 
requires the separation of GM-free products from GM-inclusive 
ones, however. Furthermore, it begs the question as to what is the 
threshold below which 'this product contains no GMOs' should 
apply. For the label to be meaningful abroad for exported GM-free 
products, multilateral agreement on that threshold would be 
needed. 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
Given the different attitudes and national approaches to regulation 
of genetically modified products, future trade disputes are a distinct 
possibility. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (finalised in 
Montreal on 29 January 2000) may have added to that likelihood. 
The Biosafety Protocol has the objective of ensuring safe 
transboundary movement of living modified organisms resulting 
from modern biotechnology, If ratified by the parliaments of 50 
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signatories, the Protocol will not only reconfirm the rights of 
ratifying countries to set their own domestic regulations but also 
allow each country to decide whether and under what conditions it 
will accept imports of GM products for release into the environment 
(for example, as planted seeds). This condoning of import 
restrictions appears also to apply to GMOs intended as food, feed or 
for processing.1 Importantly, the Protocol stipulates that lack of 
scientific evidence regarding potential adverse effects of GMOs on 
biodiversity, taking into account also the risks to human health, 
need not prevent a ratifying country from taking action to restrict 
the import of such organisms in order to reduce perceived risks 
(UNEP 2000). In essence, this reflects an acceptance of the guiding 
influence of the precautionary principle, that is, "better safe than 
sorry".2 The Protocol requires that GMOs intended for intentional 
introduction into the environment or for contained use must be 
clearly identified as living modified organisms; but modified 
organisms intended for direct use as food or feed, or for further 
processing, just require a label stating that the product "may 
contain" such organisms. No labelling requirements for processed 
foods such as cooking oil or meal were established by the Protocol.  
WTO agreements and GMOs 
An important aspect of the Biosafety Protocol that is unclear and 
hence open to various interpretations concerns its relationship with 
the WTO agreements. The text states that the "Protocol shall not be 
interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a 
Party under any existing international agreements", but at the same 
time the Protocol claims that this statement is "not intended to 
                                                 
1 Details concerning the latter products are still to be decided, however, 
pending the findings of the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission's Ad 
Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology. 
There is uncertainty because while the Protocol relates to biosafety rather than 
human safety, the phrase "… taking into account effects on human health …” 
survived the drafting process. The Codex Task Force is due to report within 
four years of its creation in June 1999.  
2 The precautionary principle implies that considerations of human health 
and the environment rank higher than possible economic benefits in 
circumstances where there is uncertainty about the outcome. 
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subordinate [the] Protocol to other international agreements" (UNEP 
2000 p.1). Certainly the Protocol's objective of protecting and 
ensuring sustainable use of biological diversity whilst also taking 
into account risks to human health is not inconsistent with WTO 
agreements. The WTO acknowledges the need for Member states to 
apply and enforce trade-restricting measures in order to protect 
human, animal or plant health and life as well as public morals. That 
right for a country to set its own environmental and food safety 
regulations at the national level is provided for in Article XX of the 
GATT. But the key goal of the WTO is to achieve effective use of the 
world's resources by reducing barriers to international trade. For 
that reason WTO Members also have agreed to not use unduly 
trade-restrictive measures to achieve environmental or food safety 
goals. More than that, such measures must be consistent with the 
key principles of the WTO: non-discrimination among member 
states, 'national treatment' of imports once having entered the 
domestic market, and transparent customs procedures. Whether the 
current WTO agreements prove to be in conflict with the rights to 
restrict trade in living modified organisms apparently provided for 
in the Biosafety Protocol only time – and possibly legal proceedings 
via the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body -- can tell.  
Members of the WTO also have trade obligations under other WTO 
agreements that restrict the extent to which trade measures can be 
used against GMOs. More specifically related to food safety and 
animal and plant health are the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT). These agreements allow Member states to 
impose certain restrictions on trade if the purpose of the measure is 
to protect human, animal or plant life and health. The TBT 
Agreement also covers technical measures aimed at protecting the 
environment and other objectives. At the same time the Agreements 
aim at ensuring that applied measures and technical regulations are 
no more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil the stated 
objectives.  
Both the SPS and TBT Agreements encourage the use of 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations where 
they exist, such as in the realms of the Codex Alimentarius (the 
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FAO's international food standards body). Currently there are no 
international standards for genetically modified products,3 although 
the Biosafety Protocol explicitly notes that signatories "shall consider 
the need for and modalities of developing standards with regard to 
the identification, handling, packaging and transport practices, in 
consultation with other relevant international bodies." (UNEP 2000 
p. 10, Article 18.3.) International harmonisation of regulatory 
approval procedures for genetically modified products is currently 
under discussion in several forums including the FAO and OECD. 
The establishment of international standards for the production, 
regulation and labelling of these products may be helpful as a way 
of reducing future trade disputes among developed countries – but 
could impose onerous compliance costs on poorer GM-exporting 
countries.  
Under the SPS Agreement a country may apply higher than 
international standards only if these can be justified by appropriate 
scientific risk assessments. In other words, while the SPS Agreement 
explicitly allows Member states to set their own standards for food 
safety and animal and plant health, it requires that measures be 
based on scientific risk assessments in a consistent way across 
commodities. The TBT Agreement is more flexible because Member 
states can decide that international standards are inappropriate for a 
number of other reasons, such as national security interests (GATT 
Article XXI). Hence determining which WTO agreement a given 
trade measure is covered by is of key importance. The SPS 
Agreement covers food safety measures and animal and plant 
health standards regardless of whether or not these are technical 
requirements. The TBT agreement, on the other hand, covers all 
technical regulations, voluntary standards and compliance 
procedures, except when these are sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures as defined in the SPS Agreement (WTO 1998a).  
The SPS Agreement's scientific requirement is important because it 
is more objective than the TBT Agreement's criteria for determining 
what is a justifiable trade restriction and what is hidden 
                                                 
3 However, the Codex Committee on Food Labelling is currently 
considering the adoption of an international standard on GMO labelling. 
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protectionism. On the other hand, the SPS Agreement may be 
inadequate for legally justifying restrictions introduced on the basis 
of some vocal groups' opposition to GM foods. Official disputes 
about trade in genetically modified products have not yet 
materialised4, but experience from earlier WTO dispute settlement 
cases that are comparable to the GMO debate give an indication as 
to how the existing rules may be applied. The SPS Agreement was 
used in the beef hormone dispute between the US and the EU, for 
example (WTO 1998c). In short, the EU import ban on meat and 
meat products from hormone-fed livestock was found to be in 
conflict with the EU's WTO obligations, the main argument being 
that the EU could not present documented scientific risk assessment 
of the alleged health risk to justify the ban.  
Scientific evidence is not always sufficient for governments to make 
policy decisions, or it may simply be unavailable. In such cases, 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement allows WTO Member states to take 
precautionary measures based on available pertinent information. 
At the same time, members are obliged to seek additional 
information so that a more objective evaluation of the risks related 
to the relevant product or process can be made within a reasonable 
period of time. The precautionary principle is an understandable 
approach to uncertainties about genetically modified products, but 
there is a risk that when used in connection with internationally 
traded products, it can be captured by import-competing groups 
seeking protection against any new technology-driven competition 
from abroad. It may thus be extremely difficult to assess whether a 
measure is there for precautionary reasons or simply as a form of 
hidden protectionism. For this reason, attention will focus acutely 
on how the provisions of the Biosafety Protocol – the most explicit 
acceptance of the use of the precautionary principle in an 
international trade agreement relating to food products to date – are 
interpreted given current WTO commitments. 
                                                 
4 Thailand did formally object to Egypt's ban on GM imports in the latter 
half of 2000, but the matter was settled without going to the trouble of setting 
up a Dispute Settlement panel at the WTO. It objected not to Egypt's right to 
impose a ban, but rather to the fact that Thai exports were singled out for 
exclusion.  
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The existing trade agreements deal with regulations and standards 
concerning not just products but also production processes and 
methods if but only if they affect the characteristics or safety of the 
product itself: standards for production processes that do not affect 
the final product are not covered by the existing agreements. In 
relation to genetically engineered products, if the process itself were 
to alter the final product in such a way that there are adverse 
environmental or health effects associated with consumption, use or 
disposal of the product, restricting trade in this product need not 
violate existing WTO rules, ceteris paribus. However, if genetic 
engineering only concerns the production process and not the final 
characteristics of a transgenic product, domestic regulations that 
restrict the use of this method of production cannot be used to 
restrict imports of products produced by this method simply 
because the importing country finds it unacceptable by its own 
environmental, ethical or other norms.5  
This discussion leads back to the role of scientific evidence. Some 
would argue that genetically modified products are different from 
conventional products regardless of whether or not this can be 
verified scientifically in the final product. One of the priorities of the 
European Commission in the next WTO round of multilateral trade 
negotiations is to obtain a clarification of the role of non-product-
related processes and production methods within the WTO 
(European Commission 1999). If trade restrictions based on 
production methods are allowed, this could lead to the inclusion of 
a long list of non-tariff barriers, and not only in relation to 
biotechnology products. 
Labelling of foods in relation to international trade is normally 
covered by the TBT Agreement unless the label relates directly to 
food safety, in which case it is covered by the SPS Agreement. Only 
labelling programs that concern production processes affecting the 
final product would be covered by the existing TBT Agreement. 
                                                 
5 This product/process distinction became (and has remained) prominent 
at the WTO as a result of the famous tuna-dolphin case in the early 1990s. The 
general issue continues to be hotly debated. See, for example, the recent paper 
by Howse and Regan (2000). 
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Determining whether or not a genetic modification affects the final 
product will probably have to be done on a case-by-case basis. 
Where labelling programs are not encompassed by the TBT 
agreement, which potentially may be the case for many transgenic 
products, the other agreements of the WTO will be applicable 
without exceptions (Tietje 1997). GATT Article III concerning non-
discrimination, for example, stipulates that Member states may not 
discriminate between otherwise like goods on the basis of their 
country of origin. A key issue using this Article will be the 
interpretation of the concept of 'like goods' and whether the 
presence of genetically modified material is 'sufficient' to 
differentiate products. Article III seeks to avoid measures that are 
based on a false differentiation of products.  
In short, the emergence of GMOs in agricultural and food 
production introduces several new and contentious issues to be 
dealt with by the WTO membership and ultimately its Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB). The DSB has not yet been able to resolve the 
dispute over the EU's ban on imports of beef produced with growth 
hormones (WTO 1998c), so it is difficult to see how it will be able to 
do any better with the far more complex issue of GM products 
should the EU choose to ban their importation too – particularly 
now that there is a Biosafety Protocol on the table condoning the use 
of the precautionary principle and suggesting scientific evidence 
need not prevent importing countries from restricting GM trade. 
To get a sense of the risk of trade disputes erupting over GMOs, it is 
necessary to assess the economic stakes involved. That is, how large 
are the potential gains from GMO crop technologies, to what extent 
will various countries benefit (or lose) from their adoption, and how 
would trade policy responses or adverse consumer reactions affect 
those projected outcomes? It is to these questions that we now turn. 
In doing so, a methodology is introduced for the empirical economic 
analysis of quarantine policy measures generally that, to the 
authors' knowledge, is more comprehensive than has hitherto been 
used.  
An empirical illustration 
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Theory alone is incapable of determining even the likely direction, 
let alone the magnitude, of some of the effects of subsets of farmers 
adopting GM-inclusive seeds, without or with trade policy and 
consumer reactions in other countries. Hence an empirical 
modelling approach is needed. To illustrate the usefulness of that 
approach in informing GMO debates, this section summarises one 
recent quantitative effort by the authors. It makes use of a well-
received empirical model of the global economy (the GTAP model) 
to examine what the effects of some (non-European) countries 
adopting the new GMO technology might be (Nielsen and 
Anderson 2001b). For such purposes the single-market partial-
equilibrium approach has to give way to an economy-wide, 
computable general equilibrium (GCE) approach.6 
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) based at Purdue 
University offers such a general equilibrium model.7 It captures the 
vertical and horizontal linkages between all product markets both 
within the model's individual countries and regions as well as 
between countries and regions via their bilateral trade flows. The 
database used for these applications reflects the global economic 
structures and trade flows of 1995. It has been aggregated to a small 
number of regions to highlight the main participants in the GMO 
debate, and it focuses on the primary agricultural sectors affected by 
the GMO debate.  
Specifically, the effects of an assumed degree of GM-induced 
productivity growth in selected countries are explored for maize 
and soybean.8 Those results are compared with what they would be 
                                                 
6 Such an approach has been called for by James and Anderson (1998) and 
Roberts (2000).  
7 The GTAP model is a multi-regional, static, applied general equilibrium 
model based on neo-classical microeconomic theory with international trade 
described by an Armington (1969) specification, which means that traded 
products are differentiated by country of origin. See Hertel (1997) for 
comprehensive model documentation and McDougall et al. (1998) for the latest 
GTAP database. 
8 These two crops are perhaps the most controversial because they are 
grown extensively in rich countries and are consumed by people there both 
directly and via animal products. Much less controversial are cotton (because it 
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if (a) Western Europe chose to ban consumption and hence imports 
of those products from countries adopting GM technology or (b) 
some Western European consumers responded by boycotting 
imported GM foods. The following scenarios are based on a 
simplifying assumption that the effect of adopting GM crops can be 
captured by a Hicks-neutral technology shift, i.e. a uniform 
reduction in all primary factors and intermediate inputs to obtain 
the same level of production. 9 For present purposes the GM-
adopting sectors are assumed to experience a one-off increase in 
total factor productivity of 5 per cent, thus lowering the supply price 
of the GM crop to that extent.10 Assuming sufficiently elastic 
demand conditions, the cost-reducing technology will lead to 
increased production and higher returns to the factors of production 
employed in the GM-adopting sector. Labour, capital and land 
consequently will be drawn into the affected sector. As suppliers of 
inputs and buyers of agricultural products, other sectors will also be 
affected by the use of genetic engineering in GM-potential sectors 
through vertical linkages. Input suppliers will initially experience 
lower demand because the production process in the GM sector has 
                                                                                                                                               
is not a food) and rice (because it is mostly consumed in developing countries). 
For a parallel quantitative assessment of the latter two products, see Nielsen 
and Anderson (2000). 
9 Available empirical evidence (see the surveys in USDA (1999) and James 
(1997, 1998, 1999)) suggests that cultivating GM crops has non-trivial cost-
reducing effects. Nelson et al. (1999) suggest that glyphosate-resistant soybeans 
may generate a total production cost reduction of 5per cent, and their scenarios 
have Bt corn increasing yields by between 1.8 per cent and 8.1 per cent. 
10 Due to the absence of sufficiently detailed empirical data on the 
agronomic and hence economic impact of cultivating GM crops, the 5 per cent 
productivity shock applied here represents an average shock (over all specified 
commodities and regions). Changing this shock (e.g. doubling it to 10 per cent) 
generates near-linear changes (i.e. roughly a doubling) in the effects on prices 
and quantities. This lowering of the supply price of GM crops is net of the 
technology fee paid to the seed supplier (which is assumed to be a payment for 
past sunk costs of research) and of any mandatory 'may contain GMOs' 
labelling and identity preservation costs. The latter are ignored in the CGE 
analysis to follow, but further research might explicitly include them and, to 
fine-tune the welfare calculations, even keep track of which country is the home 
of the (typically multinational) firm receiving the technology fee.  
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become more efficient. To the extent that the production of GM 
crops increases, however, the demand for inputs by producers of 
those crops may actually rise despite the input-reducing technology. 
Demanders of primary agricultural products such as grains and 
soybean meal for livestock feed will benefit from lower input prices, 
which in turn will affect the market competitiveness of livestock 
products. 
The widespread adoption of GM varieties in certain regions will 
affect international trade flows depending on how traded the crop 
in question is and whether or not this trade is restricted specifically 
because of the GMOs involved. To the extent that trade is not 
further restricted and not currently subject to binding quantitative 
restrictions, world market prices for these products will have a 
tendency to decline and thus benefit regions that are net importers 
of these products. For exporters, the lower price may or may not 
boost their trade volume, depending on price elasticities in foreign 
markets. Welfare in the exporting countries would go down for non-
adopters but could also go down for some adopters if the adverse 
terms of trade change were to be sufficiently strong. Hence the need 
for empirical analysis. 
Two maize/soybean scenarios are considered below. The first of 
them (scenario 1) is a base case with no policy or consumer reactions 
to GMOs. GM-driven productivity growth of 5 per cent is applied to 
North America, Mexico, the Southern Cone region of Latin America, 
India, China, Rest of East Asia (excluding Japan and the East Asian 
NICs), and South Africa. The countries of Western Europe, Japan, 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere are assumed to refrain 
from using or be unable at this stage to adopt GM crops in their 
production systems. The other scenario imposes on this base case a 
policy response by Western Europe: Western Europe not only 
refrains from using GM crops in its own domestic production 
systems, but the region is also assumed to reject imports of maize 
and soybean products from GM-adopting regions.  
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Scenario 1: Selected regions adopt GM maize and soybean 
Table 16.1 reports the results for scenario 1. A 5 per cent reduction in 
overall production costs in the maize and soybean sectors leads to 
increases in coarse grain production of between 0.4 per cent and 2.1 
per cent, and increases in oilseed production of between 1.1 per cent 
and 4.6 per cent, in the GM-adopting regions. The production 
responses are generally larger for oilseeds as compared with coarse 
grain. This is because a larger share of oilseed production as 
compared with coarse grain production is destined for export 
markets in all the reported regions, and hence oilseed production is 
not limited to the same extent by domestic demand, which is less 
price-elastic. Increased oilseed production leads to lower market 
prices and hence cheaper costs of production in the vegetable oils 
and fats sectors, expanding output there. This expansion is 
particularly marked in the Southern Cone region of South America 
where no less than one-fourth of this production is sold on foreign 
markets. In North America maize and soybean meal are used as 
livestock feed, and hence the lower feed prices lead to an expansion 
of the livestock and meat processing sectors there.  
Due to the very large world market shares of oilseeds from North 
and South America and coarse grain from North America, the 
increased supply from these regions causes world prices for coarse 
grain and oilseeds to decline by 4.0 per cent and 4.5 per cent, 
respectively. As a consequence of the more intense competition from 
abroad, production of coarse grain and oilseeds declines in the non-
adopting regions. This is particularly so in Western Europe, a major 
net importer of oilseeds, of which about half comes from North 
America. Coarse grain imports into Western Europe increase only 
slightly (0.1 per cent), but the increased competition and lower price 
are enough to entail a 4.5 per cent decline in Western European 
production. In the developing countries too, production of coarse 
grain and oilseeds is reduced slightly. The changes in India, 
however, are relatively small compared with e.g. China and the 
Southern Cone region. This is explained by the domestic market 
orientation of these sales. That means India's relatively small 
production increase causes rather substantial declines in domestic 
prices for these products, which in turn benefits the other 
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agricultural sectors. For example, 67 per cent of intermediate 
demand for coarse grain and 37 per cent of intermediate demand for 
oilseeds in India stems from the livestock sector, according to the 
GTAP database.  
Global economic welfare (as traditionally measured in terms of 
equivalent variations of income, ignoring any positive or negative 
externalities) is boosted in this first scenario by US$9.9 billion per 
year, two-thirds of which is enjoyed by the adopting regions (Table 
16.1b). It is noteworthy that all regions (both adopting and non-
adopting) gain in terms of economic welfare, except Sub-Saharan 
Africa which loses slightly because a small change in the terms of 
trade. Most of this gain stems directly from the technology boost. 
The net-exporting GM-adopters experience worsened terms of trade 
due to increased competition on world markets, but this adverse 
welfare effect is outweighed by the positive effect of the 
technological boost. Western Europe gains from the productivity 
increase in the other regions only in part because of cheaper 
imports; mostly it gains because increased competition from abroad 
shifts domestic resources out of relatively highly assisted segments 
of EU agriculture. The group of high-income East Asian countries, 
as relatively large net importers of the GM-potential crops, benefits 
equally from lower import prices and a more efficient use of 
resources in domestic farm production. Australia and New Zealand, 
by contrast, lose because the terms of trade go against their export-
oriented livestock producers. 
Scenario 2: Selected regions adopt GM maize and soybean plus 
Western Europe bans imports of those products from GM-adopting 
regions 
In this second scenario, Western Europe not only refrains from 
using GM crops in its own domestic production systems, but the 
region is also assumed to reject imports of oilseeds and coarse grain 
for SPS reasons from GM-adopting regions. This assumes that the 
labelling enables Western European importers to identify such 
shipments and that all oilseed and coarse grain exports from GM-
adopting regions will be labelled "may contain GMOs". Under those 
conditions the distinction between GM-inclusive and GM-free 
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products is simplified to one that relates directly to the country of 
origin, and labelling costs are ignored. This import ban scenario 
reflects the most extreme application of the precautionary principle 
within the framework of the Biosafety Protocol. 
A Western European ban on the imports of genetically modified 
coarse grain and oilseeds changes the situation in scenario 1 rather 
dramatically, especially for the oilseed sector in North America 
which has been highly dependent on the EU market. The result of 
the European ban is not only a decline in total North American 
oilseed exports by almost 30 per cent, but also a production decline 
of 10 per cent, pulling resources such as land out of this sector 
(Table 16.2). For coarse grain, by contrast, only 18 per cent of North 
American production is exported and just 8 per cent of those exports 
are destined for Western Europe. Therefore the ban does not affect 
North American production and exports of maize to the same extent 
as for soybean, although the downward pressure on the 
international price of maize nonetheless dampens significantly the 
production-enhancing effect of the technological boost. Similar 
effects are evident in the other GM adopting regions, except again 
for India. For Sub-Saharan Africa, which by assumption is unable to 
adopt the new GM technology, access to the Western European 
markets when other competitors are excluded expands. Oilseed 
exports from this region rise dramatically, by enough to increase 
domestic production by 4 per cent. Western Europe increases its 
own production of oilseeds, however, so the aggregate increase in 
oilseed imports amounts to less than 1 per cent. Its production of 
coarse grain also increases, but not by as much because of an initial 
high degree of self-sufficiency. Europe's shift from imported 
oilseeds and coarse grain to domestically produced products has 
implications further downstream. Given an imperfect degree of 
substitution in production between domestic and imported 
intermediate inputs, the higher prices of domestically produced 
maize and soybean mean that livestock feed is slightly  
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Table 16.1: Scenario 1 - effects of selected regionsa adopting GM 
maize and soybean 














Production        
Coarse grain 2.1 1.6 1.0 0.4 -4.5 -2.3 -5.0 
Oilseeds 3.6 4.6 1.8 1.1 -11.2 -1.3 -3.4 
Livestock 0.8 -0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.8 
Meat & dairy 0.5 0.0 0.1 1.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 
Veg. oils, fats 1.1 4.5 1.4 0.0 -0.9 -1.2 -2.1 
Other foods 0.2 0.1 0.4 1.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 
Market prices        
Coarse grain -5.5 -5.5 -5.6 -6.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.8 
Oilseeds -5.5 -5.3 -5.6 -6.5 -1.2 -0.3 -0.7 
Livestock -1.8 -0.3 -0.4 -1.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 
Meat & dairy -1.0 -0.2 -0.3 -1.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Veg. oils, fats -2.4 -3.1 -2.6 -1.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 
Other foods -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -1.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Exportsb        
Coarse grain 8.5 13.3 16.8 37.3 -11.5 -20 -26.8 
Oilseeds 8.5 10.5 8.2 21.5 -20.5 -26.5 -28.4 
Livestock 8.9 -2.0 -3.3 9.4 -1.1 -1.5 -1.5 
Meat & dairy 4.8 -0.9 -0.9 5.8 -0.5 -0.2 -1.3 
Veg. oils, fats 5.8 14.3 5.6 -3.8 -4.9 -5.3 -10.9 
Other foods 0.2 0.1 1.6 7.6 -0.6 0.1 -1.3 
Importsb        
Coarse grain -1.6 -4.6 -4.2 -20.5 0.1 11.3 11.3 
Oilseeds -2.6 -9.2 -1.6 -8.6 2.5 16.5 13.7 
Livestock -2.1 1.3 0.9 -5.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 
Meat & dairy -1.9 0.2 0.8 -1.7 -0.0 0.1 0.0 
Veg. oils, fats -3.7 -3.6 -1.7 3.1 1.3 3.4 3.7 
Other foods 0 -0.1 -0.6 -3.1 0.1 -0.1 0.4 
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Table 16.1: Scenario 1 - effects of selected regionsa adopting GM 
maize and soybean continued 





Decomposition of welfare results, 











North America 2,624 -137 -1,008 3,746 
Southern Cone 826 120 -223 923 
China 839 113 66 672 
India 1,265 182 -9 1,094 
Western Europe 2,010 1,755 253 0 
Sub-Saharan Africa -9 -2 -9 0 
Aust/New Zealand -70 3 -71 0 
Japan & Asian NIEs 1,256 551 712 0 
Other developing and 
transition econs. 
1,120 171 289 673 
WORLD 9,859 2,756 0 7,108 
a North America, Mexico, Southern Cone, China, Rest of East Asia, India, and 
South Africa. For space reasons, results for numerous regions are omitted from 
this table. 
b Includes intra-regional trade. 
Source: Nielsen and Anderson's (2001b) GTAP model results. 
 
more expensive. (Half of intermediate demand for coarse grain in 
Western Europe stems from the livestock sector.) Inputs to other 
food processing industries, particularly the vegetable oils and fats 
sector, also are more expensive. As a consequence, production in 
these downstream sectors declines and competing imports increase. 
For equal and opposite reasons, Australia and New Zealand are not 
quite as badly off in this scenario as in scenario 1. 
Aggregate economic welfare implications of this scenario are 
substantially different from those of scenario 1 (again, leaving aside 
any externalities). Western Europe now experiences a decline in 
aggregate economic welfare of US$4.3 billion per year instead of a 
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boost of $2 billion (compare Tables 16.2b and 16.1b). Taking a closer 
look at the decomposition of the welfare changes reveals that 
adverse allocative efficiency effects explain the decline. Most 
significantly, EU resources are forced into producing oilseeds, of 
which a substantial amount was previously imported. Consumer 
welfare in Western Europe is reduced in this scenario because, given 
that those consumers are assumed to be indifferent between GM-
inclusive and GM-free products, the import ban restricts them from 
benefiting from lower international prices. Bear in mind, though, 
that in this as in the previous scenarios it is assumed citizens are 
indifferent to GMOs. To the extent that some Western Europeans in 
fact value a ban on GM products in their domestic markets, that 
would more or less than offset the above loss in economic welfare.  
The key exporters of the GM products, North America, Southern 
Cone and China, all show a smaller gain in welfare in this as 
compared with the scenario in which there is no European policy 
response. Net importers of maize and soybean (e.g. 'Other high-
income' which is mostly East Asia), by contrast, are slightly better 
off in this than in scenario 1. Meanwhile, the countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa are affected in a slight positive instead of slight 
negative way, gaining from better terms of trade. In particular, a 
higher price is obtained for their oilseed exports to European 
markets in this as compared with scenario 1. 
Two-thirds of the global gain from the new GM technology as 
measured in scenario 1 would be eroded by an import ban imposed 
by Western Europe: it falls from $9.9 billion per year to just $3.4 
billion, with almost the entire erosion in economic welfare borne in 
Western Europe (assuming as before that consumers are indifferent 
between GM-free and GM-inclusive foods). The rest is borne by the 
net-exporting adopters (mainly North America and the Southern 
Cone region). Since the non-adopting regions generally purchase 
most of their imported coarse grain and oilseeds from the North 
American region, they benefit even more than in scenario 1 from 
lower import prices: their welfare is estimated to be greater by  
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Table 16.2: Scenario 2 - effects of selected regionsa adopting GM 
maize and soybean plus Western Europe bans imports 
of those products from GM-adopting regions  















Production        
Cereal grain 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.4 5.3 -2.2 -5.2 
Oilseeds -10.2 -3.6 -0.8 0.8 66.4 4.4 -1.3 
Livestock 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 -0.8 0.0 -0.4 
Meat & dairy 0.8 0.3 0.2 1.4 -0.5 -0.0 -0.5 
Veg.oils,fats 2.4 8.1 1.6 0.1 -3.4 0.0 -2.1 
Other foods 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.6 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 
Market prices        
Cereal grain -6.2 -6.0 -5.6 -6.7 0.8 -0.0 -0.7 
Oilseeds -7.4 -6.8 -6.0 -6.5 5.8 0.4 -0.4 
Livestock -2.2 -0.7 -0.4 -1.4 0.5 0.1 -0.3 
Meat & dairy -1.3 -0.4 -0.3 -1.0 0.3 0.1 -0.2 
Veg.oils,fats -3.3 -4.0 -2.7 -1.0 2.0 0.0 -0.2 
Other foods -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Exportsb        
Cereal grain 0.3 -2.9 5.0 23.4 15.9 -13.1 -27.1 
Oilseeds -28.8 -69.2 -18.4 -8.7 167.2 105.0 3.8 
Livestock 13.7 4.0 -1.4 12.6 -3.8 -1.8 -0.4 
Meat & dairy 7.5 2.1 0.1 7.1 -1.4 0.3 -1.2 
Veg.oils,fats 14.4 26.2 7.0 1.3 -15.0 5.8 -12.1 
Other foods 1.5 1.9 2.0 8.0 -1.4 -0.6 -1.4 
Importsb        
Cereal grain -1.9 -5.3 -2.8 -20 3.3 13.4 13.4 
Oilseeds -5.6 -21.9 3.0 -3.7 0.6 22.5 18.6 
Livestock -3.2 0.1 0.1 -5.9 0.9 0.5 0.7 
Meat & dairy -2.8 -0.5 0.8 -1.8 -0.2 -0.0 -0.2 
Veg.oils,fats -7.7 -5.5 -1.7 4.0 5.5 2.4 2.6 
Other foods -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 -2.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 
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Table 16.2: Scenario 2 - effects of selected regionsa adopting GM 
maize and soybean plus Western Europe bans imports 
of those products from GM-adopting regions continued 





Decomposition of welfare results 













North America 2,299 27 -1,372 3,641 
Southern Cone 663 71 -303 893 
China 804 74 70 669 
India 1,277 190 -3 1,092 
Western Europe -4,334 -4,601 257 0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 42 5 38 0 
Aust/New Zealand -52 -1 -49 0 
Japan & Asian NIEs 1,423 593 831 0 
Other developing and 
transition econs. 
1,296 101  531 672 
WORLD 3,419 -3,541 0 6,966 
a North America, Mexico, Southern Cone, China, Rest of East Asia, India, and 
South Africa. For space reasons, results for numerous regions in Table 1 are 
omitted from this table. 
b Includes intra-regional trade. 
Source: Nielsen and Anderson's (2001b) GTAP model results. 
 
almost one-fifth in the case of a Western European import ban as 
compared with no European reaction. In the case of Australia and 
New Zealand they too are slightly better off in the sense that they 
lose less in this than in scenario 1. 
Conclusion 
The results demonstrate that the potential economic welfare gains 
from adopting GMO technology in even just a subset of producing 
countries for these crops is non-trivial. In the case considered in the 
first scenario it amounts to around $10 billion per year for coarse 
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grain and oilseeds (gross of the cost of the R&D that generated GM 
technology). Moreover, developing countries would receive a 
sizeable share of those gains, and more so the more of them that are 
capable of introducing the new GM technology. The second scenario 
shows that the most extreme use of trade provisions, such as an 
import ban on GM crops by Western Europe, would be very costly 
in terms of economic welfare for the region itself (assuming 
opposition to GMOs is not very deep) – a cost which advisors to 
governments in the region should weigh against the perceived 
benefits to voters of adopting the precautionary principle in that 
way. More than that, exporters of GM products would not be able to 
reap as much benefit from the new technology in the presence of 
such a trade restriction. These gains foregone are sufficiently large 
that if policy makers ignore them when considering policy 
responses to appease opponents of GMOs, they risk getting into 
trade disputes.  
The above facts may well not prevent some countries from imposing 
import restrictions on GM products however, for at least four 
reasons. First, the Biosafety Protocol might be interpreted by them 
as absolving them of their WTO obligations not to raise import 
barriers. Second, if domestic production of GM crops is banned, 
farmers there would join with GMO protesters in calling for a 
raising of import barriers so as to keep out lower-cost 'unfair' 
competition. Third, the on-going lowering of import barriers, 
following the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and the 
information revolution's impact in reducing costs of trading 
internationally, pressure import-competing farmers to look for other 
ways of cutting imports.11 And fourth, the per capita cost of banning 
GMO imports in Western Europe amounts to barely US$15 per 
capita per year – hardly a major impediment to imposing an import 
ban. 
                                                 
11 The emergence of the concept of agriculture's so-called 
‘multifunctionality', and the call for trade policy and the WTO to deal with 
environmental and labour standards issues, can be viewed in a similar light 
(Anderson 1998, 2000).  
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Given these political economy forces, is there a way for WTO to 
accommodate them without having to alter WTO rules? Bagwell 
and Staiger (1999) address this question in a more-general setting 
and offer a suggestion. It is that when a country is confronted from 
greater import competition because of the adoption of a new 
domestic standard that is tougher than applies abroad, it should be 
allowed to raise its bound tariff by as much as is necessary to curtail 
that import surge. One can immediately think of problems with this 
suggestion, such as how to determine what imports would have 
been without that new standard. Rather than increase tariffs, 
however, direct payments that have a minimal distorting effect on 
trade may be a preferable alternative, especially if they are 
consistent with WTO support commitments. Options of this sort 
may have to be contemplated if the alternative is to add to the EU 
beef hormone case a series of GMO dispute settlement cases at the 
WTO that are even more difficult to resolve.  
Finally, the empirical results presented above show the importance 
of using a general equilibrium model when assessing the economic 
implications of quarantine measures by large countries and/or 
affecting large product groups. While the indirect economic effects 
on related groups may not be of direct concern to quarantine 
officers, they certainly should concern policy makers and advisors 
responsible for sound management of the economy, in addition to 
agricultural trade negotiators. 
References 
Anderson, K. (1998) 'Environmental and labor standards: what role 
for the WTO?' Ch. 8 in The WTO as an international organization, 
edited by Anne O. Krueger, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Anderson, K. (2000) 'Agriculture's 'multifunctionality' and the 
WTO.' Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 44(3): 
475-94, September. 
Armington, P. A. (1969) 'A Theory of demand for products 
distinguished by place of production.' IMF Staff Papers 16: 159-178. 
GMOs, the SPS Agreement and the WTO  329 
 
Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (1999) 'Domestic policies, national 
sovereignty and international economic institutions.' NBER 
Working Paper 7293, Cambridge MA, August. 
European Commission (1999) 'The EU approach to the Millennium 
Round: communication from the Commission to the Council and to 
the European Parliament.' Note for the 133 Committee. MD: 400/99, 
Brussels: European Commission. 
European Commission (2000) 'Economic impacts of genetically 
modified crops on the agri-food sector: a synthesis.' Working 
Document, DG-Agriculture, Brussels: European Commission, 
August. 
Hertel, T.W. (ed.) (1997) Global trade analysis: modeling and 
applications. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Howse, R. and D. Regan (2000) 'The product/process distinction - 
an illusory basis for disciplining unilateralism in trade policy,' 
mimeo, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, January. 
James, C. (1997) Global status of transgenic crops in 1997. ISAAA Briefs 
No. 5, Ithaca: International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
biotech Applications. 
James, C. (1998) Global Review of commercialized transgenic crops: 1998. 
ISAAA Briefs No.8, Ithaca: International Service for the Acquisition 
of Agri-biotech Applications.  
James, C. (1999) Global status of commercialized transgenic crops: 1999. 
ISAAA Briefs No.12: Preview, Ithaca: International Service for the 
Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications.  
James, S. and K. Anderson (1998) 'On the need for more economic 
assessment of quarantine/SPS policies', Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 42(4): 425-44, December. 
James, S. and K. Anderson (1999) 'Managing health risk in a market-
liberalizing environment: an economic approach', pp. 65-70 in Plant 
health in the new global trading environment: managing exotic insects, 
330  Part IV  Specific health and environmental risks from trade 
 
weeds and pathogens, edited by C.F. McRae and S.M. Dempsey. 
Canberra: National Office of Animal and Plant Health.  
McDougall, R. A., A. Elbehri and T. P. Truong (eds.) (1998) Global 
trade, assistance, and protection: the GTAP 4 data base. West Lafayette: 
Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University. 
Nelson, G. C., T. Josling, D. Bullock, L. Unnevehr, M. Rosegrant and 
L. Hill (1999) The economics and politics of genetically modified 
organisms: implications for WTO 2000. (with J. Babinard, C. 
Cunningham, A. De Pinto and E. I. Nitsi). Bulletin 809, College of 
Agricultural, Consumer and Environmental Sciences, University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, November.  
Nielsen, C. P. (1999) Økonomiske virkninger af landbrugets anvendelse af 
genteknologi: produktion, forbrug og international handel (Economic 
effects of applying genetic engineering in agriculture: production, 
consumption and international trade), with an English summary. 
Report no. 110. Danish Institute of Agricultural and Fisheries 
Economics (SJFI), Copenhagen. 
Nielsen, C.P. and K. Anderson (2000) 'Global market effects of 
adopting transgenic rice and cotton', mimeo, Centre for 
International Economic Studies, University of Adelaide, July. 
Nielsen, C.P. and K. Anderson (2001a) 'GMOs, trade policy, and 
welfare in rich and poor countries,' in Quantifying trade effects of 
technical barriers: can it be done? edited by K.E. Maskus and J.S. 
Wilson, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (forthcoming). 
Nielsen, C.P. and K. Anderson (2001b) 'Global market effects of 
alternative European responses to GMOs,' Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 
137(2) (forthcoming). 
OECD (1999) Modern biotechnology and agricultural markets: a 
discussion of selected issues and the impact on supply and markets. 
Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries. Committee for 
Agriculture. AGR/CA/APM/CFS/MD(2000)2, Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2000) Report of the Task Force for the Safety of Novel Foods and 
Feeds. C(2000)86/ADD1, Paris: OECD, 17 May. 
GMOs, the SPS Agreement and the WTO  331 
 
Roberts, D. (2000) 'Sanitary and phytosanitary risk management in 
the post-Uruguay Round era: an economic perspective', Ch. 2 in 
National Research Council, Incorporating science, economics, and 
sociology in developing sanitary and phytosanitary standards in 
international trade, Washington, DC: National Academy Press,  
Runge, C. F. and L. A. Jackson (2000) 'Labeling, trade and 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs): a proposed solution', 
Journal of World Trade (forthcoming). 
Tietje, Christian (1997) 'Voluntary Eco-Labelling Programmes and 
Questions of State Responsibility in the WTO/GATT Legal System', 
Journal of World Trade 31(1): 123-158. 
UNEP (2000) Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/biosafety-
protocol.htm 
USDA (1999) Impact of adopting genetically engineered crops in the US – 
preliminary results. Economic Research Service, USDA. Washington, 
DC, July. 
WTO (1995) The results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations: the legal texts, Geneva: WTO. 
WTO (1998a) Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, May, Geneva: WTO. 
WTO (1998b) 'Goods: Rules on NTMs', in WTO: A Training Package. 
Module 3, Geneva: WTO. 
WTO (1998c) 'EC -- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones)'. Report of the Appellate Body, 13 February. 




Food safety policy in the WTO era 
SALLIE JAMES 
The sovereign right of a country to protect its citizens from food-
borne health risks is recognised in the preamble and in Article 2.1 of 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (the SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) 1. Provided that measures to protect human health meet the 
obligations under the SPS Agreement, Member governments of the 
WTO are free to employ their own choice of policy instruments for 
food saftey purpose. 
Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
talks in 1993, there have been significant agricultural policy reform 
and international trade liberalisation. The general trend towards 
market liberalisation has, however, been matched by increases in the 
level and scope of regulations relating to food products (Henson 
1998; Henson and Caswell 1999). This is at least partly in response to 
an increase in demand for food safety (Kinsey 1993). Indeed, in a 
recent review, Roberts and DeRemer (1997) estimated that food 
safety standards accounted for 20 per cent of the restrictions on US 
agricultural exports in 1996.2 Analysts have pointed out that the 
increase in concern about food safety risks, particularly in wealthy 
                                                 
1 GATT (1994). For an extended discussion on the SPS Agreement and its 
relation to other WTO Agreements, see Roberts (1998b), Hooker (1999) and 
James (2000, Appendix). 
2 The impact of food safety standards on trade is difficult to measure 
because of the presence of firm specific costs, according to Henson (1998), who 
points out that most estimates to date are limited and/or anecdotal. 
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democracies, is in some cases not supported by scientific evidence 
(Henson, 1998; Henson and Caswell, 1999).3 To the extent that food 
safety policies reflect these concerns, risk mitigation measures may 
be difficult to defend under the science-based tests of the SPS 
Agreement. 
This chapter begins by exploring key issues relating to food safety 
policy. Attention is then turned to a discussion of proposed 
solutions to the problem of how to promote and secure libral trade 
while honouring both legitimate consumer demands for safe food 
and SPS commitments. 
Issues raised in the food safety economics  and trade 
literature 
Key considerations relevant to food safety policy makers are market 
failure, consumer perceptions of risk, information asymmetry, and 
externalities. Each is explored in this section before a discussion of 
how they might be addressed, given the disciplines of the SPS 
Agreement.4 
Market failure associated with food safety 
Henson and Traill (1993) and Swinbank (1993) afford a detailed 
examination of how the 'market' for safe food can fail. Broadly, the 
reasons include the divergence between perceptions and objective 
measures of risk; information asymmetry between buyers and 
sellers of food; the presence of externalities (such that the private 
and socially optimal levels of food safety do not concur); and 
distributional issues relating to willingness and ability to pay for 
food safety. In the context of the recent review of Australia's 
Imported Food Control Act, Tanner et al. (1998) outline the factors they 
                                                 
3 Nor have policy makers always fully considered trade impacts when 
reforming food safety policy (Hooker 1999), although the National Competition 
Policy Review of Australia's Imported Food Control Act 1992 explicitly considered 
Australia's international obligations (Tanner 1999). 
4 For comprehensive overviews of the food safety literature more 
generally see Henson and Caswell (1999) and Swinbank (1993). 
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consider to be pertinent to market failure in the food industry. 
Kinsey (1993) suggests that agreement about the extent of regulation 
required to correct food safety market failures will be difficult to 
reach since there are wide differences in opinion about the 
seriousness of each source of market failure. 
Consumer perceptions of risk 
There is a broad and comprehensive literature covering influences 
shaping consumer behaviour, especially relating to behaviour under 
conditions of uncertainty and to consumers' perceptions of risk 
(Henson and Traill 1993; Swinbank 1993; Pollack 1995; Henson, 
1998; Mahe and Ortalo-Magne 1998; Roberts 1998a; Deane 1999).  
Henson (1998) and Mahe and Ortalo-Magne (1998) outline the 
misperceptions of risk that can occur and the factors affecting 
consumers' evaluation of risk. For example, risks with the same 
probability of occurrence will frequently be estimated differently 
according to the nature of the risk involved. In particular, highly 
publicised and/or highly visible risks (like food safety scares such 
as BSE in Britain) tend to be overestimated such that the perceived 
probability of an event occurring tends to be relatively independent 
of its actual frequency. Mahe and Ortalo-Magne (1998) and Kerr 
(1999) point out that the media (at least in the short run) can 
exacerbate the problem by emphasising and dramatising real or ill-
founded hazards, especially when scientific knowledge is uncertain. 
Even when scientific opinions are fairly clear and unanimous, 
consumers seem reluctant to adopt them if they conflict with 
established beliefs. 
Mahe and Ortalo-Magne (1998) point out that consumer perceptions 
are to a large extent shaped by culture and Henson (1998) points to 
attitudes towards genetically modified (GM) and irradiated foods as 
examples of how perceptions of risk and their acceptability differ 
across countries). Insofar as these perceptions and demands are a 
primary influence on policy makers, so long as different cultures 
(and abilities to influence policy-makers) exist, they will challenge 
the WTO's objective to harmonise national health and safety 
standards. It will be especially difficult to achieve international 
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cooperation in cases when scientific evidence is limited and when 
environmental, health and ethical issues are all at stake (Mahe and 
Ortalo-Magne 1998). The debate surrounding the use of genetically 
modified organisms and the recent beef hormones dispute between 
the EC and the US is a clear example of such a case. 
In the context of the Hormones dispute, Roberts (1998b) suggests that 
"...many European consumers may prefer to consume hormone-free 
beef no matter what scientific evaluations conclude, and consent 
criteria and minority rights imply that public policy should permit 
individuals to avoid the consumption of foods that are questionable 
in their view" (p 403). Whether or not a ban on hormone-treated beef 
production and imports is the most efficient way to enable 
consumers to avoid hormone-treated beef is quite a different matter 
and is explored in James (2000).  
Kerr (1999) reports that consumer preferences are now being touted 
as a reason for restricting trade, and as an issue that is so important 
as to warrant special inclusion in the SPS Agreement when it is next 
reviewed: "...the EU would like to renegotiate the [SPS Agreement] 
to permit trade restrictions for reasons of consumer preference" (p. 
245). Such a proposal is risky since we cannot be sure that the 
'consumer groups' that lobby governments truly represent the 
preferences of society at large.  
It is clear from the amount of literature and the diversity of issues 
discussed therein that any policy maker concerned with human, 
animal and plant health issues must acknowledge the role of 
consumer perceptions and the explanations behind them. As 
Henson (1998) points out, to ignore factors such as consumer risk 
perceptions may be tempting given the complexities they introduce, 
but to do so is unlikely to reduce the number of disputes, or to make 
them easier to resolve (see also Bureau and Marette 2000). In any 
case, ignoring consumer sentiment is unlikely to make any dispute 
resolutions palatable to consumers. 
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Information asymmetry 
There is a disparity in the amount of information available to 
consumers and producers about the safety of foods. Credence 
attributes (those product attributes which are not recognisable or 
verifiable by the senses) such as nutritional value and chronic (i.e. 
delayed reaction) safety risks are the most obvious example of issues 
about which the consumer must trust the claims and integrity of the 
food manufacturer. Various solutions have been proposed to limit 
the potential for food producers to neglect (costly) food safety 
considerations in the pursuit of higher profits. Some of these are 
outlined below. 
Externalities 
Food hazards have potential effects that reach beyond the person 
afflicted with the food-borne illness. For example, production losses 
through work absences, public health expenses and the risk of the 
spread of infectious disease (i.e. through an infected person 
handling food) are all considerations somewhat beyond the concern 
of the person directly involved. An individual will often consider 
only costs to himself (should he fall ill) when deciding on their 
willingness to pay for food safety. Likewise, food manufacturers are 
unlikely to consider the wider health implications of any risks borne 
by their food and will consider only private (i.e. firm) marginal costs 
in their food safety supply decision unless institutional structures 
force them to take public health issues into account. How to induce 
this rather imperfect market to arrive at a position of the socially 
optimal level of food safety is a subject of much research. 
Approaches to managing food safety risks 
The following policy approaches are by no means exhaustive, nor 
are they necessarily mutually exclusive. On the contrary, it is likely 
that any credible food safety system would contain elements of all of 
them. At the laissez-faire end of the policy intervention spectrum, it 
has been suggested that the threat of loss of reputation, brand-
power and/or resources (e.g. through litigation) is enough incentive 
for firms to provide the level of food safety required by consumers 
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(Swinbank 1993 and Henson 1998). Clearly in practise this is 
thought to provide insufficient protection, since most western 
democracies have some level of food safety regulations. 
Private standards 
In addition to government-proscribed standards, many industries 
have adopted private standards (such as those of the International 
Standards Organization (ISO) and standards incorporating HACCP5 
principles) and minimum quality assurance schemes in a kind of 
"self regulation". Performance standards – those that specify the 
attributes of the final product – are generally thought to be more 
efficient than process standards (which dictate the method by which 
firms must produce their goods in order to conform to a chosen 
safety level) because they enable more flexibility (and therefore 
probably more efficiency) at the firm level (Unnevehr and Jensen 
1996; Henson 1998). The mandatory adoption of preventative 
systems such as HACCP in some industries may be seen as a 
compromise between rigid, market constraining "command and 
control" standards and more flexible, market based solutions (such 
as taxes). Costs of enforcement also tend to be lower (Henson and 
Caswell 1999). 
The Imported Food Control Act Review Committee recommended a 
partnership approach (or co-regulation) between the food industry 
and government to encourage industry (including the importers) to 
accept responsibility to ensure food complies with food safety 
requirements (e.g. through the adoption of quality assurance 
arrangements). The government's role would be to implement 
auditing and regulatory frameworks to ensure consumers that the 
requirements were being met (Tanner 1999). Such an approach 
appears to be consistent with the belief that performance standards 
are the best way of meeting safety standards while allowing firm 
flexibility. 
                                                 
5 HACCP stands for hazard analysis and critical control points. 
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Industry-controlled initiatives and public food safety mechanisms 
can be co-operative.6 Private standards may themselves be a 
response to public requirements and in this sense may become de 
facto public standards, especially if they are widely adopted (Henson 
1998). Indeed, in those markets where private standards are well 
established and important, they may take precedence over public 
standards in determining production and import conditions. 
In such an environment, the ability of public regulatory reform to 
overcome barriers to agri-food trade is limited (Henson 1998). The 
effectiveness of the SPS Agreement, insofar as it has jurisdiction 
over the public policy domain only, may be reduced over time as 
private guidelines and standards become more important. It at least 
raises the question of how to bring private standards under SPS 
Agreement disciplines (Henson 1998). 
The present author concedes it may be a difficult task considering 
the voluntary nature of many private standards. Perhaps the best 
way governments can prevent private standards from becoming 
non-tariff barriers to trade is by providing clear guidelines to 
industry bodies about the government's obligations to the WTO and 
by ensuring that incentive structures encourage private standards to 
abide by the spirit (if not the letter) of these obligations. Indeed, 
Article 13 of the SPS Agreement imposes certain obligations on 
WTO Members for measures developed by non-government bodies 
(i.e. that " Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to them to ensure that non-governmental entities within 
their territories…comply with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement" and that "Members shall not take measures which have 
the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging 
such…non-governmental entities…to act in a manner inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement"). A transparent, consultative 
                                                 
6 Public interventions alone may in any case be insufficient to protect 
humans from food borne health risks. As Unnevehr (1996) points out, food-
borne pathogens have the potential to enter at any point in the food preparation 
chain and therefore responsibility for food safety needs to be shared between 
consumers and producers, with some intervention by government. 
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approach will deter transgressions and check the use of SPS 
measures as disguised barriers to trade. 7 
Harmonisation (or rapprochement) 
Regulatory co-operation has been suggested as the best way of 
minimising trade disputes (Mahe and Ortalo-Magne 1998). For 
example, Kinsey (1993) suggests that, while requiring more 
expensive inspection procedures, recognising equivalence on the 
basis of attributes of the final product encourages innovation in 
production and processing methods and facilitates trade. There are 
three degrees to which countries can co-operate in their efforts to 
reform food safety policies and minimise restrictions on trade: called 
rapprochement in the trade literature (Henson and Caswell 1999; 
Hooker 1999). At the weakest extreme this involves consultation and 
co-ordination in order to narrow significant differences in national 
food safety regulations. Mutual recognition acknowledges other 
regulatory systems as equivalent in their ability to achieve food 
safety standards. The strongest level of co-ordination is 
harmonisation and standardisation of policies (which may involve 
adopting international standards), although the three types of 
rapprochement are to some extent co-existing and complementary.8  
The potential for harmonisation is limited to the extent that 
countries agree on the policy objective: called the 'acceptable level of 
risk' or the 'appropriate level of protection'. In the context of GM 
food, Caswell (2000) says: "…recognising equivalency will not go far 
in smoothing over differences in acceptance of biotechnology 
because governments essentially are disagreeing about the 
                                                 
7 In a sense, there is an adverse selection problem inherent in publicising 
SPS regulations, since the least restrictive members are the ones more likely to 
comply with the transparency clause. Conversely, because more transparent 
Members are necessarily more open to challenge, Members promulgating 
excessive restrictions are less likely to publicise their SPS measures, unless 
required to do so by law. Countries are unlikely to be transparent unless 
obligated, hence the necessity and benefits of the transparency provisions. 
8 The articles in the SPS Agreement most explicitly promoting 
rapprochement are Articles 3 and 4, which incorporate harmonisation and 
equivalence principles respectively (Hooker 1999). 
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appropriate level of protection". Similarly, Kinsey (1993) and 
Hooker (1999) argue that harmonisation will be difficult to achieve 
beyond the bilateral or regional level (where agreement on food 
safety standards is easier to achieve than in multilateral fora) since 
there are differences in opinion as to the factors to include when 
deciding on the appropriate level of protection. 
Even if harmonisation is achieved, it provides no guarantee against 
discrimination in favour of domestic producers. Henson (1998) 
asserts "…[a] food safety standard is discriminatory if costs of 
compliance are greater for importers than domestic 
producers…[such that]…even harmonised standards can be 
discriminatory…". Domestic firms will always have an advantage 
over foreign firms if there are institutional and cultural advantages 
for incumbent firms who are familiar with the domestic regulatory 
environment. They also may benefit from better access to regulatory 
and compliance information and from economies of scale in 
compliance (again, those firms with a large incumbent presence may 
reap gains from "specialising" in domestic regulations compared to 
those more international firms who have a larger range of 
regulations with which they must comply) (Henson 1998).9 
Given that all food safety standards are at least potentially 
discriminatory, one may well ask on what basis they are to be 
judged in the event of a dispute. One possible solution is to ask to 
what extent they are excessively discriminatory, that is, over and 
above what would be considered unavoidable discrimination given 
the inherent advantages to domestic firms outlined above. 
Labelling 
The use of labels has been suggested as one way of overcoming the 
problem of how to allow for consumer choice while protecting the 
interests of consumers for safe food (Mahe and Ortalo-Magne 1998; 
                                                 
9 The transparency and notification requirements of the SPS Agreement 
are likely to go some way to alleviating the excessive costs placed on those 
firms trying to export to environments where there are language barriers and 
where transparency about national regulations was previously lacking, or 
where regulatory change was frequent. 
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Runge and Jackson 2000). When there are clear health risks 
associated with consumption of a product, labels alone might not be 
the most efficient or effective solution. For example, in response to 
the overwhelming scientific evidence linking cigarette smoking to 
heart and lung conditions, public authorities have responded by 
using some combination of labelling, excise taxes and restrictions on 
sales and consumption in public places. But where the scientific 
evidence is mixed or insufficient, and where consumers have 
different degrees of risk acceptance or willingness to pay to avoid 
risk, labels are thought to allow a sufficient degree of consumer 
choice to consume or avoid products which they find acceptable or 
objectionable. They also provide information on credence attributes. 
Beyond providing information to consumers, labels also have value 
to producers as a way of revealing consumer preferences. If 
consumers base their consumption decisions on what they read on a 
label, then, ceteris paribus, the market will tend to reward those 
products with the attributes most desirable to consumers, and thus 
lead to more production of goods wanted most (Caswell and 
Padberg 1992). An even wider definition of the value of food labels 
includes their existence value: the fact that consumers may derive 
benefit for knowing that the composition and content of food 
products is being observed and regulated. Caswell and Padberg 
(1992) assert that the resulting consumer confidence in the food 
supply is important, if difficult to observe.  
Still assuming that scientific evidence as to the safety and/or 
nutritional content of food is conflicting or inconclusive, compulsory 
labelling has, especially in relation to genetically modified (GM) 
foods, produced mixed reactions. Critics of labelling systems 
purport that labels may arouse fear or suspicion in consumers 
unnecessarily: that if there is no scientific evidence to suggest that 
foods may be inherently unsafe, labels may inadvertently convince 
consumers that they pose a health risk (Quiggin 1999).10  
                                                 
10 The US is opposed to labels on hormone-treated beef for this reason; 
indeed, if there is no SPS risk associated with a product, regulations – including 
labels – cease to become an SPS issue and will be subject to The WTO's 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade disciplines (Caswell 2000) 
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The costs of a labelling system will determine to what extent it is 
preferable to other SPS measures. From a cost/benefit perspective, it 
is possible to imagine that, should the vast majority of consumers 
wish to avoid certain food technologies such as GM food, labelling 
(assuming it is not costless) may be welfare inferior to a ban on that 
technology (Bureau et al. 1998; Caswell 2000). Whether such a ban 
would be legally acceptable is another matter. 
Legal implications of the Hormones dispute  
The first SPS dispute – that between the EC and the US and Canada 
about the use of hormonal growth promotants in beef – yielded 
controversial results. The purpose here is not to debate the legal 
intricacies of the case,11 but to draw out the main implications for 
governments wishing to use the findings of the dispute settlement 
bodies as guidelines for how the directives in the Agreement should 
be interpreted. Many commentators see the dispute as a precursor to 
the brewing debate about trade in GM food, since the same sorts of 
issues that arose in Hormones – uncertainty, lack of (or disagreement 
concerning) objective and/or conclusive scientific evidence, and 
differing consumer and producer perceptions of risk – are equally 
relevant for GMOs. 
Broadly, the ruling of the Appellate Body of the Hormones case was 
thus: Firstly, that a Member's chosen 'appropriate level of protection' 
is not required to be the same as the relevant international standard 
provided that scientific evidence is obtained and presented as 
justification for a higher standard. Secondly, the scientific opinion 
on which a measure is based does not have to be that of the majority 
of experts in the field. And thirdly, the EC measure was not based 
on an adequate risk assessment and the EC should bring its policy 
into accordance with the SPS Agreement. 
An interesting finding from a policy-makers point of view is that a 
measure is considered to be in accordance with the requirements of 
Article 5.1 so long as an "objective relationship" can be found 
                                                 
11 See Hurst (1998), Roberts (1998b), Cottier (1999), Pauwelyn (1999) and 
Chapter 4 in this volume, by Stanton. 
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between scientific evidence and the measure when the measure is 
challenged (WTO 1998, para. 189), implying that there is no 
procedural requirement to Article 5.1. If this view prevails, however, 
there is potential for the spirit of the SPS Agreement to be 
undermined. As Hurst (1998) points out, the Appellate Body's 
interpretation implies that a Member has a responsibility to ensure 
its measure is consistent with scientific evidence only when it is 
challenged. Conversely, the Panel found that a risk assessment must 
be considered in advance of implementation (WTO 1997a, para. 
8.113; WTO 1997b, para. 8.116). 
The study by James (1999) of the EC ban on beef produced using 
hormones concludes that the SPS measure chosen by the EC 
ostensibly to protect consumers' health is welfare inferior to free 
trade, under the assumptions used. It is likely that beef trade 
liberalisation combined with a labelling scheme is the best way of 
securing consumer choice while abiding by WTO rules. 
Furthermore, producers outside the EU will also gain from EU beef 
trade liberalisation, as the technological constraint imposed by the 
ban is removed. These conclusions will not be news to those familiar 
with the economics of distortions and welfare, but in the context of 
SPS policy it represents a new approach and a significant departure 
from the view that SPS measures are beyond the scope of economic 
analysis. 
The use of economic analysis given the disciplines of the 
SPS Agreement 
There is a belief among some economists that the contribution of the 
discipline is being relegated to a minor role in the interpretation and 
implementation of SPS Agreement rules (Mahe and Ortalo-Magne 
1998; Hooker 1999). The role of economics is widely believed to 
belong in the risk management phase of risk analysis – for example, 
in evaluating alternative strategies – which is given secondary status 
in the SPS Agreement (Caswell 2000). 
While the disciplines in Article 5.3 allow exclusively scientific 
reasons in the decision to implement a particular measure, there 
appear to be no limits on factors that can be considered by 
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authorities in risk management decisions. Indeed, it is recognised as 
a sovereign right of a Member to choose their acceptable level of 
risk.12 There is considerable disagreement among WTO Member 
countries about which factors are legitimate ones to include in the 
risk analysis framework (Roberts 2000; Caswell 2000). For example, 
some Members have suggested that 'uncertainty' is a legitimate 
factor to consider, and they should be able to set a "zero risk" level 
based on the precautionary principle (Caswell 2000). This ambiguity 
is augmented by the somewhat imprecise line that the SPS 
Agreement implicitly draws between risk management and risk 
assessment: "…the concept of "acceptable level of risk…[on which 
the SPS Agreement in based] fuses risk assessment and risk 
management by embedding value judgements about which risks are 
'acceptable' into scientific assessments" (Roberts 2000, p 34). 
A major difference between the economic paradigm and the risk 
assessment paradigm can be summarised thus: (scientific) risk 
assessment is done on a commodity-by-commodity basis, but there 
appears to be no scope within the Agreement for commodity-by-
commodity analysis on the appropriate level of protection (risk 
management).13 The concern that has been expressed by some 
officials and commentators (see, for example, Bureau et al. 2000; 
Sinner 1999; Kerr 1999; Roberts 1998b and 2000) that using economic 
tools such as cost benefit analysis and frameworks such as that 
                                                 
12 According to Bureau and Doussin (1999), the rulings of Salmon and 
Hormones reaffirm the right of Member to choose their own standards so long as 
they are chosen in an appropriate manner: "…what is imposed is a procedure 
for setting regulations rather than a particular standard.” (p. 4). 
13 The most disaggregated that appropriate levels of protection are 
allowed to be, at least according to the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee) guidelines, are on a broad kingdom 
level: a member may choose an appropriate level of protection for human 
health, another for animal health and yet another for plant health (Committee 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 2000).  
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presented in James and Anderson (1998) on a case-by-case basis may 
be inconsistent with various Articles of the SPS Agreement.14  
More specifically, using cost/benefit analysis (or any other 
economic tool) to justify SPS measures could breach the SPS 
Agreement if it engenders different results for different import 
sources with similar risk status; or different levels of acceptable 
protection in different but comparable situations.  
There are no directives in the SPS Agreement to prevent 
governments from removing SPS restrictions if doing so is found to 
be welfare increasing, but Sinner (1999) expresses concern that such 
a strategy, even if it has a positive influence on trade, could fail to 
satisfy the consistency criteria of Article 5.5: 
"...concern could arise if ... [a] government rejected, due to 
insufficient benefits, an application for ... goods that presented 
similar risks to [other] goods approved because the benefits of 
its importation outweighed otherwise significant risks." 
(Sinner 1999, p. 7) 
There is another danger in allowing economic factors to be included 
in risk management. If economic considerations – including 
consumer gains from trade – can be considered when choosing or 
justifying a SPS measure, the opportunity may arise to use producer 
losses from import competition as a reason for restricting trade (see 
also Roberts 1998a, b and 2000; Robertson 1998; and Sinner 1999). 15 
When advocating economic analysis in SPS decisions, it should be 
kept in mind that the economic efficiency test will not always yield a 
trade liberalisation recommendation and anyway is not a legal basis 
for a SPS measure under the terms of the SPS Agreement. Using 
welfare economics may also limit the potential for harmonisation 
since cost/benefit analysis is likely to yield different results in 
different countries (Caswell 2000). 
                                                 
14 Objections have also been raised on philosophical grounds about using 
cost-benefit analysis to value human life (Henson and Traill, 1993; Swinbank, 
1993; Roberts, 2000), an issue beyond the scope of this paper. 
15 Roberts (2000) sees this possibility as limited by the directives of Article 
2.2 
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On the other hand, WTO-legal measures may be economically 
inefficient. Bureau et al. (2001) point out that under the terms of the 
SPS Agreement, "...[s]hould a country be able to prove that there is a 
risk of dissemination of a pathogen, and even if the risk level is 
small, the economic consequence of dissemination negligible, and 
the economic costs of the ban considerable, the ban would be 
legitimate." (p. 22). From an economic standpoint, this seems to be 
an undesirable possibility, especially considering the SPS 
Agreement was designed to discipline the use of unnecessarily 
restrictive non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade. But unnecessarily 
restrictive measures are the fault of domestic policy makers and lie 
not with the SPS Agreement itself. Indeed, Article 5.6 specifies that 
measures should not be more trade-restrictive than required to 
achieve the appropriate level of protection. As Roberts (2000) points 
out, "[the SPS Agreement] is an international trade treaty, not a 
regulatory blueprint" (p. 46). While it is not possible under the terms 
of the SPS Agreement for a government to justify an illegal measure 
on economic welfare grounds, there is nothing in the Agreement to 
prevent governments from choosing the most efficient policy 
instrument so long as it adheres to its provisions. 
The recently released guidelines to WTO Members on how to 
implement Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement (Committee on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures 2000) make no binding 
recommendations. A few important implications emerge. Firstly, the 
appropriate level of protection can be different according to whether 
it relates to protecting human health, animal health or plant health. 
Secondly, when setting the appropriate level of protection, a 
Member should consider appropriate levels of protection already 
determined. If there are differences between that appropriate level 
of protection and the appropriate level of protection in question, the 
Member should consider whether those differences are arbitrary 
and unjustifiable and whether the represent a disguised restriction 
on international trade. If so, either of the appropriate levels of 
protection (or both) may need revision to ensure consistency. 
Thirdly, the Committee suggests that members may wish to 
consider the decisions of other Members, and of relevant 
international organisations, when determining their appropriate 
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level of protection. For the moment, it seems conformity to 
international standards is the surest way to avoid censure from a 
WTO body. 
From the Hormones dispute it has become clear that the SPS 
Agreement provides few guidelines for situations of uncertainty, or 
scientific ambiguity, except for the precautionary principal 
embedded in Article 5.7. Measures implemented on the basis of 
uncertainty (and not applicable under Article 5.7) will be difficult to 
defend under Article 5.1, since an "uncertainty assessment" is 
nonsensical. This weakness in the SPS Agreement will become 
increasingly obvious and cumbersome with the growth of GMOs 
and measures to restrict their use and trade (Hooker 1999).  
The role of economics in determining the appropriate level of 
protection was not explicitly referred to in the guidelines, but the 
Committee did suggest "…[a]dvice may be sought from recognised, 
qualified experts, and could include commenting on …potential 
discriminatory trade effects…" (p. 4). The recommendation that 
economists be involved in providing advice about trade 
discrimination effects of SPS policy is shared by James and 
Anderson (1998), Mahe and Ortalo-Magne (1998) and Caswell 
(2000).  
A particularly worrying comment from these guidelines is offered in 
the section on practical implementation of an appropriate level of 
protection: "…Members are not always able to indicate precisely 
their appropriate level of protection. In such cases, the appropriate 
level of protection may be determined on the basis of the level of 
protection reflected in the sanitary or phytosanitary measures in 
place" (p. 4). This is certainly a risky path to take, considering that 
some existing SPS measures may have been implemented many 
years ago, under different technological, agricultural and trading 
conditions and perhaps for reasons not exclusively related to SPS 
risk.16 Far from advocating historically based policy, some 
                                                 
16 It also contradicts an earlier statement in the same guidelines that "[t]he 
determination of the appropriate level of protection is an element in the 
decision-making process which logically precedes the selection and use of one or 
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economists recommend periodic review of SPS measures (James and 
Anderson, 1998). Regular reviews of area freedom status and 
domestic quarantine and food safety policies will be needed to 
ensure methods of determining acceptable risk and measures to 
achieve it are beyond legal reproach and reflective of changing 
technology and risk conditions in the home country and abroad. 
Similarly, the Imported Food Control Act Review Committee 
recommended that legislation aimed at ensuring imported food 
meets Australian food safety standards be sufficiently flexible such 
that it can be compatible with changes in food production and 
processing technology, and any changes in Australian's own 
domestic food safety standards (Tanner 1999). 
Economic analysis should become more prevalent in import risk 
analyses. A comprehensive review of current SPS barriers may 
reveal inefficiencies, if WTO challenges do not reveal them first.17 
The use of SPS barriers is typically seen as a scientific issue, and 
necessary to protect humans, animals and plants from health risks. 
But economists would see them as a resource issue as well, and 
hence amenable to economic analysis. The fact that SPS measures 
are different from standard trade barriers in that they can correct 
externalities does not mean they are always efficient, or that the 
externalities cannot be corrected in better ways. Using economic 
analysis, particularly in risk management decisions, will improve 
the efficiency of SPS policies, and promote the balance between 
achieving gains from trade reform and protecting human, plant and 
animal health. 
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Environmental risk evaluation in quarantine 
decision making 
JOHN D. MUMFORD 
Quarantine decisions affect the value of both cultivated and natural 
environments. While the economic principles governing these 
decisions are broadly similar, many specific issues are quite 
different in the two situations. There is no consensus on the value of 
the natural environment at risk from invasive species or how it can 
be determined. An appropriate level of spending on prevention and 
mitigation of losses from invasive species in the natural 
environment has not been explicitly agreed, nor has the way in 
which that cost should be allocated within society. 
Few studies have determined either the overall value of a nation's 
natural environment or the potential economic loss to the 
environment due to invasive species. New Zealand has recently put 
a value of NZ$46 billion/year on the indigenous natural 
environment (New Zealand Ministry of Environment 1998). In the 
US two recent estimates have been published on losses due to 
invasive species. One covers only some selected species (US Office 
of Technology Assessment 1993) while in the last year a more 
general estimate has been made, US$138 billion/year lost due to all 
invasive species (Pimentel 2000; Pimentel et al. 1999), from over 
50,000 species that have entered the USA. Concern about the often 
                                                 
 Thanks to Megan Quinlan for help with background materials and 
experience with quarantine practices and Susana Mourato for discussions on 
environmental discounting issues. 
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irremediable loss of biodiversity is increasing and international 
agreements on biodiversity, trade and phytosanitary measures all 
require governments to take action. In the last year the US spent an 
estimated US$590 million to prevent and control unwanted exotic 
organisms, raised from fees (US$141 million) charged to users 
(importers, shippers, travellers, air carriers, etc) for inspections, with 
additional public funds allocated by Congress1. However, as 
Pimentel et al. (1999) point out, overall the introduction of exotic 
species to the United States has made a positive contribution of 
US$800 billion/year. International agreements require countries to 
undertake trade without unnecessary restriction. Therefore, a purely 
precautionary approach is inappropriate, and it has been discarded 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Agreement for anything other than a temporary measure2. 
There are three key issues to contemplate in including 
environmental considerations in quarantine decisions: prediction, 
evaluation and attribution. More specific issues are discussed in 
greater detail through the remainder of the chapter. 
Prediction of impacts of invasion by exotic species in natural 
environments is, in general, even more difficult than in agricultural 
systems (Myers et al. 2000; US Office of Technology Assessment, 
1993). The systems have greater ecological complexity, which affects 
both the prediction of the direct impacts and the management 
performance of any curative actions. It is also more difficult to 
anticipate the pathways of invasion, the range of possible invaders 
or the geographic boundaries of potential impacts. Public attitudes 
to environmental risks are diverse, as well, so it is more difficult to 
agree even on the time scales that might be appropriate to consider. 
Stakeholders determine the value of environmental risk and its 
prevention through complex valuation criteria. But who is a 
stakeholder? How can these criteria be agreed and measured? How 
do we value conservation in a dynamic ecological community? Risk 
                                                 
1 USDA Budget 1999 estimated. 
http://www.usda.gov/agency/obpa/Budget-Summary/2000/text.html#mrp 
2 Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. 
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acceptance, even when the degree of risk is agreed, is a normative 
process dependent on the attitudes, interests and circumstances of 
each individual. Quarantine agencies must try to take actions that 
reflect a reasonable representation of that acceptance in the public. 
However, attitudes may vary much more on environmental issues 
than they do for commodity regulation, in which the relatively 
narrow business interests of fairly homogenous stakeholders are 
better focused (Perkins 1989; Kazmierczak 1996). Many people feel, 
at one extreme, that they have an obligation to protect the 
environment. At the other extreme there are those who put the 
environment, especially the unseen, distant or future environment, 
well below the day-to-day priorities of the here and now and their 
own struggles for families, work and homes (Stonehouse and 
Mumford 1994). Creating a consensus on even the dimensions of 
evaluation for environmental quarantine will inevitably be difficult. 
The attribution of roles within a quarantine program with 
environmental relevance is also more difficult than for commodities. 
The responsibility for initiation, prevention, management and cost 
recovery does not always fall on the same group. Institutional 
divisions, for example between ministries of environment or interior 
and agriculture, as in the USA and UK, make it more difficult to 
initiate action or to take management decisions. President Clinton's 
decision in 1999 to establish an integrated interdepartmental 
approach in the USA3, New Zealand's earlier establishment of a 
Biosecurity Council, and similar efforts in South Africa, are steps 
towards resolving issues of responsibility. However, there remains a 
problem of what the role of "non-responsible" stakeholders is. 
Should a group that is not prepared to pay for management of an 
invasive species have as much, or any, say in the way that 
management is conducted – if they are not prepared to be 
responsible should they even be considered stakeholders? Should 
groups who will suffer costs or lost opportunities because of 
quarantine, and that have no choice but to bear the burden as a 
result, have limits put on their personal losses, when they are not 
necessarily responsible for the risk? Indeed is quarantine a 
                                                 
3 http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppd/ead/eo13112.html 
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democratic issue in which all citizens and organisations are 
automatically stakeholders? 
Environmental risk evaluation 
What has value in the environment? 
There are four components of value in the natural environment: use, 
existence, bequest and moral values. Use (or at least the option of 
use) is the easiest to measure. Recreation and amenity can be valued 
by estimating costs of travel, user fees, purchase of equipment 
associated with outdoor pursuits, etc. Indirect benefits arise from a 
value people place on the knowledge that a natural environment (or 
component of it) exists, that they can pass on this existence to future 
generations (at least to grandchildren, the limit of many people's 
thoughts), or that they have fulfilled a moral obligation in providing 
stewardship. Indirect values require measures of contingent 
valuation to express willingness to pay, which are fraught with 
difficulties of estimation. Two critical issues of contingent valuation 
are the lack of public awareness of what is in the environment to 
value in the first place – many species are unseen, far away, etc – 
and the problem of valuing non-responses. The first tends to 
undervalue the environment, and the latter, if non-responses are 
ignored, may overvalue it.  
In commodity oriented quarantine decisions values are likely to be 
limited to, or at least dominated by, use. By contrast, non-use values 
(existence, bequest and moral) are likely to be the greater part of 
total environmental value. Of NZ$46 billion/year (1994 values) 
value placed on indigenous biological diversity in New Zealand, 
only NZ$9 billion/year is through direct environmental services to 
the national economy and the remainder is in indirect benefits (for 
example aesthetic and moral values) (New Zealand Ministry of 
Environment 1998). That report suggested it would be conservative 
to assume 5-10 per cent of the direct value would be at risk from all 
environmental change each year, but made no assumptions about 
losses to the much higher, but less tangible, indirect values. 
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The natural environment may face relatively low risks in terms of 
lost use value from introduced organisms. Many threats from exotic 
organisms are to individual species within an ecosystem, and this 
may not greatly affect recreation or amenity value, unless there is 
significant loss of a highly visible species or one particularly 
associated with certain cultural values. Furthermore, existence value 
is not lost in direct proportion to the area affected. Large areas could 
be lost completely, but as long as some is preserved much of the 
perceived existence value is maintained, though it may be more 
vulnerable to further loss in the future. 
An alternative approach, considered by the EU in regard to 
environmental liability for a threat to the natural environment in 
protected areas (European Commission 2000), takes the cost of 
restoration to the original state or to an equivalent state as the 
starting point for a reasonable valuation of damage. However, the 
cost of restoration of an area does not have a direct relation to the 
actual lost value, which may be greater or less. This is particularly 
true in cases where only some parts of the environment are 
damaged, and so the existence and bequest value of the remaining 
areas continue, despite the loss of part of the area, or where use 
simply moves elsewhere.  
Where would the greatest impact in quarantine measures be? 
Quarantine involves both preventative management of people, 
products and vessels entering the country, and subsequent 
mitigative management in the event of outbreaks. Risk to the 
natural environment could come from any form of entry, but seems 
more likely to come from diverse personal belongings, packaging 
materials and adventitious passage on ships and aircraft than from 
agricultural produce (which is more likely to harbour its own more 
specific pests). In terms of value the threat to forests and amenity 
trees appears to be greatest, due both to the relatively large area 
they occupy, and their high value in the case of amenity trees. 
Of the US$138 billion/year losses estimated by Pimentel et al. (1999) 
approximately US$33 billion/year is more or less "environmental". 
Of these the greatest impact comes from the introduction of 
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carnivorous mammals, especially cats, followed by rats, molluscs 
and forest insects. The relative impact of future invasive species is 
likely to be much less for individual species, given the widespread 
presence of rats, cats and several molluscs already. 
Various studies have indicated the extent of invasions into natural 
environments. Mooney and Drake (1989) reviewed several sets of 
data indicating very high levels of invasions amongst many major 
taxonomic groups, for example over half the 2000 flowering plant 
species in Hawaii are invaders. Wallner (1996) describes extensive 
invasions in forest communities in the United States. Smith et al. 
(1997) present a comprehensive list of over 250 designated 
quarantine insect and disease pests for Europe, many of which 
would attack natural environments. 
Risk acceptability related to the environment 
The standards for risk acceptability are different for the natural 
environment and for agriculture. Moral, bequest and existence 
values apply to the environment. Since these indirect values can be a 
substantial multiple of the direct value, the scale of risk may be 
greater in natural environments, but there is likely to be much less 
objective agreement on the level of that value. The natural 
environment is a universal property, so everyone is to some extent a 
stakeholder, but the degree of personal attachment is for the most 
part weaker than for commercial interests. There must be more 
reliance on public services to manage environmental risks than 
would be the case for commodities under private management, so 
the public has less opportunity to participate personally in decisions 
or subsequent actions. Finally, risk analysis involves a balance of 
benefits and losses, but there is little imperative to take a risk to 
improve or develop the environment, as there might be in 
agriculture, through the import of risky propagation materials, for 
example. As a result there is likely to be a more conservative 
approach to environmental risks. 
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Demand for environmental risk evaluation in quarantine 
Quarantine policy must be embodied in national legislation that 
complies with international obligations. This should reflect broad 
social values on the roles and rights of producers and importers, 
travellers, consumers, agriculture, fisheries and the natural 
environment. The quarantine process should be both effective in 
meeting the demands expressed and be economically efficient. 
Various approaches are taken, none of which are definitive. Some 
involve explicit economic evaluation of risks while others apply 
values implicitly, but "any decision implies evaluation" (Stonehouse 
and Mumford 1994). Explicit criteria are highly transparent, which is 
an important goal at both national and international levels. 
However, explicit criteria may highlight intrinsic cultural 
differences on risk and values within and between nations. 
National legislation 
Economic criteria are not the only rationale established in law as a 
basis for quarantine. For example, the New Zealand Biosecurity Act 
19934 provides several justifications for a Minister to notify a 
national pest management strategy to deal with an exotic pest 
organism: the Minister should be of the opinion that the benefits of 
action exceed the cost, it is better to act nationally than locally, and 
that there will be a "serious adverse and unintended effect" on either 
"economic wellbeing" or the "viability of species", "the survival and 
distribution of indigenous plants or animals, or the sustainability of 
natural and developed ecosystems, ecological processes, and 
biological diversity", soil or water quality, "human…enjoyment of 
the recreational value of the natural environment", and/or cultural 
values. 
The US Council on Environmental Quality specifies environmental 
impact statements (EIS) in which cost/benefit analysis (CBA) may 
be a part of the process, along with qualitative environmental 
values, though no particular method is specified5. 
                                                 
4 Section 57 
5 http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppd/ead/g12 
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James and Anderson (1998) recommended that greater emphasis be 
placed on objective economic evaluation in Australian quarantine 
policy. Their concern is that quarantine actions are often a simplistic 
reaction to the relatively narrow interests of particular interest 
groups, either producers, consumers or environmental groups. Such 
decisions, particularly those resulting in exclusion of products, may 
not provide the most economically efficient outcome and do not 
reflect overall social values. 
International agreements 
The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is working 
towards new guidelines that can operate in conjunction with the 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)6 to reduce environmental risk 
from invasive organisms. These are not based on economic criteria 
but on an implied value in biodiversity. IPPC (2000) recognises "that 
under the IPPC's existing mandate, to take account of environmental 
concerns, further clarification should include consideration of the 
following five proposed points relating to potential environmental 
risks of plant pests: 
 Reduction or elimination of endangered (or threatened) 
native plant species; 
 Reduction or elimination of a keystone plant species (a 
species which plays a major role in the maintenance of an 
ecosystem); 
 Reduction or elimination of a plant species which is a major 
component of a native ecosystem;  
 Causing a change to plant biological diversity in such a 
way as to result in ecosystem destabilisation; and 
 Resulting in control, eradication or management programs 
that would be needed if a quarantine pest were introduced, 
and impacts of such programs (e.g. pesticides or release of 
non-indigenous predators and parasites) on biological 
diversity." 
                                                 
6 http://www.biodiv.org/ 
Chapter 18  Environmental risk evaluation  361 
 
Within the CBD itself, economic factors are not specifically 
mentioned as part of the obligations for environmental assessments 
and where economic issues are mentioned they are in language that 
does not specify any particular methodology. The CBD has draft 
guiding principles for the prevention and mitigation of impacts of 
alien species (UNEP 2000). The first is precautionary, in which "Lack 
of scientific certainty about the environmental, social and economic 
risk posed by a potentially invasive alien species or by a potential 
pathway should not be used as a reason for not taking preventative 
action against the introduction of potentially invasive alien species." 
The second states that prevention is cheaper than cure, and refers to 
later principles on how to respond when an outbreak has occurred: 
"The preferred response would be eradication at the earliest possible 
stage (Principle 13). In the event that eradication is not feasible or is 
not cost-effective, containment (Principle 14) and long-term control 
measures should be considered (Principle 15). Any examination of 
benefits and costs (both environmental and economical) should be 
done on a long-term basis." 
The CBD guidelines do not consider issues of distribution of costs 
and benefits, nor of time preferences for benefits or time periods to 
be covered in analyses. While the relative values of prevention and 
cure a priori are proverbial, they certainly bear close examination 
once some actual probabilities are available in specific cases. 
A new draft International Standard on Phytosanitary Measures 
(IPPC 1999) was under consideration until August 2000. The 
portions particularly relevant to economic considerations of 
environmental evaluation in pest risk assessments are: 
"2.3.2 Analysis of economic consequences 
2.3.2.1 Time and place factors 
… economic consequences are expressed with time, and may 
concern one year, several years or an indeterminate period. 
The total economic consequences over more than one year can 
be expressed as net present value of annual economic 
consequences, and an appropriate discount rate selected to 
calculate net present value. 
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… The rate of spread may be estimated to be slow or rapid; … 
Appropriate analysis may be used to estimate potential 
economic consequences over the period of time when a pest is 
spreading … factors … could be expected to change over time, 
with the consequent effects of potential economic 
consequences. Expert judgement and estimations will be 
required. 
Analysis of commercial consequences [only commercial 
considerations] 
Analytical techniques [related to producers/consumers] 
2.3.2.4 Non-commercial and environmental consequences 
Some of the direct and indirect effects of a pest cannot be 
measured, or are inadequately measured, in terms of prices in 
established product or service markets. Examples include in 
particular environmental effects (ecosystem stability, 
biodiversity, amenity value) and social effects (employment, 
tourism). These impacts could be approximated with an 
appropriate non-market valuation method. 
If quantitative measurement of such consequences is not 
feasible, qualitative information about the consequences may 
be provided. An explanation of how this information has been 
incorporated into decisions should also be provided. 
2.3.3 Conclusion of the assessment of economic consequences 
Wherever appropriate, the output of the assessment of 
economic consequences described in this step should be in 
terms of a monetary value. The economic consequences can 
also be expressed qualitatively or using quantitative measures 
without monetary terms. Sources of information, assumptions 
and methods of analysis should be clearly specified. 
The part of the PRA [pest risk analysis] area where presence of 
the pest will result in ecologically important loss should be 
identified as appropriate. This is needed to define the 
endangered area." 
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The environmental risk prevention problem  
Quarantine changes the probabilities of particular environmental 
values occurring. The quarantine decision could be expressed as 
choosing between "with" and "without quarantine" probability 
distributions of environmental value, in which the "with quarantine" 
values were net of the cost of quarantine (including foregone 
opportunities associated with trade loss, etc). Kehlenbeck (1996) 
proposes such a model and Orden et al. (in Chapter 11) demonstrate 
the implications in two important case studies. 
It should be recognised that it may not be possible to keep a natural 
environment free of unwanted organisms forever. As a result it is 
more appropriate to use the annual value of the environment, as 
expressed by access value or some measure of willingness to pay for 
its presence or maintenance, rather than its full asset value in 
estimating the benefits of management. This value is only 
maintained while the environment retains its quality and society 
maintains its appreciation or use of it. The value in relation to 
invasion by unwanted organisms is, therefore, only the value over 
the years between now and the next occasion on which that or 
another unwanted organism changes the value again, or simply as 
far ahead as each individual's horizon of thought extends. Thus, the 
cumulative present value up to the point at which some change 
occurs may be the key evaluator. 
Agricultural commodities have an easily expressed annual value, so 
the value of preventing a probability of proportional loss for a year 
can be set against the cost of that prevention through quarantine. 
The natural environment may well have an annual value in terms of 
use, but its existence, bequest or moral value depends on its 
continued existence, and for many people this could extend over 
generations in time. For example, the bequest value of guaranteeing 
the existence of a natural environment for only one year is likely to 
be nil, and would presumably rise steadily over several generations, 
and then level off once grandchildren (or possibly great-
grandchildren) had been considered. These longer-term indirect 
values are likely to exceed the simple annual use values. However, 
the cost of prevention of invasion during a given year can not be 
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readily set against the first year as a fraction of the long term non-
use value, since without an assurance of continued long term 
protection people may not perceive any long-term non-use value. 
Unlike the case of quarantine for commodity protection, for 
environmental protection it may not be possible to look at 
comparisons of simple annual costs of prevention set against the 
benefit of that year's protection. An environmental quarantine 
protection program may need to be assessed as a long term 
prevention measure (with inevitable political uncertainties 
associated with the commitment to continue it) against a long term 
benefit that only has perceived value through maintaining its long 
term existence. An important issue in this case would therefore be 
how long existence of a natural environment or process must be 
maintained to give the public a sense of value, and how one 
expresses the uncertainty of continuing protection. 
Comparison with commodity oriented quarantine 
Because of the huge number of potential quarantine risks each 
country faces it is appropriate to focus on either "key pests" or "key 
pathways" to make quarantine manageable (Orr et al. 1993). But will 
the "key pest" or "key pathway" approach work when protecting 
environmental value? Is there a "key value" in the environment to 
protect? In agriculture much of the risk is from pathways that can be 
self interested and self regulating to some degree (nursery stock, 
etc); whereas the natural environment is more at risk from 
adventitious hitchhikers and pests in packaging. As a result, it is 
more difficult to conduct pest risk analysis (PRA), and there is little 
option for self inspection and regulation, or a cooperative approach.  
Pests of the natural environment are likely to attack or compete with 
common and widespread species, simply on the basis of probability 
of encounter. They are less likely to focus on rare species, although 
the impact on vulnerable rare species could be greater if they are 
attacked. There is a natural conflict between valuing rarity and 
diversity, whereas key impacts will focus on dominant and simple 
species. 
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The problem-solution paradigm of quarantine related to invasion of 
natural environments contains an inbuilt paradox. It is a complex 
problem, but must be managed through the specific solutions 
available to the quarantine system: Pest risk analyses on individual 
organisms, disinfestation or inspection of individual aircraft or 
passengers, etc. 
Quarantine actions fall into several categories: prevention, through 
inspection and restriction of imports; surveillance for outbreaks or 
introductions; eradication or suppression following detection of 
outbreaks. The economic issues for environmental risks for each of 
these categories should be considered separately. 
Prevention 
The prohibition or special treatment of high-risk material is 
problematic for environmental risks since it is not always clear 
where the high risks are likely to arise, although wood and 
equipment that has been stored or used outdoors prior to shipment 
(for example, used cars) are particular problems. The value of 
controlling such imports can best be based on extrapolation from 
reported introductions elsewhere, for example instances of Asian 
gypsy moth arriving on used cars add to a probabilistic loss of 
broadleaf trees (Mumford 1999). 
Inspection 
Inspection at entry ports is a broad risk reducing action that can be 
financed by user fees on passengers and shippers. This is a fair 
system and the role of reducing environmental risk can be an 
additional justification beyond that for commodity pests. There is 
clearly wide public acceptance of such inspection and it is a good 
example of a precautionary approach with very widely distributed 
and modest individual cost, which treats each source of risk equally.  
Inspection beyond entry points, in the natural environment, is very 
difficult because of its scale, diversity and the lack of information 
about many native species. New organisms may spread in low 
numbers over many years and suddenly flare up in suitable climatic 
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conditions. Even for major agricultural pests there is considerable 
controversy over appropriate sampling methods to detect new 
introductions and ongoing infestations (eg Carey 1992). 
Eradication and suppression  
The control of invasive organisms in natural environments depends 
on the technical feasibility of management, the relative costs and 
benefits and their distribution and the organisational capacity to 
undertake control. Myers et al. (1998) reviewed the principles for the 
successful eradication of introduced insect species and some of the 
relevant economic issues. The potential for reinvasion/ 
reintroduction is a significant factor that could make eradication 
uneconomic.  
Evaluation framework relevant to environmental risk 
A consistent analytical framework for plant health decision making 
is essential. Cost/benefit analysis (CBA) provides such a 
framework, classically by projecting a stream of predicted costs and 
benefits for management options, expressed in monetary terms, and 
setting present values on these streams. Further detailed analysis 
may consider the distribution of benefits in time and space, risk 
attitudes can be incorporated, and non-monetised elements can be 
incorporated either qualitatively or quantitatively. The aim is to 
provide a transparent and objective framework in which 
management options can be compared on common economic 
criteria, generally present monetary value. 
CBA, as a principle, has been widely adopted as a guide for plant 
health decisions. It is a component of the risk management stage of 
pest risk analysis recommended by the IPPC (1996). Its use was 
recommended in the recent US plant resources safeguarding review 
(US National Plant Board 1999). In Australia it has been used and 
recommended, specifically (Hinchy and Fisher 1991) and as part of 
the risk management process (Nairn et al. 1996; Nunn 1997; James 
and Anderson 1998). The New Zealand Biosecurity Act 1993 specifies 
what is in effect a CBA to advise on quarantine decisions. It is also 
recommended as an approach to decisions on biodiversity damage 
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in the EC White Paper on Environmental Liability (European 
Commission 2000).  
Several alternatives to CBA could also be used, but CBA is a fairly 
broad concept and other analyses are very similar in intention. 
Nairn et al. (1996) and Nunn (1997) discuss more subjective analyses 
that may be appropriate where scientific data is limited, for example 
"scenario trees" and semi-quantitative assessment. Cook (2000) used 
a method of break-even analysis, in a sense that inverts CBA, 
calculating the level of loss that would be needed for a CBA to show 
no net benefit and then considering the probability of that level 
being exceeded. The European Commission (2000) notes the cost 
and difficulty of conducting CBAs using contingent valuation and 
revealed preference techniques. It suggests the use of benefit 
transfer techniques (crudely, reference to costs, losses or benefits 
from a database of similar cases elsewhere, with modifications as 
appropriate where they can be justified) as a practical alternative. 
The EC Environmental Liability White Paper also suggests a 
"reasonableness test" as an alternative to CBA, which amounts to a 
subjective consensus that a management approach will be 
reasonable, given the information available at the time. This is 
proposed both as a cheaper alternative to a full CBA and in cases 
where there is inadequate quantified data. This may be particularly 
appropriate where rapid decisions are required before an outbreak 
spreads to an unmanageable size. 
Quantitative valuation 
The methodology applied by Pimentel (2000) to estimate losses to 
US agriculture and the environment is not fully explained, but is 
presumably based on extrapolation of individual consensus 
estimates of losses from particular types of invasive organisms on 
various crops and environments. The OTA study (US Office of 
Technology Assessment 1993) applied more specific consensus 
estimates but for only a selected list of pest species. 
There is almost inevitably a lack of fully quantified data on the 
losses to expect from introduced pests that affect natural 
environments. Various contingent valuation techniques have been 
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used to determine the public willingness to pay for controlling such 
pests, for instance the gypsy moth in the northeastern USA (Jakus 
and Smith 1991; Miller and Lindsay 1993; Moeller et al. 1977). This is 
a particularly suitable pest for this method, since it is well 
recognised by the public and attacks amenity trees as well as forests. 
The negative values associated with pest control programs need to 
be included in analyses. Mumford et al. (1996) modified a method 
used in the USA by Pimentel et al. (1993) to quantify the 
environmental effects of pesticides applied against cotton pests in 
Egypt. In both cases this involved applying a per unit 
environmental cost (made up of a predominant human health cost, 
with some additional impacts on bees and other wildlife) for each 
dollar of pesticide applied. In the US an environmental cost of 
$19/kg active ingredient (ai) was estimated. In Egypt the figure 
used was $5/kg active ingredient, based on lower GDP and costs in 
Egypt, but assuming more social and environmental contact because 
of the close proximity of agriculture to human and other 
populations and water. 
Time frame, discount rates  
Time frames and discount rates are key elements of the valuation of 
quarantine risks. The longer the timeframe and the lower the 
discount rate the higher will be the apparent benefits of any risk 
prevention activity. Realistic figures must be agreed, which is likely 
to be more difficult for a multidimensional environmental valuation 
with diverse stakeholder interests than it will be for commodity 
protection. In commodity oriented quarantine/eradication studies 
relatively short time frames and high (commercial) discount rates 
have been used (Mumford 2000; Mumford et al. 2000). The short 
timescale reflects the relatively high likelihood of reinvasion and the 
fickleness of commitments to maintain quarantine efforts, even after 
major eradication efforts, such as Medfly in the USA (Mumford et al. 
1995). A high discount rate (for example 8-15 per cent in the Middle 
East (Mumford and Knight 1996; Enkerlin and Mumford 1997), 6 per 
cent in the UK (Mumford et al. 2000) and 4 per cent for US decisions 
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on forest management7) reflects opportunity costs for what is, in 
effect, a commercial decision, even in the case of a public good. 
These same considerations could apply to the use element of 
environmental value, and would also apply to the future costs of 
quarantine or eradication efforts. With higher discount rates the 
timescale of benefits is less significant in determining present values 
since values beyond 15-20 years will be so heavily discounted that 
they will not add significantly to the total present value. 
As discussed earlier, the time frame for environmental protection 
must be long to reflect existence, bequest and moral value. This is 
especially important since these values may represent much the 
greater part of the overall value. It has been suggested earlier that 
these values increase, up to a point, with time, probably with very 
little value for the first few years of protection. This poses a problem 
in relation to discounting. A commercial discount rate would render 
long term values negligible, and over-value short term benefits. A 
purely social discount rate of zero would give very high values for 
long term protection horizons, and would certainly over-value 
environmental protection compared to what people are likely to be 
prepared to pay in reality.  
Two approaches could be used to create a more realistic value. One 
is to use a variable discount rate that falls with time, say up to the 
third generation. Another is to account for the increasing probability 
that protection will fail to be maintained successfully (due to 
variable political commitment, or simply bad luck), by applying a 
compounding "failure rate" [eg Future Value = Potential Value * (1-
Failure Rate)^Year]. There may be a threshold of probability below 
which people no longer accept that their bequest or moral obligation 
has been fulfilled, however. So, for example, once (1-Failure 
Rate)^Year was 50 per cent or less the future value may be deemed 
to be zero. 
Moral obligation as an element of environmental value – the feeling 
that you have done something you really ought to have done – 
could be assumed to have a zero discount rate, a social value that 
                                                 
7 http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives/fsh/1909.17/1909.17,10.txt 
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does not decline or increase with time. Experience suggests that the 
purely moral value put on environmental protection is relatively 
low compared to bequest or existence values; people see value 
accruing to themselves through existence or to their families as 
bequests.  
Figure 18.1 illustrates an example of a 100-year time series of present 
values for three elements of environmental value (Use, potential 
value $1 million/year, discount 5 per cent; Moral, potential value $5 
million/year, discount 0 per cent; Bequest, potential value $5 
million/year, discount declining from about 5000 per cent to 0 per 
cent over 100 years8; Cost; constant $3 million/year). In this example 
there is an assumption that commitment to maintain quarantine 
effort would continue through to at least the years for which the 
cumulative values are shown.  
 
Figure 18.1: Environmental valuation over 100 years 
 
























                                                 
8 In this example a dynamic discount rate is used for bequest values, in 
which the rate for each year D(t) equals (A/(1+B)t), in which A and B are 
arbitrary variables equal to 0.1 and 50, respectively. 
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Figure 18.2 illustrates the same example, but with anticipated failure 
rate of 1 per cent per year (so all values are reduced to an expected 
value of Potential Value * (1-Failure Rate)^Year) and assuming zero 
bequest and moral value once the cumulative failure rate exceeds 50 
per cent (from year 69), while use value continues.  
 
Figure 18.2: Environmental valuation over 100 years with some 
policy failure 
 























Non-market values, alternative dimensions for value 
Many environmental values, particularly associated with forests, 
involve either non-market values or indirect market values. 
Rosenberger and Smith (1997) reviewed the literature on non-
market impacts of forest insect pests in the USA and methods used 
for measuring these: travel cost methods, hedonic pricing and 
contingent valuation. Values included recreational use, aesthetic 
attraction (sometimes revealed in tourism potential) and property 
prices. Travel cost methods measure the amount people spend to 
enjoy an environment, including costs of travel, special equipment, 
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time off work, etc. This tends to undervalue the resource, as some 
people live close by, and others may not visit because they could not 
meet the full cost of travel. Hedonic pricing relates impacts to their 
effects on prices of related marketable products, like house prices or 
hotel rates, and relies on a market existing and the ability to 
attribute changes in prices within that market to particular events. 
Contingent valuation is based on surveys of people who are 
questioned on their behaviour by accepting or rejecting values 
associated with an activity or resource, but it may also undervalue, 
particularly through fear that high charges may be imposed if 
respondents agree they would accept them. Despite concerns often 
expressed about any of these methods, they give reasonable 
quantitative guides to non-market values, which must in any event 
be coupled with similarly uncertain estimates of ecological impacts 
before quarantine decisions can be made. Because the effect on 
property prices is so tangible it can often outweigh all other values, 
as Clough (1997) found, estimating the potential impact of tussock 
moth in New Zealand (impacts on property values through 
defoliation of amenity trees in Auckland suburbs exceeded other 
national impacts).  
Institutional feasibility 
In some cases the capacity for a quarantine agency to act effectively 
to prevent invasion may be inadequate to make quarantine 
technically feasible. For instance, in countries with extensive land 
borders where control of movement is difficult to enforce, it would 
be a moot issue to consider the economic benefits of partial 
quarantine. Many countries in Asia and Latin America cannot put 
quarantine inspections near to borders for fear of violence to 
inspectors. In other cases, even for island states, the number of entry 
points and the volume of trade and visitors would require excessive 
numbers of inspectors. The UK, for example, relies heavily on a 
system of inspection at points of delivery for predetermined high-
risk products, in cooperation with the importers, and has only 90 
inspectors as a result. Such systems make prevention of 
environmental risk from invasion very difficult. 
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Can an institution respond in the event that an outbreak occurs? If 
not, it is not an economic decision. The Ministry of Agriculture in 
Mauritius was faced with the decision of eradicating Oriental fruit 
fly in 1996, only because it already had a national campaign for 
suppression of several other similar species of fruit flies, making 
eradication a practical possibility9. 
Approaches to responsibility for environmental risk 
Precautionary approach  
A precautionary approach to quarantine would not be applicable if 
it interfered with trade and movement. However, it is widely 
argued that the irremediable nature of many introductions of exotic 
species, and the catastrophic nature of some, warrants this response 
(the Convention on Biodiversity "enshrines the precautionary 
approach as a principle of international environmental law"10). In 
any event, quarantine must represent a balance of risk and potential 
benefit from movement and introductions of foreign materials – 
which on the whole are positive to human welfare. 
Strict and unlimited liability  
While strict liability has the appeal of imposing all the costs 
associated with prevention and mitigation of environmental loss 
onto the perpetrators, the polluter pays principle, the same 
shortcomings arise that plague all attempts to impose strict and 
unlimited liability. The scale of damages is often too great for any 
individual or even an industry to cover. Large commodity 
eradication programs such as Medfly in California can cost over 
US$100 million. Damage may be too large for compensation to be 
covered where eradication may not be technically feasible, for 
instance the total annual value of the US forest related industries 
that could be damaged by Asian long-horned beetle is around 
US$138 billion/year11. It is also difficult to prove liability for specific 
                                                 
9 Eradication was successfully achieved in this case. 
10 http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/Protocol/Index.html 
11 http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/np/mba/apr00/asian.htm 
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introductions. For example, while the entry path for Asian longhorn 
beetle into the USA through shipping pallets and wooden packing 
crates is well established it is not possible to trace the infestation to a 
particular shipment, or to attribute proportions of loss to outbreaks 
resulting from multiple introductions. When beetles are intercepted 
it would be difficult to charge a pro rata share of costs on the basis 
of detection incidence. There may be, for instance, potential bias in 
sampling – some entry paths may be particularly easy to detect (and 
so charge). However, they may also be easier to intercept and stop, 
and in any event may be less important than other less detectable 
pathways.  
Shared liability 
The US Safeguarding Review (US National Plant Board 1999) and 
Perrings (2000) propose systems in which funds are set up by 
government against which eradication costs could be drawn. These 
would be subject to suitable scientific expectations of effective 
control, economic justification and lack of other appropriate sources 
of funds (such as fines on those responsible for introduction or 
levies on expected beneficiaries). Participants in the risk would 
contribute to the bonds, and government may also share some of the 
risk. Such funds would be particularly useful for eradication 
programs aimed at restoring natural environments. There is a 
general lack of chargeable beneficiaries and it is difficult in most 
cases to recover sufficient funds from importers, either because it is 
impossible to prove responsibility or due to inadequate resources on 
the part of individual importers. An argument for shared liability 
with government as a contributor to the fund is that quarantine 
agencies may have failed to prevent an introduction, and that 
government represents beneficiaries, who should take some 
responsibility. A counter argument against such schemes, however, 
could be that they offer insurance without penalties for moral 
hazard, that is, risky behaviour by individuals or organisations. 
Budget limited approach  
In many cases legislation, or appropriation, regardless of the needs 
that arise in a particular year predetermines the absolute national 
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expenditure on plant health. So this is in effect the social value of 
plant health to the nation, as determined by the legislators. Priorities 
must be established up to the overall limit approved. While this may 
be a reasonable approach for directing routine preventative 
quarantine efforts it is less suitable for curative operations that 
follow introductions. Given the unpredictable arrival of invasive 
species, important and otherwise controllable outbreaks late in a 
financial year could, for instance, go unchecked if all funds had been 
allocated in earlier months. Underspending against an allocation for 
control of outbreaks, as a result of success at prevention or good 
luck in a particular year, could lead to diminished funding in 
following years, despite no real change in risk 
Cost recovery principles 
Cost recovery is an increasingly important feature of quarantine 
services around the world, and is certainly a significant issue for 
Australian (Nairn et al. 1996) and US (US National Plant Board 1999) 
quarantine. While there appears to be general agreement and 
acceptance of inspection and certification charges, there is no 
consensus on charges for other aspects of plant health. In the UK 
recently there has been concern over the legal basis for charging for 
unsolicited inspections of premises receiving imported plant 
material, which resulted in the charging being dropped temporarily. 
Costs of surveillance outside of entry points is generally borne by 
government, but costs associated with subsequent eradication or 
control efforts may be met either by individual property owners 
who are required, for example, to destroy crops or by government, 
who may undertake area-wide control efforts (Mumford et al. 2000). 
The general principles are discussed below. 
Polluter pays  
Fairness implies that those who cause a problem should pay for it 
and much of the law on pollution control is predicated on this 
principle. Invasive species are sometimes described as 'biological 
pollutants' (for example, Wallner 1996), and as such it is suggested 
they be regulated similarly. However, polluter-pays regulation 
works most appropriately where the sources are readily identifiable 
376  Part IV  Specific health and environmental risks from trade 
 
and the polluters are large enough entities to be able to afford to pay 
(for example, utility companies) or the pollution caused is modest 
per polluter (for example, engine exhaust). In the case of biological 
invaders, the source may not always be clear (in which case clear-cut 
introductions may be disadvantageously treated, while others are 
left to government) and the potential losses and mitigation costs are 
often large compared to the ability of individual importers to pay. 
Groups of importers/shippers could be required to take out 
insurance in aggregate to overcome the problem of not being able to 
attribute the source of invasions to any one individual (as proposed 
by Perrings 2000). However, this could reduce the incentive for 
responsibility for each subscriber, unless premiums were based on 
some proven risk contribution, or encourage smuggling to avoid 
payment. 
Stakeholder pays 
If the polluter cannot be found or made to pay, the fairest alternative 
is for beneficiaries of prevention or mitigation, the stakeholders, to 
pay. This is attractive where stakeholders are readily identifiable 
and organised in a way that allows levies to be imposed, for 
example relatively centralised agricultural industries. In principle, 
stakeholders will suffer most, through private costs or lost options 
as a result of unwanted organisms, and if it is more efficient for 
them to respond collectively this should be facilitated. However, for 
environmental protection, it is unlikely that suitable stakeholders 
could be identified or that they would be willing or able to pay the 
substantial costs of quarantine. Where stakeholders pay they should 
have representation in making decisions on how prevention and 
mitigation should be undertaken.  
Two issues will arise with any stakeholder payment system. The 
first is the way a levy is raised – in effect a measure of the degree of 
stake held by each individual. (What is an appropriate measure to 
predict individual benefits from a range of uncertain introductions?) 
The second is the extent to which a corporate response reduces each 
individual's incentive to limit risk to themselves (for example, some 
parents do not risk vaccinating their own children once the general 
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level of vaccination rises to a high level). Both these problems must 
be dealt with by agreement of the stakeholders themselves. 
Citizen pays 
The last resort is for the citizen to pay, either through government 
action, private control efforts or lost amenity or opportunity? 
Quarantine is often described as a 'public good' (Nairn et al. 1996; US 
National Plant Board 1999) and as such the question eventually 
comes down to the relative efficiency of government funded 
quarantine activities. Even if polluters or stakeholders can be found 
who can/should pay are the transaction costs low enough to make it 
worthwhile collecting? Even for many agricultural quarantine 
situations this may not be the case, for damage to the environment it 
would certainly not be. However, the penalties for purposeful or 
accidental introductions of unwanted organisms should be set at 
levels that genuinely deter those responsible to protect the public 
from unnecessary expenditure. Adequate information, both for 
professional shippers and private travellers, would need to be 
provided to reduce the chances of people being victims of 
ignorance. Furthermore, the public should have some representation 
in the decisions on how prevention and mitigation are carried out, 
to ensure efficient and effective actions. This may be difficult, since 
knowledge of the technical aspects of the subject is generally limited 
to its practitioners. There may be a case for more international 
reviews of the efficiency and effectiveness of national responses to 
biological invasions 
Implications of change 
A number of external factors will continue to drive the needs and 
opportunities for environmental aspects of plant health in the near 
future, both technical and institutional. 
Technological change is likely to have a significant impact on 
prediction, evaluation and attribution capabilities. For example, low 
cost detection systems to identify any living material in sealed 
shipments and genetic identification of invasive organisms will 
contribute to tracing pathways and attributing responsibility for 
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introductions. Improved spatial modelling of spread related to 
climate, host and niche availability will allow much more accurate 
estimates of potential ecological impacts. There are also continuing 
improvements in environmental valuation techniques and the 
establishment of wider databases of reference values (for instance, 
the US Invasive Species Council's efforts to establish an information-
sharing system on economic impacts). Together, these will allow 
much better prediction of economic consequences of introductions, 
which could alter the opportunities for cost recovery. 
Institutional changes will also affect the impact of quarantine. 
Continual efforts to improve cost recovery may push quarantine 
services to focus on cases where responsibility can be attributed 
clearly to major importers or constituency groups who can afford to 
pay. This may mean greater attention to commodity based 
quarantine, at the expense of the natural environment. Some classes 
of environmental pests may also be more likely than others to be 
addressed – for instance timber pests from packing materials where 
shippers can be held responsible, rather than the types of organisms 
brought in by individual travellers. The greater vertical integration 
of supply chains and resulting traceability of produce through the 
food chain will make the analysis and management of risk pathways 
more direct and the clear responsibility for the operation of the 
pathway will make regulation and cost recovery more 
straightforward. 
Accounting changes could open new opportunities for financing 
environmental quarantine operations. Companies are increasingly 
required to make environmental reports within their annual reports 
to shareholders and regulators, indicating the extent of the 
environmental liabilities they have and the financial provisions that 
have been set up to account for those liabilities12. The level of 
provision is open to scrutiny by regulators and tax authorities. 
Given the strict liability for environmental damage imposed in 
many jurisdictions, transport companies, importers, and exporters 
                                                 
12 For example, in the United Kingdom, Financial Reporting Standard 12. 
See for example: http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/bulletins/tb40.htm or 
http://www.188e.com/kjsj/interacct/frs12.htm 
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may need to state any potential environmental risks to which they 
contribute (such as invasive organisms) and to make provisions, 
such as insurance or asset set-aside, to compensate for these 
sufficiently.  
Some changes may have adverse effects, for example putting cost 
recovery and/or explicit cost benefit analysis into legislation can act 
against environmental risk protection. Such legislation in effect 
looks for a "constituency" for any problem, which in the case of 
invasions in natural environments may not readily exist. Even 
where an environmental constituency does exist it may be in 
competition with commodity oriented quarantine programs that can 
draw on more focussed resources and outcompete on estimated 
value of loss. Environmental quarantine may not reflect the true 
value society places on it because of the difficulty of mobilising the 
expression of that value. 
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Acceptance of the SPS Agreement is increasing as its provisions and 
their implementation become familiar. In the three SPS cases so far 
taken to dispute settlement, however, little attention has been given 
to economic considerations, which allowed a legalistic approach to 
dominate proceedings. The debate on 'The Economics of 
Quarantine' is about reducing the imbalance between drawing on 
physical sciences, yet ignoring economic science in the application 
of the SPS Agreement. 
The SPS Agreement mandates a scientific assessment of potential 
risks to human, animal and plant life or health associated with 
imported commodities. Public perceptions of these risks are often at 
variance with scientific assessments, which cause political tensions 
and complicate decisions about the 'appropriate level of protection' 
(ALOP). It is argued in the preceding chapters that risk assessments 
should include economic analysis and the trade effects of quarantine 
regulations (e.g., Chapter 3, by Nunn). 
The case for cost/benefit analysis (CBA) 
By taking account of both benefits and costs, economists uses CBA 
to provide consistent assessments and to rank policy alternatives. 
The SPS Agreement in its present form is selective, neglecting 
consumer interests and other benefits from de-restricting trade, 
while focusing on the risks and costs from relaxing quarantine 
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protection. (The word 'benefits' does not appear anywhere in the 
SPS Agreement.) 
The CBA approach to policy choice in SPS cases would probably not 
be welcomed by governments because it would cause political 
tensions with protected domestic producers. In Australia, for 
example, the Senate report on quarantine for salmon scarcely 
mentioned consumers or other producers affected by the 1999 
changes (tuna and lobster aquacultures). Yet the authority of science 
in quarantine decisions need not be weakened by including 
economic considerations. Although only producers receiving 
quarantine protection appear to be consulted as 'stakeholders', SPS 
Article 4.6 does require that SPS measures should be 'not more 
trade-restrictive than required'. This suggests CBA could be applied 
to establish economy-wide interests, while still basing decisions on 
scientific evidence. 
General equilibrium is the best approach to trade policy because it 
includes 'second round' and later effects of any changes. Several 
papers presented used partial analysis to good effect (Chapters 8 
and 11, by Bigsby and Orden et al.), while others (Chapters 15 and 
16 by Otsuki et al. and Anderson and Nielsen) adopted general 
equilibrium approaches. These studies contained excellent empirical 
work, which should be valuable in persuading governments to 
adopt a rational economic approach to quarantine regulation.  
The costs of a pest or disease outbreak need not destroy a domestic 
industry. The costs of eradicating or isolating an outbreak are not 
always high, which should allow some SPS measures to be relaxed 
(Chapters 11 and 14 by Orden et al. and Forsythe et al.). Hence, 
quarantine effectiveness is not necessarily zero-sum. 
An economy-wide approach should be promoted to overcome the 
narrow sectoral views familiar in the conventional trade protection 
debates. On the one hand, import-competing industries want 
quarantine protection because it provides valuable 'rents' and 
separation of rents from risk protection is difficult. On the other 
hand, export industries (two-thirds of Australia's agricultural 
output is exported) demand access to overseas markets, yet they do 
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not appear to make any connection with their country's own 
restrictive quarantine regime.1  
Just as a tariff is a tax on exports (Clements and Sjaastad 1983), so 
quarantine restrictions that protect against diseases and pests raise 
domestic costs and reduce some exporters' competitiveness.  As 
pointed out long ago by Haberler (1936), "The economic conflict 
over trade is between groups having different interests within each 
country." 
Most governments follow cautious SPS policies, as described in 
Corden's 'conservative social welfare function', which suggests that 
any significant absolute reductions in real incomes of any significant 
section/group should be avoided (Corden 1974). This attaches low 
weights to income increases, high weights to income losses and 
makes income maintenance a policy target. By avoiding income 
redistribution, especially income 'losses', this policy downgrades 
growth and change. It is a risk-adverse strategy, which fairly 
describes political attitudes to quarantine by most governments, 
including Australia's, and by much of the public. This risk-averse 
strategy flows into the ALOP. 
Two policy alternatives in many of the above chapters are either: 
 adopt policy change if some are made better off, none 
worse off (conservative social welfare function); or 
 ensure that the gainers pay compensation to losers, which 
is less precise but makes change possible. 
The outcome will depend on the government's confidence in being 
able to persuade the community to accept change and economic 
adjustment. 
 
                                                 
1  Note the recent bilateral dispute where Australian quarantine 
restrictions on imported fruits effectively prevented access for Philippine fruits, 
which led the Philippine Government to impose quotas on their imports of 
Australian beef and live cattle. 
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Is CBA consistent with SPS? 
The central role of the SPS Agreement is to police foreign quarantine 
restrictions that unnecessarily restrict market access (i.e. provide 
protection). It requires consistent rules for risk assessment audits 
and risk management, but leaves the rules to be determined by 
national authorities. The SPS Agreement focuses on the cost of 
quarantine to foreign competitors and the potential losses to the 
protected industry from relaxation of SPS measures. There is no 
consideration of benefits to consumers or user industries. 
In the WTO's dispute settlement cases involving the SPS Agreement, 
little attention has been given to economic questions by panels or 
the Appellate Body. Apparently economics is diminishing in the 
WTO, yet recognition that risk assessment and risk management are 
key considerations should raise the profile of economics in assessing 
the implementation of SPS measures.  
Does the SPS Agreement allow for CBA? Economic factors are 
mentioned only three times in the SPS Agreement: 
 Article 5.3. refers to 'relevant economic factors' but limits it to 
potential damage, that is, to production (sales) losses and to cost 
of eradication, while there is no mention of 'benefits'; 
 Articles 5.4 and 5.5. refer to 'minimising trade restrictive effects', 
that is, non-tariff import barriers should not be 'arbitrary or 
unjustified' as in GATT Article XX); and 
 Article 5.6. states that 'measures are not more trade-restrictive 
than required', in addition, Annex A refers in paragraph 4 to 
'economic consequences', but only in terms of assessing risk. 
How committed are governments to the SPS Agreement? 
Opposition to changing quarantine measures is highly concentrated 
and vocal, and focuses on easily demonstrated 'costs' (usually 
couched in terms of the industry being destroyed!). Politicians are 
vulnerable to such lobbying, especially when prominent civil groups 
are implacably opposed to change. Nationalism carries more weight 
than CBA or other rational analysis. 
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Was the SPS Agreement included in the Uruguay Round just to 
prevent technical quarantine standards from replacing tariffs? Or 
was it included for the more pro-active purposes of reducing trade 
restrictions? CBA would be less welcome if the former, than if the 
latter. 
Should the SPS Agreement be modified to include CBA? 
There is much official opposition to re-negotiating the SPS 
Agreement, although the European Commission and sympathetic 
NGOs would like to open up re-negotiation. The latter have three 
goals in mind:  
 to introduce the precautionary principle (the EU version is 
included in the Cartagena Protocol), animal rights (included in 
the present WTO agricultural negotiations), and food safety 
standards;  
 to strengthen environmental rules and to tighten global 
standards enforced with trade sanctions; and 
 to clarify risk assessment processes and establish risk 
communication guidelines. 
One course of action could be to seek more precise international 
standards (harmonisation according to SPS Article 2, using Codex, 
IPPC, etc). This brings 'one size fits all' problems where differences 
are crucial. (in climate, income/capita, social values, and so on). 
Moreover, there is a stock of existing quarantine regulations to be 
reviewed, and attempting to harmonise these would be a huge 
undertaking, and one that would have to be done by the 
international standards organisations, not the WTO. 
Another suggestion, by Donna Roberts (see Chapter 2 above) is a 
'WTO plus' approach. This could establish a new framework among 
a limited 'like-minded' group without changing the SPS Agreement. 
The US quarantine approach is science/cost based which appeals to 
many countries, and such a cluster could work to harmonise these 
countries' quarantine standards. By contrast, the EU adopts a socio-
political, regulatory approach, in collaboration with European-based 
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NGOs. Bringing these disparate approaches together would be 
difficult, as recent SPS dispute cases have shown (e.g., the US-EU 
beef hormones case). 
ALOP – CBA interface 
However presented, the 'appropriate level of protection' is a vague 
term. So far, SPS experience is limited to only a few cases. Many 
quarantine regulations are untested against ALOPs (see Chapter 7 
by Gascoine). For human, plant and animal health, individual 
ALOPs may be defined, but for individual commodities this appears 
impossible (SPS Article 5.5). 
The 'appropriate level of protection' is defined in the SPS Agreement 
as "The level of protection deemed appropriate by the (WTO) 
Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitory measure to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health within its territory." This is 
deemed to be a matter of national sovereignty, but it should avoid 
"arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions…if they result in 
discrimination as disguised restrictions on trade." 
The ALOP (otherwise known as the acceptable level of risk) is 
central to any dispute about SPS measures. In practice, the ALOP is 
a subjective measure based on lobbying, public opinion, scientific 
evidence (as far as there is any) and nationalism, and is determined 
by an interaction between politicians and officials required to form a 
judgement. It is stated in broad terms because it has to be so 
comprehensive. In Australia, it is described as "high and very 
conservative, aimed at reducing risk to very low levels, but not zero 
risk" (see Chapter 5 by Goh and Ziegler). 
In practice, no WTO Member has articulated its ALOP with 
precision because, unless it is set at zero, domestic industries facing 
any quarantine risks will complain. In this context CBA would seem 
to have a positive contribution to make to ALOP, by giving 
substance to an economy-wide approach. Each government is free to 
choose any approach and take account of any factors it considers 
relevant, as long as they are used consistently. 
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The above chapters express concern about the present framework 
for assessing an ALOP and the ambiguities in SPS Agreement. The 
differences between advocates of the present risk-formed approach 
and the more comprehensive CBA approach to policy decisions 
suggested a general model could be developed to explain the 
differences. This was written up for this volume by Snape and 
Orden (see Chapter 10 above). That chapter explains how the SPS 
Agreement is an exception to the GATT general rules, which are 
designed to facilitate reductions in trade barriers, because, unless 
there are scientific grounds for quarantine policies, they may not be 
used to restrict trade. The ALOP sets the acceptable level of risk and 
applies restrictions with discrimination by product or country. If the 
SPS Agreement required countries to adopt best-practice policies, all 
citizens would benefit and not just producers enjoying quarantine 
protection. But this would be a huge leap for political economy. 
Developing countries 
The SPS Agreement's processes are too costly and too resource 
intensive for many developing countries. Non-OECD countries wish 
to include the SPS Agreement in the WTO's on-going agricultural 
negotiations, and to seek both special and differential treatment and 
technical assistance. The fascinating chapter on alfatoxins (Chapter 
15 by Otsuki et al.) reveals how a small change in SPS measures can 
be used to severely restrict access to OECD markets for developing 
countries' exports. This is clear example of how OECD countries' 
rhetoric about helping developing countries falls short in practice. 
Financial assistance for dispute cases has failed to materialise too; 
and scientific SPS evidence is often expensive for developing 
countries to access. 
New technology and SPS measures 
Technological advances alter the needs for SPS measures over time. 
There is a tendency to ignore the effects of new technologies. 
Similarly, steady-state assumptions for CBA are inappropriate. New 
technology can be the answer to many problems, including 
resistance to diseases and pests, advanced warning systems, etc. 
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Producers benefit from early warning systems and resistant 
varieties. Consumer attitudes do not adjust quickly, but benefits 
accrue anyway. 
Can the SPS Agreement keep up with changing technology? How 
should disputes take account of new technology? There are new 
pathogens as well as new cures. Many health and food safety 
problems of today were not even known a few years ago. 
Conclusion 
If the goal of the SPS Agreement is to prevent abuse of quarantine 
measure as replacement for other import barriers then 
harmonisation of standards would help. However, the restrictive 
wording of the SPS Articles and the lack of a consistent analytical 
framework raises concerns. Yet opening the SPS provisions to wider 
use, for example for environmental reasons, or for food safety, is 
actively sought by consumer and environmental lobbies. 
Could introducing CBA strengthen the role of the SPS Agreement? 
The answer is probably yes, because CBA can clarify differences 
between policy options and rank alternative outcomes. However, it 
is doubtful that CBA will be adopted because of the revisions that 
would need to be made to SPS Articles, not to mention the political 
problems it would cause governments domestically. Moreover, 
there does not seem to be much meeting of minds among lawyers, 
scientists and economists. 
A major constraint to reform of national quarantine regulations 
remains gaining community acceptance of risk analysis associated 
with a change. Public perceptions of risk attach higher risks to 
'dreaded' outcomes and catastrophes than can be demonstrated 
statistically, and anecdotes tend to carry greater weight than 
scientific evidence. Overcoming such prejudices must be a first step 
in convincing the community that economic benefits can occur from 
using science-based quarantine measures that are no more 
restrictive than necessary. 
To conclude,  several areas for further research flow from the above 
chapters. They include the following: 
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 Valuable empirical chapters on ALOP and CBA have helped to 
clarify some issues, but more empirical evidence to establish the 
values of the CBA approach are needed to illustrate ways to 
make the SPS Agreement more effective. A vital step to offest the 
efforts of advocates for more regulation seekers is to expose the 
costs of excessive regulations. Investigating specific cases where 
data are available would help with this. 
 According to the SPS Agreement, producers are regarded as 
bearing the costs of quarantine relaxation. In practice, of course, 
this is offset by gains to consumers and other users of the 
protected product. Empirical research to assess the gains from 
SPS reforms is needed to convince governments that relaxing 
quarantine measures brings economic benefits worth having, 
despite possible costs to some producers and the environment. 
 What are the 'costs' of a conservative ALOP? Only when CBA is 
applied to the concept of ALOP will it be possible to assess this 
unique phenomenon. 
 As trade in animals, plants and crops expands, quarantine 
authorities are collaborating to establish acceptable standards for 
those imports which minimise administrative delays. How could 
this experience be applied to ALOP? 
 The primary requirement seems to be further analysis of the 
relationships between SPS procedures and CBA. The chapter by 
Snape and Orden is a welcome first step. 
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AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF 
SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 
 
Members, 
 Reaffirming that no Member should be prevented from adopting or 
enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, 
subject to the requirement that these measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between Members where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction 
on international trade;  
 Desiring to improve the human health, animal health and phytosanitary 
situation in all Members; 
 Noting that sanitary and phytosanitary measures are often applied on the 
basis of bilateral agreements or protocols;   
 Desiring the establishment of a multilateral framework of rules and 
disciplines to guide the development, adoption and enforcement of sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures in order to minimize their  negative effects on 
trade; 
 Recognizing the important contribution that international standards, 
guidelines and recommendations can make in this regard;   
 Desiring to further the use of harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures between Members, on the basis of international standards, guidelines 
and recommendations developed by the relevant international organizations, 
including the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of 
Epizootics, and the relevant international and regional organizations operating 
within the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention, without 
requiring Members to change their appropriate level of protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health; 
 Recognizing that developing country Members may encounter special 
difficulties in complying with the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of 
importing Members, and as a consequence in access to markets, and also in the 
formulation and application of sanitary or phytosanitary measures in their own 
territories, and desiring to assist them in their endeavours in this regard;   
 Desiring therefore to elaborate rules for the application of the provisions 
of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in 
particular the provisions of Article XX(b)1; 
                                                 
1 In this Agreement, reference to Article XX(b) includes also the chapeau of 
that Article. 
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1. This Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
which may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade.  Such measures 
shall be developed and applied in accordance with the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
2. For the purposes of this Agreement, the definitions provided in Annex A 
shall apply.   
3. The annexes are an integral part of this Agreement. 
4. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights of Members under the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with respect to measures not within 
the scope of this Agreement.   
 
Article 2 
Basic Rights and Obligations 
1. Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, provided 
that such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.   
2. Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is 
applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5. 
3. Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do 
not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical 
or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of 
other Members.  Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a 
manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. 
4. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant 
provisions of this Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the 
obligations of the Members under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to 









1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as 
possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, 
except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in 
paragraph 3. 
2. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent 
with the relevant provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994. 
3. Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than 
would be achieved by measures based on the relevant international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, or as a 
consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member 
determines to be appropriate in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5.2  Notwithstanding the above, all measures 
which result in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from 
that which would be achieved by measures based on international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other 
provision of this Agreement.   
4. Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the 
relevant international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, in particular 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and 
the international and regional organizations operating within the framework of 
the International Plant Protection Convention, to promote within these 
organizations the development and periodic review of standards, guidelines 
and recommendations with respect to all aspects of sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures. 
5. The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures provided for in 
paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 12 (referred to in this Agreement as the 
"Committee") shall develop a procedure to monitor the process of international 
harmonization and coordinate efforts in this regard with the relevant 
international organizations. 
                                                 
2 For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 3, there is a scientific 
justification if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available 
scientific information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. 




1. Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other 
Members as equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or from 
those used by other Members trading in the same product, if the exporting 
Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its measures 
achieve the importing Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection.  For this purpose, reasonable access shall be given, upon request, to 
the importing Member for inspection, testing and other relevant procedures. 
2. Members shall, upon request, enter into consultations with the aim of 
achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements on recognition of the 
equivalence of specified sanitary or phytosanitary measures.   
 
Article 5 
Assessment of Risk and Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary 
or Phytosanitary Protection 
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are 
based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to 
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment 
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations. 
2. In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available 
scientific evidence;  relevant processes and production methods;  relevant 
inspection, sampling and testing methods;  prevalence of specific diseases or 
pests; existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and 
environmental conditions; and quarantine or other treatment. 
3. In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and determining the 
measure to be applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection from such risk, Members shall take into account as 
relevant economic factors:  the potential damage in terms of loss of production 
or sales in the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease;  
the costs of control or eradication in the territory of the importing Member;  and 
the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks. 
4. Members should, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection, take into account the objective of minimizing negative 
trade effects. 
5. With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the 
concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against 
risks to human life or health, or to animal and plant life or health, each Member 
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shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be 
appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on international trade.  Members shall cooperate in the 
Committee, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, to develop 
guidelines to further the practical implementation of this provision.  In 
developing the guidelines, the Committee shall take into account all relevant 
factors, including the exceptional character of human health risks to which 
people voluntarily expose themselves. 
6. Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when establishing or 
maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, Members shall ensure that such 
measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account 
technical and economic feasibility.3 
7. In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available 
pertinent information, including that from the relevant international 
organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by 
other Members.  In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the 
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and 
review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable 
period of time.  
8. When a Member has reason to believe that a specific sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure introduced or maintained by another Member is 
constraining, or has the potential to constrain, its exports and the measure is not 
based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, 
or such standards, guidelines or recommendations do not exist, an explanation 
of the reasons for such sanitary or phytosanitary measure may be requested and 





Adaptation to Regional Conditions, Including Pest- or Disease-Free Areas 
and Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence 
                                                 
3 For purposes of paragraph 6 of Article 5, a measure is not more trade-
restrictive than required unless there is another measure, reasonably available 
taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly 
less restrictive to trade. 
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1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are 
adapted to the sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of the area - whether all 
of a country, part of a country, or all or parts of several countries - from which 
the product originated and to which the product is destined.  In assessing the 
sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics of a region, Members shall take into 
account, inter alia, the level of prevalence of specific diseases or pests, the 
existence of eradication or control programmes, and appropriate criteria or 
guidelines which may be developed by the relevant international organizations.   
2. Members shall, in particular, recognize the concepts of pest- or disease-
free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence.  Determination of such 
areas shall be based on factors such as geography, ecosystems, epidemiological 
surveillance, and the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls. 
3. Exporting Members claiming that areas within their territories are pest- 
or disease-free areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence shall provide the 
necessary evidence thereof in order to objectively demonstrate to the importing 
Member that such areas are, and are likely to remain, pest- or disease-free areas 
or areas of low pest or disease prevalence, respectively.  For this purpose, 
reasonable access shall be given, upon request, to the importing Member for 




 Members shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures and shall provide information on their sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures in accordance with the provisions of Annex B. 
 
Article 8 
Control, Inspection and Approval Procedures 
 Members shall observe the provisions of Annex C in the operation of 
control, inspection and approval procedures, including national systems for 
approving the use of additives or for establishing tolerances for contaminants in 
foods, beverages or feedstuffs, and otherwise ensure that their procedures are 
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1.  Members agree to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to other 
Members, especially developing country Members, either bilaterally or through 
the appropriate international organizations. Such assistance may be, inter alia, 
in the areas of processing technologies, research and infrastructure, including in 
the establishment of national regulatory bodies, and may take the form of 
advice, credits, donations and grants, including for the purpose of seeking 
technical expertise, training and equipment to allow such countries to adjust to, 
and comply with, sanitary or phytosanitary measures necessary to achieve the 
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection in their export 
markets.  
2. Where substantial investments are required in order for an exporting 
developing country Member to fulfil the sanitary or phytosanitary requirements 
of an importing Member, the latter shall consider providing such technical 
assistance as will permit the developing country Member to maintain and 
expand its market access opportunities for the product involved. 
 
Article 10 
Special and Differential Treatment 
1. In the preparation and application of sanitary or phytosanitary  
measures, Members shall take account of the special needs of developing 
country Members, and in particular of the least-developed country Members.   
2. Where the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection 
allows scope for the phased introduction of new sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures, longer time-frames for compliance should be accorded on products 
of interest to developing country Members so as to maintain opportunities for 
their exports. 
3. With a view to ensuring that developing country Members are able to 
comply with the provisions of this Agreement, the Committee is enabled to 
grant to such countries, upon request, specified, time-limited exceptions in 
whole or in part from obligations under this Agreement, taking into account 
their financial, trade and development needs. 
4.  Members should encourage and facilitate the active participation of 





Consultations and Dispute Settlement 
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1. The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated 
and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to 
consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement, except as 
otherwise specifically provided herein. 
2. In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical 
issues, a panel should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in 
consultation with the parties to the dispute.  To this end, the panel may, when it 
deems it appropriate, establish an advisory technical experts group, or consult 
the relevant international organizations, at the request of either party to the 
dispute or on its own initiative. 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall impair the rights of Members under 
other international agreements, including the right to resort to the good offices 
or dispute settlement mechanisms of other international organizations or 




1. A Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  is hereby 
established to provide a regular forum for consultations.  It shall carry out the 
functions necessary to implement the provisions of this Agreement and the 
furtherance of its objectives, in particular with respect to harmonization. The 
Committee shall reach its decisions by consensus.  
2. The Committee shall encourage and facilitate ad hoc consultations or 
negotiations among Members on specific sanitary or phytosanitary issues.  The 
Committee shall encourage the use of international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations by all Members and, in this regard, shall sponsor technical 
consultation and study with the objective of increasing coordination and 
integration between international and national systems and approaches for 
approving the use of food additives or for establishing tolerances for 
contaminants in foods, beverages or feedstuffs. 
3. The Committee shall maintain close contact with the relevant 
international organizations in the field of sanitary and phytosanitary protection, 
especially with the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of 
Epizootics, and the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention, 
with the objective of securing the best available scientific and technical advice 
for the administration of this Agreement and in order to ensure that 
unnecessary duplication of effort is avoided.   
4. The Committee shall develop a procedure to monitor the process of 
international harmonization and the use of international standards, guidelines 
or recommendations.  For this purpose, the Committee should, in conjunction 
with the relevant international organizations, establish a list of international 
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standards, guidelines or recommendations relating to sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures which the Committee determines to have a major trade impact.  The 
list should include an indication by Members of those international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations which they apply as conditions for import or 
on the basis of which imported products conforming to these standards can 
enjoy access to their markets.  For those cases in which a Member does not 
apply an international standard, guideline or recommendation as a condition 
for import, the Member should provide an indication of the reason therefor, 
and, in particular, whether it considers that the standard is not stringent 
enough to provide the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. 
If a Member revises its position, following its indication of the use of a 
standard, guideline or recommendation as a condition for import, it should 
provide an explanation for its change and so inform the Secretariat as well as 
the relevant international organizations, unless such notification and 
explanation is given according to the procedures of Annex B. 
5. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the Committee may decide, as 
appropriate, to use the information generated by the procedures, particularly 
for notification, which are in operation in the relevant international 
organizations. 
6. The Committee may, on the basis of an initiative from one of the  
Members, through appropriate channels invite the relevant international 
organizations or their subsidiary bodies to examine specific matters with 
respect to a particular standard, guideline or recommendation, including the 
basis of explanations for non-use given according to paragraph 4.   
7. The Committee shall review the operation and implementation of this  
Agreement three years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, 
and thereafter as the need arises. Where appropriate, the Committee may 
submit to the Council for Trade in Goods proposals to amend the text of this 
Agreement having regard, inter alia, to the experience gained in its 




 Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance 
of all obligations set forth herein.  Members shall formulate and implement 
positive measures and mechanisms in support of the observance of the 
provisions of this Agreement by other than central government bodies.  
Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to 
ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories, as well as 
regional bodies in which relevant entities within their territories are members, 
comply with the relevant provisions of this Agreement.  In addition, Members 
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shall not take measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring 
or encouraging such regional or non-governmental entities, or local 
governmental bodies, to act in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement.  Members shall ensure that they rely on the services of non-
governmental entities for implementing sanitary or phytosanitary measures 




 The least-developed country Members may delay application of the 
provisions of this Agreement for a period of five years following the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement with respect to their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures affecting importation or imported products. Other 
developing country Members may delay application of the provisions of this 
Agreement, other than paragraph 8 of Article 5 and Article 7, for two years 
following the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement with respect to 
their existing sanitary or phytosanitary measures affecting importation or 
imported products, where such application is prevented by a lack of technical 




1. Sanitary or phytosanitary measure - Any measure applied: 
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or 
spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-
causing organisms;   
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of 
the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, 
toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or 
feedstuffs;   
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the  Member 
from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or 
                                                 
4 For the purpose of these definitions, "animal" includes fish and wild 
fauna; "plant" includes forests and wild flora;  "pests" include weeds; and 
"contaminants" include pesticide and veterinary drug residues and extraneous 
matter. 
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products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of 
pests;  or 
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the  
Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.   
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, 
regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end product 
criteria; processes and production methods;  testing, inspection, certification 
and approval procedures;  quarantine treatments including relevant 
requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the 
materials necessary for their survival during transport;  provisions on relevant 
statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment;  and 
packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety.   
2. Harmonization - The establishment, recognition and application of 
common sanitary and phytosanitary measures by different Members.   
3. International standards, guidelines and recommendations 
(a) for food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations 
established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to 
food additives, veterinary drug and pesticide residues, 
contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes and 
guidelines of hygienic practice;  
(b) for animal health and zoonoses, the standards, guidelines and 
recommendations developed under the auspices of the 
International Office of Epizootics;  
(c) for plant health, the international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations developed under the auspices of the Secretariat 
of the International Plant Protection Convention in cooperation 
with regional organizations operating within the framework of 
the International Plant Protection Convention;  and 
(d) for matters not covered by the above organizations, appropriate 
standards, guidelines and recommendations promulgated by 
other  relevant international organizations open for membership 
to all Members, as identified by the Committee. 
4. Risk assessment - The evaluation of the likelihood of entry,  establishment 
or spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member 
according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, 
and of the associated potential biological and economic consequences; or the 
evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health 
arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing 
organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs. 
5. Appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection - The level of 
protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or 
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phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within 
its territory.   
NOTE:  Many Members otherwise refer to this concept as the "acceptable level 
of risk". 
6. Pest- or disease-free area - An area, whether all of a country, part of a 
country, or all or parts of several countries, as identified by the competent 
authorities, in which a specific pest or disease does not occur.  
NOTE:  A pest- or disease-free area may surround, be surrounded by, or be 
adjacent to an area - whether within part of a country or in a geographic region 
which includes parts of or all of several countries -in which a specific pest or 
disease is known to occur but is subject to regional control measures such as the 
establishment of protection, surveillance and buffer zones which will confine or 
eradicate the pest or disease in question. 
7. Area of low pest or disease prevalence - An area, whether all of a country, 
part of a country, or all or parts of several countries, as identified by the 
competent authorities, in which a specific pest or disease occurs at low levels 
and which is subject to effective surveillance, control or eradication measures.   
 
ANNEX  B 
TRANSPARENCY OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY 
REGULATIONS 
Publication of regulations 
1. Members shall ensure that all sanitary and phytosanitary regulations5 
which have been adopted are published promptly in such a manner as to enable 
interested Members to become acquainted with them. 
2. Except in urgent circumstances, Members shall allow a reasonable 
interval between the publication of a sanitary or phytosanitary 
regulation and its entry into force in order to allow time for producers in 
exporting Members, and particularly in developing country Members, to 
adapt their products and methods of production to the requirements of 
the importing Member. 
 
Enquiry points 
3. Each Member shall ensure that one enquiry point exists which is 
responsible for the provision of answers to all reasonable questions from 
                                                 
5 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures such as laws, decrees or ordinances 
which are applicable generally. 
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interested Members as well as for the provision of relevant documents 
regarding:   
(a) any sanitary or phytosanitary regulations adopted or proposed 
within its territory;   
(b) any control and inspection procedures, production and 
quarantine treatment, pesticide tolerance and food additive 
approval procedures, which are operated within its territory;  
(c) risk assessment procedures, factors taken into consideration, as 
well as the determination of the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection;   
(d) the membership and participation of the Member, or of relevant 
bodies within its territory, in international and regional sanitary 
and phytosanitary organizations and systems, as well as in 
bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements within the 
scope of this Agreement, and the texts of such agreements and 
arrangements.   
4. Members shall ensure that where copies of documents are requested by 
interested Members, they are supplied at the same price (if any), apart from the 
cost of delivery, as to the nationals6 of the Member concerned. 
 
Notification procedures 
5. Whenever an international standard, guideline or recommendation does  
not exist or the content of a proposed sanitary or phytosanitary regulation is not 
substantially the same as the content of an international standard, guideline or 
recommendation, and if the regulation may have a significant effect on trade of 
other Members, Members shall: 
(a) publish a notice at an early stage in such a manner as to enable 
interested Members to become acquainted with the proposal to 
introduce a particular regulation; 
(b) notify other Members, through the Secretariat, of the products to 
be covered by the regulation together with a brief indication of the 
objective and rationale of the proposed regulation.  Such 
notifications shall take place at an early stage, when amendments 
can still be introduced and comments taken into account; 
                                                 
6 When "nationals" are referred to in this Agreement, the term shall be 
deemed, in the case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO, to 
mean persons, natural or legal, who are domiciled or who have a real and 
effective industrial or commercial establishment in that customs territory. 
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(c) provide upon request to other Members copies of the proposed 
regulation and, whenever possible, identify the parts which in 
substance deviate from international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations;   
(d) without discrimination, allow reasonable time for other Members 
to make comments in writing, discuss these comments upon 
request, and take the comments and the results of the discussions 
into account. 
6. However, where urgent problems of health protection arise or threaten 
to arise for a Member, that Member may omit such of the steps enumerated in 
paragraph 5 of this Annex as it finds necessary, provided that the Member: 
(a) immediately notifies other Members, through the Secretariat, of 
the particular regulation and the products covered, with a brief 
indication of the objective and the rationale of the regulation, 
including the nature of the urgent problem(s); 
(b) provides, upon request, copies of the regulation to other 
Members; 
(c) allows other Members to make comments in writing, discusses 
these comments upon request, and takes the comments and the 
results of the discussions into account. 
7. Notifications to the Secretariat shall be in English, French or Spanish. 
8. Developed country Members shall, if requested by other Members, 
provide copies of the documents or, in case of voluminous documents, 
summaries of the documents covered by a specific notification in English, 
French or Spanish.   
9. The Secretariat shall promptly circulate copies of the notification to all 
Members and interested international organizations and draw the attention of 
developing  country Members to any notifications relating to products of 
particular interest to them. 
10. Members shall designate a single central government authority as 
responsible for the implementation, on the national level, of the provisions 




11. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as requiring: 
(a) the provision of particulars or copies of drafts or the publication 
of texts other than in the language of the Member except as stated 
in paragraph 8 of this Annex;  or 
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(b) Members to disclose confidential information which would 
impede enforcement of sanitary or phytosanitary legislation or 
which would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of 
particular enterprises.   
 
ANNEX C 
CONTROL, INSPECTION AND APPROVAL PROCEDURES7 
1. Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and 
ensure the fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that:   
(a) such procedures are undertaken and completed without undue 
delay and in no less favourable manner for imported products 
than for like domestic products;   
(b) the standard processing period of each procedure is published or 
that the anticipated processing period is communicated to the 
applicant upon request;  when receiving an application, the 
competent body promptly examines the completeness of the 
documentation and informs the applicant in a precise and 
complete manner of all deficiencies;  the competent body 
transmits as soon as possible the results of the procedure in a 
precise and complete manner to the applicant so that corrective 
action may be taken if necessary;  even when the application has 
deficiencies, the competent body proceeds as far as practicable 
with the procedure if the applicant so requests;  and that upon 
request, the applicant is informed of the stage of the procedure, 
with any delay being explained; 
(c) information requirements are limited to what is necessary for 
appropriate control, inspection and approval procedures,  
including for approval of the use of additives or for the 
establishment of tolerances for contaminants in food, beverages or 
feedstuffs;   
(d) the confidentiality of information about imported products arising 
from or supplied in connection with control, inspection and 
approval is respected in a way no less favourable than for 
domestic products and in such a manner that legitimate 
commercial interests are protected; 
                                                 
7 Control, inspection and approval procedures include, inter alia, 
procedures for sampling, testing and certification. 
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(e) any requirements for control, inspection and approval of 
individual specimens of a product are limited to what is 
reasonable and necessary;   
(f) any fees imposed for the procedures on imported products are 
equitable in relation to any fees charged on like domestic products 
or products originating in any other Member and should be no 
higher than the actual cost of the service;   
(g) the same criteria should be used in the siting of facilities used in 
the procedures and the selection of samples of imported products 
as for domestic products so as to minimize the inconvenience to 
applicants, importers, exporters or their agents;   
(h) whenever specifications of a product are changed subsequent to 
its control and inspection in light of the applicable regulations, the 
procedure for the modified product is limited to what is necessary 
to determine whether adequate confidence exists that the product 
still meets the regulations concerned;  and 
(i) a procedure exists to review complaints concerning the operation 
of such procedures and to take corrective action when a complaint 
is justified.   
Where an importing Member operates a system for the approval of the use of 
food additives or for the establishment of tolerances for contaminants in food, 
beverages or feedstuffs which prohibits or restricts access to its domestic 
markets for products based on the absence of an approval, the importing 
Member shall consider the use of a relevant international standard as the basis 
for access until a final determination is made. 
2. Where a sanitary or phytosanitary measure specifies control at the level 
of production, the Member in whose territory the production takes place shall 
provide the necessary assistance to facilitate such control and the work of the 
controlling authorities. 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from carrying out 
reasonable inspection within their own territories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
